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Abstract 
The principal aim of the Lisbon Treaty is to address the pre-Lisbon concerns about the 
coherence of EU action. In this regard, coherence is the simple litmus test for EU external action 
in the post-Lisbon era.  
This thesis investigates the coherence of EU external action towards Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
in the post-Lisbon era in light of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and 
the introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service with the aim of enhancing coherence 
in EU external action. The principle of coherence governs the interaction between various 
policy strands of EU external action (horizontal coherence). The importance of coherence is 
linked to visibility and efficiency based on the effective use of EU resources, as well as to the 
credibility of the Union. This thesis concentrates on coherence in the interaction between EU 
policies towards SSA using the key EU policies towards the region namely development policy, 
trade policy, the CFSP and the CSDP. The regional context facilitates the analysis of the 
different strands of external action policies where, despite of or perhaps due to the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the different instruments of EU foreign policy and lines of competence demarcation 
between their institutions are still mired in complexity. Although the focus is on coherence, the 
specialised regional focus of the thesis also facilitates a broader understanding of the nuances 
in the implementation of EU external relations law and EU external policies in different 
contexts especially in the post-Lisbon era. Using Mali as a case study, the thesis submits that 
while it can be argued that policy coherence for development (which is a key requirement in 
EU external action towards SSA) cannot be certainly determined, Mali clearly illustrates 
incoherence vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options in EU external 
action towards SSA. The thesis also discussed the limits and prospects of coherence in EU 
external action despite the changes made at Lisbon.  
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Chapter One 
1.0. On the Coherence of EU External Action towards Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): an 
Introduction 
1.1. General Introduction     
The Treaty of Lisbon1 aims to address pre-Lisbon concerns about the overall coherence2 of EU 
external action.3 Indeed, the process of Treaty reform which had started with the Laekan 
                                                 
1The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 [2007] OJ C306/01 (hereinafter the Lisbon Treaty). The Treaty 
came into force two years after in 2009 when it gained the requisite number of ratifications. For the amended 
Treaties, see Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU), 2010/C 83/01 [2010] OJ C-83/01). For the story of the 
journey to Lisbon, see for example, Berman, P, From Laekan to Lisbon: the Origins and Negotiation of the Lisbon 
Treaty' in Biondi A, et al,  (eds.) EU Law After Lisbon (OUP, 2012), 3; and Craig, P, The Lisbon Treaty – Law 
Politics and Treaty Reform (OUP, 2012), p 1-25. 
2Although the TEU and the TFEU speaks of ‘consistency’, the other language versions of these Treaties refer to 
‘coherence’. The practice of the usage of these two words in the academic field of EU external relations law and 
policies varies amongst scholars, and there is as yet no consensus on the definition of the requirement (see pp 4-5 
below). In any event, for ease of reference, this thesis will hereinafter adopt the term 'coherence' as a general 
approach. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the term 'consistency' is completely eschewed from the analysis. In 
contrast, it will be mentioned as is necessary in the course of this analysis. 
3This is different from the coherence of EU law and policies in their internal implementation within EU Member 
States (see for example Prechal, S, and Van Roermund, B, The Coherence of EU Law: The Search for Unity in 
Divergent Concepts (OUP, 2008)). With regards to external relations law and policies with which this thesis is 
concerned, it is noteworthy that this aspect of EU law which governs EU external relations is also referred to as, 
‘EU international relations law’ or ‘EU foreign relations law’. The different variants in nomenclature are accepted 
in EU legal discourse (see for example Cremona, M, (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law (OUP, 
2008); and Dashwood, A, and Maresceau, M, Law and Practice of EU External Relations (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008); and Koutrakos, P, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006); and for a similar variant, 
Cremona, M, and De Witte, B, (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Hart, 2008). In the same vein, 'EU 
international relations', ' EU foreign relations', 'EU foreign policy' and 'EU external action' all refer to EU external 
relations. Indeed, while there is a difference between EU cooperation policies and its unilateral policies which are 
more generally regarded as foreign policy, it is arguable that all EU external policies are EU foreign policy. Indeed, 
although foreign policy has been narrowly defined as ‘relations between states’ (Smith, S, and Smith, M, The 
analytical Background: Approach to the study of British Foreign Policy in Smith, S, et al, (eds), British Foreign 
Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation (London, Unwin Hyman, 1988), p 15), it has also contrastingly 
been defined broadly as the notion of ‘external relations’ (Clarke, M, ‘Policy processes in a Changing World’ in 
British External Policy-Making in the 1990’ (London: Macmillan for RIIA, 1992), p 72). With specific regards to 
the EU, references abound regarding the view that EU external relations is foreign policy for example, see in 
particular, Smith, K, European Foreign Policy: What it is and What it does (London: Pluto Press, 2002), especially 
p 8 where she explains that: “[…]the foreign policy of the EU is the capacity to make and implement policies 
abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of European Union”; Sicurreli, D, The European 
union’s Africa Policies: Norms, Interests and Impact (Surrey: Ashgate 2010), p 37; Hill, C, The Changing Politics 
of Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p 4); and Louis, J, ‘The European Union: from external relations 
to foreign policy’ (2007) 2 EU Diplomacy Papers 4, who argues that the distinction between EU external policies 
is artificial; also see in general Koutrakos, P, (ed.) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011); Khaliq, U, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the European Union: 
A Legal Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Keukeleire, S, and MacNaughton, J, The Foreign policy 
of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); De Baere, G, Constitutional Principles of EU 
External Relations (OUP, 2008); Manners, I, and Whitman, R, (ed.) The Foreign Policies of European Union 
Member States (Manchester University Press, 2000). For specific reference to the successive association 
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Declaration of 20014 and culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, placed the question of the 
requirement of coherence in EU external action high on the agenda. Although the issue of 
coherence has a long history in the field of EU external relations law and policies,5 these recent 
developments have led to an increasing academic interest in EU external relations law and 
policies in general,6 and to a focus on the requirement of coherence thereto in particular.7 
Effectively, the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and policies remain 
pertinent post as pre-Lisbon. An arguably simplistic reason for this is the retention of the 
traditional legal dynamics that prima facie hold implications for coherence. At the heart of these 
dynamics are the legal, institutional and procedural distinction between the strands of EU 
external relations policy under the ex-Community Pillar on the one hand, and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on the other hand.8 However, in addition, and perhaps 
more cogently, the pertinence of coherence in the post-Lisbon era stems from the attendant need 
                                                 
agreements with SSA as instruments of EU foreign policy, see Werner, F, ‘The Association Agreements of the 
European Communities: A Comparative Analysis’ (1965)19 IO 2, p 245. Ultimately, this thesis does not distinguish 
between the different variants and will use any of them as is necessary. The other concerns the Lisbon Treaty aims 
to address are the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union. These are regarded imperatives 
both with regards to internal and external dimensions of EU policies and law-making, but these are in any event 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
4Laekan Declaration on the Future of the European Union, European Council, 14 – 15 December 2011, Annex I 
to Presidency Conclusions. 
5See Chapter Two of this thesis. 
6See for example fn 3 above; most recently Eeckhout notes that EU external relations law is a subject of great 
importance (see his Abstract for Eeckhout, P, EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2011). 
7See 1.2. below. This is not related to the similarly budgeoning interest in the related concept of 'coherenticism' 
espoused by 'coherentist' legal philosophers (see for example Araszkiewicz, M, and  Šavelka, J, (ed.), 'Coherence: 
Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence' (2013) 107 Law and Philosophy Library;  
Hage, J, C,  'Law and Coherence' (2004) 17 Ratio Iuris; Balkin, J, M,  'Understanding Legal Understanding: The 
Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence’ (1993) 103 YLJ 105–76; Hurley, S, 'Coherence, Hypothetical 
Cases and Precedent’ (1990) 10 OJLS, 221–51; for earlier works, also see Dworkin, R, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); and Dworkin, R, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986). 
8As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the Lisbon Treaty abolished the former three Pillar structure of the 
EU. However, although the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters ((PJCCM) - the former Third 
Pillar previously  known as the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)) was subsumed into the ex-Community (the former 
First Pillar) at Lisbon, the legal distinction between the latter and the CFSP (the Former Second Pillar) has been 
retained. For this reason, Koutrakos argues that the Treaty abolished the pillars in all but name (see Koutrakos, P, 
‘Primary law and policy in EU external relations-moving away from the big picture’ (2008) 33 EL Rev 666 at 668-
70). 
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to investigate the effects of the Lisbon developments in practice.9 Indeed, Duke10 rightly notes 
that coherence is the simple litmus test for EU external action in the post-Lisbon era.11 
 
The principle of coherence governs the explicit ties between various policy strands of EU 
external action,12 and not without good reasons. In academic materials13 and relevant EU policy 
documents14 coherence is linked to effectiveness and visibility. In practical terms, the needs 
underlying the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and policies is not hard 
to identify or to agree with. For example, there is a need for the effective use of EU resources, 
which are undeniably limited.15 Closely tied to this, is the need to ‘maximize the effects of the 
desired outcomes'.16 Furthermore, it can be argued that credibility is an added value of 
coherence. In this regard, it has been suggested that the extent to which the EU ensures the 
coherence of its policies is directly relevant to its credibility as an international actor and also 
holds direct or indirect implications for the ability of the EU to intervene on the international 
scene.17 Against this backdrop, the Treaties expressly provide that the Union shall ensure the 
                                                 
9See for example, Okemuo, G, ‘The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali and the consistency of EU-Africa 
policy’ [2014] 34 Liverpool Law Rev. 3, 217-240. 
10Duke, S, ‘A difficult birth: the early days of the European External Action Service’ in Koutrakos, P, (ed.) ‘The 
European Union’s External Relations: a year after Lisbon’, CLEER Working Papers 2011/3. 
11Ibid., p 69. 
12Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the eve of the 21st Century: 
Challenges and options for a new partnership, COM (96) 570 (final) p 4. 
13See for example Duke fn 10 above; and Koutrakos, P, ‘Security and Defence Policy within the Context of 
EUExternal Relations: Issues of Coherence, Consistency, and Effectiveness’ in Trybus, M, and White, N, (ed.) 
European Security Law (OUP, 2007), p 250; also see Hillion, C, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the 
external relations of the European Union’ in Cremona, fn 3 above, p 10. 
14See for example, the Preamble to the Lisbon Treaty which refers to efficiency; and also Commission 
Communication ‘Europe in the World – some practical proposal for coherence, effectiveness and visibility’ COM 
(2006) 278 final); and ‘Enhancing coherence and efficiency between institutions and actors’ (2002), Final Report, 
Working Group VII, Section 5, CONV 459/02. 
15See Koutrakos, fn 13 above, p 250 where he adds rationalisation of resource allocations and the prevention of 
duplication as added values of coherence. 
16Ibid. 
17Ibid. 
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coherence of its external actions and policies,18 and the High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy HR/VP with an EU External Action Service (EEAS) was created 
for this purpose.19 
 
This thesis investigates the post-Lisbon coherence of EU external relations law and policies 
towards Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).20 As Amaya21 posits, context is essential when evaluating 
the coherence of an interpretation or an action.22 The regional context or focus will (1) facilitate 
                                                 
18See in particular Article 21(3) TEU and Article 7 TFEU; and Chapter Two of this thesis for other relevant 
provisions. 
19Article 18(4) TEU; Article 27(3) TEU; also see Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010) OJ L201/30; and Council of the 
European Union, Press Release, 3010th Council meeting, General Affairs, Luxembourg, 26 April 2010, 8967/10 
(Presse 89), p 8; and in general Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.5.3.5. and 2.5.3.6.) 
20The Sub-Saharan Africa region is the region of Africa south of the Sahara (see Appendice II). The region 
harbours 49 of the 53 African countries (see Annex I) which are geographically divided into four regions namely 
Western Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Central Africa. Otherwise, the countries of the region are 
organised along various regional economic and regional security lines (see Appendice III). It is noteworthy that 
although the EU does not have any specific regional approach to SSA, the EU recognises this region officially as 
illustrated in EU case law (see for example Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR I-3651, 
para 69), and in some EU policy documents (see for example Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 final 
(hereinafter 'Agenda for Change'), p 9; European Commission, Green Paper EU Development Policy in Support 
of Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development: Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy, Brussels, 
COM(2010) 629 Final, at para 4.2; European Commission, Humanitarian Policy towards SSA available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/sub-saharan-africa/sub-saharan-africa_en, accessed 14 January 2015; also see 
European Court of Auditors, The European Development Fund (EDF) Contribution to a Sustainable Road Network 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (pursuant to Article 287(4) TFEU, second subparagraph), Special Report No 17, 2012); and 
for the recognition of EU external action towards the region by other ancillary organisations see for example 
Bossner, S, and Stang, G, 'The EU and Sub-Saharan Africa: An energy partnership?' (2014) EUISS Issue Brief No. 
5; Faria, F, Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: the role of the European Union (2004) EUISS Occasional 
Papers No. 51; Vasconcelos,  A,  et al, ‘WEU’s Role in Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, (1995) ISS, Chaillot Papers 22; Hoebink, P, 'The Coherence of EU Policies: Perspectives from the North 
and the South' (2005) Commissioned Study, Center for International Development Issues Nijmegen, Brussels, p 
4, especially para 10; for recent independent academic research on EU and SSA see for example Kluth, M, 'The 
European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa – from intervention towards deterrence?' (2013) 1 ASR 22, p 19 – 29; 
and also Delputte, S, 'The EU as an emerging coordinator in development cooperation: perspectives from Sub-
Saharan Africa', (2013) 26 Afrika Focus 1, pp 99-107 (which is the report of a PhD research). Indeed, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is recognised as a region in every field of academic discipline, including in the legal field (see for example 
Onyema, E, 'Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Sub-Saharan Africa', (2010) 26 Arbitration International 1, p 205-
218). The reason why the region is chosen as a context for this study is discussed at 1.2. below.  
21See Amaya, A, 'Ten Theses on Coherence in Law' in Araszkiewicz and Šavelka, fn 7 above, p 243. 
22Ibid, p 247; also see Margolis, J, 'The Locus of Coherence', 7 Linguistics and Philosophy no. 1, where context 
is explained as the clue in assessing coherence; and Kaufmann-Kohler, G, 'Is Consistency a Myth?' in Gaillard, E, 
and Banifatemi, Y, (ed.) Precedent in International Arbitration (Geneva: IAI Series on International Arbitration 
No. 5, 2008), p137; also see Robertson, C, 'How the European Union functions in 23 languages', a paper presented 
at the Department of Professional and Intercultural Communication of the Norwegian School of Economics and 
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the analysis of the different strands of external action policies where, despite of or perhaps due 
to the Treaty of Lisbon, the different instruments of EU foreign policy and lines of competence 
demarcation between their institutions are still blurred or mired in complexity. Moreover, (2) 
The shared competence nexus between EU development and security policies, which is 
arguably more prevalent in the context of EU relations with SSA,23 is illustrative. The 
specialised regional focus also (3) facilitates a broader understanding of the nuances in the 
implementation of EU external relations law and policies in different contexts. In this way, (4) 
the thesis adds to the existing scholarship in this field of EU law which has recently been 
witnessing a rise in specialised focus on different regional contexts.24 Nevertheless, at all times, 
the pivot of the analysis remains the extent of the coherence of EU external action towards SSA 
in the light of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law.   
 
1.2. Why Sub-Saharan Africa? 
The reason for adopting SSA as a regional focus is not far-fetched. From all indications, SSA 
is arguably the best comprehensive regional context or case study for an analysis of the 
coherence of EU external relations law and policies. In this regard, this region provides a major 
empirical field of examination of the coherence of EU foreign policy. 
                                                 
Business Administration, 30 September 2011, p 14 (where he states that terms take meaning from context), 
available at https://www.nhh.no/Files/Filer/institutter/fsk/Synaps/28-2013/Robertson_28_2013.pdf, accessed 15 
January 2015. 
23See in general Chapter Two and Chapter Five of this thesis. Indeed, the first EU case on the security-
development nexus namely the ECOWAS case (Case C-91/05, fn 20 above) arose in the context of EU external 
action towards SSA. 
24For example, see Hillion, C, ‘The Evolving System of EU External Relations as Evidenced in the EU 
Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine’, PhD Dissertation (2005), University of Leiden. Indeed, many of the edited 
series on the law of EU external relations including with regards to the CFSP contain chapters on EU relations 
with different regions, and sometimes even countries (see for example, Cremona, fn 3 above; Trybus and White, 
fn 12 above; Dashwood, A, and Hillion, C, The General Law of EC External Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2000); and Blockmans, S, (ed.), The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (The 
Hague: TMC Asser, 2008)). 
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EU external action towards SSA is a classic field of EU external relations and arguably, the 
Union’s oldest and most comprehensive external relations or foreign policy. It is beyond the 
specifics of foreign policy in relation to EU enlargement which holds possibilities of accession 
to the EU for the relevant countries. It is also beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) which deals with the Union’s closest neighbours, including the North African region.25 
Furthermore, EU external action towards SSA is also different from external action within the 
context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which deals solely with international trade. 
 
Deeply rooted in the history of the EC and EU,26 EU relations with SSA are a particularly 
important aspect of EU development cooperation policy27 and, more widely of its external 
action. Until the early 1990s, this development cooperation policy focused exclusively on trade 
and development aid.28 This is clearly illustrated in the pre-90s successive bilateral trade and 
development agreements governing this cooperation29 discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter 
                                                 
25The ENP covers 16 of EU’s closest neighbours namely, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, The Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. While 
five of these countries namely Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya) are within the African continent, they 
are north of the Sahara (see Appnedice I) and are therefore outside the scope of this thesis. 
26Martenczunk, B, ‘From Lomé to Cotonou: the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement in a Legal Perspective’ (2000) 
5 EFA Rev. 461; also see Chapter Two of this thesis. In general, although EU relations with SSA dates back to the 
Communities, this thesis does not differentiate between Community law and EU law. However, references are 
made to the EC/ex-Community and the EU/Union as is necessary. This sits well with the view that European law 
is ‘the law of the European Community and Union’ (see Koutrakos, P, and Evans, M, (eds.) Beyond the Established 
Legal Orders (Oxford: Hart, 2011), p 1; and Eeckhout, P, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations (OUP, 2004), p 4; also see Declaration III 'European Union declaration on institutional 
changes resulting from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon' , attached to the  Partnership Agreement 
between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States of the other part (hereinafter the Cotonou Agreement) (2000) OJ L317/3 (First 
Revision (2005) OJ L287/1; Second Revision (2010) OJ L287/3). 
27See Chapter Three of this thesis on EU development cooperation policy towards SSA 
28Nkundabagenzi cited in Kronenbeger, V, and Wouters, J, The EU and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal 
Aspects (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p xx; also see in general Chapters Two, Three and Four of this thesis. 
29Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States 
associated with that Community, signed at Yaoundé on 20 July 1963 (Yaoundé I) [1964] OJ L93/1430; Convention 
of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with 
that Community, signed on 29 July 1969 (Yaoundé II) [1970] OJ L282; ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé signed at 
Lomé on 28 February 1975 between the African, Caribbean And Pacific States of the One Part and the European 
Economic Community of the other part (Lomé I Convention) [1976] OJ L25/1; Second ACP-EEC Convention 
signed at Lomé on 31 October 1979 (Lomé II Convention) [1980] OJ L347/1; ACP-EEC Convention signed at 
Lomé on December 08 1984 (Lomé III Convention) [1986] OJ L86/3; and ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé 
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Four of this thesis. However, by the year 2000, the Union’s ‘modern and flexible development 
policy’ had evolved to take a broader approach to defining and addressing poverty.30 This was 
reflected in the new framework agreement signed in 2000 namely the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement31 (hereinafter the Cotonou Agreement). This framework agreement which currently 
governs EU relations with SSA covers a wide range of policy fields. These include trade (and 
related aspects of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) which all could conveniently be 
termed economic policies), development aid policy, and a political dimension which includes 
aspects of security policy.32 
 
Beyond this comprehensive development cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement, the EU 
also conducts its autonomous foreign and security policy towards SSA through the instruments 
of its CFSP. An integral part of the CFSP is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).33 
                                                 
on 15 December 1989 (Lomé IV Convention) [1989] OJ L229/1 (amended [1998] OJ L156/3.  These are essentially 
bilateral agreements (see Case C-316/91 Re the European Development Fund: Parliament v Council [1994] 3 
CMLR 149). 
30See Case C-377/12 Commission v Council [2014] Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 June 2014, 
especially para 37; Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 20 above, especially paras 64-67; Case C-403/05 Parliament v 
Commission [2007] ECR I-0000, para 57; Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR 1-6177, especially para 
13; also see Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development 
Policy: ‘The European Consensus on Development’, [2006] OJ C46/1, especially para 12; and A Secure Europe 
in a Better World--European Security Strategy’ (ESS), Brussels, December 12, 2003, p14; and also Peers, S, 
‘Fragmentation or evasion in the Community’s development policy? The impact of Portugal v France’ in 
Dashwood and Hillion, fn 24 above, p 112. 
31See the Cotonou Agreement, fn 26 above. Although the Cotonou Agreement was signed between the EU and its 
Member States on the one part and the wider African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states on the other 
part, the comprehensive substance of the agreement applies more to EU relations with SSA. This is as much for 
other objective reasons as for historical reasons (see 2.2.4. of this thesis for the historical evolution of EU external 
action towards SSA; also see Annex 2 attached to this thesis for the list of ACP states including those in SSA). It 
is noteworthy that while the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is in SSA, it is not fully 'associated' under the Cotonou 
Agreement as the other countries of SSA (see Protocol 3 on South Africa attached to the Cotonou Agreement, fn 
26 above). In contrast to the latter, RSA is not a party to the trade chapters of the Cotonou Agreement but rather 
has its own specific Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU ([1999] OJ L/311). 
The EU does not consider RSA as a developing country in the strict sense, and only the political provisions of the 
Cotonou Agreement applies to RSA. RSA is therefore outside the scope of this thesis. 
32Indeed, the Cotonou Agreement has been controversially termed a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of EU policies (see Orbie, 
J, ‘EU Trade and Development Policy: On Pyramids and Spaghetti Bowls’ (2007) LX Studia Diplomatica 1, p 109, 
where the spaghetti metaphor is used to describe the complexity of EU trade and development relations with the 
political South in general). 
33This policy was known as the ESDP (an abbreviation for its precursor the European Security and Defence 
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Although it is not uncommon to see the CFSP used as an umbrella term covering the EU 
activities under the CSDP, the latter is  de facto, if not de jure distinct from the former.34 
Accordingly, this thesis considers the two as distinct aspects of EU external action meriting 
separate analysis. This is due to the distinct functional and institutional logic of the CSDP.35 For 
example, while the CFSP functionally deals with politics and diplomacy as these relate to 
foreign and security policy,36 the CDSP distinctly provides the Union with operational capacity 
for civilian missions and military operations, as well as technical supports relating to these 
aspects of security policy.37 The CSDP is a critical autonomous instrument of EU external action 
in general, and towards SSA in particular.38 Indeed, in no other region of EU external action is 
instability as prevalent as in SSA. It follows that EU external action towards SSA is distinctly 
multifaceted. This is with regards to both the legal instruments of EU external relations law and 
policies and with regards to the relevant institutional frameworks. Attendant to these is the 
unavoidable overlap in practice in the interaction between policy objectives. Illustrative is the 
                                                 
Policy) pre-Lisbon. This (ESDP) has therefore been established even in the official language use. Nevertheless, 
this thesis will stick to the CSDP (the abbreviation for the Common Defence and Security Policy) as it was renamed 
at Lisbon. 
34See for example European Commission, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) Statement on EEAS Review, European 
Parliament/Strasbourg, 12 June 2013, SPEECH/13/530, where the HR/VP talks about ‘the need for faster and more 
effective CFSP and CSDP procedures’); also see The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership Council of 
the European Union, Brussels, 19 December 2005 15961/05, paragraph 4(a), where a distinction is made between 
the two; The House of Lords EU Committee, European Union - Thirty Fourth Report (2006) 1 HL Paper 206-I 
para 299; and Van Vooren, B, and Wessel, R, EU External Relations Law, Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p 400. Koutrakos, P, The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (OUP, 2013), 
especially Chapter 2; and also Koutrakos, P, 'Primary law and policy in EU external relations – moving away from 
the big picture' (2008) 33 ELR 671. Indeed, although it was not pursued, an option was put forward at the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to establish the security and defence policy (CSDP) as a Fourth Pillar in the 
former three Pillar structure (see Heisbourg, F, ‘European Defence: Making it Work’, ISS Chaillot Papers 42, 
September 2000, p 27). 
35See Chapters Five and Six of this thesis. 
36See Chapter Five of this thesis. 
37See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
38Out of the thirty-four CSDP missions that have so far been carried out by the EU, sixteen were in SSA, including 
the first extra-regional EU military operation (see Chapter Six of this thesis for a full analysis of the CSDP in 
SSA). Otherwise, a list of the CSDP missions and operations is available at http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart, 
accessed 17 February 2014. 
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interaction between development cooperation policy and the autonomous instruments of EU 
security policy as framed within the CFSP and the CSDP.39 A second dimension could be seen 
in the interaction between the distinct objectives of trade policy and development policy under 
the entwined trade and development cooperation policy.40 In general, not only is development 
indissolubly linked to security, but these two policy aspects are also linked to trade.41 Hence the 
need for an overall coherence between the different policy aspects. 
 
With specific regards to the needs underlying the requirement of coherence in EU external 
relations law and external action, this is arguably of most importance in the context of EU 
external action towards SSA. For example, with regards to the link between coherence and 
credibility, it is arguable that EU external action towards SSA is one of the most visible fields 
of EU external action and hence a major reflection of the coherence of EU external action to 
the world.42 Furthermore, the link between coherence and effectiveness is well alive in this 
                                                 
39For a recent investigation of the interaction between development policy and security policy in the context of 
EU external action towards SSA, see Orbie, J, and Del Biondo, K, 'The European Union's “Comprehensive 
Approach” in Chad: Securitisation and/or Compartmentalisation?' (2015) 29 Global Society 2, p 243-259. 
However, in the context of this thesis see Chapters Three and Six of this thesis on development policy and the 
CSDP respectively. 
40See Chapters Three and Four on development policy and trade policy respectively. 
41On the link between trade and other aspects of EU foreign policy see in general Koutrakos, P, Trade, Foreign 
Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart 2001); and also Dehoussie, F, ‘After Amsterdam: A 
report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European union (1998) 9 EJIL 3, 525) who explains that 
“most foreign policy decisions interconnect with international economic co-operation or defence”.  However, also 
see in general, fn 3 above. 
42To these may also be added the issue of the contending Chinese inroad into SSA where the EU has established 
critical foreign policy interests (see for example, Moody, A, and Chao, W, ‘China ‘stepped into the breach’’, 
CHINA DAILY, April 11-17, 2014, p 31). Significantly, these go beyond trade development and security, to include, 
inter alia, a cross-cutting crucial value like human rights. It is arguably undeniable that a lack of coherence of EU 
policies in the region and the attendant impact on EU credibility thereto, could contribute to strong Chinese 
foothold in the region, with the ‘potentials’ of endangering EU interests and the values EU promotes in the region 
(for an analysis of the difference in the approaches of the EU and China to Africa’s development see for example 
Carborne, M, ‘The European Union and China’s rise in Africa: competing visions, external coherence and trilateral 
cooperation (2011) 29 JCAS 2, 203-221; and also Grauls, P, and Stahl, A, ‘European development policy towards 
sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges of the growing Chinese presence’, (2010) Émulations, n°7.  To manage the 
differences between the two, the EU initiated a trilateral cooperation between the EU, Africa and China (see 
European Commission, ‘The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation’, COM (2008) 
654 final, Brussels). However, it is arguable that cooperation neither completely eliminates national or regional 
interests, nor the differences in values. For example, while EU uses aid conditionality to promote human rights, 
the rule of law and democracy and good governance, China’s development policy is without conditionality. These 
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context. Indeed, the geographical proximity between Europe and Africa means that ineffective 
EU policies hold with it some political and economic implications for Europe itself. For 
example, not only since the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean,43 there can be little doubt that 
Europe is often exposed to the effects of extreme poverty or violent conflicts in SSA.44 Suffice 
it to state that the need for coherence in EU external action is also arguably more pertinent in 
the context of EU external action towards SSA. Remarkably, EU credibility in much of the ACP 
States, and SSA in particular, is already reported to be at an all-time low.45 
 
Within the limited confines of this thesis, it is impossible to examine all the 49 countries of 
SSA. Consequently, a country case study of Mali is provided. This is mainly for topical reasons. 
Mali is the most recent country of SSA where the need for an all-EU approach bordering on the 
construction of a united whole arose. As discussed below,46 an all-EU approach bordering on 
the construction of a united whole is the essence of coherence in EU external action. Mali is 
one of the three initial 'core' countries that benefit from the EU Strategy for Security and 
                                                 
are different foreign policy ideals that both are unlikely to successfully impose on each other). 
43See for example, BBC News 'Mediterranean migrant crisis: EU refugee quotas to be proposed', available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32685942, accessed 15th May 2015. 
44For example, in justifying aid to Africa under the Lomé framework, the Commission explicitly noted that if 
nothing is done to narrow the gap between rich and poor countries, the consequence could be violent conflict to 
which Europe would be highly exposed (European Commission, ‘Community Aid to the Third World: the Lomé 
Convention’, European File 17/79, October 1979 available at http://aei.pitt.edu/4486/01/001984_1.pdf, accessed 
30 August 2010); most recently, “Europeans have recognised that African economic prosperity is essential for 
European prosperity...” (European Commission (2007), Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council, From Cairo to Lisbon- The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, COM (2007) 357 final, 2); also see in general 
Morel, E, Africa and the peace of Europe (New York: B.W. Heubsch, 1917); and Vasconcelos, fn 20 above. 
Furthermore, as noted by Dr Nicholas Westcott, Managing Director Africa, European External Action Service 
(EEAS), millions of Europeans live in Africa (Dr Nicholas Westcott, Keynote Address, delivered to the EUISS 
conference on EU-Africa foreign policy after Lisbon, 18 October 2011). There is no doubt that the safety and 
prosperity of these millions of Europeans in Africa are important to Europe. 
45Mackie, J, et al, ‘Bridging the credibility: challenges for ACP-EU relations in 2011’, Policy and Management 
Insights, ECDPM, No. 2, December, 2010). It is noteworthy that this does not detract from the Union’s positive 
contributions (see for example the conclusions in Khaliq, fn 3 above, especially p 447. Indeed, the positive 
contributions of the EU to SSA are undeniable and are well illustrated in subsequent Chapters on the distinct EU 
policies towards the region). 
46See 1.2. below. 
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Development in the Sahel (hereinafter  the Sahel Strategy)47 - itself a new comprehensive  EU 
policy towards the Sahel sub-region of SSA. The Sahel,48 a band of desert stretching across 
Africa49 is in general marked by poverty and fragility.50 In recent times, the entire region has 
been struck by a severe multi-dimensional crisis and volatility reportedly exacerbated by the 
region's location as an uncontrolled passageway between the troubled Maghreb in the north and 
the piracy-afflicted Gulf of Benin in the South.51 Due to the geographical proximity of Europe 
to the region, the EU and its Member States have vested interests in the region's progress and 
stability.52 The Sahel Strategy was a response to these challenges.53 Although, the Sahel 
Strategy is the key framework for EU action at both individual and collective levels to help 
countries in the wider Sahel-Sahara region address key security and development challenges, 
                                                 
47European External Action Service, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, EEAS, 2011 (hereinafter 
the Sahel Strategy), available at http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, accessed 12 January, 
2013. The Sahel Strategy is the key framework for EU action at both individual and collective levels to help 
countries in the wider Sahel-Sahara region address key security and development challenges. The three initial core 
countries are Mali, Niger and Mauritania. However, the Strategy was extended to Burkina Faso and Chad in 2014. 
It is important to note that the Sahel Strategy is different from The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa 
(See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 3124th Foreign Affairs Council 
meeting, Brussels, 14 November 2011). Also adopted in 2011, the latter is the political umbrella of EU actions in 
the Horn of Africa. It takes a regional approach to the eight countries that are members of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) namely, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and 
Uganda. 
48See Appendice II attached to this thesis. 
49From Senegal in the West to Eritrea in the East (Ibid.). 
50To be labelled a ‘fragile state’ is not something any country in Africa welcomes. Fragility does not only carry 
the stigma of incapacity and lack of progress, poverty, violence and poor governance, but also implies that a 
country is unable to borrow on the market and faces stringent conditionalities put in place by international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank (Cilliers, J, and Sisk, T, D,'Africa's fragile states need extra help', ISS Today, 
4 December 2013, available at https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-fragile-states-need-extra-help 
Accessed 12 February 2015). 
51Ould-Abdallah, A, 'Why the Sahel urgently needs an EU backed security framework', January 15, 2014, 
http://europesworld.org/2014/01/15/why-the-sahel-urgently-needs-an-eu-backed-security-
framework/#.Vf0jTHjFsdU, accessed 12 September 2105. 
52Including countering the establishment of terrorist safe havens, drug trafficking, organised crime, unchecked 
migration and safeguarding access to strategic resources (Ould-Abdallah, A, 'The EU has a role to play, but 
Africans must lead', January 15, 2014, available at http://europesworld.org/commentaries/the-eu-has-a-role-to-
play-but-africans-must-lead/#.Vf0ecHjFsdU, accessed 12 September 2015; also see  Reitano, T, and Shaw, M, 
'Failure to control drug trafficking aggravates Mali crisis 31 May 2013, available at https://www.issafrica.org/iss-
today/failure-to-control-drug-trafficking-aggravates-mali-crisis, accessed 12 September 2015); and the Sahel 
Strategy fn 47 above, p 2 (at fn 1) where it is pointed out that there were also kidnapping of European nationals . 
53Ibid. 
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Mali's recent crisis has put it at the centre of EU action in the Sahel, with a wide range of EU 
tools most recently deployed there.54 
 
Mali's underdevelopment and Least Developed Country (LDC)55 status is not in doubt. Since 
1971, Mali has always ranked as one the world’s least developed countries. In 2010, the United 
Nation’s Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index ranked Mali 160th 
of 169 countries, and by 2011 it ranked 175 out of the 187 countries listed.56 There was a 
regression in 2013 when the country was 182 out of 186 countries listed in the Human 
Development Report.57 Although progress has been made since then, the performance is still 
abysmal as the 2014 report places it at 176 out of 187 countries.58 As a result of its abysmal 
development index, aid has always played a significant role in Mali.  In fact, due to its high 
level of aid dependency for fighting poverty, Mali has become a donor’s darling and a 'testing 
ground' for new aid modalities.59 Most recently, an international Donor Conference for 
Development in Mali was held in Brussels to mobilise international support for development 
and peace in Mali.60 This was based on the understanding that the challenges Mali is facing also 
                                                 
54The European Union and the Sahel, EEAS Factsheet, February 2014. The implications of the recent military 
coup in Burkina Faso for the sub-region is a question whose answer lies in the future, and also outside the scope 
of this analysis. 
55LDC's are recognised as the “poorest and weakest segment” of the international community. They are highly 
disadvantaged in their development process and risk, more than other countries, failure to come out of poverty. As 
such, the LDCs require special support from the international community (The Least Developed Countries: Things 
to Know, Things to Do (NY: UN-OHRLLS, 2009), p 2). 
56See European Union External Action, Fact Sheet, the European Union and the Sahel, Brussels, 06 February 
2014, 140206/01, p 4). 
57See the UNDP's Human Development Report, 2013, p 1146. 
58See UNDP 2014 Human Development Report, available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/events/2014/july/HDR2014.html, accessed 30 September 
2015. 
59Such as budget support and other programme-based approaches (see Loquai, C, 'Supporting domestic 
accountability in developing countries: Taking stock of the approaches and experiences of German development 
cooperation in Mali' (ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 115, July 2011), p 1). 
60See Together for a new Mali, Donor Conference for Development in Mali, Brussels, 15 July 2013, available at 
http://donor-conference-mali.eu/together-new-mali, accessed 20 August 2015. 
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weighs on the future of the region, the African continent and, on a wider level, the whole 
world.61   
 
In contrast to its development profile, the history of Mali’s instability is mired in controversy. 
For example, Mali has been presented as a country once considered a model of democratic 
transition62 and historical stability63 in Africa. However, it has also been suggested that Mali 
has been repeatedly subjected to political, economic and ecological turmoil since 
independence.64 In any event, the compound effect of the crisis and other profound obstacles to 
development65 means that the whole of EU approach is employed in EU external action towards 
Mali. This presents it as a veritable case study out of the 49 countries of SSA, and out of the 5 
countries of the Sahel sub-region of SSA to which the Sahel Strategy apply. Interestingly, Mali 
is also one of the countries of SSA associated to the ex-Community under Part IV of the Treaty 
of Rome.66 This means it also has historical relevance even within the geographical focus of 
this thesis.67 This is significant in so far as the thesis is a legal analysis set in its historical and 
political contexts.68 Suffice it to state that Mali inspires a reflection on a geographically focused, 
                                                 
61Ibid. 
62For example, see in general, Zounmenou, D, 'Mali's Unfortunate Military Coup an Unnecessary Setback for 
Democracy', ISS, Pretoria, 24 March 2012,available at https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/malis-unfortunate-
military-coup-an-unnecessary-setback-for-democracy, accessed 12 August 2015; and Souaré, I, & Handy, P, 'Mali: 
A Model for Constitutional Reform in Africa', ISS Pretoria, 10 May 2010, available at 
https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/mali-a-model-for-constitutional-reform-in-africa, accessed 12 August 2015. 
63Mali-Communaute europeenne, Document de strategies pays et programme indicatif national pour la periode 
2008-2013, p, 6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-nip-mali-2008-2013_fr.pdf, 
accessed  25 October 2015. 
64Brigaldino, G, 'Managing European Aid Resources in Mali' in Carlsson, J, et al, (ed.) Foreign Aid in Africa: 
Learning from Country Experiences (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), p 145. 
65Ibid, p 128. For example, Mali is not only an LDC but also a Landlocked LDC (LLDC) with implications for       
its trade with the outside world including the EU (see further Chapter Four of this thesis (at 4.5.); and also see 
Chapter Three (at 3.5.) for the relevant dimensions of Mali’s poverty). 
66Mali was one of the first SSA associates to the EU under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. Hence, its cooperation 
with the EU began in 1958, and it became independent from France in 1960. See Chapter Two of this thesis (at 
2.2.4.1.) for the historical evolution of EU external action towards SSA. 
67Namely SSA. 
68See 1.4. below. 
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evidence-based assessment of the dynamics of the coherence of EU external towards SSA in 
the light of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law. 
 
In the remaining sections of this introductory chapter, the aims of this thesis and research 
questions will be outlined, followed by a description of the methodology used. An overview of 
the chapters of this thesis will also be provided. However, prior to these, a working definition 
of coherence in the context of EU external action will be introduced.69 This is in contrast to the 
analysis of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law which is done elsewhere 
in this thesis.70 
1.3. Consistency or coherence: defining the working concept 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to repeat all the previous debates on the relationship between 
the closely related concepts of coherence and consistency in the field of EU external relations 
law. The aim of this section is to provide a pertinent overview of these in order to define the 
working concept for the purposes of this thesis. As mentioned earlier,71  the English language 
version of the Treaties speak of ‘consistency’. Contrastingly, other language versions refer to 
‘coherence’.72 While these are similar concepts, they do not always mean exactly the same. 
Indeed, Wessel notes that in legal theoretical analysis as in other fields of scholarly endeavour,73 
the concepts of consistency and coherence are often distinguished.74 He explains that 
consistency in law is the absence of contradictions. Coherence, on the other hand, refers to 
                                                 
69See 1.3. below. 
70See 2.5. below. 
71See fn 2 above. 
72For example, the French, the Italian, Spanish, and German versions of the Treaties, refer to ‘cohérence’, 
‘coerenza’, ‘coerencia’ ‘Kohärenz’ resepctively. These words, and the wordings of other language versions of the 
Treaties translate to ‘coherence’ (see Wessel, R, The European Unions’s Foreign and Security Policy: a Legal 
Institutional Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999), p 297 for this, and for other language versions). 
73See for example Araszkiewicz and Šavelka, fn 7 above. 
74Wessel, fn 72 above, p 297. 
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positive connections.75 This is the most widely expressed view among EU legal scholars 
working in this field.76 Significantly, each language version of the Treaties is authentic.77 By 
implication, all language versions must convey the same information or message since they are 
to have the same legal status and legal effects.78 Nevertheless, there is more debate than 
consensus regarding whether the Treaties provide for consistency or coherence.79 
 
Highlighting the significance of the discrepancy between consistency and coherence, Koutrakos 
submits that “the definition of the requirement of consistency is not without problems.”80 
However, if this requirement is to be applied and monitored or examined in practice, there is 
need for at least a definition of the applicable standard along with what this would entail in 
practice.81 In this regard, this thesis agrees with the view that the requirement of 'consistency' 
foreseen in the English language version of the Treaties entails more than avoiding legal 
contradictions and presupposes a quest for synergy and added value between the different 
                                                 
75Ibid. 
76See for example Hillion, fn 12 above; Tietje, C, ‘The Concept of Coherence in the TEU and the CFSP’ (1997) 
2 EFARev 211; and also Cremona, M, ‘Coherence through Law: What difference will the Treaty of Lisbon make?’ 
(2008)  3 HRSS p 15; Koutrakos, fn 41 above , p 39; Blockmans, S, ‘An Introduction to Political and Legal Aspects 
of EU Security Policies’ in Casteleiro, A, and Spernbaur, M, (eds.), ‘Security Aspects in EU External Policy’, EUI 
Working Papers, Law 2009/01, p 9, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/10288/LAW_2009_01.pdf;jsessionid=CB57C80CE335CE9179AF4F
E6E6DB8E5C?sequence=3, accessed 10 September 2010. 
77Article 55(1) TEU and Article 358 TFEU. This is of course a separate issue from the question of whether this is  
a legal obligation or a political requirement (see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.1.3.). 
78See Robertson, fn 21 above. In fact, in Case C-100/84 Commission v UK [1985] ECR 1169,  the ECJ explained 
that where a comparative examination of the various language versions of an EU legal text does not enable a 
conclusion to be reached in favour of any of the arguments put forward, then ‘no legal consequences can be based 
on the terminology used’ (para 16). 
79Of course, this is not to say that the two concepts are always mutually exclusive (see for example Case C-266/03, 
Commission v Luxembourg, [2005] ECR I-4805, para 60; and Case C-433/03, Commission v Germany, [2005] 
ECR I-6985, para 66, where references were made to both coherence and consistency; also see Khaliq fn 3 above, 
p 447; Hoebink, P, 'Coherence and consistency in Europe’s foreign policy', in Bond (anthology) Europe in the 
world: essays on EU Foreign, security and Development Policies (London: Bond, 2003), 37–43; and in general, 
Mathisen, G,  'Consistency and coherence as conditions for justification of Member State measures restricting free 
movement' (2010) 47 CMLRev., 1021–48). 
80Koutrakos, fn 41 above, p 39. Indeed, it has been suggested that it is due to the complexity of the phenomenon 
of consistency that much of the literature remains at the more general or conceptual level (Hartlapp, M, et al, 
‘Linking Agenda Setting to Coordination Structures: Bureaucratic Politics inside the European Commission’, 
(2012) 53 JEI 4, 425-441). 
81Robertson, fn 21 above, p 16. 
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actions of the Union.82 This covers both consistency and coherence with the former construed 
as forming a first degree of the latter.83 Ultimately, although coherence and consistency could 
have different meanings, the requirement of the Treaties covers both, and is essentially about 
'the construction of a united whole'.84 This includes both lack of legal contradictions on the one 
hand, and synergy between the different elements of EU external action policies, on the other 
hand.85 Of course, it can be argued that legal contradictions which would mainly be detected in 
instruments where they exist, would rarely arise. This is because a requirement would usually 
be acknowledged in the instruments, even if rhetorically, in anticipation of practice.86 As for 
coherence based on the construction of a united whole vis-a-vis synergy between the different 
elements of EU external action policies, the thesis approaches it as a question that entails the 
synergy of norms, instruments and institutions in practice, as well as synergy in the sequencing 
of available policy options in the external projection of EU strategies and policies.87 In EU 
                                                 
82Hillion, fn 13 above, p 12. 
83Gauttier, P, 'Horizontal coherence and the external competences of the European Union', (2004) 10 ELJ 26. This 
is similar to the distinction between consistency in a narrow sense (absence of contradictions) and consistency in 
a broad sense (coherence) (see Franklin, C, The Burgeoning Principle of Consistency in EU Law' (2011) 30 YEL 
1 pp 42–85; and also Khaliq, U, 'The external action of the European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon' in Trybus, 
M, and Rubini, L, (ed.) The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2012), p 246. 
84Koutrakos, fn 41 above. 
85Koutrakos, fn 13 above, p 250; also see Von Elsuwege, P, 'EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar 
Structure: in Search of a New Balance Between Delimitation and Consistency' (2010) 47 CMLRev., 987–1019, p 
27. 
86See the aims of this thesis in section 1.3. below. 
87See the Sahel Strategy , fn 47 above, p 2; also see Zounmenou, D, 'Is a Military Intervention in Mali a Realistic 
Option?', Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, 25 June 2012, available at   
 https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/is-a-military-intervention-in-mali-a-realistic-option, accessed 24 November 
2015; however, also see Nuttall, S, “Coherence and Consistency” in Hill, C, and Smith, M, (ed.) International 
Relations and the European Union (OUP, 2005) Chapter 5, who makes a distinction between horizontal coherence 
and institutional coherence. For the purposes of this thesis, the policy options discussed are the core EU external 
action policies towards SSA namely Trade, Development, Trade, CFSP and the CSDP (see 1.2. above). Indeed, 
these are the main EU external policies represented in Article 3(5) TFEU on the aims of EU external relations: “In 
its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to 
the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of 
human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” [author's emphasis]. Using 
Moussis's categorisation, these are simply external policies, and are different from internal sectoral policies of the 
Union which may have external effect (see Moussis, N, Access to European Union, law, economics, policies, 
available at (Rixensart: http://www.europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/, accessed 08 June 2016). However, as 
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external action parlance, this amounts to horizontal coherence.88 
 
Overall, despite the theoretical debate regarding the concepts of 'coherence' and 'consistency', 
many recent scholarly works in this field of research have generally taken to ‘coherence’ as a 
general approach.89 This is not simply because most languages refer to the dynamic notion of 
coherence. Rather, this may not be unrelated to the difficulty the term 'consistency' prima facie 
poses. For example, consistency would usually indicate a zero-sum game. As Wessel notes, 
                                                 
indicated at 1.5. below on research methodology, development policy is at at all times the benchmark policy for 
the investigation of the dynamices of coherence in EU external action towards SSA. The reason for this is further 
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.4.2. 
88It is further noteworthy that the issue of coherence in the context of EU external relations law and policies is not  
monolithic. Rather, it is mainly of two dimensions namely vertical and horizontal coherence. In this regard, it is  
important to expressly indicate the dimension of coherence which this thesis is concerned with. Vertical coherence 
 governs the interaction between EU policies and the policies of the Member States. This would mainly occur in 
 areas where both the Member States and the EU may act simultaneously in relation to the same policy or subject 
 matter (Cremona, fn 76 above, p 16). In contrast, horizontal coherence governs the interaction between different 
 strands of EU external policy. As mentioned above (at p 5), in examining the requirement of coherence in EU 
 external relations law and EU external action towards SSA, this thesis investigates the extent of the construction 
 of a united whole in this context. The foreign policies of the EU Member States are a crucial part of EU foreign 
 policy.  See for example Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg (Inland Waterways Agreement) [2005] ECR  
1-4805, at para 60; Case C- 433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR 1-6985, at para 66; Case C-124/95 The 
 Queen ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR I-114, at para 27; Case C-70/94  
Werner v Germany [1995] ECR I-3189, at para 10; Case C-221/89, Factortame II [1991] ECR I-3905, at para 14; 
 Case C-127/87 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 3333, at para 7; Case C-57/86 Greece v Commission [1988]  
ECR 2855, at para 9; Joined Cases C-6/69 and 11/69 Commission v France [1969] ECR 523, at para 17; also see 
 Council Decision 94/942/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 3382/94 [1994] OJ L367/31 which provide that  
the two instruments constitute “an integrated system involving, in accordance with their own powers, the Council, 
the Commission and the Member States” (Article 1 Council Decision 94/942); and European Commission, ‘Europe 
in the World – Some practical proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility’ (2006) COM 278 which 
indicates that the EU external action is not served only by the EU policies but also the foreign relations of the 
Member States; also see Hillion, fn 13 above, p 10; and Takman, A, ‘External action after the Lisbon Treaty: the 
case of the EU and the OSCE’, UI Brief No. 18 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2013), p 2. 
Moreover, the post-Lisbon EEAS as an EU foreign service coordinates the diplomatic services of the EU Member 
States all over the world. This renders vertical coherence as much an imperative as horizontal coherence in the 
construction of a united whole in EU external action. Indeed, see to this effect, European Security Strategy’ (ESS), 
fn 30 above, p 13: “[…] Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the 
external activities of the individual member states.” However, this thesis is not concerned with vertical coherence 
- which would entail addressing the bilateral policies of EU Member States outside the EU framework. 
Nevertheless, materially, the exclusion of the investigation of vertical coherence from the scope of this thesis does 
not mean that references are not made to principles and practices relating to vertical coherence where these 
contribute to addressing any of the questions which the thesis sets to answer (see for example the analysis in 
Chapters Five (on the CFSP) and Six (on the CSDP) of this thesis). For the relevant EU external policies 
investigated in this thesis along the lines of horizontal interaction see fn 87 above. 
89However, see Von Elsuwege fn 85 above; Franklin, fn 83 above; and also Marangoni, Anne-Claire (2014)  
Towards consistency of EU external policies? A case study on the European Commission, PhD – Thesis,  
Maastricht: Universitaire Pers Maastricht, all of who have opted for 'consistency'. 
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concepts of law cannot be more or less consistent – something is either consistent or it is not.90 
Contrastingly, coherence is not given to a binary choice but is only a matter of degree,91 and 
hence a more realistic goal in the context of policy framework analysis.92 As mentioned above,93 
this thesis follows the same line and adopts 'coherence' as a general approach albeit not to the 
total exclusion of a mention of 'consistency' from the analysis. 
1.4. Aim of this thesis and sub-research questions 
As mentioned above, at the core of this thesis is the question of the coherence of EU external 
action towards SSA especially in the light of the requirement of coherence in EU external 
relations law. In particular, the thesis seeks to answer the question: to what extent is the Union's 
external action towards SSA coherent in the light of both the requirement of coherence as 
strengthened as Lisbon, and the introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS which are aimed at 
enhancing the coherence of EU external action? In dealing with this question which borders 
mainly on horizontal coherence,94 the thesis covers two key sub-questions namely: (1) What 
are the dimensions of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law that could be 
considered central to the potential determination of the coherence of EU external action towards 
SSA,95 and what do their theoretical examination reveal regarding the possibility of determining 
their existence (or lack thereof) with certainty? (2)How does the relevant policy instruments, 
                                                 
90Wessel, fn 72 above. 
91Ibid. 
92For the difficulties of this approach, see Franklin, fn 83 above; also as mentioned earlier (see fn 76 above), this 
is not to say that the two concepts are always mutually exclusive. 
93See fn 3 above. 
94See 1.4. above. 
95As discussed in this thesis, these are two fold: (1) policy coherence for development as explained in Chapter 
Two  
of this thesis at 2.5.1.1.2 below, and (2) synergy in the sequencing of available policy options in the external 
projection of EU strategies and policies as briefly mentioned at 1.3. above, and also explained in Chapter Two of 
this thesis at 2.5.1.1.2.  with  special reference to SSA. As mentioned at fn 87 above, the relevant policy options 
discussed in the context of this thesis are the core EU external action policies towards SSA namely Trade, 
Development, Trade, CFSP and the CSDP and the benchmark policy in this regard is development policy. 
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the legal-institutional dynamics and the Mali case study reflect these and the potentials of the 
post-Lisbon HR/VP and the EEAS to add value to the quest for coherence especially in the 
particular context of this study? 
 
Overall, the thesis proceeds from an understanding that whilst the study of EU external action 
and policies towards SSA is prominent in development studies, economics, history, and political 
science amongst other disciplines,96 there is a dearth of exploration of its legal aspects.97 This 
is notwithstanding the utility and significance of the law in the organisation of EU external 
relations.98 To facilitate the discussion necessary to address the topic including the key research 
question and the sub-research questions, the thesis analyses: 
 
a) The pertinent background and constitutional principles of EU external relations law, the 
scope of EU external competence, and the delimitation of competence between the 
relevant strands of EU foreign policies. The provisions of the Treaties on these are the 
basic legal frameworks and the legal intricacies that the issue and principle of horizontal 
coherence revolves around. 
 
b) The dynamics and dimensions of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations 
law and their import on the interaction between the core EU external action policies 
towards SSA namely Trade, Development, Trade, CFSP and the CSDP, as well as on the 
                                                 
96In general, the nature of the European integration project has, since its very beginning, been viewed through a 
number of different prisms (see for example, Khaliq, U, ‘Treaty conflict and the European Union, or conflicting 
perspectives on the European Union?’ (2012) 37 EL Rev 4, pp 492-503). However, from all indications, there is 
little or no doubt that European integration is more or less ‘integration through law’. 
97One of the available legal analysis in this area is Martenczuk, fn 26 above. However, this is not specifically 
concerned with coherence. 
98See in general Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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possibility of determining with certainty the existence (or lack thereof) of coherence in 
practice. 
 
c) The pertinent historical background of EU external relations with SSA which may more 
or less continue to hold implications for coherence in EU external action towards the 
region. 
 
d) The legal and functional instruments, as well as the institutional dimensions of EU 
external action and their implications for coherence in EU external action in general, 
and towards SSA especially in the light of the changes introduced at Lisbon. 
 
 
e)   A case study of EU external action towards Mali is undertaken to obtain a further          
 insight into the aims of this research. 
The relevant Chapters as they relate to these different aspects of the analysis are introduced 
below.99 
1.5. Methodology of the Research 
The thesis is first and foremost a legal analysis albeit placed squarely within its historical and 
political contexts. Hence, in answering the research question and sub-research questions set out 
above, the thesis adopts a law in context approach and embarks on a legal analysis of the 
relevant legal provisions, instruments and institutional dimensions of the Union’s multifaceted 
policies towards the region. For this purpose, the thesis concentrates on the four key EU policies 
                                                 
99See 1.7. below. 
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towards SSA namely development policy, trade policy, the CFSP and the CSDP with 
development policy as the benchmark policy for the investigation of the research question.100  
By and large, in attempting to assess the extent of the coherence of EU external action towards 
SSA, the analysis broadly covers the relevant norms, institutions and instruments101 of these 
policies, including the functional deployment of same with special reference to Mali as a case 
study for the region, especially in the light of the relevant legal provisions.102 While a 
comprehensive analysis of all relevant instruments of EU external action in SSA cannot be 
undertaken within the limited confines of this thesis, a comprehensive analysis of the 
institutions of external action towards SSA is pertinently provided. This enables the thesis to 
investigate the added value of the new HR/VP and the EEAS to the quest to enhance, if not 
ensure,103 coherence in EU external action with special reference to SSA. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the thesis adopts an approach that is analytical and not simply 
descriptive of the issues discussed. It combines textual and contextual analysis of the 
requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and the coherence of EU external action 
towards SSA in practice. Invariably, the analysis draws not only from EU external relations law 
and international law, but also from the relevant disciplines of development economics, history, 
political science and strategic studies. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Two, the limits of the 
law in the conduct of EU external action, in the light of the constraints of politics, and to some 
extent, the influence of history, is well recognised.   
                                                 
100See 1.4. above. 
101This is also the categorisation of coherence by Cremona, fn 76 above, p 16, where she also refers to 
complementarity. 
102This does not detract from the fluidity that arises from the pragmatic application of law in this context (see the 
subsequent Chapters of this thesis). 
103See in general Chapter Two of this thesis, at 2.5.1. 
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With regards to the more substantive aspects of this thesis namely the relevant principles of EU 
external relations law, the distinct policies of EU external action towards SSA and the case 
study on Mali, a legal analysis of the relevant principles and constitutional aspects of EU 
external action towards SSA is undertaken. This deals with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties, the relevant bilateral treaty frameworks and an analysis of the procedural and 
substantive aspects of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and EU 
external action towards SSA. Furthermore, in investigating the selected key policies of EU 
external action towards SSA, the thesis necessarily looks at whether there are any rules, 
procedures or institutional arrangements in any of the four selected policy areas that illustrates 
a breach of the dimensions of the requirement of coherence investigated in this thesis. This 
includes the question of any evidence for detrimental effects of any detected incoherence. It 
also entails an analysis of whether there are any rules, procedures or institutional arrangements, 
in any of the four selected policy areas that address or attempt to overcome incoherence with 
other policy areas. The investigation of whether there is incoherence and the extent to which 
this is already addressed helps the thesis to answer the research question, provide a conclusion, 
and finally recommend what needs to be done which is not already done to address and 
overcome any detected incoherence. At all times, it should be borne in mind that the limited 
focus of the selection of policies and instruments in this thesis is in no way purported to 
undermine the significance of other policies and instruments not covered. The scope of analysis 
is necessarily subjected to the word limit requirement. 
 
Apart from wide-ranging academic literature, the thesis uses appropriate official sources of the 
EU, encompassing treaty law and secondary legislation. It is within these instruments and in 
their practical application that the rules, procedures and institutions of the distinct policies as 
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they relate to coherence are analysed.  However, the thesis does not consider only 'hard law' but 
also case law and  'soft law' sources such as European Commission Communications, Council 
Conclusions, and European Council guidelines, other policy and institutional documents, as 
well as reports, monographs, edited collections, speeches, and journal articles. Although the 
soft law documents constitute a 'grey zone between law and politics,'104 they are useful for the 
purposes of this thesis as they elaborate on the scope and direction of EU activities relating to 
the issues under consideration. Moreover, as they are frequently used by the EU, their inclusion 
is necessary to provide an analysis as comprehensive as possible for the purposes of this thesis. 
Although interviews were initially planned in anticipation of potential gaps on open points, this 
was eventually found not to be indispensable for the purposes of answering the research 
questions. Indeed, not only are myriad recent reports and materials from a wide range of sources 
available, some of these which are pertinently studied in this thesis are based on interviews.105 
Furthermore, apart from institutional practice, the other relevant policy dynamics such as norms 
and instruments are completely examinable through desk research. Moreover, of no less 
significance is a combination of fiscal challenges and insecurity in Mali.106 
1.6. Research limitations 
Apart from a lack of primary interviews, there are limitations to this study that are worth 
highlighting. For example, as is often the case with reports, “[…] we know, there are known 
knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is 
to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns; 
                                                 
104Malanczuk, P, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th rev. ed.), (London: Routledge, 2000), 
p, 54. 
105For an example of a pertinent and recent one see Davis, L, Reform or Business as Usual? EU Security Provision 
in Complex Contexts: Mali (2015) 29 Global Society 2, 260-279. 
106See for example Caleb Weiss, 'Al Qaeda has launched more than 100 attacks in West Africa in 2016', 08 June 
2016, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/over-100-al-qaeda-attacks-in-west-africa-
since-beginning-of-the-year.php, accessed 10 June 2016. 
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the ones we don’t know we don't know.”107 Indeed, in the specific case of the EU, there is an 
understanding that the conduct of its external relations is undoubtedly dependent upon a web 
of legal rules, political realities and economic conditions of both national and supranational 
nature whose influence cannot always be accurately ascertained.108 Significantly, these play 
into the institutional dimension of EU external action, itself complicated not only since it may 
be said to be the result of the cumulative effect of both internal and external measures, but also 
because policy formulation and decision-making may take place within different frameworks 
for external action. The end result is a certain level of 'institutional uncertainty'109 that makes it 
difficult to conclude the institutional dimension of policies under investigation with certainty.110 
These may all be more the case in the context of the unarguably complex dynamics of EU 
external relations with SSA.111 Suffice it to state that the complexity of the historical, political 
                                                 
107See U.S. Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing — Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, 12 Feb 2002, 
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636, accessed 16th May 2015. 
108Koutrakos, fn 41 above, p 1; also see Mold, A, and Page, S, 'The Evolution of EU Development Policy – 
Enlargement and a Changing World' in Mold, A, (ed.) EU Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges 
for the 21st Century (Amsterdam University Press, 2007), p 12 on the complexity of the interaction between 
policies; with specific regards to the legal dimension see for example the Introduction to Koutrakos, P, EU 
International Relations Law (2nd edn), where he cited Anthony Aust: “anything to do with the European 
Communities is complex and this is particularly so for the law governing their external relations”; and Holdgaard, 
R, External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal Discourses (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2008), p 2, where he makes reference to how EU external relations law is regarded as 
incomprehensible and impenetrable by traditional legal standards; and also Peers, S, 'EC Frameworks of 
International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Association' in Dashwood and Hillion, fn 24 above, p 160 
where he makes reference to the legal complexities of EU external relations; and also in general De Witte, B, 'Too 
much constitutional law in the European Union’s Foreign Relations?', in Cremona and De Witte, fn 3 above, p 3 – 
16; and also Wessel, R, 'The Legal Dimension of EU Foreign Policy' in Aarstad, A, K, et al  (Eds.), Handbook of 
European Foreign Policy (London: Sage, 2015), Chapter 21. 
109Aggarwal, V, and Forgaty, E, 'Between Regionalism and Globalism: European Union Interregional Trade 
Strategies' in Aggarwal, V, and Forgaty, E, (ed.), EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p 30; also see Vanhoonacker, S, ‘The Institutional Framework’ in Hill and 
Smith, fn 87 above, p 68. 
110See for example, Aggrawal and Forgaty, fn 109 above, p 30 where they submit that it can be difficult to define 
a coherent set of procedure and processes whereby broad EU trade policy is made. 
111See for example Martenczunk, fn 26 above where he writes on the institutional and procedural complexity of 
development cooperation in this context; and Ravenhill, J, 'Back to the Nest? Europe's Relations with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of Countries' in Aggarwal and Forgaty, fn 109 above, p 121 where he writes on the 
complexity of the reality beyond the letter of one of the successive regimes of association signed in the context of 
EU external action towards SSA; also see Mangala who submits that while different theoretical frameworks may 
offer insight into the fundamental dynamics driving the relationship, no individual theoretical framework can 
adequately explain the totality of EU-Africa relations which is also built on a dense and complex web of 
institutional, economic, political, social and cultural ties (Mangala, J, 'Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Historical 
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and legal relations between EU and SAA cannot be over-emphasised and indeed cannot be fully 
illustrated within the limited confines of this thesis. In this regard, while the country case study 
of Mali makes for manageability, the attendant limitations cannot be denied in so far as there 
are as much differences as similarities in the countries of SSA.112  Overall, the thesis has been 
completed on the basis of available information, and it is possible that there are inaccessible 
internal practices and documents which might illustrate factors that could shed more light on 
the issues under consideration, but are classified. This is an acknowledgement of data 
limitations. 
 
However, beyond data limitations, it is worthy to note that the examination of coherence in this 
thesis,113 does not in any way imply a commitment to an assessment of end results. The latter 
is outside the purview of legal research, and it may not be out of place for policy analysts with 
interest in end results to consider the study too legal and institutional in approach. 
 
In any event, in so far as the legal and institutional changes made at Lisbon with a view to 
enhancing (or ensuring) coherence in EU external action are still nascent, any appraisal of their 
further potential impacts at this stage somewhat remains tentative. Moreover, as recently 
explained by some scholars of EU studies: 
 
“Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and 
indeed European societies are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in 
a continuous situation of adaptation. New challenges and new requirements arise 
                                                 
Background, Institutional Architecture, and Theoretical Frameworks' in Mangala, J, (ed.), Europe and the 
European Union: A Strategic Partnership (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p 37. 
112The EU is not oblivious to this and have embraced differentiation in its approach, especially according to the 
level of development of the countries of the region (see Chapter Three of this thesis especially at 3.5.2). 
113Namely, norms, instruments and institutions (see 1.5. above). 
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continually, both internally and externally.”114   
 
1.7. The Thesis Outline 
The thesis chapter structure reflects a sequential presentation of arguments that address the 
research questions. It is divided into eight chapters including this general introduction and a 
general conclusion. 
 
This Chapter One is the introductory chapter. It provides a general overview of the thesis, the 
research methodology adopted and the overall structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter Two is a foundational Chapter which aims to provide a historical and contextual 
background for the overall analysis. In doing this, the Chapter provides a pertinent overview of 
the relevant constitutional principles of EU external relations law and the implications of these 
for the coherence of EU external action in general and towards SSA in particular. Furthermore, 
the Chapter provides a brief historical overview of the evolution of EU's special relations with 
SSA, including the background to the framework agreements of EU external action towards 
SSA. This is important both as a pertinent background for the discussion of the policies of EU 
external action towards SSA, and as an effective introduction for the historical and political 
                                                 
114Blurb for Pelkmans, J, et al (eds.) The EU Internal Market in Comparative Perspective: Economic, Political 
and Legal Analysis (European Interuniversity Press, 2008) as found in Zalewska, M, and Gstrein, O, J,  'National 
Parliaments and their Role in European Integration: The EU‘s Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship 
and Political Insecurity' College of Europe, Bruges Political Research Papers No. 28, 2013; also see Khaliq, U, 
'The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of EU Foreign Policy' in Trybus and Rubini, fn 83 above where he writes 
with specific regards to Lisbon: '[…] after Lisbon, it is obvious that the level of sophistication and the nature of 
cooperation has moved on. It is an evolutionary process, and Lisbon was never going to be a foreign policy 
revolution.' However, for recent threats to European integration see for example  Sykes, S, 'Now French voters 
call for FREXIT after Germany face demands for EU referendum', available at  
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/654175/French-voters-demand-Frexit-EU-referendum-Germany-UK-
Brexit?ref=yfp, accessed 26 March, 2016. Indeed, as at the date of the conclusion of this thesis, the referendum 
had been concluded and the result is in favour of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU. 
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context which the analysis is placed on. Accordingly, it explores the historical relations – or 
lack thereof - between EU Member States and the countries of SSA with a view to highlighting 
the legacies that may or may not continue to hold implications for the coherence of EU policies, 
even against the background of the Lisbon changes. Equally, the Chapter distills the objectives 
of EU external action in general, and towards SSA in particular, and also introduces the 
benchmark policy for the examination of the issues that surround the assessment and 
determination of coherence in the context of this thesis. Furthermore, it traces the evolutionary 
background of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and practice, and also 
analyses the legal, political and institutional framework of this requirement as well as their 
import on the main issues under consideration. Overall, although the legal framework has to be 
placed in its historical context, the emphasis is especially on the post-Lisbon legal and 
institutional framework for EU external action. 
 
Chapter Three provides an analysis of the first core EU policy towards SSA, namely 
development cooperation policy. In doing this, the Chapter analyses the legal basis for EU 
development policy within the EU legal order, and also analyses the distinct legal instruments 
of EU development policy with special reference to SSA. Furthermore, it pertinently 
investigates the institutional dimension of EU development policy including in relation to 
policy formulation, implementation and enforcement. The role of the HR/VP and the EEAS in 
development policy is also discussed. Finally, building on the theoretical framework, the 
Chapter specifically discusses the dimensions of this policy towards Mali as a case study. 
 
 Chapter Four provides analysis of EU Trade policy towards SSA. In doing this, the Chapter 
follows the structure of Chapter Three. Hence, it analyses the legal basis for EU trade policy 
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within the EU legal order, and also analyses the distinct legal instruments of EU trade policy 
with special reference to SSA. Furthermore, it investigates the institutional dimension of EU 
trade policy including in relation to policy formulation, implementation and enforcement. The 
role – or lack thereof - of the HR/VP and the EEAS in trade policy is also discussed. Finally, 
the Chapter discusses EU trade policy towards SSA with a view to determining coherence using 
Mali as a case study. 
 
Chapter Five provides the analysis of the CFSP. In the light of the indefinite scope of this 
framework, the analysis centres on a particular aspect of the CFSP namely diplomacy especially 
as it relates to security. The discussion in this Chapter follows the structure in Chapters Three 
and Four. Essentially, it analyses the legal basis for the CFSP within the EU legal order, and 
also analyses the distinct legal nature and instruments of the CFSP with special reference to 
SSA. Furthermore, it investigates the institutional dimension of the CFSP including in relation 
to policy formulation, implementation and enforcement. The role of the HR/VP and the EEAS 
in the CFSP is also discussed. Finally, the Chapter places a special focus on CFSP in Mali with 
a view to determining coherence. 
 
Chapter Six provides analysis of the CSDP. The discussion in this Chapter also follows the 
structure in Chapters Three, Four and Five. It analyses the legal basis for the CSDP within the 
EU legal order, and also analyses the distinct legal nature and instruments of the CSDP with 
special reference to SSA. Furthermore, it investigates the institutional dimension of the CSDP 
including in relation to policy formulation, implementation and enforcement. The role of the 
HR/VP and the EEAS in the CSDP is also discussed. Finally, the Chapter places a special focus 
on the CSDP in Mali in order to enable the assessment of coherence.   
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Chapter Seven discusses a key specific instrument aimed at enhancing coherence in EU external 
relations with SSA, namely the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
discuss whether these have proven or potentially will prove a veritable instrument for enhancing 
coherence in EU external relations with SSA using Mali as a case study. 
 
Chapter Eight summarises the main issues at the heart of the matter as drawn from the analysis 
and strings of argument in the previous Chapters in order to arrive at a conclusion and proffer 
recommendations. In doing this, the Chapter draws from the theoretical examination of the 
relevant issues and the Mali case study and highlights the complexity around the issues 
including with regards to the determination of the existence of coherence or lack thereof and 
with regards to the determination of the potentials of the HR/VP and the EEAS to add value to 
the quest for coherence with special reference to EU external action towards SSA. Finally, it 
proffers recommendations based on the conclusions. 
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Chapter Two 
2.0. Contextualising the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and EU 
external action towards SSA  
2.1. Introduction 
The previous Chapter provided a general introduction to this thesis. The present Chapter 
contextualises the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and its essence in EU 
external action towards SSA. Although context was touched upon in the introduction,1  this was 
merely synoptic and was only provided as one of the grounds of justification for embarking on 
this thesis. Similarly, the concept of coherence was only discussed briefly in that Chapter to 
satisfy the need for a working definition of coherence and to clarify the dimension of coherence 
the thesis is concerned with.2 In contrast, the present Chapter places the requirement of 
coherence within the broad structural, historical and legal context of EU external action with 
special reference to SSA. In doing this, the Chapter at all times traces the historical evolution 
of the requirement of coherence in EU external action including with special reference to SSA. 
This is to enable recognition of some kind of continuity in its development. The Chapter is both 
an integral aspect of this study and a pivotal background which the whole thesis is based on.  
 
The Chapter is divided into four sections. Section one provides a brief discussion of the origins 
of EU external relations law and policies including with special reference to SSA. This is 
followed by an analysis of the pertinent constitutional principles of EU external relations law 
which the interaction between EU external action policies and the requirement of coherence 
revolve around. These include a discussion of the settled and yet pertinent question of the 
international legal personality of the Union, and also an analysis of the scope of EU external 
                                                 
1See Chapter One at 1.3.  
2See Chapter One at 1.2. 
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competences as they relate to the coherence of EU external action. Where necessary a special 
highlight is placed on the Lisbon changes. The subsequent Section provides an analysis of EU 
external objectives in general and towards SSA in particular especially in the light of the Lisbon 
changes. This is followed by a discussion of the legal, political and institutional frameworks for 
coherence in EU external action albeit with special reference to SSA.  
 
The Chapter submits that the EU is not only committed to the coherence of its external action 
in general, and towards SSA in particular, but also to policy coherence for development which 
requires all other external policies of the EU to be in harmony with the objectives of 
development policy towards the region. However, it argues that although these are clearly 
illustrated by the strengthening of the requirement of coherence at Lisbon, the Union's legal 
commitment in this regard are in general short of enforceable external obligations. Furthermore, 
it highlights the legal and political limitations on the potentially enforceable internal obligation 
on EU institutions. Against this background, it stresses that the coherence of EU external action 
towards SSA would invariably not rest solely on the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign Policy and the Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) which were established for coherence. This is because these are only 
bridging institutions that would have to depend on the political will of the relevant traditional 
EU institutions, and perhaps, sometimes the Member States to enhance coherence. Overall, it 
acknowledges that the limits of the law and the constraints of politics in the field of EU external 
action would generally mean that the Lisbon legal and institutional changes portend as much 
potentials as challenges for coherence in EU external action in general, and policy coherence 
for development in particular especially in the context of EU external action towards SSA. 
Nevertheless, the Chapter concludes that these may only be determined by a contextual 
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investigation. 
2.2. Internal market: why external relations and objectives? 
European integration began as a direct reaction to World War II (WWII).3 Evolutionarily, the 
desire to reconstruct a Europe prostrate from the ruins of war4 was marked by many different 
levels of development towards the ultimate aim of integration. However, it is generally accepted 
that the first major step in European integration was the establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC).5 Its aim was the establishment of a common market for coal and 
steel in order to take these products needed to make weapons away from national governments 
and hence make another war impossible.6 The ECSC was subsequently followed by the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom),7 and the European Economic Community 
(EEC)8 created by the Treaty of Rome. The expressed aim of this last Community was the 
establishment of a common market (also known as the 'internal market' or 'single market' as it 
later came to be known when integration moved on from a mere customs union).9 Essentially, 
the Community started its life as a customs union - the most advanced form of trade integration 
                                                 
      3Trybus, M, European Union Law and Defence Integration (Oxford: Hart, 2005), p 11; also see the Schuman 
Declaration – 9 May 1950, available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-
day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm, accessed February 02, 2015. 
4Okigbo, P, C, N, Africa and the Common Market (London: Longman, 1967), p 2. 
     5Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding, accessed 30 August 2010. Also known as the Treaty of Paris, the 
ECSC which was concluded for a fixed period of 50 years expired by its terms on 23 July 2002. 
     6See for example Trybus, fn 3 above, p 19 where he submits that “There is no modern warfare without weapons 
made of steel made with iron ore and coal”. In the particular context of post-war Europe, it was considered that 
another war between France and Germany could only be diminished by effective control over their coal and steel 
industries (Wessel, R, ‘Towards a United Europe? A Legal Perspective on European Institutionalisation and 
Integration’ in Wilde, J, and Wiberg, H, (eds.) Organised Anarchy in Europe: The Role of Intergovernmental 
Organisations     (London: Taurus, 1996), p 47).  
      7Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (1957), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding, accessed on August 30 2010. Unlike the ECSC, this Treaty which 
established a common nuclear market “to ensure that all users in the [Union] receive a regular and equitable supply 
of ores and nuclear fuel” continues to exist, albeit in a somewhat semi-detached manner from the EU (see Council 
Decision of 12 February 2008 establishing Statutes for the Euratom Supply Agency [2008] OJ L 41/15). 
      8Treaty establishing the European Economic Community http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding, accessed 30 August 2010. 
     9See fn 11 below.  
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with the potentials for advancing to a common market with all the economic and political 
implications of that advancement.10 This was also the precursor of the EU as it is presently 
known, albeit not without going through several amendments. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome was 
successively amended by the Single European Act (SEA),11 the Treaty of Maastricht12 or TEU 
(which established the European Union for the first time), the Treaty of Amsterdam,13 and the 
Treaty of Nice.14 This last Treaty is the immediate predecessor to the Lisbon Treaty15 which 
categorised the Treaties as TEU and the TFEU.16 
 
If the original core aim of the EU - at least as was initially represented through the 
Communities17- was the establishment of an ‘internal’ common market, then the need for the 
evolution of EU external relations law and policies is worth exploring. In this regard, the 
following are the generally accepted key reasons for the evolution of the external dimension of 
                                                 
10See Okigbo, fn 4 above, p 22; and also p 18 – 23 inclusive where he also discussed the different types of  
economic integration including Preferential Area and Free Trade Area which do not have any prospects of further  
economic or political integration). 
     11Single European Act, 17 February 1986 [1987] OJ L169. The SEA was the legal channel for the transcendence 
of the Community from a mere customs union without internal barriers to trade, to an ‘internal market’ or ‘single 
market’ with complete totality of freedom of economic activity. For a detailed analysis of the SEA and the change 
to 'single market' see Lonbay, J, 'The Single European Act' (1998) 11 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, p 31. 
      12Maastricht Treaty, TEU or Union Treaty: Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992 [1992] OJ C191/1. This 
Treaty renamed the EEC European Community (EC). 
      13Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the TEU, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain 
Related Acts, 2 October 1997 [1997] OJ C340/1.  
14Treaty of Nice Amending the TEU, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related 
Acts, 26 February 2001 [2001] OJ C80/1. 
      15The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 [2007] OJ C306/01. It is noteworthy that prior to Lisbon, there 
was a Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Rome, 29 October 2004 [2004] OJ C310/1. However, this 
treaty did not enter into force. 
16See the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU), 2010/C 83/01 [2010] OJ C83/01). However, for recent 
threats to European integration see for example Sykes, S, 'Now French voters call for FREXIT after Germany face 
demands for EU referendum', Express, 23 march 2016, available at  
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/654175/French-voters-demand-Frexit-EU-referendum-Germany-UK-
Brexit?ref=yfp, accessed 26 March, 2016, where he also covers the topical BREXIT EU Referendum.  
17The European Communities were the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC (see fns 5, 7 and 8 above). They were all 
distinct legal entities but together became known as the European Communities following the merging of their 
different institutions by the Merger Treaty of 1965. 
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the law and policies of the EU.18 Bearing in mind that the fields of EU external relations law 
and policies have evolved with the EU, these are better understood as the initial motivations 
only.19  
 
2.2.1. Protection of the internal market.20 
One of the reasons furnished for the evolution of the external dimension of the law and policies 
of the EU is the need for the external protection of the developing internal market based on a 
uniform measure. The main consideration in this regard is that an external policy is a necessary 
complement for the internal dimension in order to protect the attainment of the integration 
process and to promote its objectives.21 The functional policy aimed at addressing this was the 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP).22 From the earliest beginning, the ex-Community could 
by virtue of the CCP23 regulate commercial policy relations. This it could do by both unilateral 
measures concerning imports and exports (autonomous commercial policy), and by agreements 
with third countries (conventional commercial policy).24 In one of its earliest cases,25 the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (hereafter the ECJ)26 held that the CCP was conceived “in the 
                                                 
18Kapteyn, P, J, G, and Verloren van Themaat, P, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities (London: 
Kluwer Law, 3rd edn.) p 1253 - 1254. 
19This may be trite but is still worthy to be mentioned (indeed, see the recent Case C-377/12 Commission v Council 
[2014] Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 June 2014, at paras 24, 41-42). The distinct historical and 
evolutionary backgrounds of the different policies are pertinently discussed in the relevant Chapters of this thesis 
(for the recent use of this approach see for example, Jan Kuijper, P, et al, The Law of EU External Relations; Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary on the EU as an International Legal Actor (OUP, 2013)).   
20Kapyten and Verloren van Themaat, fn 18 above, p 1253. 
21Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat, fn 18 above, p 1253. 
22Article 207 TFEU (ex-Article 133 EC); also see Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union 
(Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2006), p 483, who notes that 'the unified internal market would not be possible' without 
the CCP; and Bretherton, C, and Vogler, J, The European Union as a Global Actor. (London: Routledge, 1999), p 
47.  
23Originally Article 113 Treaty of Rome. 
24See Case 8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhven v Massey Ferguson GmbH [1973] ECR 897 at para 4; also see Kapteyn 
and Verloren van Themaat, fn 18 above, p 1275. 
25Opinion 1/75 OECD Understanding on a Local Cost Standard [1975] ECR 01355, at para 1363. 
26By virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU institution formally known as the European Court of Justice is now 
'the Court of Justice of the European Union'. Although the acronym for the new name of the Court would be CJEU, 
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context of the common market, for the defence of the common interests of the [EU].”27 
However, it can be argued that the EU did not sleep on the potential impact of the protection of 
the common market and the defence of the common interests of the EU to the rest of the world 
as the next objective illustrates. 
 
2.2.2. Post-common market responsibility 
A second reason proffered for the evolution of EU external relation and the law regulating it 
revolves around what is perceived as the Union's responsibility for the major effect of its 
common market on the world economy. For example, it is suggested that the EU felt a heavy 
responsibility for the functioning of the international economic system.28 The key reference for 
this view is the Union's objective of contributing to a harmonious development of world trade 
and to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade.29 Indeed, the EU has well 
been a relentless generator of strategies and proposals for framework agreements in terms of 
the international political economy.30 However, whether these have achieved the expressed aims 
is debatable.31 This is not different in the context of EU external action towards SSA where 
                                                 
for ease of reference, this thesis prefers to use ECJ which is the acronym for the previous name of the Court namely 
the European Court of Justice. Indeed, Arnull explains that it is likely that the term 'European Court of Justice' will 
continue to be used (Arnull, A, 'The European Court of Justice after Lisbon' in Trybus, M, and Rubini, L, (ed.) The 
Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), p 35.  
27Opinion 1/75, fn 25 above, at 1363 – 1364. 
28Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat, fn 18 above, p 1254. 
29Article 206 TFEU (ex-Article 131 EC, and originally article 110 Treaty of Rome). This is considered evidence 
that the founding fathers of the EU were conscious of this responsibility from the very beginning (Kapteyn and 
Verloren van Themaat, fn 18 above, p 1254). 
30Hill, C, and Smith, M, International Relations and the European Union (OUP, 2005), p 12. 
31See for example Bartels, L, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’, (2007) 18 EJIL 4, 
715-716 (hereinafter Bartels (a) (reprinted in Cremona, M, (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law 
(OUP, 2008) p 128) (hereinafter Bartels (b)); and Brenton, P, and Manchin, M, 'Making EU trade agreements work: 
the role of rules of origin' (2003) 26 WE 5, pp 755-69; also see Panagariya, A, 'EU prefential trade arrangements 
and developing countries' (2002) 25 The World Economy 10, p 1415-32; and see in general Lister, M, The European 
Community and the Developing World (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988; Twitchet, C, Europe and Africa: from 
association to Partnership, (Hants: Saxon House, 1978); Zartman, W, The Politics of Trade Negotiations between 
Africa and the European Community (Princeton University Press, 1971); Brown, W, The European Union and 
Africa: The Restructuring of North -South Relations (London: I.B. Taurus, 2002). 
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opinions may differ on both the prospects and challenges to the achievement of the said 
objectives.32 Significantly, these objectives are often tied to development policy in EU external 
action towards SSA where development is arguably at the heart of the EU's engagement.33 
 
2.2.3. Political objectives 
Another reason proffered for the evolution of EU external action concern political objectives. 
The crux of this point is that European integration has since its earliest beginnings also had 
political objectives which were expressed along with other objectives in the first paragraph of 
the preamble of the Treaty of Rome.34 Indeed, if the reason behind the establishment of the first 
Treaty namely the ECSC35 is anything to go by, it is arguable that the communities36 were only 
a ‘basis’ for a broader project,37 if not first and foremost a peace project.38 This should constitute 
                                                 
32Ibid. 
33Ibid.; also see 2.2.4. below; and Chapter Three of this thesis. 
34 Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat, fn 18 above, p 1254. 
35See p 2 above. 
36See fn 16 above. 
37See the 5th paragraph of the Preamble to the ECSC: “…to create, by establishing an economic Community, the 
basis for a broader and deeper Community …” [emphasis added]; also see Lonbay, fn 11 above, p 33 where he 
indicates that “the founding fathers of the Community envisaged a "spill-over" effect to political cooperation; and 
in general Bebr, G, ‘The European Coal and Steel Community: a Political and Legal Innovation’ (1953) 63 YL Rev 
1; Stefanou, C, and Xanthaki’, H, A legal and Political Interpretation of Articles 224 and 225 of the Treaty of 
Rome, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), p 177, where they note that political scientists have always stressed the 
importance of the Treaty of Rome as an open-ended political document rather than an economic agreement; 
Cameron, F, ‘The EU as a Global Actor: Far from Pushing its Political Weight Around” in Rhodes, C, (eds.) The 
European Union in the World Community (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p 20; and Hallstein, W, United Europe, 
Challenge and Opportunity (Harvard University Press, 1962), especially pp 40-41. On the importance of the text 
of preambles, see Kelsen, H, The Law of the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p 3, who opines that it is usual to determine the purposes of an 
international organisation in the preamble of the treaty by which the organisation is constituted; with specific 
regards to the EU, see Arnull, A, ‘The European Court and judicial objectivity: a reply to Professor Hartley’, (1996) 
LQR 411 where he identifies ‘preamble to the Treaty’ as one of the sources of guidance which the ECJ resorts to  
in seeking to identify the aims of a provision.  
38See The Schuman Declaration, fn 3 above. Indeed, the ECSC – the very first of the Treaties - solemnly declared 
in the 1st paragraph of its Preamble that “world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate 
with the dangers that threaten it.”  It further emphasised in the 2nd paragraph of the preamble that “the contribution 
which an organised and vital Europe can make to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful 
relations”; also see Kronenbeger, V, and Wouters, J, The EU and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), p xvii, where the EU is said to be first and foremost a peace project; and 
Pinder, J, and Usherwood, S, The European Union: a very short introduction (OUP, 2007). 
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little or no surprise. The idea of ‘peace through commerce’ or the restraining effect of economic 
ties is arguably well recognised in international law.39  
 
Essentially, it will not be completely correct to regard the recent direct references to the 
‘preservation and strengthening of peace and security’ in the preambles of both the TEU and 
TFEU as a matter of firsts.40 These were not occasioned solely by the recent developments in 
EU law and European integration. Quite specifically, they were not occasioned by the 
development of the CFSP41 which is generally accepted as the legal embodiment of EU political 
objectives. With regards to the external dimension, a point has been made that the emergence 
of the Union as a political actor on the international scene was also externally motivated.42 In 
particular, it is suggested that there were expectations from both European political elites and 
third countries that the EU would assume an international political role concomitant to its 
economic strength.43  
 
In any event, it is well known that the possibility of a common political stance was started in 
the context of an informal European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970 – a couple of years 
after the Treaty of Rome. The EPC was accepted as a pure intergovernmental arrangement 
between the Member States to be conducted outside the integration process under the Treaty of 
Rome.44 Significantly, it was at this stage that ‘coherence’ was first introduced as a value worthy 
                                                 
39Or international relations (for example, see in general, Kant, I, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, Translated 
by Humphrey, T, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992); and for a recent example of the invocation of this idea see in 
general, Clinton, W, ‘National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement’ (Washington DC: White House, 
1996). 
40See specifically the 8th and 11th paragraphs of the Preamble to the TFEU and TEU respectively. 
41Coupled with the CSDP as its integral part. 
42Koutrakos, P, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006), p 415. 
43Ibid.; however see the reference to world peace in the 1st paragraph of the Preamble to the ECSC cited in fn 38 
above.  
44See for example, Denza, E, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the Union, (OUP, 2002) Chapter Two; and 
Macleod, I, et al, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford: Clarendon Place, 1996), p 411. 
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of pursuit in EU external action.45 The Member States desired a distinction between the nascent 
informal intergovernmental EPC foreign policy, and the less political economic external 
relations of the ex-Community under the Treaty of Rome. The recognition of coherence as a 
value was necessitated by the need for coherent interaction between these two dimensions of 
EU foreign policy. The EPC eventually gained ‘Treaty status’ by virtue of the SEA, and 
morphed into the CFSP at Maastricht.46 Nonetheless, at all times in the course of their evolution, 
the political objectives or foreign and security policies (as they are contemporarily known) have 
remained legally and procedurally separated from other EU external policies. Undoubtedly, this 
legal and procedural duality is mainly, even if not solely, behind the issue of coherence in EU 
external action. This is more so in EU external action towards SSA which traverses these 
different strands of EU external policy. Significantly, SSA region is where EU external action, 
and perhaps the issue of coherence, began to evolve.47 
 
2.2.4. SSA associates to the internal market: at the fore of EU external action  
 As explained earlier, EU relations with SSA is deeply rooted in the history of European 
integration.48  This is by no means surprising due to the long historical relationship between 
Europe and SSA prior to the former's integration.49 Separated only by the Straits of Gibraltar, 
                                                 
45See 2.3. below.  
46See 2.4. below. 
47Of course, that it practically began here does not mean to say that the region is the sole reason for the evolution 
of EU external relations (see 2.2.4.2. below especially p 12). 
48See Chapter One at 1.0.  
49For a general historical discussion on Europe's relations with SSA see for example, Roberts, J, The Pelican 
History of the World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980); Falola, T, Key Events in African History: A Reference 
Guide (Westport: Greenwood, 2002); Rouvez, A, Disconsolate Empires (Lanham: University Press of America, 
1994); Wilson, H, The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1870 (OUP, 1977), p vii); Holland, T, 
Millennium (London: Little Brown, 2008);  Wesseling, H, Imperialism and Colonialism: Essays on the History of 
European Expansion (London: Greenwood, 1997); Olson, J, & Shadle, R, (ed.) Historical Dictionary of European 
Imperialism, (NY: Greenwood Press, 1991). 
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the continents of Africa and Europe are close neighbours50 with interactions dating back to 
centuries.51 Indeed, even the Schuman Declaration52 which began the European integration 
project persuaded that “with increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement 
of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent”.  Arguably, this 
would mainly be with reference to SSA, at least initially. Indeed, all the above objectives which 
are explained as the initial motivations for the evolution of EU external relations law and 
policies could be traced back to the special and historical relations between Europe and SSA 
region. This sub-section is important for this, and also for another reason namely, to contribute 
to an understanding of the 'historical challenge' facing the EU in its quest to achieve coherence 
in the present and future dynamics of EU external action towards SSA especially if not 
addressed.53 Having said that, it is noteworthy that an extensive historical account is outside the 
scope of this thesis.54 For the purposes of this thesis and this sub-section, it suffices to shed light 
on the pertinent historical developments which are relevant to the matter at hand.  
 
2.2.4.1. SSA and Association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome 
If the background to EU external relations with SSA is the pre-integration historical relations 
                                                 
508 Miles is popularised as the shortest distance between Europe and Africa (see for example 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2011/09/03/rock-star-bob-geldof-raises-200-million-to-invest-in-
africa/, accessed 01 April 2014.  It follows that there are different degrees of proximity between the different 
regions of Africa and the European continent (for example, see the ENP discussed in Section 1.0 above). 
51See fn 49 above. 
52See fn 3 above. 
53As the European Commission posits, the Cotonou Agreement (i.e. the contemporary dimension of EU external 
relations with SSA) has to be understood in the context of colonisation (see the European Commission Document 
‘The Cotonou Agreement’, Brussels 2009, DV1, available at 
ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/.../cotonou_agreement_20091009.ppt, accessed 29 December 2010). In the 
same vein, the House of Lords also considers history important in understanding EU external relations law and 
policies towards SSA (see for example House of Lords European Union Committee, Thirty-Fourth Report of 
Session 2005 – 06 (Vol I: Report), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2006). However, it is noteworthy that this sub-section, is not concerned with what is commonly known as 
the familiar historical themes of “Gold, Glory, and the Gospel” (for that see author's cited at fn 49 above). 
54Ibid. 
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between the relevant ex-colonial EU Member States and SSA,55 it was France which brought 
the issue of the former to the negotiation for the Treaty of Rome. Indeed, out of the Six Founding 
Member States, only France had the deepest and the most relevant colonial experience with 
SSA, including Mali the country of case study in this thesis.56 Luxembourg had no colonial 
experience, while the Netherlands, Germany and Italy had what could be regarded as limited 
colonial experiences.57 On its part, Belgium had a relevant colonial experience58 albeit not as 
expansive as the experience of France in the region. France's interests in the region were 
extensive and included trade, development aid and political and military aid all under the French 
policy of assimilation.59 In general, France’s ‘familial’ relations with its former territories in 
SSA is well known and so strong60 that it has even been suggested that France tethered between 
                                                 
      55Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom were the main colonial powers in Sub-Saharan Africa (see 
for example Rouvez, fn 49 above). At the lower rung of the ladder, Germany, Spain and Italy, also have a colonial 
past in the region although their presence and the resulting ties were not so lasting. Finally, there are the other EU 
countries (the Netherland, the Nordic countries and the Central and Eastern European countries) with no colonial 
experience whatsoever in SSA. Indeed, some of the Central and Eastern European Countries were not independent 
at the time of colonialism. This is also the case with Luxembourg, which did not exist as an independent entity at 
the time of the colonial race. It follows that not all EU Member States have historical African policies. In general, 
while some of the new EU Member States have developed some national policies in SSA, these are mainly 
development aid related. 
56Then known as French Sudan and a part of what was known as French West Africa. Other colonial interest of 
France which it brought to the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome include other territories in French West Africa 
namely Senegal, Dahomey (known today as Benin Republic), Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, French Guinea 
(known today as Guinea), Upper Volta (known today as Burkina Faso); French Equatorial Africa (including Chad 
(also known as Tchad), Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangui-Sari);  French Togoland and French Somaliland  (see 
Okigbo, fn 4 above, p 26). 
57For historical accounts of Italy's colonial experience in Africa see for example, Raymond, B, The False Dawn: 
European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1975); Palumbo, P,  A 
Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from post-unification to present (Berkeley: University of 
California, 2003); Bosworth, R, Italy and the Wider World 1860 – 1960 (London: Routledge, 1996); Smith, D, 
Modern Italy, a political history (Yale University Press, 1969); Naylor, P, North Africa: A History from Antiquity 
to the Present (University of Texas Press, 2009); and Moore, M, Fourth Shore: Italy’s Mass Colonisation of Libya 
(London: George Routledge & Sons, 1940). For Germany, see for example, Colonial Problem (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1973); and Louis, H, The Cold War as History (OUP, 1967). Luxembourg, did 
not exist as an independent entity during the colonial race. Although the Netherlands had some colonial experience 
in the Republic of South Africa (RSA), the latter is outside the scope of this thesis as explained in Chapter One 
(see Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0., in particular fn 30) 
58Belgium's experience was mainly in the Congo where France also had a colonial experience (see Okigbo fn 4 
above, p 26). A historical account of Belgium's colonial experience is provided in most of the history text books 
cited in fn 49 above. 
59For a full historical account of these see for example Lynch, F, France and the International Economy: From 
Vichy to the Treaty of Rome (London: Routledge, 1997).  
60Indeed, both the French policy of association and the preceding policy of assimilation involved the concept of 
‘EurAfrican’ or ‘French family’ Indeed, ‘EurAfrican’ was not a mirage. Not only did France regard the ideas of 
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Europe and Africa, unable to choose which link should be privileged.61 In short, it suffices to 
state that France decided not to sacrifice its African interests, but rather sought to win on both 
sides.62 It successfully convinced the other five Founding Members of the Union, and the Six 
agreed to “the association of the Overseas Countries and Territories […]”63 as one of the 
activities of the ex-Community.64 Although France was later joined by Britain65 to promote the 
interests of SSA and the interests of Europe in the former at the EU, as discussed elsewhere in 
this thesis,66 their influence has not always been successful and has definitely not always been 
heeded even at the threat of incoherence. For while the need for the 'fusion of interest which is 
indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system' was embraced as declared 
                                                 
liberty, equality and fraternity born during the French Revolution as applicable to all men including its colonies, it 
in fact granted full civil and political rights of French citizens to the peoples’ of its colony with the latter remarkably 
participating in the French National Assembly (Onwubiko, K.B.C., School Certificate History of West Africa: AD 
1000–1800 (Book One) (Onitsha: Africana-Fep Publishers Limited, 1985) p 274).    
61Claeys, A, ‘‘Sense and sensibility’: the role of France and French interests in European development policy 
since 1957’ in Arts, K, and Dickson, A, (eds.) EU Development Cooperation: from model to symbol? (Manchester 
University Press, 2004), p 113, where the scholar also states more convincingly that the economic attractions of 
an integrated Europe could not outweigh France’s economic, political and symbolic interests in SSA. 
62Ibid. 
63Article 3(k) EEC. 
64Article 3(k) EEC. 
65That is following the latter's accession to the EC in 1973 by virtue of the Treaty between the Member States of 
the European Communities and the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, 
27 January 1972, in Documents concerning the accessions to the European Communities of the Kingdom of 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic. Volume II (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1987), p 21-24). Protocol 22 to the Acts of Accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark brought in the former British Commonwealth countries in Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) as 
co-parties with the original associates (listed in fn 56 above). This was the origin of the ACP group of States the 
formation of which was formalised in the 1975 Georgetown Agreement. Hence, while the first two association 
agreements namely Yaoundé I and Yaoundé II were between the EC and the countries of SSA listed in fn 56 above, 
the subsequent agreements were between the EU and members of the wider ACP Group of States (see Convention 
of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with 
that Community, signed at Yaoundé on 20 July 1963 (Yaoundé I) [1964] OJ L93/1430; Convention of Association 
between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that 
Community, signed on 29 July 1969 (Yaoundé II) [1970] OJ L282; Lomé I Convention [1976] OJ L25/1; Lomé II 
Convention [1980] OJ L347/1; Lomé III Convention [1986] OJ L86/3; and Lomé IV Convention [1989] OJ L229/1 
(amended [1998] OJ L156/3; and also Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other part 
(hereinafter the Cotonou Agreement) (2000) OJ L317/3 (First Revision (2005) OJ L287/1; Second Revision (2010) 
OJ L287/3).    
66See in general Chapter Six on the CSDP. 
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in the Schuman Declaration,67 same has not been extended to EU policies that evolved on the 
heels of the common economic system. This is especially visible in the CFSP and CSDP where 
the legal and institutional dynamics is yet to be fused in a way that the interest of one becomes 
the interest of all. As discussed in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis, this lack of fusion of 
interest in these policy fields implicates the coherence of EU external action especially towards 
SSA where the interface between security and development requires a coherent EU external 
action. In general, the lack of fusion gives room for the historical notions of ‘spheres of 
influence’ to come into play despite the active canvassing of the need to overcome this and to 
have a shared European vision of Africa.68 This may not necessarily be active, but also could 
play out as 'indifference' or 'deference' on the part of EU Member States that have no historical 
influence in SSA. Against this background, it can be argued that even though there is a potential 
for the construction of a more coherent EU external action towards the region69 in the light of 
the Lisbon changes, the long history of Europe’s relations with Africa also has buried in it the 
potentials for perpetuating the factors that militate against coherence in EU external action 
towards SSA.  
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that the aims and provisions of association was provided 
under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. The aim of association was “to promote the economic and 
social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations 
between them and the Community as a whole”.70 In general, the objectives of association under 
                                                 
67It is well known that European interests in Africa differed greatly in the colonial era and was often a source of 
conflict between the European countries (see for example Taylor, A, The struggle for mastery in Europe, 1848-
1918 (OUP, 1954); and Robinson, R, et al, Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan, 1961); also see Morel, 
E, Africa and the Peace of Europe (London: National Labour Press, 1917). While this was mainly between France 
and Britain, the latter did not accede to the Union until 1973 (see fn 65 above).  
68Vasconcelos, A, ‘Security for Africans’ (2007) 5 ESDP p 10. 
69By this is meant, the construction of a united whole (see 1.2. above). 
70Article 131 EEC. 
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Part IV covered trade and commerce,71 and aid and investment.72 However, the fluid and 
changing nature of what could be regarded as ‘sensitive obligations’73 were set out in an 
Implementing Convention of five years duration annexed to the Treaty of Rome.74 These 
obligations related mainly to trade and aid with the latter conducted by way of a European 
Development Fund (EDF).75  Trade and aid were the only sectoral policies at this time, and they 
were entwined in an internal fusion of interest of the Member States within the EU framework.76 
Essentially, the issue of coherence had not yet arisen at this stage. It can be argued that this was 
because of the narrow and particularly limited areas of policy at this time. Indeed, trade and 
development were entwined in EU external relations with SSA in a way that the two are 
sometimes considered one and the same.77  
 
In any event, whatever the implications of the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome and 
the Implementing Convention concerning trade between the Founding Six and the associates,78 
                                                 
71Arts 133 and 134 EEC; arts 184 and 185 EC; now arts 200 and 201 TFEU. 
72Art 132(3) and (4) EEC; art 183(3) and (4) EC; now art 199(3) and (4) TFEU. 
73Bartels (b), fn 31 above), p 133. 
74Art 136 EEC; art 187 EC; now art 203 TFEU; it should be noted that the association was not actually favoured 
by all the other five founding Member States of the EEC at the beginning. For, while Belgium and Italy were in 
support of France’s association proposal, Germany and The Netherlands were intransigent in their opposition to 
what they regarded as colonial problems (Werts, J, The European Council (The Hague: TMC Asser Institute, 1992), 
p 14). Accordingly, the eventual compromise reached amounted to the principle that “application to the EEC Treaty 
to the […] colonies would be recognised in that Treaty while the details of what this in fact meant would be worked 
out in a separate protocol”.   
75The EDF was established for development assistance to the associates. These funds were almost entirely used 
for ‘capital aid programmes to develop physical infrastructure such as roads, hospitals and schools’ (see European 
Commission External Service, 'Taking Europe to the World: 50 Years of the European Commission’s External 
Service', 2004, p 15). Other aspects of association under Part IV were with regards to the right of establishment 
and free movement of workers. 
76See Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. 
77Ibid. Indeed, the view has been expressed that trade is development (European Commission, 'How economic 
partnership agreements benefit both consumers and producers in Europe and developing countries', p 2, available 
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_151010.pdf, accessed, 12 January, 2014). However, this 
is debatable, and it may be more correct to speak of development through trade (see for example Orbie, J, ‘EU 
Trade and Development Policy: On Pyramids and Spaghetti Bowls’ (2007) LX Studia Diplomatica 1,  p 109; also 
see Khaliq, U, U, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign policy of the European Union: a Legal Appraisal (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p 130 where he makes reference to trade-driven poverty alleviation; and further Chapter 
Three and Chapter Four of this thesis).  
 
78See Chapter Four of this thesis on EU trade policy towards SSA. 
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for practical purposes, the associated territories considered themselves as belonging to the 
European customs union.79 Indeed, the modalities of the progressive tariff reduction pursuant 
to the relevant Articles of the Treaty of Rome also applied to them.80 In all effects, the protection 
of the internal market via the CCP protected both the Founding Six and the Associates. 
Nevertheless, this was the practical beginnings of what would evolve as EU external relations 
law.81 The relevant constitutional principles of the EU82 required a different legal arrangement 
between the EU and the Associates at the latter's Independence.83   
 
2.2.4.2. SSA and Association beyond Part IV of the Treaty of Rome 
Beyond the provisions of association under Part IV, the Treaty of Rome also provided under 
Article 238 EEC, for associations “characterised by reciprocal rights and obligations, common 
actions, and special procedures.”84 Arguably, this was in anticipation of the imminent political 
and juridical change in the status of the SSA associates whose independence were looming at 
                                                 
79Okigbo fn 4 above, p 32. 
80For a detailed account of this see in general Bartels (a) and Bartels (b), fn 31 above; also see Chapter Four of 
this thesis on EU trade policy towards SSA.  
81Even the EU Delegation began in this context with the required physical presence of the EU Commission for 
the purposes of administering and accounting for the EDF (see Commission External Action Service, fn 75 above). 
82See Section 2.3. below for the relevant constitutional principles of EU external relations.  
83At the time of signing the Treaty of Rome, the associates were not sovereign or independent and therefore did 
not possess the legal capacity required to engage in a legal relationship, hence their association as dependent 
territories under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. As classically defined in the Island of Palmas case (1928) 22 AJIL 
875): “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in a portion of the globe 
is the right to exercise therein to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” It has been suggested 
that the Implementing Convention was limited to 5 years because of the prevailing uncertainty at the time, 
especially regarding the political and juridical development of the associated territories. Indeed, at the time of the 
Treaty of Rome, the wind of independence was already blowing. In fact, some of the British colonies had already 
(re)gained their independence, hence predicting the likelihood of the same with regards to all the other colonial 
territories in SSA. Although ex-British colonies gained independence earlier than the ex-colonies of other relevant 
EU Member States, they were not parties to the first two agreements due to Britain's late accession to the EC in 
1973 (see fn 65 above).  
84This provision is now enshrined in Article 217 TFEU (ex -Article 310 EC). This is different from the new 
express provision on international agreements under Article 216TFEU. The latter do not require the establishment 
of an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure (for a 
breakdown of these elements which has never been officially explained see Macleod, fn 44 above).  
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the time of signing of the Treaty of Rome.85 However, such argument would be too simplistic 
especially in the light of the fact that this provision provides that association agreements under 
this provision may be concluded with 'one or more third countries or international organisations 
agreements'. Hence while EU external relations may have practically commenced with SSA, it 
will not be entirely correct to say that this was the only external relations anticipated by the 
Founding Treaty. Indeed, there was also a provision regarding agreements relating to the CCP 
and a provision on co-operation with various international organisations including the United 
Nations and its specialised agencies, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).86 The difference between these other provisions on 
external relations and the provision on association agreement is that the former two are more 
precise and specific than the latter in terms of the scope of EU competence.87 In the case of 
'association agreement', no definition at all is provided about what it might contain nor is there 
any reference given regarding its parameters.88 Thus an association agreement has the potential 
to accommodate all and every subject matter area. In general, association agreements provide 
an instrumental space for ‘an all-embracing framework to conduct bilateral relations.’89 They 
therefore have no policy coverage limits and can accommodate any and every field of EU 
external action covered by the Treaties.90 Indeed, from all indications, an association agreement 
                                                 
85This is considered, even if controversially, the framework for the post-independence association of the 
independent SSA countries which were previously associated under Part IV. In any event, it eventually became the 
veritable framework for EU external relations relations with the countries of SSA. 
86Article 220 TFEU (ex Article 302 to 304 EC).  
87Although, the scope of the CCP may not be quite precise, there is at least an indication of what it is about. On 
the meaning of EU competence and the scope of EU external competence (see 2.3. below). 
88See Eeckhout, P, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (OUP, 
2004), p 103 who explains that the text of the provision on association under Article 217 TFEU (ex -Article 310) 
TEU as set out in the previous page is not a model of clear drafting but merely highlights the structural components 
while being silent on the substance (see fn 83 above). 
89European External Action Service, ‘Association Agreements’, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/association/, 
accessed 30 March 2014. 
90See for example Case C-12/86 Demirel v StadtSchwäbischGmünd [1987] ECR 3719; [1989] 1 CMLR. In this 
regard, Eeckhout explains that ‘it is only in the context of association that one sees the full and complete external 
dimension of [EU] policies.’ Eeckhout, fn 88 above, p 103. 
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could even cover a field of activity that is not necessarily provided for in the Treaties.91 This 
has allowed the evolution of EU relations with SSA beyond trade and aid to include political 
objectives,92 and other wider responsibilities which arose as a corollary to the EU's position as 
a powerful polity.93 Pertinently, with the evolution of EU objectives the need for coherence 
between the distinct policies bearing the objectives also arose.94 The following section traces 
the evolution of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and policies through 
the evolution of EU external competences. It also provides a necessary background to the 
subsequent overview of coherence as it relates to EU objectives towards SSA.95 
 
2.3. The requirement of coherence in context: of the evolution of EU external 
competences  
 
The context of this thesis namely EU external action towards SSA was introduced in Chapter 
One of this thesis.96 In contrast, this section places the requirement of coherence in EU external 
relations with SSA in context. In this regard, it discusses the evolution of EU external 
competences. It is within these contexts that the evolution of the requirement of coherence is 
discussed. 
 
                                                 
91Illustrative is the pre-Maastricht EU development cooperation policy which was not provided for in the Treaties 
but has been at the core of the successive agreements between EU and SSA (See Chapter Three of this thesis). 
92This began with the introduction of human rights in Article 5 of Lomé IV (see Chapter Four of this thesis). As 
will be recalled from Chapter One of this thesis, Lomé IV is the 6th successive association agreement (signed in 
1989) in the context of EU external relations with SSA (see 1.0. above, especially fn 28). 
93European Commission, Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness 
and Visibility, COM (2006) 278 Final, 3-4.  For a discussion of EU objectives towards SSA, see 2.4. below. 
94Significantly, this did not commence with the interaction between trade policy and development policy which 
were originally at the heart of EU external relations with SSA. These were traditionally entwined in the context of 
EU external relations with SSA in a way that portrayed EU development policy and EU trade policy towards SSA 
as one and the same policy (see 2.2.4.1. above).   
95At 2.4. below. 
96See 1.0. above. 
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2.3.1. The EU's capacity to act externally and the evolution of EU external competences 
The EU and the ex-Communities on which it is founded are creations of international law which 
owe their existence to the will of the Member States as expressed in the constitutive Treaties.97 
Hence, they have no inherent sovereign powers.98 The 'powers' or competences99 of the Union 
are 'conferred'100 on it by the Member States.101 This principle of ‘conferral’102 as entwined with 
the notion of competence in the Treaties103 holds the implication that only limited powers are 
conferred on the EU.104 Effectively, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set 
out therein.105 The principle of conferral applies to external competences of the Union,106 and 
external competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member 
                                                 
97The question of the legal personality or the international legal capacity of the Union has been rendered obsolete 
by the Treaty of Lisbon.By virtue of a combination of Article 1 TEU and Article 47 TEU. As Khaliq explains: “In 
international law, personality is the basic proposition that an entity whether it is a state, intergovernmental 
organisation or person, has in specific context some legal capacity.” (Khaliq, fn 77 above, p 20); also see Khaliq, 
U, 'Treaty Conflict and the European Union, or Conflicting Perspective on the European Union?' (2012) ELRev. 
495, at 498-9; and Sari, A, 'The Conclusion of International Agreement in the Context of the CSDP' (2008) 57 
ICLQ 53, for how this question was settled even before Lisbon by virtue of implied legal personality. However, 
this may not have laid to rest the question of whether the EU is a classic international organisation or not. 
Nevertheless, despite this debate, there is no doubt that the EU is not a state (see for example, the German cases 
Maastricht [1994] 1CMLR 57; and Lisbon [2010] 3 CMLR 13, 276 where the EU is defined as a Staatenverbund 
(a German word for the association of sovereign states); and for a recent discussion of the EU as a Staatenverbund 
see in general, Guastaferro, B, 'The European Union as a Staatenverbund? The endorsement of the principle of 
conferral in the Treaty of Lisbon' in Trybus and Rubini, fn 26 above, p 117). 
98Macleod, fn 44 above, p 39-40. 
99The legal power to act or ‘jurisdiction’ - which is what ‘competence’ will directly translate to, from its origin in 
the French legal term la competence; also see Orebech, P, ‘The EU Competency Confusion: Limits, “Extension 
Mechanisms”, Split Power, and “Institutional Clashes”’, (2003) 13 JTLP 1, p 107. 
100Or 'attributed' (of course, this dates back to the ex-Communities).  
101See Article 5 (2) TEU (ex-Article 5 TEU). 
102Also known as the principle of attribution. However, since ‘conferral’ is the term employed in the Treaties, it 
is employed in this analysis for ease of reference. Indeed conferral, is the term used in international law (see for 
example Sarooshi, D, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (OUP, 2005), 
especially Chapter 3). Hence the principle is not only a fundamental principle of EU external relations, but also of 
international law. In international law, only states possess the totality of rights and duties (see Advisory Opinion, 
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Reports 174, 179). This statement 
is not to suggest that international law has been accepted as supreme to EU legal order (see for example fn 212 
below). 
103Article 5 TEU (ex-Article 5 EC as amended). 
104Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.  
105Article 5TEU (ex-Article 5 EC).  
106As it applies to the internal (Opinion 2/94 Accession by Communities to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR 1-1759). 
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States.107 However, this is not to say that the scope of EU external competences or the 
delineation of competence between the EU and the Member States is always clear cut.108 The 
situation remains same post as pre-Lisbon despite the express delineation of competences in the 
Treaties.109 According to De Witte, this lack of clarity in the delineation of competence between 
the EU and the Member States renders the field of EU external relations a clear case of politics 
versus law.110 Indeed, from all indications, the field of EU external relations law and policies is 
located in a grey zone of complex interaction between law and politics.111 Negotiating this 
complex interaction has meant embracing flexibility and pragmatism albeit not without 
unavoidably staking the determination of certainty in almost every aspect of EU external 
relations law and policies including the requirement of coherence.112 It has been suggested that 
flexibility, which sometimes entail differentiation actually strengthens unity.113 However, 
whether this is always the case is another question altogether. For it can be argued that while 
flexibility can aid institutional and instrumental malleability for the achievement of EU objectives 
and the requirement of coherence, it can also mar same.114 In any event, it also cannot be left 
                                                 
107Article 5 TEU (ex-Article 5 EC as amended); Article 4 TEU and Article 2 TFEU. 
108On the expansion of the scope of EU competence beyond the express competences see 2.3.2. below. In contrast, 
the nature of EU competence (that is whether it is exclusive, shared or indeterminate) is discussed in the relevant 
sections of the subsequent Chapters of this thesis. On another note, Article 1 TEU (ex-Article 1 TEU as amended) 
has rendered obsolete the question of division of competence between the ex-Community and the EU (Case C-
176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR 1-7879, para 40; and C-440/05 Commission v Council [2007] ECR 1-
0000, at para 54).  
109See Article 3TFEU (on EU exclusive competences), Article 4 TFEU (on shared competences), Article 6 TFEU 
(on supporting, coordinating and complementing competences), and Article 5 TFEU (competences to provide 
arrangements within which EU Member States must coordinate policies). Indeed, it cannot be said with certainty 
what is the exact meaning of these different types of EU competences. 
110De Witte, B, ‘Politics versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic Minorities’, in Zielonka, J, (ed.), Europe 
Unbound. Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002), 137-160. 
111See for example, Holdgaard, R, External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and 
Legal Discourses (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008), p where he explains that EU external relations 
law cannot be studied or applied without a constant awareness of the underlying political dynamics. In general, 
the EU is sui generis (Denza, E, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the EU (OUP, 2002), p 1; and also De Baere, G, 
Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (OUP, 2008), p 1). In the same vein, some of the Union's modus 
operandi are also sui generis (see for example, Chapter Five of this thesis). 
112See 2.5. below. 
113See in general, De Witte, B, et al (ed.), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 
2001). 
114See Chapter Five on the CFSP, Chapter Six on the CSDP, and Chapter Seven on the JAES. 
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unsaid that an understanding of the limits of the EU's competences in the light of its status as a 
Staatenverbund115 is crucial to an understanding of the limits of EU law. This is for all purposes 
including in relation to prescribed requirements such as coherence. As Thym explains, the 
Staatenverbund continues to serve as the conceptual underpinning of the derivative character of 
the EU legal order where ultimate authority rests with the Member States.116 With specific regards 
to coherence, Khaliq emphasises the crucial place of the Member States when it comes to the 
needed sacrifices for coherence in EU external action.117 It is not clear where these leave the 
legally correct affirmation that coherence is contingent on the principle of conferral and its 
corollary, namely the question of legal basis.118  Or perhaps, it is?119 
 
2.3.2. The evolution of EU external competences and the requirement of coherence 
thereto120 
 
The reasons for the EU's foray into external relations has been discussed above. However, for 
all that has been said, EU external competences have evolved with integration. This has been 
achieved through successive Treaty amendments and also through the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
                                                 
115See fn 97 above. 
116Thym, D, “In the name of Sovereign Statehood: a Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgement of the German 
Constitutional Court” (2009) 46 CMLRev. 1795, at 1799; also see Koutrakos, P, ‘Primary law and policy in EU 
external relations-moving away from the big picture’ (2008) 33 EL Rev 666 at 674-676); also see Holdgaard, fn 
111 above. 
117See for example Khaliq, U, 'The Treaty of Lisbon and the future of European law and policy' in Trybus and 
Rubini fn 26 above, p 260; and also Khaliq, fn 7 above, p 139. Having said that, it is noteworthy that not all aspects 
of the requirement of coherence in the context of EU external relations law and policies are easy to determine (see 
2.5. below). 
118See Franklin, C, ‘The budgeoning principle of consistency in EU law’ (2011) 30 YEL 1, p 60-61. It is 
noteworthy that this is often referred to as either ‘legal base’ or ‘legal basis’ in various academic literatures. Both 
are used interchangeably in this thesis. The requirement for a legal basis applies to both internal and external 
action. For the relevance of legal basis to the coherence discourse see 2.3.3. below.  
119See 2.3.3. below; and also in general 2.5. below; and Chapters Three to Six of this thesis. 
120As mentioned in Chapter One, the issue of vertical coherence which arises in the context of the interaction 
between EU and the Member States in the exercise of their competences is outside the scope of this thesis (see 1.2. 
above). In contrast a discussion of the scope of EU external competence is an aspect of this thesis. The latter is 
part of the background for the discussion of the evolution of EU objectives towards SSA, as it is for the discussion 
of the requirement of coherence both in EU external action in general, and towards SSA in particular.  
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with the former in fact often inspired by the latter. Indeed, despite the general Staatenverbund 
status of the EU, there is room to admit that there is a kind of dialogue between the ECJ and the 
Member States acting as constituante on the external competences of the Union.121  
 
Pertinently, on the heels of the evolution of EU external competences is also the evolution of 
the requirement of coherence in EU external action. Indeed, as mentioned above,122 although 
coherence prima facie gained attention in the build up to and in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the question of coherence has a long history in EU external relations law and practice.123  
 
The external competences explicitly conferred on the ex-Community by the Treaty of Rome 
were limited. As mentioned above, these include competences to conclude and enter into 
agreements relating to the CCP, to conclude association agreements, and to co-operate with 
various international organisations. However, there was also a general competence under 
Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome.124 By virtue of this provision, the EU can act where the 
Treaties have not provided the necessary powers but an action was necessary “within the 
framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the 
Treaties”.125 In Case 22/70 (ERTA), the ECJ established that this provision also applies to 
external action.126  
 
                                                 
121See Jan Kuijper, P, 'Fifty Years of EC/EU External Relations: Continuity and the Dialogue between Judges and 
Member States as Constitutional Legislators' (2007) 31 FILJ 6, p 1572; also see in general, Orebech, fn 99 above; 
and p 55 below, especially fn 152 on the judicially birthed principle of implied competence.  
122At 1.0. above. 
123Nevertheless, the requirement of coherence does not date back to the Treaty of Rome for obvious reasons. 
124Article 352 TFEU (Ex-Article 308 EC). 
125See for example inter alia, Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 13; and Case C-
271/94 Parliament v Council [1996] ECR I-1689, paragraph 13. 
126It has been suggested that this was the legal basis for the post-Treaty of Rome association agreements between 
EU and SSA (see Djamson, E, The Dynamics of Euro-African Co-operation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 
p 70-71).  
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Beyond the Treaty of Rome, the evolution of EU external competences began with the SEA. 
This extended EU external competence to two other areas namely, environment127 and research 
and technological development.128 It also formalised the previously informal EPC by giving it 
a Treaty status.129 According to Guattier, the two faces of the coherence principle130 were laid 
down by the SEA at this point.131 Indeed, with the formalisation of a dual EU external relations 
also came the formalisation of the requirement of coherence. This was couched in Article 30(5) 
SEA as follows: 'The external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in 
[EPC] must be consistent.' However, even prior to the SEA, ‘an embryonic form of the 
coherence requirement’132 had been formed on the recognition that the EPC and the other formal 
fields of external relations could not operate in total isolation from each other.133 The coherence 
requirement was pursued by way of an institutional link between the two mechanisms.134 This 
was an early illustration of the recognition of the role of institutions in enhancing the coherence 
of EU external action. Indeed, there is no doubt that institutions can enhance the coherence of 
EU external action, especially where there is political will, including on the part of Member 
States.135 Significantly, both,136 to a varying extent set the pace for the evolution of the 
requirement of coherence, as they do the external competences of the Union.137 
 
                                                 
127Article 191 (ex-Article 174(4) EC). 
128Articles 180(b) and 186 (ex Articles 164(b) and 170 EC). 
129Article 1 (sub-paragraph 3) and Title III SEA; also see 2.2.3. above. 
130Vertical and horizontal coherence (see 1.3. above). 
131Gauttier, P, ‘Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the European Union’ (2004) 10 ELJ, p 
23-41.  
132Koutrakos, P, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 10. 
133Ibid. 
134The key institution in this regard was the European Council (see 2.5. below). Although it was neither then nor 
contemporarily listed as an institution in the Treaties, the European Council was also accorded Treaty Status in the 
SEA (Article 2 SEA).  
135As discussed in the different Chapters on policy case study, the Member States and the institutions have 
different levels of political influence depending on the policy at stake. In any event, whether they can 'ensure' 
coherence as provided in the Treaties is another question entirely (see 2.5.1.1. below).  
136The EU and the Member States. 
137See fn 135 above.   
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Subsequent to the SEA, the next express expansion of the external competence of the Union 
was at Maastricht. The Maastricht Treaty established the CFSP as it morphed from the EPC. It 
also codified development cooperation policy.138 Furthermore, it added some sectors in which 
EU and Member States could cooperate with third countries and competent international 
organisations. 139 However, it was the legally and procedurally distinct CFSP that upped the 
stakes for coherence. In contrast to the informal EPC and ex-Community dichotomy, a structure 
akin to a 'Chinese wall' was erected between the CFSP and the non-CFSP external relations by 
virtue of ex-Article 47 TEU. This Article provided that the CFSP shall not affect the non-CFSP 
external relations under the ex-Community. A provision on coherence under ex-Article 
3(2)TEU required the coherence of EU external activities as a whole in the context of its 
external relations, security, economic and development policies. Furthermore, a ground was 
also laid for what is contemporarily known as Policy Coherence for Development (PCD).140 
This was done by way of a specific provision requiring the Union to take account of the 
objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to 
affect development countries.141 Essentially, PCD is about the coherence of the objectives of 
other EU external policies with the objectives of development policy.142 
 
In so far as the distinction between the non-CFSP and CFSP external action is mainly legal and 
procedural, the requirement of coherence was pursued by means of a 'single institutional 
                                                 
138Articles 208 - 211 (ex-Articles 177 – 181 EC).  This is a codification of what was already in practice say for 
example in EU external relations with SSA (see 3.1. below).  
139These include education under Article 165 TFEU (ex-Article 149(3) EC); vocational trainings under Article 
166(3) TFEU (ex -Article 150(3) EC); culture under Article 167 TFEU (ex- Article 151(3) EC); and public health 
under Article 168 TFEU (ex-Article 152(3) EC). 
140See 2.5.1.1.2.; and 2.5.2. below. 
141Ex-Article 178 EC (Article 130v of Maastricht Treaty).   
142A requirement quite different from the general requirement for the coherence of EU external policies (see 
2.5.1.1.2.; and 2.5.2. below).  
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framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out'.143 
The essence of this provision is that the same set of institutions applies to both the political 
dimension of external relations and the economic dimension.144 Suffice it to state that while this 
arrangement is not a window dressing, the institutions were not functionally fused for the 
purposes of the CFSP and non-CFSP external action. Institutional competences were, and have 
remained clearly delineated between these two dimensions of EU external action145 which at all 
times are legally and procedurally separate.146  
 
The Amsterdam Treaty more visibly extended the CCP competence of the EU to cover 
international agreements in the areas of services and intellectual property. However, it is 
arguable that it also considerably started the legal evolution of the military side of the CFSP 
namely the CSDP. Indeed, it included a provision147 drafted to permit the Union to work with 
or through the Western European Union (WEU).148 As discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis, 
this is the evolutionary path of what eventually emerged as the EU's CSDP competence at 
Lisbon. The Nice amendment which followed Amsterdam provided the first leg on the ladder 
for CSDP crisis management149 which was also concretised at Lisbon. Through all the above 
                                                 
143Ex-Article 3 TEU.  
144The Lisbon amendments has rendered obsolete the debate surrounding the single institutional framework and 
its implications (for the debate see for example, Wessel, R, The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy: A 
Legal Institutional Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999, p 74-75); Everling, U, 'Reflections on the Structure of 
the European Union' (1992) CMLRev., 1053 – 1077; Curtin, D, M, 'The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A 
Europe of Bits and Pieces' (1993) CMLRev., 17-67; Curtin, D, M, and Dekker, I, F, 'The European Union as a 
'Layered' International Organisation: Institutional Unity in Disguise' in Craig, P, and De Burca, G, (eds.) European 
Union Law: An Evolutionary Perspective (OUP, 1999); Kapteyn and Verloren Van Themaat, fn 18 above, p 310-
311). 
145Institutional competences in the context of the different policies are discussed in the relevant substantive 
Chapters on the distinct EU policies towards SSA (see Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six of this thesis). 
146See Chapter Five of this thesis for the CFSP procedure. 
147Ex-Article 17(2) TEU.  
148The now defunct Western European Union (WEU) was a regional organisation formed by the European 
Member States of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Turkey. For further information on the 
WEU see http://www.weu.int/, accessed 25 February 2011.  
149See Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts [2001] OJ C80/01, and in particular Article 1(2) amending ex-Article 17 
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successive Treaty amendments, the provisions on coherence remained the same as introduced 
at Maastricht Treaty although policy coherence for development continued to evolve outside 
the Treaties. It is not until Lisbon that the legal requirement of coherence was again revisited. 
Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter One, the Lisbon amendment was more about addressing the 
issues surrounding the coherence discourse than about any other aspect of external action. 
 
In general, the Lisbon amendment as it relates to EU competence is both minimal and expansive 
at the same time. It is minimal with regards to the expansion of express EU competence. In this 
regard, it mainly codified what were already in practice150 and pertinently constitutionalised the 
CSDP.151 In contrast, the expansive dimension of the Lisbon amendment as it relates to the EU's 
external competence stems from the constitutionalisation of the doctrine of implied competence 
under Article 216(1) TFEU. This provides for EU competence to act externally: 
  
“where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is 
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one 
of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding 
Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.”152  
 
                                                 
TEU. The other amendments of this Treaty are outside the scope of this analysis. 
150For example, it expanded the CCP to cover Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Article 91(1)(a) TFEU (ex-
Article 71(1)(a) EC)), and codified the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (by virtue of a new Article 8 TEU) 
and humanitarian aid (by virtue of Article 214 TFEU). Similar to the pre-Maastricht practice of EU development 
policy (see 3.1. below), EU humanitarian policy previously had no Treaty basis and was implemented as an aspect 
of development cooperation policy following the latter's codification at Maastricht (see for example De Baere, fn 
111 above, p 15 where he referred to this as dubious). This practice which in principle runs contrary to the principle 
of conferral (discussed at 2.3.1. above) and the attendant requirement of a legal basis for EU competence to act 
(see 2.3.3. below) is a clear example of the flexibility and pragmatism of EU external relations law and policies 
(2.3.1. above).  
151Previously the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP). 
152This was based on the recommendation of the External Action Working Group that there should be a Treaty 
provision to reflect the case law of the Court of Justice (CONV 459/02, Final Report of Working Group VII on 
External Action, Brussels, 16 Dec 2002, detailed report of discussions, para 18). The pertinent cases include Case 
22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263; Kramer (Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer 
[1976] ECR 1279; Opinion 2/91(Re ILO Convention 170) [1993] ECR 1-1061; and Opinion 1/03 Lugano 
Convention [2006] ECR 1-1145 (which is extensively analysed by in Koutrakos, P, ‘Current Developments: 
European Union Law’, (2010) 59 ICLQ p 482). 
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Overall, it could be concluded that the scope of EU external competence traverses the express 
EU external competences, the internal competences of the EU as they may be affected by the 
former, and in fact any action that could contribute to achieving the whole gamut of EU 
objectives153 and values.154  The legal implication of this is that it can no longer be said with 
confidence to what extent the outer limits of these powers in practice, are definable. Indeed, it 
is arguably apparent that the laws have the potential of expansion to accommodate the dynamics 
for the achievement of the Union's international objectives. In the light of this nearly indefinite 
scope of EU external competence, it can be argued that the question regarding whether EU 
external competences should be increased155 is a question that may relate more to the internal 
dimension of EU policies than the external. With regards to the latter, a more pertinent question 
is how to make a coherent whole of the existing external competences which clearly traverse 
all fields of external policy as are derivable from the relevant legal basis.  
 
2.3.3. The question of the legal basis for the exercise of EU external competences and its 
imperative for coherence   
 
As mentioned above, the corollary to the principle of conferral is that there must be a legal basis 
for any EU action.156 This applies to EU external action.157 A legal basis can be either 
                                                 
153This is including, but not limited to the express external objectives under Article 21(2) TEU (discussed at 2.4.1 
below). In this regard, also see the general EU objectives enshrined in Article 3 TEU. 
154Although values are prima facie similar to objectives, the former is usually at the heart of or the driving force 
of the latter. EU values are mainly enshrined in Article 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities.” They could also be found in the Preamble to the Treaties.  
155A panel on the topic ‘Reforming the EU: Fewer or More Competencies?’ was proposed for the University of 
Birmingham Institute of European Law 4th Conference on European Law & Policy in Context, 26th - 27th June 
2014, Birmingham Law School). Having said that, it is necessary to keep in mind that the expansion of EU 
competence does not mean that the Member States are stripped of their competences in those areas of EU 
competence.  
156At p 50, in particular fn 118. The legal basis is 'often' referred to in the relevant decision or implementing 
measure.  
157Ibid. Indeed, the choice of legal basis is so constitutionally significant that an incorrect legal basis will lead to 
invalidation of an act, and in the context of external action will create complications both at “EU level and in the 
international legal order” (Opinion in Case C-2/00 Cartegena Protocol [1996] ECR 1-1759; also see for example 
Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR I-3651). In the context of international agreements, invalidated agreements 
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substantive or procedural, and can sometimes bear both imports in terms of the power it confers. 
Substantive attribution has to do with the empowerment or legal authorisation to act in certain 
fields or in furtherance of certain objectives as identified in the legal basis. Procedural 
attribution has to do with the required procedure or specified legal means for doing the things 
authorised.158 In any event, legal basis holds constitutional and practical importance to the issue 
of horizontal coherence. This is because the legal basis for each policy is the pivot which the 
legal scope of distinct policies, their procedures and institutional aspects revolve around.159 
These are important aspects of the coherence discourse and are relevant for answering the 
research questions, even if only to a certain extent, in the light of the flexibility attendant to the 
limits of the law and the constraints of politics in EU external action as indicated above.160 
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that the legal basis for EU external action is not restricted to 
the provisions of the Treaties. As indicated earlier, association agreements are overall 
frameworks that could bring together disparate objectives and different fields of EU policy and 
even import fields not codified in the Treaties. Significantly, once agreed, the provisions of 
association agreements become integral parts of EU law.161 In effect, not only are they capable 
of having direct effect in EU legal order,162 they also provide legal basis for EU external action 
                                                 
are nonetheless to be binding on the EU in order to protect third parties and to comply with the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I – 3641, at para 
25).  
158Dashwood, A, ‘The attribution of external relations competence’ in Dashwood, A, and Hillion, C, The General 
Law of EU External Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p 121. 
159Opinion in Case C-133/06 Parliament v Council [2006] OJ C108/12, at para 32; also see Cremona, M, 
‘Defining competence in EU external relations: lessons from the Treaty reform process’ in Dashwood, A, and 
Maresceau, M, (eds.) Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 39.  
160See 2.3.1. above. 
161See in particular Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 157 above, para 37-38; also see Macleod, fn 44 above, p 368.  
162See for example, Case 469/93 AmministrazionedelleFinanzedelloStato Chiquita Italia [1995] ECR 1-4533, 
para 40; and Case C-87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze (Brescaini) 
[1976] ECR 0129. It is noteworthy that the general legal effect of association agreement on the parties to the 
agreement is not clear. For example, with specific regards to the Cotonou Agreement, it should be noted that 
although the relationship is said to be contractual (Green Paper on Relations between EU and ACP on the Eve of 
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towards the relevant third parties. This is significant because the substance of an association 
agreement depends on the consensual agreement of the EU and the Member States on the one 
hand,163 and the relevant third party on the other hand. Perhaps, even more significant is the fact 
that provisions of an association agreement arguably cuts across primary substantive legal basis 
and secondary implementing legal basis.164 Illustrative is the Cotonou Agreement signed in the 
context of EU external relations with SSA as ruled in the ECOWAS case.165  However, as the 
ECJ established in Portugal v Council, this is not to say that the mere inclusion of provisions 
for cooperation in a specific field in an agreement predetermines the legal basis of EU acts for 
implementing cooperation in such a field.166 Suffice it so state that there is room for flexibility 
and pragmatism even with regards to the question of legal basis despite the principle of 
conferral. Of course, this makes it difficult to determine the extent of the impact of legal basis 
on the question of coherence. In any event, in so far as the thesis is primarily based on a legal 
analysis, the legal basis for the relevant policies examined in this thesis are discussed in the 
relevant Chapters.  
 
                                                 
21st century, Chapter 2, Part 6), the EU insists that its obligations toward the ACP did not tie its hands in its external 
commercial policies in any way (see Ravenhill, J, 'Europe's Relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of Countries: Back to the Nest?' in Aggarwal, V, and Forgaty, E, (ed.), EU Trade Strategies: Between 
Regionalism and Globalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p 121).  
163Even though the Treaties expressly provide that it is the EU that may conclude an association agreement, the 
Member States are fully involved and shares the competence (see Case 87/75 Bresciani fn 162 above). This is 
made possible by the legal phenomenon of mixity – a legal phenomenon peculiar to EU external relations law, and 
perhaps one of the aspects of the law and practice of EU external relations that render this field of legal studies 
incomprehensible and impenetrable by traditional legal standards (see for example, Holdgaard, fn 111 above, p 2). 
For further analysis of mixity see Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.3.1.  
     164The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has confirmed the possibility of a legal distinction between 
a legal basis for the conclusion of an international agreement and a legal basis for implementation (Opinion 1/94 
Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of 
intellectual property (WTO) [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, at para 29; Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR 1-
6177 at para 47 and 67). Depending on their wording and context, the provisions of an agreement may constitute 
a substantive legal basis for their implementation (Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council, para 67).  
165Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 157 above. In this case, the Council argued that the Union’s contribution to 
combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons falls under the CFSP. In 
contrast, the Commission contended that it falls under development policy, and hence ought to have its legal basis 
in the Cotonou Agreement.  
166Case C-268/94 fn 164 above, para 47. 
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2.4. Coherence of what? EU objectives towards SSA: the Cotonou Agreement and 
beyond 
 
The three evolutionary aims of EU external action discussed above are the pivots which the 
Union's external action policies and their objectives revolve around. In general, those initial 
objectives represent the core EU external policies namely Trade (CCP), development 
cooperation, the CFSP and the CSDP. Indeed, while EU external policies have many 
dimensions, the wide scope of these four core policy areas means that the other external policies 
could mainly be categorised as aspects of these core four policies.167 More significantly, by 
virtue of the Lisbon amendment, there is a new dimension to the pre-Lisbon dispensation where 
each EU external policy had its objective expressly attached to its provision or related 
provision(s) in the Treaties.  
 
2.4.1. The amalgamated objectives of EU external action  
 
One other significant change made at Lisbon which is pertinent to the coherence discourse is 
the amalgamation of the objectives of EU external action under Article 21(2) TEU.168 This 
                                                 
167For example, EU humanitarian aid policy and environmental policy can be categorised as aspects of EU 
development policy (indeed, see fn 150 above). Furthermore, human rights is a cross-cutting policy and an aspect 
of both the CFSP and development policy.  
168“2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of 
cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, 
security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; (d) foster the 
sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of 
eradicating poverty; (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; (f) help develop international measures to preserve and 
improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to 
ensure sustainable development; (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made 
disasters; and (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance.” This provision of Article 21(2) recaptures Article 3(5) TEU: “In its relations with the wider world, 
the Union shall […] contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular 
the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” 
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amalgamation of all EU external objectives under one provision hold the connotation that these 
objectives can be pursued through any of the EU external policies. In fact, Article 21(3) TEU 
explicitly provides for this.169 This stands to reason in the light of the cognisable influential 
interface between the different EU external policy objectives despite their distinct functional 
aspects. With specific regards to coherence, Koutrakos explains that the bringing together of 
different fields of EU external action within a common framework pursuing a set of common 
values, principles and objectives under Article 21(2) TEU is aimed at facilitating coherence.170 
However, it is noteworthy that this alignment of the different fields of external action under 
Article 21(2) TEU at Lisbon does not mean that there are, de facto, no more express distinct 
EU policy objectives.171 Suffice it to state that Article 21(2) and (3) TEU unnerves the historical 
rigid distinction between the CFSP and the non-CFSP external action.172  
 
Nevertheless, it will be too simplistic to argue that this distinction reeks of the legalisation of 
                                                 
169See Case C-377/12 Commission v Council [2014] Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 June 2014, 
at paras 36 and 37. 
170Koutrakos, fn 132 above, p 675. 
171Indeed, as discussed in the relevant subsequent Chapters of this thesis, trade policy and development 
cooperation policy continue to retain their specific objectives under the relevant distinct provisions of the Treaties. 
In the same vein, the CSDP has specific objectives. This is despite the fact that it is an integral part of the CFSP 
which itself has no specific policy objectives beyond the general objectives of external action under Article 21(2) 
TEU. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the CFSP right from origin uniquely covers ‘all areas of foreign and security 
policy.’ This is also logical when viewed in the light of the fact that all EU external policies are foreign policies. 
Indeed even development policy is foreign policy in the light of the values and influences it promotes abroad (see 
Smith, K, European Foreign Policy: What it is and What it does (London: Pluto Press, 2002), especially p 8). It 
can be argued that the latter is recognised within the EU (see McMahon, J, The Development Cooperation Policy 
of the European Community (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998), p 5, where he notes the resistance of the Member States 
to giving ‘foreign policy’ mandate to the ex-Community when the Commission proposed a more supranational 
development policy a few years after the Treaty of Rome. 
172See 2.3.2. above. In fact, a mutual non-affectation clause was introduced at Lisbon by virtue of Article 40 TEU 
(ex-Article 47 TEU as amended): “The implementation of the [CFSP] shall not affect the application of the 
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union 
competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the [TFEU]. Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in 
those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid 
down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter.” This is different from the 
earlier provision under ex-Article 47 (see p 17 above). For this reason Peers regards the amalgamation of EU 
external objectives at Lisbon as a paradox which while aimed at enhancing the coherence of EU external action, 
is nonetheless rife with contradictions (Peers, S, 'Is readmission linked to development?', a blog entry in EU Law 
Analysis blog, 23rd January 2014, available at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/is-readmission-linked-
to-development.html, accessed 15 January 2015). 
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political expediency for the purposes of delimiting the more supranational institutional 
competences.173 As can be deduced from the discussion of the evolution of EU external 
competences, the secular trend that started with a separate EPC, through to its distinction on 
codification at SEA, and an eventual culmination in a legally distinct CFSP has always been 
intended. At all times, it is a conscious choice by EU Member States to continue to maintain a 
strict separation between a ‘more intergovernmental’ EU external action in the ‘sensitive’ 
political and foreign policy fields on the one hand, and a ‘more supranational’ EU external 
relations in the economic oriented policies on the other hand, as is agreeable to the Member 
States.174 This is by no means a denial of the attendant potential ‘organisational dysfunction vis-
à-vis agreed policy objectives’175 and the implications of this for coherence.176 But as this thesis 
illustrates, the latter which is mainly a question of institutional coherence is not the sole issue 
surrounding the question of coherence in EU external action. In fact, it is mainly an internal 
issue which may not necessarily hold any implication for coherence beyond the constitutional 
dynamics that occasions internal institutional turf battle.177 A contrario, there are issues 
regarding coherence in the interaction between the interaction of other policy objectives with 
                                                 
173For example, the choice of a CFSP action as opposed to non-CFSP delimits and greatly reduces the influence 
of the European Commission (see 2.4.3 below) while concentrating more power on the Council and EU Member 
States (see Chapter Six of this thesis on the CFSP); also see Weatherill, S, ‘‘Competence creep and competence 
control’’ [2004] 23 YEL 1; and Dashwood, A, ‘‘The Limits of European Community Powers’’(1996) 21 EL Rev. 
113 for the position that the CFSP helps the Member States in their desire to regain control and limit EU ‘creeping 
competence’ phenomenon as made possible by the integrative jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
174See 2.2.3. above, especially p 7. Also see for example, Trybus, fn 3 above, 3-4, where he explains that there 
are no purely intergovernmental or supranational organisations, but rather that the notions of ‘supranational’ and 
‘intergovernmental’ are opposite ends of a spectrum from which can be derived the classification of organisations 
and institutions as ‘more intergovernmental’ or ‘more supranational’; also see Pescatore, P, The Law of Integration 
(Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1974, p 51, who explains that while the EU Commission might be supranational in the 
sense that it is an autonomous institution, a true construction of the EU arrangement even where the Commission 
is truly involved cannot lead to a conclusion of ‘supranationality’ – the essence of which is “a real and autonomous 
power placed at the service of objectives common to several states”). Therefore in general, there is no strand of 
EU policy that is completely supranational or completely intergovernmental. It is always a case of more or less so, 
with a certain level of flexibility that makes for malleability between the two forms of integration.  
175Beger, N, and Bartholme, P, ‘The EU’s quest for coherence in peacebuilding: between good intentions and 
institutional turf wars’, (2007) 1 Studia Diplomatica, p 245-264, at 261. 
176Perhaps, the clearest illustration of this is the security-development interface (see for example Case C-91/05 
(ECOWAS), fn 158 above).  
177See Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 158 above. However see Chapter Five of this thesis.  
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development objectives say for example in the security-development interface on the one hand, 
and in the trade-development interface on the other hand.178 Furthermore, there is an issue 
regarding coherence in the sequencing of policies functionally. The latter which is less 
controversial than the former is easier to determine existentially as the Mali case study 
illustrates.179 Overall, while Article 21(2) TEU prima facie reads new, its practical implications 
in terms of integrating the objectives of EU external action may not be so new. Illustrative is 
EU external action objectives towards SSA as elaborated in the Cotonou Agreement.  
 
2.4.2. EU external objectives towards SSA: the Cotonou Agreement and beyond 
 
EU external action objectives in general have been discussed above. With specific reference to 
EU external action towards SSA, the three evolutionary aims of EU external action discussed 
above are generally at the centre of EU external objectives and policies towards the region. 
Indeed, EU external relations has evolved from the successive development cooperation 
agreements which originally focused solely on trade and development aid.180 The wide scope 
of EU external objectives towards SSA is primarily illustrated by the Cotonou Agreement. In 
general, the Cotonou Agreement was concluded ‘in order to promote and expedite the 
economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States, with a view to contributing to 
peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment.’181 
However, at the centre of the partnership is the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating 
                                                 
178See 2.5.1. - 2.5.2. below; and also Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. 
179As discussed in Chapter Six, it is the case that the military dimension of the CSDP was not employed to 
complement other EU policies and activities in the country when this was necessarily required. This is contrary to 
the construction of a united whole and hence, contrary to the requirement of coherence (also see in general, 
Okemuo, G, ‘The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali and the consistency of EU-Africa policy’ [2014] 34 
LLR 3, 217-240).  
180See 1.1. above, in particular fns 25 and 28; also see 2.2.4. above. 
181Cotonou Agreement Article 1. 
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of poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration 
of ACP States182 into the world economy.183 In line with developments in the field of 
international development, the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development 
naturally tied to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).184  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three below, this development cooperation objective of reduction and 
eventual reduction of poverty had become the key objective of EU development policy by virtue 
of Article 208 TFEU. However, in contrast to the distinction of development policy and its 
objectives in the Treaties, the Cotonou Agreement expressly traverses economic and trade 
objectives,185 development objectives,186 and political objectives covering peace building, 
conflict prevention and resolution.187 In contrast to trade which was traditionally entwined with 
development policy, the security objectives were factored into development cooperation 
following the creation of the CFSP at Maastricht. Without excluding other possible reasons, this 
was mainly a reaction to the high incidence of political, military and humanitarian crisis in the 
ACP countries, especially those of SSA. These crisis frustrated much of the development effort 
made under the previous association agreements. Hence, maintaining the development-focus of 
the agreement did not discount the introduction of security provisions. Indeed, it is arguable 
that the security-development nexus requires this. Nevertheless, the introduction of these 
                                                 
182Including SSA. 
183Cotonou Agreement Article 1. It is noteworthy that the core objective of development policy namely the 
eradication of poverty is entwined in this Article with the objective of EU trade policy namely the gradual 
integration of ACP States into the world economy (see 3.3.1. below). 
184Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement as amended by the 2010 revision reflects this. This is in consonance with 
the obligation on the Union and the Member States to comply with the commitments and take account of the 
objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organisations 
pursuant to Article 208(2) TFEU. However, see 3.2.1. below for the current status of the MDGs, and the current 
tide in the evolution of EU development policy objectives.  
185Cotonou Agreement Articles 34-54. 
186Cotonou Agreement Articles 19-33 and 55-80. 
187Cotonou Agreement Article 11. 
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security and political objectives into development cooperation did not affect the CFSP 
competence of the EU. Hence, in practice, CFSP security and political actions were carried on 
alongside development cooperation measures in the context of EU external action towards SSA. 
The same applies to actions under the CSDP which eventually evolved on the back of the 
CFSP.188 In general, although trade, security and other wider political objectives are all integral 
parts of EU development cooperation policy towards SSA under the Cotonou Agreement, the 
distinct objectives of the different policies also remain integral parts of the equation. Arguably, 
the retention of the distinct objectives of the distinct policies of external action despite the 
amalgamation of the latter under Article 21(2) TEU is a further indication of this. In any event, 
development is at all times at the core of EU external action and objectives towards SSA. And 
the Treaties require the coherence of other policies with development policy. This renders 
development policy the benchmark for the analysis of coherence in EU external action in all 
the dimensions indicated in Chapter One above.189  
 
    
 
                                                 
188The Cotonou Agreement also contains a provision for political dialogue including with regards to the political 
objectives (Article 8), other core objectives, and crosscutting issues like human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law and good governance (Article 9). However, it is noteworthy that this cross-cutting issues were introduced into 
the development agreements prior to Maastricht. For example, while the two Yaoundé Conventions and the first 
three Lomé regimes covered the Part IV policy trio of trade, development aid and investment, by the time of Lomé 
IV, the objectives and principles of development cooperation were extended to include the active promotion of 
human rights in the light of the link between human rights and development (for an extensive discussion of this 
link see for example Alston, P, and Robinson, M, Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement 
(Oxford University Press, 2005); Uvin, P,  Human Rights and Development (Bloomingfield: Kumarian, 2004); 
Sano, H, ‘Development and Human Rights: the necessary but partial integration of human rights and development’ 
(2000) 22 HRQ 3; for a critical view see for example Galtung, J,  Human Rights in Another Key (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994), in particular, p 108; and, Pahuja, S, ‘Rights as Regulation: the integration of development and human 
rights’ in Morgan, B, (ed.) The Intersection of Rights and Regulation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), Chapter 10);with 
specific regards to the EU-ACP context under which EU relations with SSA Africa falls, see Bulterman, M, Human 
Rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues or Virtual Reality (Oxford: Hart, 2001). 
It is noteworthy that these cross-cutting issues are not given to extensive discussion in this thesis but are only 
mentioned as is necessary.  
189See 1.3. above. 
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2.5. The legal, political and institutional frameworks for coherence in EU external action 
towards SSA 
 
The requirement of coherence for EU external action in general, and towards SSA in particular 
is embedded in a number of frameworks. These could be conveniently divided into legal, 
political and institutional frameworks. Invariably, these are not mutually exclusive but work 
together, or at least are aimed at such. This section distils the key legal, political and institutional 
frameworks for coherence in EU external action in general and towards SSA in particular.   
2.5.1. The legal frameworks for coherence in EU external action towards SSA 
 
The key legal frameworks for coherence in EU external action towards SSA are the Treaties 
and the Cotonou Agreement. These are discussed in turn below, followed by an extrapolation 
of the legal import of the requirement for coherence in EU external action in general, and 
towards SSA in particular. 
 
2.5.1.1. The Treaties: between the general requirement for coherence and the 
requirement for policy coherence for development  
 
The Treaties are the primary legal framework for the requirement of coherence in EU external 
action in general.190 However, the key provisions in this regard are the general requirement for 
coherence under Article 21(3) TEU and Article 7 TFEU on the one hand, and the requirement 
for the coherence of other policies with development policy under Article 208 TFEU. These 
shall be analysed in turn. 
 
 
 
                                                 
190There are many provisions in the Treaties on coherence including as they apply to EU institutions (see 2.5.3. 
below). 
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2.5.1.1.1. The general requirement for coherence under Article 21(3) TEU and Article 7 
TFEU 
 
Article 21(3) TEU provides that: 
 
 The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action 
 and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted 
 by the High representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall 
 ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.”  
 
In the same vein, Article 7 TFEU provides that: “The Union shall ensure consistency between 
its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the 
principle of conferral of powers.”  
 
Article 21(3) TEU and Article 7 TFEU are both geared towards horizontal coherence across EU 
external policies and activities in general. No specific policy is targeted.  However, it can be 
argued that this is where their commonality ends. For example, Article 21(3) TEU only requires 
the Union to ensure coherence between the different policies of external action and its other 
policies. A contrario, Article 7 TFEU requires coherence not only between policies but also 
between activities. It may seem subtle, but it can be argued that there is a difference between 
'policies' as specified in Article 21(3) on the one hand, and between 'policies' and 'activities' as 
also specified in Article 7 TFEU. The former could refer to the stage of formulation and the 
coherence of policy instruments. In contrast, the latter holds a connotation of coherence 
between activities across the different policies. Hence, it implies synergistic sequencing of 
available policy options. The reference that such coherence shall be ensured, taking all of the 
Unions's objectives into account, and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers 
implies the requirement of coherence in overall output. Despite the subtle difference between 
the two, Article 21(3) TEU and Article 7 TFEU when read together requires synergy, in other 
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words the construction of a united whole as discussed in Chapter One.191 However, both 
provisions are different from the one in Article 208 TFEU which requires policy coherence for 
development as will now be discussed. 
 
2.5.1.1.2. The specific requirement of coherence of other policies with development 
policy 
 
By virtue of Article 208 TFEU: 
 
“[…] Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective 
the  reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union 
shall take  account of the objectives of development cooperation in the 
policies that it  implements which are likely to affect developing countries 
[…]”192 
 
It is easy to interpret this simply as a call for the coherence of other EU policies with 
development cooperation policy as entwined with trade in, say, the Cotonou Agreement which 
embodies EU trade and development cooperation with SSA. However, it is in particular, an 
emphatic call for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)193 with a central focus on 
                                                 
191See.1.3. Above. 
192Ex-Article 178 EC (author’s emphasis); also see Council Decision establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service [2010] OJ L201/30, para 4 of preamble. It is noteworthy that 
this formulation of the objective of development policy and the one under the Cotonou Agreement (both of which 
focus on ‘the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty’) are weaker than the formulation under Article 
21(2)(d) namely the straightforward ‘eradication of poverty.’ However, it is arguable that the conceptual distinction 
between ‘reduction’ and ‘eradication’ of poverty is not as significant as the interpretation of ‘poverty’ as an 
antithesis of development (see for example Case C-403/05 and Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 157 above; and more 
generally Chapter Four of this thesis). 
193See European Commission, Green Paper, EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and 
sustainable development: Increasing the impact of EU development policy, COM(2010) 629 final, para 2.6.; For 
the key instrument on PCD see the Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of 
the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union 
Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus on Development’, [2006] OJ C46/1 (hereinafter European 
Conensus); and for other pertinent documents see European Commission, Policy Coherence for Development – 
Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals, COM (2005) 134 Final; EU Report 
on Policy Coherence for Development, COM (2007) 545 Final; Policy Coherence for Development-Establishing 
the Policy Framework for a whole-of-the-Union approach, COM (2009) 458 Final. For further pertinent discussion 
of PCD in this Chapter see 2.5.2. below). 
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development objectives as distinct from the objectives of trade policy.194 Indeed, beyond a call, 
it is also a clear commitment to PCD, over and beyond the requirement of coherence between 
all areas of external action.195 Nevertheless, this is not to say that the exact meaning of this 
requirement is clear, or that the exact perimeters of this requirement has been determined. 
Indeed, the concept of PCD is not only open to interpretation like the concept of coherence,196 
but is particularly a concept in evolution.197  
 
In terms of practical application in the context of EU external relations law and policy, it has 
been suggested that the central concern of this requirement is that the needs and interests of 
developing countries are taken into account when the Union makes and implements its other 
policies.198 However, the extent to which the Union is required to do this is difficult to say. And 
this is even different from the question of whether the requirement is merely concerned with 
desisting from doing harm or includes ensuring that other policies actively support development 
objectives.199 While these could be a reason why policy coherence for development has been 
                                                 
194For the distinction between the two despite the traditional entwining of trade and development in EU external 
action towards SSA, see Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. 
195See Article 21(2) TEU and Article 7 TFEU; and also paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the EEAS Decision (for 
the texts and analysis of these provisions see 2.5. below). For the imperative of adopting this view in practice and 
the implications of otherwise see Arts, K, ‘Changing interests in EU development cooperation: the impact of EU 
Membership and advancing integration’ in Arts and Dickson, fn 61 above, p 106 – 107.  
196See 1.3. above. 
197See for example, Dohlman, E, 'Towards Policy Coherence for Inclusive and Sustainable Department', Policy 
Coherence for Development Unit, Office of the Secretary General, OECD, Brussels, 12 June 2014). 
198Bretherton, C, and Vogler, J, 'A global actor past its peak?' (2013) 27 International Relations 3, 375 – 390; 
Ga ̈nzle, S, et al, (eds.) The European Union and global development: an ‘enlightened superpower’ in the making? 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012); Portela, C, and Raube, K, 'The EU polity and foreign policy coherence' (2012) 8 
Journal of Contemporary European Research 1, 3–20; Thomas, D, C, 'Still punching below its weight? coherence 
and effectiveness in European Union foreign policy' (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 3, 457–474; 
Carbone, M, (eds.) Policy coherence and EU development policy (London: Routledge, 2009); Gebhard, C, 
'Coherence' in Hill and Smith, fn 30 above, p 101–127. 
199European Consensus, fn 193 above, para 9; this reflects Article 208 TFEU (ex-Article 177 EC). 
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considered an impossible requirement to meet200 or even a wishful thinking,201 there are other 
reasons that could foster such conclusion even if an attempt is made to provide further 
clarification regarding the requirement. For example, the House of Lords Special Committee 
on the EU explains that the requirement demands that the Union clearly articulate the reasons 
for acting in a manner which could impact negatively on developing countries in order that 
counter-arguments may be advanced: 'Commission officials should consider the potential 
impact of their proposals on developing countries at the outset and be prepared to justify their 
proposals in public, including any negative impact they might have.'202 Of course, this is clearly 
onerous and may be difficult, if not impossible for the EU to meet especially in the light of the 
complex relationship between trade and development.203 Nevertheless, these technical 
difficulties does not detract from the Union's commitment to policy coherence for development 
both in the Treaties and beyond, including in the Cotonou Agreement which specifically applies 
to EU external action towards SSA.  
  
2.5.1.2. The Cotonou agreement and the requirement of policy coherence for 
development  
 
In the specific context of EU external action towards SSA, the Cotonou Agreement also bears 
what could be regarded as an externalised form of the Union's commitment to policy coherence 
                                                 
200Carbone, M, 'Mission impossible: the European Union and policy coherence for development' (2008) 30 
Journal of European Integration 3, 323–342. This view is of course debatable especially in the light of the fact 
that PCD is not  necessarily a zero-sum game (see for example, Carrera, S, (ed.) Policy Coherence for Development 
in the EU Council: Strategies for the Way Forward (Brussels: CEPS, 2006)).  
201Krätke, F, 'Policy Coherence: a sensible idea lost in translation?, The Guardian, 11 November, 2013, available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/11/policy-coherence-
global-development-zero-sum-game, accessed 12 January 2015.  
202House of Lords Thirty Fourth Report, fn 53 above, para 124. 
203For example, there are different concepts of 'development' (see Krätke, fn 201 above, where she also explains 
with specific regards to trade that trade economists have a different view of what benefits the development of 
people, countries and economies than diplomats, agronomists or jurists). In the same vein, the concept of poverty 
lacks a generally accepted definition (Khaliq fn 77 above, 115 above, p 120). This trade-development interface 
(which is further discussed in Chapters Three and Chapter Four of this thesis) is different from the more or less 
controversial development-security nexus where one could arguably stand in place of the other as discussed in 
Chapter Five of this thesis.  
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for development. Beyond their commitment to pursue the objectives of the partnership,204 
Article 12 commits the partners to policy coherence for development. Of course, in so far as 
the other relevant policies are primarily EU policies and emanate from the EU, it is arguable 
that the commitment of the partners under Article 12 of Cotonou Agreement does not mean an 
equal assumption of responsibility.205Indeed, despite the commitment, the Union acknowledges 
that its policies other than development policy can support the development priorities of ACP 
States in line with the development objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. This is in consonance 
with the requirement of policy coherence for development in Article 208 TFEU. Nonetheless, 
it is noteworthy that while these may prima facie reek of legal commitments, their legal import 
is another matter.  
 
2.5.1.3. The prospects of an obligation for coherence 
 
The extent of the legal import of the requirements is debatable. Invariably, the Treaties are 
internal instruments whose provisions are not directed to external parties. However, that an 
instrument is internal does not mean it is automatically devoid of any external legal imports. 
Indeed internal instruments can give rise to legitimate expectations.206 At least, in theory, it 
could be argued that EU internal instruments including the Treaties may result in the creation 
                                                 
204The Cotonou Agreement is expressly named a partnership agreement. However, as already mentioned above, 
it is an association agreement under EU law. 
205Although an association agreement is based on ‘reciprocal rights and obligations’, this do not always mean 
equivalent rights and obligations (see Case 87/75 Bresciani, fn 162 above para 22; also see Case C-12/86 Demirel, 
fn 90 above para 9, where the ECJ confirms that association implies the creation of a special privileged link with 
a non-Member State). That reciprocity does not always mean equivalent rights and obligations is not peculiar to 
the EU since this is the   position even in international law (see Agwu, F, ‘Reciprocity and its implications in 
international relations’ in Eze, O, (ed.) Reciprocity in International Relations (Lagos: NIIA, 2010), p 31; and also 
Barker, J, International law and international relations: International Relations for the 21st Century (London: 
Continuum, 2000), p xv.).   
206For example, Wessel (fn 144 above, p 301) posits that Common Positions create expectations on the part of 
third countries.  
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of expectations on the side of the recipient of EU policies.207 This position finds its basis in the 
‘international doctrine on unilateral acts’.208 The obligations in this regard may arise either by 
evidence of intention to accept obligations or on the basis of the principle of good faith.209 In 
general, good faith can intervene to bring into being an objective interpretation that is 
independent of will. For example, in the case of the EU, a combination of the commitment in 
the Treaties to ensure coherence, and the firm wordings of the European Consensus discussed 
below could seal the doctrine of good faith. By extension, this could import the doctrine of 
estoppel based on 'the simple fact that the law will demand consistency in conduct where the 
results of inconsistency would be to prejudice another party'.210  
 
However, it would be a contentious proposition that the Union and its Member States211 may 
be under an obligation to ensure the coherence of EU external action in general, and towards 
SSA, in particular. While this may be as much the case with the general requirement of 
coherence across all policies as it is with the requirement of coherence of other objectives with 
development policy objectives, the reasons behind the contentions may vary.212 In fact, it is 
                                                 
207Ibid., p 193.  
208Ibid. 
209With regards to the latter, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nuclear Tests cases emphasized: “[…] 
Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation. […] Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda 
in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed 
by unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obligation thus created 
be respected […]’ (ICJ Reports 1974, para 46 (as cited in Wessel, fn 144 above, p 194, in particular n 133)). 
However, see fn 162 above on the controversial relationship between EU law and international law. 
210Nollkaemper, A, The Legal Regime for Transboundary Water Pollution: Between Discretion and Constraint 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff), p 214; and Macgibbon, I, ‘Estoppel in International Law’ (1958) ELR 468 – 513. 
211As they are indeed jointly responsible for providing “the [EU’s] financial assistance” under the successive 
association agreements between the EU and SSA (Case C-316/91 European Parliament v Council (EDF) [1994] 
ECR 625). 
212And these are apart from issues regarding enforceability such as the standing rules under EU legal order (see 
for example, Chalmers, D, et al, European Union Law Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2nd 
edn.), Ch 10.),  and the unclear relationship between EU law and International law (see for example Case T-85/09 
Kadi v Commissions (Kadi II) [2010] ECR II-5177; and Eeckhout, P, EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2nd edn.), 
p 405 where it is in fact argued that this relationship is that it is one governed by EU law, with international law 
only able to permeate the former under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the EU. 
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arguable that the latter is not meant to be of any enforceable legal import. This is as much the 
case for the provision of Article 208 TFEU as the provision of Article 12 of the Cotonou 
Agreement.213 Indeed, it appears that the EU has explicitly rejected any such enforceable 
obligation to third parties. For example, the EU has previously explained (significantly in the 
context of EU external action towards SSA) as follows: 'consistency - in the strict sense of the 
term, i.e. taking into account the external effects of the other policies, cannot be the subject of 
an international undertaking by the [Union]. Consistency is a matter for political appraisal in 
the face of sometimes conflicting objectives.'214 From this perspective, it is not surprising that 
the Union commits itself in the Cotonou Agreement to 'enhance' (as opposed to 'ensure') the 
coherence of its other policies with a view to attaining the development objectives of the 
Agreement. The difference between this and the wording of the Treaties which states that the 
Union shall take into account the objectives of development policy in the implementation of its 
other policies is noteworthy. It reflects the position of the Commission noted above and 
indicates a commitment to make efforts to enhance policy coherence for development as 
opposed to placing an enforceable obligation on the Union to ensure coherence of its other 
policies with development policy objectives. Indeed while Article 12 provides procedures for 
possible consultation for the partners where a threat to PCD might arise, it also makes clear that 
the Union is not bound to accede to the submissions made by its partners regarding the threat 
to PCD.215 This acutely reflects the view that incoherence may sometimes be intended or at 
least be unavoidable in foreign policy.216 Although this view may not rightly apply to the 
                                                 
213In any event, with specific regards to the Cotonou Agreement, as mentioned above (at fn 162), the legal effect 
of this agreement on the parties is not known. 
214European Commission, Directorate-General VIII/1 Green Paper on relations between the European Union and 
the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century Challenges and options for a new partnership Brussels, 20 
November 1996. 
215This explicit qualification rules out a possible recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism of Article 98 of 
the Cotonou Agreement. 
216On coherence sometimes being unavoidable see Craig, P, Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (OUP, 
2010), p 423; and on coherence sometimes being intended see Hoebink, P, 'The Coherence of EU Policies: 
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requirement of coherence as it patterns to synergy in the sequencing of available policy options, 
the prima facie obligations on EU institutions to ensure coherence across EU policies and 
activities are best appreciated not only in the light of the limits of the law but also in the light 
of the constraints of politics.217 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the fact that an obligation 
may be unenforceable is not tantamount to a negation of its existence.218 In any event, it is 
arguable that the coherence of EU external action remains a political imperative and a political 
requirement as will now be discussed especially with regards to policy coherence for 
development. 
 
2.5.2. The European Consensus219 - a political framework for PCD in EU external action 
 
The key extra-legal framework for coherence in EU external action is the European 
Consensus.220 This instrument which predates the Lisbon Treaty initially committed the EU to 
                                                 
Perspectives from the North and the South' (2005) Commissioned Study, Center for International Development 
Issues Nijmegen, Brussels, p 19, where he also explains that coherence can also be political or economic based on 
conflicting interests and complexity of issues. The remedy he proposes for these includes tolerating incoherence, 
mitigation, compensation, additional/flanking policy.  
217Significantly, the involvement of the Member States in the context of relevant policies remains crucial to the 
question of coherence. This would be the case with the CFSP and the CSDP for which the EU does not have 
exclusive competence. When concerted external action is mounted under these two policy dimensions, Article 4(3) 
TEU ( ex-Article 10 EC) imposes at the very least a duty of close cooperation between the Member States and the 
EU institutions—not only in order to facilitate the achievement of EC tasks, but also ‘to ensure the coherence and 
consistency of the action and [the Union’s] international representation’ (C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg 
[2005] ECR I-4805, para 60; as confirmed in C-433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-06985, para 66 and 
more recently in C-246/07 Commission v Sweden [2010] ECR I-3317, para 75). The limits of the law in regulating 
the Member States in this regard is discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter Six of this thesis. 
218However, see Peers, S, ‘The CJEU enhances the EU’s role as an external actor’, a blog entry in EU Law 
Analysis blog, 11 June 2014, available at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/the-cjeu-enhances-eus-role-
as-external.html, accessed 01 July 2014, where he notes that a legal commitment does not always imply a concrete 
obligation. This is in line with the view that the weight accorded to compliance with the legal obligation in an 
agreement is important (Holdgaard, fn 111 above, p 303). 
219See European Consensus, fn 193 above (it is not a legal instrument and is duly published in “Series C” of the 
Journal which is for Information and Notices).  
220As discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, two other related instruments namely the JAES and the Strategy 
for the Sahel are important instruments for coherence in EU external action towards SSA. However, they are not 
frameworks for coherence in the same way as the prescriptive requirements of the Treaties, and the aspirational 
requirements of the Cotonou Agreement and the PCD. Rather the JAES and the Strategy for the Sahel are 
respectively more like regional  implementing instruments for coherence in EU external action towards SSA in 
general, and the Sahel sub-region of SSA in particular. As an umbrella framework, the JAES merits a separate 
Chapter for its analysis. It is discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis. In contrast, the Sahel Strategy as a sub-
 73 
 
 
taking action to advance policy coherence for development in a number of areas namely Trade, 
Environment, Climate change, Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Social dimension of 
globalisation, employment and decent work, Migration, Research and innovation, Information 
Society, Transport and Energy.221 However, a subsequent review identified five areas of 
proactive engagement and focus in the immediate future namely trade and finance, climate 
change, food security, migration and security.222 In contrast to the Treaty provisions on 
coherence discussed above, the PCD as spelt out in the European Consensus clearly portends 
only an aspirational goal.223 In this way, it may be similar to the unenforceable provisions of 
the Treaties as discussed above.224 Overall, whether it is an impossible requirement to meet,225 
indeterminate or merely aspirational, PCD as spelt out in the European Consensus, the Treaties 
and the Cotonou Agreement, is undeniably a demonstration of the Union's commitment to 
policy coherence for development as a priority. Similar to the general requirement of 
coherence,226 PCD is recognised as essential for the credibility of the EU as a global actor.227 
 
2.5.3. Institutional frameworks for coherence in EU external action with special 
reference to SSA 
 
Article 13(2) TEU provides that each institution shall act within the limits of the powers 
                                                 
regional implementing framework pertinent to Mali is analysed as necessary within the context of the distinct 
policies discussed in the subsequent Chapters of this thesis. 
221European Consensus, fn 193 above, para 35. 
222Council Conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development, 18 November 2009, doc. 16079/09. Of course, 
not all the areas identified in any of the two instances are investigated in this thesis (see 1.2. above).  
223The most recent DAC Peer Review of the European Union OECD 2012 affirms that PCD remains a political 
priority for the whole of the EU (see 'European Union', Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Development Assistance Review (DAC) Peer Review, 2012, p 16). This is not to deny the potency of 
politically binding obligations See for example, Flynn, N, and Peart, N, 'The Role of Political Agreement in a 
Legally Binding Outcome' (European Capacity Building Initiative, 2010, available at 
http://www.eurocapacity.org/downloads/TheRoleofPoliticalAgreementInALegallyBindingOutcome.pdf, accessed 
17 April, 2015). It is also not to deny affirm that 'non-enforceable' equates to a complete lack of persuasive force. 
224See 2.5.1.3. above. 
225See p 37 above. 
226As discussed at 1.1. above. 
227Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development 3166th Foreign 
Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 14 May 2012, para 1. 
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conferred on it in the Treaties and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives 
set out in them.228 Institutional competences apply to the principle of coherence in EU external 
relations law.229 This section provides an overview of the institutional framework for coherence 
in EU external action as a background for the discussion of their roles within the context of 
different policies as discussed in the subsequent Chapters of this thesis.230 The relevant 
institutions in this regard are the European Council,231 the Council,232 the European 
Commission (the Commission),233 the European Parliament (EP),234 and the ECJ.235 These 
institutions are jointly responsible for coherence pursuant to Article 13(1) TEU.236 This is 
different from the key responsibility for coherence under Article 21(3) which is placed on the 
Council and the Commission, assisted by the HR/VP. Although the HR/VP and the EEAS in 
her service are not listed as institutions under the Treaties,237 they are also introduced in this 
                                                 
228This is also settled law (Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [1990] ECR I-2041, especially para 21; and Case 
C-316/91 (EDF) fn 211 above, especially para 11 and 12). 
229Article 13(1) TEU.  
230Of course, this is not to counteract the tacit flexibility and pragmatism which prevails in the context of EU 
external action as discussed at 2.3.1. above. With regards to the institutional dimension, it is particularly 
noteworthy that the different evolutional history of different EU policies imports with them different institutional 
frameworks that came about at different periods and developed along different tracks with their own integration 
logics (Vanhoonacker, S, ‘The Institutional Framework’ in Hill and Smith, fn 30 above, p 68). In practice, EU 
institutions often activate hybrid procedures to bypass the procedural constraints imposed by the Treaties (see 
Sicurelli, D, The European Union’s Africa Policies (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), p 159). Sometimes, the EU institutions 
resort to Inter Institutional Agreements (IIAs) for the flexible and pragmatic arrangements as has most recently 
been codified at Lisbon by virtue of Article 17(1) TEU. For more on the practice of IIAs prior to Lisbon see for 
example, Hummer, W, ‘From ‘Interinstitutional Agreements’ to ‘Interinstitutional Agencies/Offices’?’ [2007] 13 
ELJ 1, p 47; and Monar, J, ‘Interinstitutional Agreements: the phenomenon and its new dynamics after Maastricht’ 
[1994] 31 CML Rev 693; also for agreements in EU law in general, see Hofmann, H, ‘Agreements in EU law’ 
[2006] 31 ELR 6, p 800). The role of the institutions or lack thereof in policy making and implementation in the 
context of the different policies are discussed in the relevant subsequent Chapters of this thesis covering the 
different policies.  
2312.5.3.1. below.  
2322.5.3.2. below. 
2332.5.3.3. below. 
2342.5.3.4. below. 
2352.5.3.7. below.   
236Article 13(1) TEU (ex-Article 3 TEU). Other institutions listed are the European Central Bank and the Court 
of Auditors. However, their analysis is outside the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this list 
is a slight change from the pre-Lisbon position when neither the ex-European Investment Bank nor the European 
Council was accorded the status of ‘institution’. Beyond this joint responsibility, there are also other individual 
responsibilities for coherence on some of the institutions as discussed in the relevant sub-sections below. 
237See Article 13 TEU. The EEAS was established in 2010 pursuant to pursuant to Article 27(3) TEU (see Council 
Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, [2010] OJ 
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section.238  
2.5.3.1. The European Council  
 
The European Council was established as an informal body in 1975 for the purposes of ensuring 
coherence between the nascent EPC and other EU external action under the ex-Community.239 
However, it only became an official EU institution at Lisbon.240 While it is charged with 
providing the EU with the necessary impetus for its development and defining the general 
political guidelines thereof,241 the Treaties do not expressly assign any formal role to this 
institution with regards to the contemporary requirement of coherence. Nevertheless, it would 
generally have further importance for coherence especially at the strategic level due to its 
position and influence as the apex EU institution.242 This, and the fact that it has the 
responsibility for identifying the strategic interests and objectives of the Union both under the 
CFSP and non-CFSP,243 as well as the fact that the HR/VP attends the meetings of the European 
Council post-Lisbon244 could aid coherence. However, this will ultimately depend on the 
political will of EU Member States who they represent.  
 
                                                 
L201/30, (hereinafter EEAS Decision), para 1 of Preamble. On the special position of the EEAS, see 2.5.3.6. 
below. 
238After all, they are the core post-Lisbon bodies for enhancing coherence (see 2.5.3.5. and 2.5.3.6. below). 
239See 2.3. above. 
240The European Council is composed principally of the Heads of State and Government of EU Member States 
(Article 15(2) TEU). However, its President (often elected) and the President of the Commission are also official 
Members of this institution (Article 15(2) TEU). Traditionally, it makes the Treaties which are the 'primary laws' 
of the EU (a function for which it is known as the Masters of the Treaties), but has no legislative powers 
whatsoever. The input of the European Council which takes the form of a political decision only has legal force 
once it has been adopted by the Council according to the decision-making procedures (Hayes-Renshaw, F, and 
Wallace, H, The Council of the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p 164). 
241Article 13 TEU. It has specific roles in relation to the CFSP and CSDP (see Chapters Five and Six of this thesis 
respectively). 
242Gilbert, M, Surpassing Realism – The Politics of European Integration since 1945 (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003), p 219.  In this position, the European Council settles issues outstanding from discussions at the 
lower levels.  
243Article 22(1) TEU 2nd indent. 
244Article 15(2) TEU. 
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2.5.3.2. The Council  
 
Generally described as the ‘pre-eminent legislative authority’, the Council exercises joint 
legislative and budgetary function with the EP,245 and also carries out policy-making and 
coordinating functions.246 The Council is comprised of several configurations of the Ministers 
of each EU Member State.247 The exact configuration of the Council depends on the topic or 
policy area it is discussing.248 However, with regards to external action, there is a special 
arrangement. Pre-Lisbon, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 
comprising of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Member States played the ‘Senior Council’ and 
dealt with external action.249 Post-Lisbon, there is now a specific Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC).250 In general, the FAC elaborates the Union’s external action on the basis of strategic 
guidelines laid down by the European Council. It is composed of foreign ministers from EU 
Member States, and depending on agenda brings together trade ministers (CCP), defence 
ministers (CSDP) and development ministers (development cooperation). With regards to 
coherence, in general, the Council as an institution shares the responsibility for ensuring the 
coherence of EU external action with the HR/VP and the Commission pursuant to Article 21(3) 
TEU. This is imperative in so far as it functions as a “Doppelorganschaft”,251 operating across 
                                                 
245Article 14(1) and Article 16(1) TEU, and also Article 314 TFEU; on the EP see 2.5.3.4. below. 
246Article 16(1) TEU; there is also a provision for the possibility of a Council action sans a proposal from the 
Commission or the HR. 
247Presently 10 configurations (see 'Council Configurations' available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/, accessed 12 December 2014). By virtue of Article 
236 TFEU, the European Council can decide on the list of other Council formations.    
248Any of the Council's 10 configurations can adopt an act that falls under the remit of another configuration. 
Therefore, with any legislative act the Council adopts no mention is made of the configuration (see 'Council 
Configurations' available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/, accessed 12 
December 2014).  
249There was no legal basis for this. 
250Article 16(6) TEU. The FAC is the second part of a divided GAERC, with the other part being the General 
Affairs Council (GAC). In contrast to the FAC, the GAC deals with institutional and administrative issues. In this 
regard, it inter alia prepares meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European 
Council and the Commission. Article 16 (6) TEU.  
251Bono, R, G, 'Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order' (2006) 43 CMLRev., p 337-394, at 378 where he 
explains same: “i.e. two-fold organic nature”. 
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the CFSP and non-CFSP external action in terms of decision making. However, the role of the 
Council in ensuring coherence as part of Article 21(3) triad would mainly be limited to the 
policy making level similar to the position of the European Council. Although both the GAC 
and the FAC are tasked with ensuring coherence,252 there is every indication that the task of 
ensuring coherence of EU external action at the level of policy formulation falls on the FAC.253 
In this regard, the aim of ensuring coherence across the different Council configurations could 
be fostered by the Chairing role of the HR/VP across the different policy-specific FAC.254 It is 
noteworthy that the Council also has special Committees and Working Groups that help to 
prepare its work.255 Some of these are policy-specific and are mentioned in the relevant 
Chapters on the case studies as may be necessary. However, the discussion in this Chapter will 
not be complete without a mention of the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER).256 This is designated as the main forum for ensuring policy coherence for 
development.257 Otherwise, the role of the Council and its preparatory bodies in the different 
                                                 
252Ibid; and Article 2 Council Rules of Procedure annexed to Council Decision of 1 December 2009 adopting the 
Council's Rules of Procedure (2009/937/EU) [2009] OJ L325/35 (hereinafter Council Rules of Procedure).  
253Article 16 (6) TEU; and Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/council-configurations/foreign-affairs?lang=en, accessed 27 December 
2011. In contrast, the GAC's task of ensuring coherence 'in the work of the different Council configurations' will 
be limited to the institutional and the administrative issues for which it is responsible (see fn 250 above).  
254See 2.5.3.5. below. However, see Chapter Four of this thesis for the specificity of the Trade Council. 
255For a list of the Council Working Groups, Working Parties and Special Committees see the Council Rules of 
Procedure, fn 252 above. Of course, these are different from the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) - a body 
of staff responsible for assisting the European Council and the Council (including the Working Groups and 
Committees). It helps organise and ensure the coherence of the Council's work and the implementation of its 18-
month programme (see 'General Secretariat of the Council', available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/general-secretariat/, accessed 15 February 2016; and for a detailed analysis of 
the CGS see Wessel, fn 144 above, p 85-88; and in general Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, fn 240 above, Chapter 
4). 
      256Article 16(7) TEU: ‘A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council’; also see Article 240TFEU; Article 19(1) Council Rules 
of Procedure (fn 252 above). COREPER is composed of two bodies (Rules of Procedure Art.19 para 2 sentence 
1): Members of COREPER II are Ambassadors of the Member States in Brussels, while those of COREPER I are 
their deputies.  
257Council Conclusions on Integrating Development Concerns in Council Decision-making of 17 October 2006 
(doc. 14072/06). A designation that is significant in so far as this Committee is arguably the highest Council 
preparatory body which 'preparation' sometimes turns out as the final Council Decision (that is except for matters 
of high politics which is generally left to the Council or sometimes the Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
especially in the high politics fields of the CFSP and CSDP as discussed in Chapter Five and Six of this thesis 
respectively. Otherwise, the decisions of COREPER are often confirmed by the Council even though they are non-
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EU external policies are pertinently discussed in the subsequent Chapters of this thesis.  
2.5.3.3. The Commission 
 
Recently described as the 29th Member State at the table,258  the Commission represents and 
upholds the interests of the EU as a whole.259 It has a traditional right of initiative with regards 
to internal EU affairs post as pre-Lisbon.260 But this does not apply globally across EU external 
policies.261 With regards to ensuring coherence in external action, the Commission takes very 
much centre stage. It specifically shares the responsibility for ensuring coherence of external 
action with the Council and the HR/VP.262 Of course how these play out in practice is another 
matter in the light of its more supranational orientation as opposed to the arguably more 
intergovernmental orientation of the Council, the HR/VP, and the EEAS.263 Nevertheless, this 
is not to deny the potentials of institutional coordination possibly based on effective negotiation 
or 'productive dialogue'.264 Similar to the Council, the Commission is not monolith. Within the 
                                                 
binding guidelines. These are adopted as 'A Point' (not open to debate, leaving any issue for which an agreement 
has not been reached by COREPER as 'B Point' on the agenda (subject to debate). Similar to the Council, 
COREPER can also set up Special Committees and Working Groups itself).  
258See Wessel, R, and Van Vooren B, EU External Relations Law, Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) p 375. It is completely independent and neither seeks nor takes instructions from any 
Government or other institution, body, office or entity. Also, more generally known as the ‘Guardian of the 
Treaties’, the Commission is tasked with ensuring the application of the Treaties, and overseeing the application 
of EU law under the control of the ECJ (Article 17(1) TEU).   
259Article 17(1) TEU. 
260Article 17(3) TEU. In terms of institutional prerogative, the Commission has the traditional exclusive right of 
‘initiative’ in relation to legislation and regulation. Article 17(2) TEU. 
261See the analysis of the role of the Commission in 5.4. and 6.4. below. 
262By virtue of Article 21(3) TEU. 
263See for example 3.4., 4.4. and 5.4. below. However, as mentioned above, It is noteworthy that in the context 
of EU external action towards SSA, the Commission especially have a much longer presence than any other EU 
institution (see 3.4. – 3.5. below), and is in fact known for its influence in shaping EU-Africa policies (Sicurelli, 
D, ‘Framing security and development in the EU Pillar structure. How the views of the European Commission 
affect EU-Africa policy’, [2008] 30 JEI 2, p 217-234; also see Hewitt, A, and Whiteman, K, ‘The Commission 
and development policy: bureaucratic politics in EU aid – from the Lomé leap forward to the difficulties of 
adapting to the twenty-first century’ in Arts and Dickson, fn 61 above, p 133). 
264Cruz, J, 'Legal Pluralism and Institutional Disobedience in the European Union' in Avbelj, M, and Komarek, 
J, (ed.) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 2012), p 254; also see 
European Commission, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the 
European Commission (HRVP) Statement on EEAS Review, European Parliament/Strasbourg 12 June 2013, 
SPEECH/13/530.  
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Commission, responsibilities are dispersed over different Directorate Generals (DGs).265 The 
requirement of coherence also applies in this regard pursuant to Article 17(6)(b)TEU.266 This is 
particularly important in the context of EU external action towards SSA where two strong DG's 
namely DG Trade and DG DEVCO267 operate side by side.268   
 
2.5.3.4. The European Parliament (EP) 
 
The EP jointly exercises legislative and budgetary functions with the Council.269 With specific 
regards to coherence of external action,, the EP is not assigned any specific formal role beyond 
the general responsibility on the institutions to ensure coherence.270 However, this is not to say 
that its contribution in this regard is less important.271 For one, the EP could be relevant for 
enhancing PCD by virtue of its power to ‘assent’ or ‘consent’ to international agreements.272 
Indeed, the EP most recently created a standing Rapporteur for PCD which is aimed at pointing 
out potential incoherencies in EU policies, and ensuring that the effects of new European 
legislation on developing countries are taken into account during the law-making process.273 
                                                 
265A current list of the Commission's DGs is available at http://ec.europa.eu/about/ds_en.htm, accessed 15 June 
2015.  
266The responsibility for ensuring coherence in this context rests on the President of the Commission. In fact, the 
Commission has established special mechanisms for coherence (see Appendix 7: Commission Mechanisms for 
Coherence, attached to the House of Lords Thirty-Fourth Report, fn 53 above). 
267DG Trade is self-explanatory in a way that DG DEVCO is not. Pre Lisbon, there was a DG DEV (formerly 
DG VIII) responsible for policy formulation and programming for the ACP countries and therefore SSA countries. 
It also coordinated political relations with the ACP countries, the African Union (AU) and regional organisations. 
But, there was also DG AIDCO (Europeaid), in charge of the implementation of programmes covering the whole 
of the project cycle except for programming. The post-Lisbon DG DEVCO is an incorporation of the former DG 
DEV and AIDCO. 
268See the analysis of the role of the Commission especially in 3.4. and 4.4. below.  
269While it has always been an EU institution, its powers have only developed incrementally through the 
successive Treaty amendments.  
270Under Article 13 TEU.  
271The HR/VP who is the key post-Lisbon institution for coherence recognises this (see SPEECH/13/530 fn 
264above). 
272This is one of the major role of the EP in EU external action as couched in Article 218(6)(a) TFEU.  
273DAC Peer Review of the European Union, OECD 2012, 223 above, p 16. The EP has various Committees for 
the different fields of EU external policies. These Committee instruct legislative proposals through the adoption 
of reports, propose amendments to Plenary and appoint a negotiation team to conduct negotiations with the Council 
on EU legislation. They also adopt own-initiative reports, organise hearings with experts and scrutinise the other 
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The EP’s involvement or lack of it in the distinct EU external policies is pertinently discussed 
in the relevant Chapters of this thesis along with the other institutions.  
 
2.5.3.5. The HR/VP 
 
The HR/VP is not listed as an EU institution under Article 13(1) TEU. Nevertheless, it is 
arguably more or less an EU institution in so far as it is a member of the Commission where 
she also serves as Vice-President.274 In any event, she holds the core post-Lisbon position for 
ensuring coherence across the spectrum of EU external action.275 Indeed, even though she 
shares the responsibility for ensuring coherence with the Council and the Commission under 
Article 21(3) TEU, she is the one formerly charged with the responsibility of coordinating the 
interactions between the relevant institutions to enhance coherence. This is the reason behind 
her ‘triple-hat’ as the chair of the FAC, Vice-President of the Commission (VP) and High 
Representative for the CFSP and CSDP. Having said that, it is noteworthy that her role as VP 
does not bring her completely under the Commission's procedure as her role at any time would 
depend on the hat on her head.276 Similarly, her role as the Chair of FAC does not imply 
membership of the Council in general, or FAC in particular. In contrast to the pre-Lisbon High 
                                                 
EU bodies and institutions (see List of Committees available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/parliamentary-committees.html, accessed 7 November 2014). The 
most pertinent being the International Trade Committee (INTA), The Development Committee (DEVE) and the 
Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) which is divided into a Human Rights Committee (DROI) and a Security and 
Defence Committee (SEDE).   
274Article 18(4). 
275See for example, 'Europe and the World’, Speech by High Representative Catherine Ashton, EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, Speech 10/378, 
Megaron “The Athens Concert Hall”, Athens, 8 July 2010, p 3, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-10-378_en.htm?locale=en, accessed 15 January 2014; also see Piris, J, The Lisbon Treaty – A 
Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p 248; and Mirschberger, M, 'Who leads the 
EU? Competences, rivalry and a role for the President of the European Council, the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Presidency of the Council and the President of the European 
Commission' in Trybus and Rubini, fn 26 above, p 18-30.  
276According to the Treaties, the HR/VP is only bound by Commission procedure only when she is exercising her 
Commission-related responsibilities (Article 18 (4) TEU). 
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Representative for the CFSP and the Secretary General of the Council,277 the HR/VP has no 
decision-making power within the Council but rather acts upon the mandate given to her. In 
fulfilling her 'institutional bridging' mandate, the HR/VP is supported by the EEAS.278  
 
2.5.3.6. The EEAS 
 
The EEAS is a ‘functionally autonomous body’ of the EU under the authority of the HR/VP.279 
In supporting the HR/VP in fulfilling her mandate with regards to coherence, one of the aims 
behind the creation of the EEAS was to bring the disparate policies together.280 In doing this, it 
is particularly required to seek to ensure that other areas of EU external action respect the 
objectives of the Union’s development policy in line with Article 208 TFEU and the European 
Consensus281 as discussed above.282 
 
Arguably, it is de facto, if not de jure an EU institution.283 De Baere and Wessel284 posits that 
                                                 
277Who was also a member of the Council. 
278At all times, the discussion of the role and function of the EEAS cannot be fully separated from a discussion 
of the HR/VP as the two are intertwined under Article 2(3) TEU. 
279See EEAS Decision, fn 236 above, preamble 1. 
280See Article 18(4) TEU; and also the various Articles of the EEAS Decision (fn 236 above); indeed as Cardwell 
rightly notes, apart from the creation of the new role of the HR/VP and the EEAS, the role of different EU 
institutions within the distinct policies was not fundamentally changed at Lisbon (Cardwell, P, (ed.) EU External 
Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (The Hague: TMC Asser/Springer, 2011) p 113).  
281EEAS Decision, fn 236 above, Preamble, para 4.  
282See 2.5.1.1.2.; 2.5.1.2. and 2.5.2. above. 
283For example,  see para 8 of the Preamble to the EEAS Decision: ‘For matters relating to its staff, the EEAS 
should be treated as an institution within the meaning of the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment 
of Other Servants of those Communities (‘CEOS’). Furthermore, the EEAS is listed amongst EU institutions and 
bodies by the EU at http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/eeas/index_en.htm, accessed 19 June 2014; also 
see Mark, F, ‘The European External Action Service: a new institutional framework for EU development 
cooperation’, German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 15/2010). Indeed, the relevant departments and 
functions of the Council Secretariat and the Commission were transferred en bloc to the EEAS (see the annex to 
EEAS Decision, fn 236 above). However, see Missiroli, A, 'The New Foreign policy System after Lisbon: A Work 
in Progress' (2010) 15 EFARev. 427-452 where he posits that the EEAS can best be described as sui generis for 
want of a better categorisation). 
284See De Baere, G, and Wessel, R, ‘EU law and the EEAS: of complex competences and constitutional 
consequences’, Draft paper – presented at the conference The EU’s Diplomatic System: post-Westphalia and the 
European External Action Service, Europe House, London, UK, 19 November 2013, available at 
http://www.utwente.nl/mb/pa/research/wessel/wesselconf11.pdf, accessed 30 May 2014. 
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the ‘indeterminate status’ of the EEAS285 and the open-ended nature of its mandate limits its 
potentials to effectively perform its tasks in relation to coherence.286 However, it is arguable 
that this is not significantly different in import from the already accepted flexible and pragmatic 
approach to institutional procedures as mentioned above.287 Indeed, perhaps of arguably more 
significance is the fact that the EEAS as indeed the HR/VP, does not have a final say over most 
of the EU’s external relations tools. With specific reference to SSA, the Managing Director of 
EEAS Africa recently called to mind the concept of Staatenvbund by pointing out that the EEAS 
acts as the servant of the Member States, not the master.288 Arguably, this would apply to all 
EU institutions.289 In this regard, the potential impact of the EEAS as the HR/VP to aid 
institutional coordination for coherence would depend not only on the political will of 
traditional EU institutions, but also the Member States, as the case may be.290 Indeed, where 
there is political will, a productive dialogue would lead to effective institutional coordination. 
However, whether inter-institutional dialogue can successfully navigate all the inter-policy 
interactions that implicate coherence is another matter.291 In any event, the relevant provisions 
                                                 
285Ibid., p 2, where they also explain that this indeterminate status is “the result of a compromise between those 
wanting the EEAS to be an essentially intergovernmental body close to or part of the Council and those preferring 
it to be close to or part of the Commission.” 
286Ibid: “A study commissioned by the European Parliament found that most stakeholders now agree that the sui 
generis positioning of the EEAS was a mistake: the Commission perceives the construction as a loss of power that 
ought to be regained or protected, while the Member States feel the priorities set out by the EEAS often compete 
with their own national priorities. The fact that the EEAS is not an institution proper therefore makes it significantly 
more difficult for it fully to perform its tasks.”; also see Wouters, J, et al., The Organisation and Functioning of 
the European External Action Service: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities (Brussels: European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, 2013), p 25, 
for the reference to the detrimental impact of the open ended nature of the mandate of the EEAS on the latter’s 
functioning. 
287See fn 230 above. 
288'A new Framework for European Relations with Africa', Speech delivered by Nick Westcott, Managing 
Director Africa EEAS, to the EUISS conference on EU-Africa foreign policy after Lisbon,18 October 2011, 
available at http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2011/181011_en.htm, accessed 15 March 2014. 
289Including the 'supranational' Commission (see fn 174 above). 
290See SPEECH/13/530, fn 264 above; also see Cruz 264. 
291Illustrative is the interaction between trade and development (see Chapter Three and Chapter Four of this 
thesis). Also, further illustrative is the interaction between the CFSP and the CSDP on the one hand, and other EU 
policies on the other hand, vis-a-vis the sequencing of available policy options (see in particular Chapter Five and 
Chapter Six of this thesis for illustration with Mali case study). 
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on the mandate of the EEAS are pertinently discussed in the context of the distinct policies 
analysed in this thesis.292 The EU Delegations are also covered as may be relevant.293 
 
2.5.3.7. The ECJ 
 
Post as pre-Lisbon, the ECJ has the responsibility to ensure that the law is observed in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties.294 It rules on actions brought by a Member State, 
an institution or a natural or legal person, and in other cases provided for in the Treaties.295 With 
specific regards to coherence, the Court has no express jurisdiction. However, this does not 
mean a total lack of jurisdiction in this regard. For example, it is arguable that Articles 21(3) 
TEU and 7 TFEU on coherence are not outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ in so far as they are 
not expressly excluded from this jurisdiction.296 Indeed, Elsuwege suggests that it is.297 And so 
does Kronenberger.298 This is not surprising especially in the light of 'the creative jurisprudence' 
of the ECJ.299 However, the question of who will take recourse is another matter. For example, 
Kronenberger notes that 'In the end, recourse to the Court on such an issue might actually mean 
that the institutions principally entrusted with the duty of ensuring such consistency, have failed 
to do so', and further expresses doubt regarding whether an EU institution will take another to 
                                                 
292See Chapters Three to Six of this thesis. 
293The EU Delegations is a part of the EEAS (Council Regulation (EU) No 370/2011 amending regulation (EC) 
No 215/2008 on the Financial Regulations Applicable to the 10th European Development Fund, as regards the 
European External Action Service [2011] O J L102/1, para 4); also see Délégation de l’Union européenne en 
République du Mali http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/index_fr.htm for the role of the EU Delegation to Mali. 
294Article 19 TEU. 
295Ibid.  
296The only jurisdictional limitations as far as the Treaties are concerned are Articles 24, 275 and 276 TFEU 
ruling out the Court’s direct jurisdiction over the CFSP. It follows that all other provisions of the Treaties arguably 
fall under the Court’s jurisdiction. 
297Von Elsuwege, P, 'EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: in Search of a New Balance 
Between Delimitation and Consistency' (2010) 47 CMLRev., 987–1019. 
298Kronenberger, V, 'Coherence and Consistency of the EU's action in international crisis management: the role 
of the European Court of Justice' in Blockmans, S, (ed.), The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy 
and Legal Aspects (The Hague: TMC Asser, 2008), p 210-211. 
299See implied competence discussed above.  
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Court simply based on an issue bordering on coherence.300   
 
With specific regards to the requirement of policy coherence for development which is arguably 
indeterminate and political in nature,301 it is noteworthy that the ECJ has previously been 
hesitant to rule on it, choosing to leave the matter to the political institutions of the Union.302 
Suffice it to state that the issues surrounding policy coherence for development are complex 
and difficult, if not impossible to negotiate.303 It follows that even though the post-Lisbon 
increased references to it at Treaty level would appear to elevate the concept of coherence to 
standing as one of the central regulatory standards of EU external relations law, the efficacy of 
such a regulatory standard is yet to be determined. In fact, it could well be conceded that there 
is a general lack of institutional capacity for enforcing the requirement of coherence in EU 
external action as there is for the legal enforcement of the EU common interest in external 
relations in general.304 Attendantly, it is easy to posit that the Union is so committed to 
                                                 
300Kronenberger, fn 298 above, p 211. This will not only be odd but may actually be impossible in the light of the 
expected common understanding of the dearth of EU resources and the limitations posed by the complexity of the 
institutional provisions of EU external relations law. In fact, Mold and Page are of the opinion that the coherence 
rhetoric may outstrip resources, performance and legal provisions, and in this regard call for the requirement to be 
toned down (see Andrew Mold and Sheila Page, 'The Evolution of EU Development Policy – Enlargement and a 
Changing World' in Mold, A, (ed.) EU Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges for the 21st Century 
(Amsterdam University Press, 2007), p 11 – 28).  
301Also see the other limitations discussed above. 
302This was in relation to trade (see Chapter Four of this thesis). It is likely that the Court will take similar 
approach in other policy contexts as they relate to policy coherence for development. Indeed, it is doubtful that the 
Court will venture into policy coherence for development as it relates to the CFSP and the CSDP. This is because 
of the intense nexus between security and development wherein one could conceptually stand for the other 
conveniently (see Chapter Five and Chapter Six of this thesis). Arguably, it is these that Vanhoonacker refers to 
when she explains that increased coordination mechanisms within and between EU institutions are no guarantee 
that the interplay between the different foreign policy subsystems results in a coherent foreign policy (see 
Vanhoonacker, S, and Neuhold, C, 'Dynamics of Institutional Cooperation in the European Union: Dimensions 
and Effects', (2015) 19 EIOP 1, p 1–15). 
303DAC Peer Review of the European Union, OECD 2012, fn 223 above, p 17 (this brings to mind Carbone's 
position that PCD is impossible (see p 68 above, fn 200 inclusive); also see Hoebink, fn 216 above, p 12 where he 
explains that a causal link between policy and policy results is often hard to determine even in political science 
literature on policy evaluation. 
304Wouters et al, fn 286 above, p 20; also see the relevant sections of the subsequent Chapters on specific EU 
external policies towards SSA. This is understandable in the field of foreign policy which generally eludes the 
grasp of law, and in the light of the potential difficulties with enforcing the principle of coherence as discussed 
above.  
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coherence that it engages in a moral rhetoric with a view to inspiring the relevant 
protagonists.305 However, the problem with this, is that it may be a dangerous level of 
commitment in that the Union may ultimately be setting itself up for failure in the light of the 
glaring legal, political and even resource limitations. Nevertheless, the Union's performance 
has to be measured against its own commitments.306 This is the line towed in this thesis in its 
investigation of the coherence of EU external action towards SSA. 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing, the EU is not only committed to the coherence of its external action in 
general, but in particular, to policy coherence for development in its external action towards 
SSA. However, although these are clearly illustrated by the strengthening of the requirement of 
coherence at Lisbon, including by the creation of the HR/VP and the EEAS to enhance 
coherence, there are legal and political limitations to their potential enforceability. Invariably, 
the coherence of EU external action towards SSA would not rest solely on the HR/VP and the 
EEAS. This is as much the case for the requirement of policy coherence for development, as 
for the general requirement of coherence with regards to synergy in the sequencing of available 
policy options. The reason for this is that they are only bridging institutions that would have to 
depend on the political will of the relevant traditional EU institutions, and sometimes the 
Member States to enhance coherence depending on the policy in question. However, these may 
only be determined by a contextual investigation. It is to this that the subsequent analysis turns 
to, starting from the generally agreed core of EU external action towards SSA namely 
development policy, using Mali as case study. 
 
                                                 
305Khaliq fn 77 above, p 260. 
306Or utterances (ibid). 
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Chapter Three 
3.0. EU development policy towards SSA – financially aiding poverty eradication, 
sustainable and human development 
3.1. Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the EU's primary approach to SSA outside the CFSP 
is based on the entwined trade and development cooperation policy framed under the successive 
association agreements signed in the context of EU external relations with SSA.1 In contrast to 
the CFSP external action towards the region, this approach is based on a contractual partnership 
under the relevant successive association agreements. However, although trade and 
development are entwined under this framework of association as a type of development 
assistance,2 EU development policy is de jure and de facto distinct from EU trade policy which 
is discussed in the next Chapter. Primarily illustrative in this regard is the historical institutional 
distinction between the two,3 the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ),4 
and also the relevant provisions of the Treaties for these different policies.5 Significantly, this 
has been widely embraced by EU legal scholars6 even before the post-Lisbon development in 
                                                 
1See the successive agreements between the EU and the countries of SSA cited in Chapter One of this thesis at 
1.0., especially fns 29 and 31; also see for example, Bartels, L, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European 
Union’, (2007) 18 EJIL 4, 715-716 (reprinted in Cremona, M, (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law 
(OUP, 2008), p  128-171; and also Orbie, J, ‘EU Trade and Development Policy: On Pyramids and Spaghetti 
Bowls’ (2007) LX Studia Diplomatica 1. While the Treaties refer to this policy as development cooperation policy, 
the analysis resorts to 'development policy' and 'development cooperation' interchangeably. 
2MacLeod, et al, The External Relations of the European Union Communities (Oxford: Clarendon Place, 1996), 
p 272 
3This is most visible in the EU Commission (see the analysis in Chapter Four of this thesis at 4.4. 
4See for example, Case 45/86 Commission v Council (GSP) [1987] ECR 1493; and Opinion 1/78 (Re the draft 
Agreement on Natural Rubber) [1979] ECR 2871. 
5See 3.2.3. below and Chapter Four (at 4.3.2.) including with regards to the most recent illustration at Lisbon. 
6See for example Peers, S, 'EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Association' 
in Dashwood, A, and Hillion, C, The General Law of EC External Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell), p 170, 
where he expressly acknowledging the well-known division between commercial policy and development policy; 
also see Ravenhill, J, 'Back to the Nest? Europe's Relations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of 
Countries' in Aggarwal, V, and Fogarty, E, (ed.) EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism 
(London: Palgrave, 2004), 118 – 147; and MacLeod, fn 2 above, p 272. 
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this aspect of EU external relations law and policies.7 
 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy this 'separation' thesis is neither to deny that the entwining of 
trade policy with development policy in the relevant instruments in the context of EU external 
relations with SSA is not easy to disentangle,8 nor is it to deny that trade policy could contribute 
to development policy objectives.9 Furthermore, while it can be argued that the entwining of 
trade policy and development policy is in recognition of the potential contribution of trade to 
development,10 this is not to say that the entwining of trade and development in the context of 
EU external relation with SSA was originally framed in terms of policy coherence for 
development. As discussed in Chapter Two, the issue of coherence in EU external action 
evolved on the heels of the evolution of the political dimension of EU external action.11 
Coherence was not considered an issue when development and trade were the only key external 
policies.12 In the light of the instrumentality of trade to development, and the EU's trade-driven 
poverty alleviation,13 it is arguable that it may have been taken for granted that trade was already 
compliant with development objectives. Of course, this is until the concerns leading to the 
adoption of the European Consensus for development which includes trade as one of the policy 
fields that is required to be coherent with development objectives.14 
 
                                                 
7See fn 6 above. 
8Indeed, they have been analysed as entwined (see for example Bartels, fn 1 above; and Orbie, fn 1 above; also 
see Macleod, fn 2 above, who discusses it both as Development and Assistance Policies on the one hand (p 18), 
and simply as Association as a Special Type of Development Assistance, on the other hand (p 380). 
9See the GSP case, fn 4 above; and Opinion 1/78, fn 4 above; also see for example, Bartels, fn 1 above; Orbie, fn 
1 above; and  Khaliq, U, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the European Union A Legal Appraisal 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), especially 130-139; and in general, Chapter Four of this thesis. 
10Ibid.; also see Khaliq, fn 9 above, p 123; and also p 130 where he states that trade has far greater potential than 
aid as an instrument to alleviate poverty (citing OECD, The Development Dimension of Trade (Paris: OECD, 
2002), and OECD, Strengthening Trade Capacity for Development (Paris: OECD, 2002)). 
11See Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.2.3; 2.2.4.1.; and 2.3.2.). 
12Ibid. 
13See Khaliq, fn 9 above, p 130; and in general Chapter Four of this thesis. 
14See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.2. above. 
 88 
 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to analyse EU development policy towards SSA as a distinct 
field of EU external action towards the region. This means ultimately separating it from trade 
which it is historically and legally entwined with in this context.15 The main reason for 
discussing development policy first, is not only because development is at the heart of EU 
external relations towards SSA,16 but also because of the requirement of policy coherence for 
development.17 As discussed in Chapter Two, over and above the requirement of coherence of 
EU external policies in general, policy coherence for development is about the coherence of 
other policies with development objectives.18 
 
In this regard, the Chapter provides the crucial benchmark that will facilitate comparison with 
the selected relevant strand(s) of EU external action towards SSA with a view to determining 
their coherence, including in the light of the requirement of policy coherence for development. 
In doing this, the Chapter discusses the instruments and institutional dynamics of EU 
development policy towards the region, it especially highlights the post-Lisbon institutional 
developments aimed at enhancing coherence.19 
 
In general, it is submitted that the post-Lisbon law and practice render more plausible the 
argument that EU development policy towards SSA has always been separable from EU Trade 
                                                 
15Although development and security are also interlinked, development policy and security policy have always 
remained distinct policies albeit not without an overlap in their scopes (see Chapters Five and Six of this thesis). 
16See for example Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.4.2.); and also 3.2. below.   
17See Chapter Two (at 2.5.2.). 
18 Ibid. 
19These will enable a subsequent analysis of coherence across all EU policies towards the region, albeit with a 
specific focus on the requirement of policy coherence for development as discussed in Chapters One and Two 
respectively. As discussed in Chapter One, the analysis of coherence in the context of this thesis centres on the 
examination of synergy between the norms, instruments and institutions towards the construction of a united whole 
including in overall output. However, as the analysis in Chapter Two illustrates, there is a special requirement for 
policy coherence for development. Therefore, while this thesis investigates the coherence of EU external policies 
towards SSA in general, it does this with an understanding of the particular requirement regarding development 
objectives. 
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Policy towards the region despite the historical intertwining of the two in the successive 
association agreements that regulates EU external relations with SSA. Using Mali as a case 
study, the Chapter illustrates that EU development cooperation including in the context of EU 
external action towards SSA revolves mainly around development assistance by means of 
financial aid for strategies aimed at poverty eradication and sustainable development.20  In this 
regard, the analysis further illustrates that although there is a central objective of EU 
development policy in general, the objectives and strategic priorities of EU development policy 
towards SSA centre on the distinct development needs and interests of the relevant recipient 
sub-geographic regions and countries of SSA.21 This is either mutually agreed or unilaterally 
determined by the EU, but in a process distinct from the procedure for the determination of EU 
trade policy towards the region as discussed elsewhere in this thesis.22 Against this background, 
it is posited that the specific strategic objectives as stipulated in the relevant region or country-
specific instruments are not only relevant for a better understanding of the dynamics of EU 
development policy in this context, but are also as relevant to the determination of coherence 
as the general objectives of EU development policy as spelt out in the Treaties. It all depends 
on the policy against which policy coherence for development is being assessed.23 The 
involvement of the post-Lisbon body for coherence namely, the European external Action 
Service (EEAS)24 in the procedure for development policy is highlighted. 
 
                                                 
20See 3.3.2. to 3.5. below. In the meantime, it is noteworthy that development cooperation is not concerned with 
financial assistance only, but may also include technical assistance (Martenczuk, B, ‘Community Cooperation 
Policy and Conflict Prevention’ in Kronenberger, V, and Wouters, J, The European Union and Conflict Prevention: 
Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2004) p 191. 
21See 3.4. below; and for the relevant sub-geographic regions of  SSA, see Annex III attached to this thesis. 
22See Chapter Four of this thesis (at 4.4.). 
23For example, while the general objective of development policy may be at the heart of the discussion of policy 
coherence for development as it relates to trade, it may not be as relevant as the specific strategic objectives in the 
discussion of policy coherence for development as it relates to the CFSP and the CSDP. 
24Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, [2010] 
OJ L201/30, (hereinafter EEAS Decision); also see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.6. above. 
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As an implicit benchmark for the analysis of other strands of EU external action towards SSA 
discussed in the subsequent Chapters of this thesis, this Chapter also sets the structure to be 
followed in the subsequent Chapters of this thesis. In this regard, the Chapter is divided into 
four sections. The first section analyses the legal basis and the scope of objectives of this EU 
development policy with special reference to SSA. The second section provides a pertinent 
analysis of the institutional dimension of this policy. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
interaction between these legal and institutional dimensions is relevant to the coherence 
discourse. Furthermore, in so far as the thesis is first and foremost a legal analysis, the legal-
institutional analysis provides a pertinent background for the subsequent analysis of the 
instruments of EU development policy towards SSA in the third section.  The fourth and final 
section centres on Mali as a case study. Since the institutional dimension is globally applicable 
to the region, the Mali case study focuses mainly on the instruments and objectives albeit not 
to the total exclusion of the institutional dimension.25   
 
3.2. The legal basis and scope of objectives of EU development policy with special 
reference to SSA 
 
The aim of this section is to discuss the legal basis and scope of objectives of EU development 
policy. This is a pertinent background for the subsequent analysis of its institutional structure 
and the evolution of the instruments and dynamics of EU development policy towards SSA. 
The legal basis is most imperative in so far as the thesis is first and foremost a legal analysis. 
Furthermore, as explained in Chapter Two, the legal basis for each EU policy is the first 
indication of the scope and objectives of the policy both of which are important to the coherence 
                                                 
25These are only mentioned where necessary. 
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discourse because of the interaction between the policies. However, prior to the discussion of 
the legal basis and scope of objectives of EU development policy with special reference to SSA, 
it is imperative to provide a pertinent contextual background of this policy. This enables a 
deeper insight into the background of development policy over and above the general 
background to EU external relations law and policies provided in Chapter Two. 
 
3.2.1. EU development policy towards SSA and coherence: a pertinent contextual 
background 
 
Opinions vary regarding which EU external policy is the EU's external anchor.26 With specific 
regards to development policy, not only has it been suggested that ‘development rightly finds 
its place at the head and heart of EU external action worldwide’,27 it has also been officially 
affirmed that ‘[…] Development policy is at the heart of the EU's relations with all developing 
countries […].’28 Historically, the evolution of EU trade policy as an integral part of the 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) did not occur without recognition of the development 
concerns of the EU’s trade partners.29 This is particularly so in the context of EU external 
relations with SSA where EU external action arguably began.30 
 
EU development policy towards SSA emerged on the heels of EU trade policy.31 However, in 
                                                 
26 See Chapter Four to Chapter Six of this thesis. 
27Commissioner Andris Peilbags, speech to European Parliament Development Committee, SPEECH/10/288, 2 
June 2010, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/288&type=HTML, 
accessed 27 May 2012. 
28Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within 
the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The 
European Consensus on Development’, [2006] OJ C46/1 (hereinafter the European Consensus), para 1, 2nd indent.   
29See Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.2.3.). 
30bid. 
31See Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.2.4.); and also for example, Article 1 of each of the successive agreements 
from Yaoundé I to Lomé IV cited in Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0., particularly in fns 29 and 31; also see Abass, 
A, ‘EU Crisis Management in Africa: Progress, Problems and Prospects’ in Blockmans, S, (ed.), The European 
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contrast to the latter which evolved as an integral part of the CCP, the former did not have any 
clear status in the Treaties initially. It has been suggested that the earliest two attempts to 
establish EU development policy within the framework of the Treaties were resisted by the 
Member States.32 According to this view the Member States considered development policy a 
particularly influential ‘foreign policy’ mandate that should not be ‘lost’ to the EU.33 Indeed, 
even after the Member States gave their approval, development policy was left outside the 
Treaties.34 However, this does not mean that it was certainly completely outside the EU's 
normative and institutional framework. To this effect, Hoebink argues that development 
cooperation was present in the Treaty of Rome, but only in the form of ‘associationism’.35 While 
this could find support in Macleod's concept of 'association as a type of development assistance', 
it runs contrary to Schrijver's position that the period between Part IV and the Maastricht Treaty 
(which codified development policy) is a period of ‘legal gap’.36 Similar to Schrijver's position 
is the view expressed by Grille that EU development policy evolved in an ad hoc manner.37 
                                                 
Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague: TMC Asser, 2008), p 332, who posits that 
the successive agreements ‘were largely motivated by trade.'; also see Obasanjo, O, ‘The need for an African 
response’ in Zartman, W, (ed.) Europe and Africa: the new phase (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p 181, where 
he posits that the ties were born of trade and investment, and strengthened by aid. 
32See McMahon, J, The Development Cooperation Policy of the European Community (the Hague, 1998), p 5; 
these earliest two attempts to establish a Community development policy were a Commission memorandum on a 
Community policy for development co-operation, Summary SEC (71) 2700 final, 27 July 1971 (Bulletin of the 
European Communities, Supplement 5/71), and a subsequent Memorandum from the Commission on a 
Community policy on development cooperation: Programme for initial actions, SEC (72) 320 final, 2 February 
1972 (both documents are available at http://aei.pitt.edu/, accessed 04 August 2012). 
33See McMahon, fn 32 above; also see Chapter One of this thesis (at 1.1. above, and particularly fn 3) on the view 
that all EU external policies are foreign policies. 
34See Development aid: 'Fresco' of Community action tomorrow, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, COM (74) 1728 final, 30 October 1974, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/74) 
available athttp://aei.pitt.edu/, accessed 04 August 2012. 
35See Hoebink, P, ‘Evaluating Maastricht’s Triple C: an introduction to the development paragraphs of the Treaty 
on the European Union and suggestions for its evaluation’ in Hoebink, P, (ed.), The Treaty of Maastricht and 
Europe’s Development Co-operation (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2005), p 2. 
36Schrijver, N, ‘When will the New Emperor wear his clothes? The efforts of the European union towards a 
common development cooperation policy’ in Bulterman, M, et al (eds.) Views of European Law from the mountain 
(Kluwer Law International) p 382. 
37See Grille, E, The European Community and the Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p 
337. 
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Indeed, it remains an open question whether the Yaoundé Conventions38 were a continuation of 
association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, or entirely a new regime under the provision 
on association agreement.39 As discussed in the previous Chapter, the latter is only a framework 
for agreements not a substantive legal basis for any specific policy. 
 
In any event, the practice of EU development policy was legally affirmed when the ECJ ruled 
that EU competence in the field of development aid is not exclusive, but rather shared with the 
Member States.40 This is generally regarded as the first express indication that the EU and the 
Member States shared competence for development policy. But whether, it would also be 
regarded as the first express indication of the EU's competence for development policy is 
another question especially in the light of Hoebink's argument.41 In any event, it is perhaps also 
significant that the implication of the shared competence in this context is that Member States 
are entitled to enter into commitments themselves vis-à-vis non-Member States, either 
collectively or individually, or even jointly with the EU.42 In entering such commitments with 
or without the EU, the Member States could draw on the rules applicable to EU expenditure 
                                                 
38The first two post-independent association agreements between the Member States and European Community 
on the one hand and the newly independent countries of SSA on the other (see Chapter One of this thesis, at 1.0., 
in particular fn 28). 
39As enshrined in Article 217 TFEU (ex-Article 310) which was then Article 238 EEC. For the debate on this 
point see Okigbo, P, Africa and the Common Market  (London: Longman, 1967), p 47; Werner, F, ‘The Association 
Agreements of the European Communities: A Comparative Analysis’ (1965)19 IO 2, p 226; also see in general 
Zartman, W, The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971); and Djamson, E, The Dynamics of Euro-African Co-operation (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p 71, who contrastingly suggests that the Yaoundé Conventions  may have been 
conceived under Article 352 TFEU (ex-Article 308 EC; then Article 235 EEC) discussed in 2.3.2. above especially 
fn 119 ; also see Martenczuk, B, ‘From Lomé to Cotonou: the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement in a Legal 
Perspective’, [2000] 5 EFARev 461, p 463 where he suggests that the use of the provision on association agreement 
only started with the Lomé regimes which succeeded the Yaoundé Conventions. Having said that, it is noteworthy 
that the question of legal basis for EU trade and development policy towards SSA is further discussed in Section 
3.1 below. 
40See Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council (India) [1996] ECR 1-6177; Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 
European Parliament v Council and Commission (Bangladesh) [1993] E.C.R. 3685; and Case C-316/91 European 
Parliament v Council (EDF) [1994] E.C.R. 625). 
41However, see Hoebink's argument in the previous page. 
42Ibid.,para 26. This was a reaffirmation of the Court's judgement in Case C-181/91 and C-248/91 (fn 40 above). 
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and could associate the EU institutions with the procedure thus set up.43 Furthermore, at all 
times, any question regarding delineation of competence for development aid is an internal 
question for the EU and its Member States.  It can be argued that this Tous pour un, un pour 
tous44 arrangement holds the interpretative implication that it may not always be concluded 
with certainty whether EU development aid can rightly be classified as an integral part of EU 
development policy or be regarded as just a collective development aid policy of the Member 
States.45 However, it is noteworthy that Parliament v Council established that both the EU and 
the Member States are jointly responsible for providing the relevant aid in the framework of 
EU development policy. This renders obsolete the question of delineation of competence. 
Overall, the question of the primary source of EU development aid is immaterial in this context 
in so far as the answer would not detract from the categorisation of the title and topic of this 
Chapter.46 
 
With specific regards to coherence, it can be argued that while these sui generis arrangement 
between the EU and the Members States may have addressed issues relating to vertical 
coherence,47  the latter is a different matter from horizontal coherence with which this thesis is 
concerned.48 Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it was not until the codification of EU development 
                                                 
43Ibid., para 41. 
44See Hillion, C, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations of the European Union’ in 
Cremona, fn 1 above. 
45It can be taken for granted that most, if not all EU Member States have bilateral development policy (see for 
example, Westcott, N, 'A new framework of European relations with Africa', Speech delivered by Nick Westcott, 
Managing Director, Africa EEAS, to the EUISS Conference on EU-Africa Foreign Policy after Lisbon, 18 October, 
2011; and in general, Hoebink, P, (ed.) European Development Cooperation: In Between the Local and the Global 
(Amsterdam University Press, 2010). Pre Lisbon, the EU competence for development policy was complimentary 
to the development policies of the Member States pursuant to ex-Article 177 EC. However, in the light of the 
Lisbon amendments, EU development policy and the development policy of the Member States complement and 
reinforce each other pursuant to Article 208(1) TFEU (ex-Article 177 EC as amended). 
46Also see Martenczuk, fn 20 above, p 202. 
47Between EU development policy and the development policies of the Member States. 
48The question of vertical coherence is outside the scope of this thesis as indicated in Chapter One. 
 95 
 
 
policy at Maastricht49 that the requirement of coherence was also codified. Even then, the 
requirement of policy coherence for development,50 as is the general requirement of horizontal 
coherence of EU policies,51 centred mainly on the distinction and the interaction between the 
CFSP and non-CFSP external policies of the EU.52 Suffice it to state that this was prior to the 
evolution of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)53 and the eventual intense highlight on 
the need to take account of the objectives of development policy in the making and 
implementing of other EU policies including trade policy. As mentioned above, it may have 
been taken for granted that trade was coherent with development objectives in the light of the 
trade-driven poverty alleviation especially in the context of EU external relations with SSA. 
Perhaps it was, even if only to an extent.54 In any event, this development cooperation was one 
in which trade and development was entwined under the context of association as a type of 
development assistance. However, if at all times trade had a legal basis in the Treaties within 
the context of the CCP, while same cannot certainly be said for the development policy, it could 
be argued that any reference to trade and development cooperation policy is not (or should not 
be) a reference to a policy, but a reference to a combination of trade policy and development 
cooperation policy, even though the former could contribute to development.55 
                                                 
49130u of Maastricht Treaty (subsequently amended by ex-Article 177 EC). 
50Ex-Article 178 EC This was Article 130v of the Maastricht Treaty. 
51Ex-Article 3 TEU. This was previously Article C of the Maastricht Treaty. 
52These applied to EU external relations with SSA even though this aspect of EU external relations was excluded 
from the procedural dimension of development cooperation policy as enshrined in the Treaties at Maastricht. The 
procedural dimension of development cooperation policy as enshrined in ex-Article 179 EC (this was Article 130w 
of the Maastricht Treaty) did not 'affect cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the 
framework of the ACP-EC Convention' pursuant to ex-Article 179(3) EC. It is arguable that this was in recognition 
of the special procedure of development cooperation policy as a type of development assistance under the 
framework of association agreements (see 3.3.1. below). In general, this development assistance is also funded by 
a special financial mechanism which is outside EU budget (see the European Development Fund (EDF) mentioned 
in Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.2.4.), and more generally 3.4.below). 
53See Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.5.2). 
54See in general Chapter Four of this thesis. 
55The practice of development cooperation without an express legal competence would be contrary to the principle 
of conferred powers as discussed in Chapter Two (at 2.3.1). Nevertheless, as indicated in that same Chapter, 
flexibility and pragmatism is embraced in EU external relations law and policies. 
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The objectives of EU development policy are discussed below.56 However, it is important to 
note at this stage that no attempt is made at any stage of this analysis to define ‘development’ 
as a concept. Indeed, development is a concept that eludes any clear and specific definition. In 
general, it could be regarded as a set of values as opposed to a clearly defined operation.57 In 
the context of this analysis, the concentration on EU development cooperation policy in general 
and towards SSA in particular is limited to the relevant provisions of the Treaties, unilateral EU 
instruments, association or partnership agreements signed in the context of EU external action 
towards SSA, and the interpretation of these in case law.58 In so far as the investigation of 
coherence in the context of EU external action towards SSA is concerned, it is the construction 
of development policy in EU external relations law and policies that matters. However, the 
latter has evolved flexibly over time within the context of political change in both the EU and 
the global political environment.59 As discussed below, it is a development policy that has 
embraced related constructions in international instruments such as sustainable development 
and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).60 In fact, the MDG's guided the Union’s 
                                                 
56See 3.2.3. below. 
57Henkin, L, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p 191. 
58This does not mean that all the instruments of EU development cooperation are discussed in this Chapter. Indeed, 
the legal, policy and financial instruments of EU development cooperation are too numerous to be covered in the 
limited confines of this thesis. In this regard, instruments are discussed to the extent of their relevance and 
sufficiency to answering the research question. As explained in Chapter One, the limited focus in the selection of 
instruments is in no way purported to undermine the significance of other instruments not covered in this thesis 
(see Chapter One of this thesis, at 1.5.). 
59Mold, A, 'The Evolution of EU Development policy – Enlargement and a Changing World' in Mold, A, EU 
Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges for the 21st Century (Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 
p 11. Whether this development policy of the EU was the origin of international development assistance in general 
as evolved post World War II, or whether the reverse is the case is not clear. In any event, international development 
assistance was only officially institutionalised in 1961 with the creation of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Commitee (DAC) as it evolved from an earlier 
consultation forum for donor counties  (see Fuhrer, H, The Story of Official Development Assistance (Paris, 1996),  
p 4; (See Fuhrer, p 8).   
60Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 September 2000. The 
MDGs expires at the end of 2015, and a post-2015 agenda has been agreed On 25th September 2015 (on this date, 
193 Members of the United Nations, with 154 Heads of States & Governments present, formally adopted the new 
Development Framework “Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (hereinafter 
(Sustainable Development Goals). This new framework comprises of 17 Goals and 169 Targets to empower people 
the world over within the next 15 years). For more on Sustainable Development Goals, see 
http://www.globalgoals.org, accessed 10 October, 2015; and for the EU's involvement in the negotiation leading 
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policy on development cooperation.61 Even the 'new EU development policy' as laid out in the 
Agenda for Change policy instrument62 includes action on the MDGs.  As explained earlier,63 
this is not surprising because the treaties require that “The Union and the Member States shall 
comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the 
context of the United Nations and other competent international organisations” pursuant to 
Article 208(2) TFEU.64  
 
Noticeably, the more ambitious the EU development policy becomes, the more ambitious the 
EU's commitment to the requirement of coherence of other policies with development 
objectives. For example, several years after the European Consensus,65 and other subsequent 
relevant instruments,66 the Council's Conclusion on the Agenda for Change commits the EU to 
                                                 
to this see 'Millennium Development Goals: what after 2015?', available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/what-after-2015_en, accessed 15 August 
2015; and for a more academic-focused discussion on the global construction of EU development policy see Hollis, 
S, 'The Global Construction of EU Development Policy' (2014) 36 JEI 6, p 567-583. 
61Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European 
Union, meeting within the Council, on the financing of European Union aid under the multiannual financial 
framework for the period 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the 
allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union applies (hereinafter Internal Agreement for the 11th EDF) [2013] OJ L210/1, 
Preamble paragraph 8. 
62See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an 
Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 final (hereinafter 'Agenda for Change'); also see the European External 
Action Service and  European Commission, Instructions for the Programming of the 11th European Development 
Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – 2014-2020, (hereinafter Instructions for the 
Programming of the 11th EDF or DCI),  Brussels 15 May 2012, p 1 for a specific reference to the Agenda for 
Change as a 'new EU development policy'. The 'new EU development policy' is said to be a response to crises and 
profound changes in the international context in recent years which have forced the EU to sharpen its analysis, 
streamline its policy agenda and reinforce its operational instruments in support of inclusive and sustainable 
development. 
63See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.4.2., particularly fn 187. 
64Ex-Article 177 EC, sub-paragraph 3. Of course, this is not a confirmation of the coherence of EU development 
policy with relevant international instruments. The coherence of EU development policy with relevant 
international instruments is a different question entirely, and one outside the scope of this thesis. 
65See the European Consensus fn 28 above. 
66For the history of the evolution of policy coherence for development in the EU before and after the European 
Consensus see for example Egenhoffer, C, et al, Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council: Strategies 
for the Way Forward (Brussels: CEPS, 2006), p 6-8. 
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a more pro-active integration of development objectives into EU policies and external action.67 
The latter is a further affirmation of a commitment to a proactive engagement and focus in the 
immediate future on five areas, including trade and security which are investigated in this 
thesis.68 In the same vein, the financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 
2014-2020 reiterates that while striving for overall coherence of the Union's external action in 
accordance with Article 21 TEU, the Union is to ensure policy coherence for development as 
required by Article 208 TFEU.69 This is a replication of the fourth recital of the EEAS Decision: 
 
“[…] the Union’s external cooperation programme […] should […] fulfill the objectives 
for  external action as set out in Article 21 TEU in particular in paragraph (2)(d) 
thereof, and […] respect the objectives of the Union’s development policy in line with 
Article 208 TFEU”.  
 
Article 21(2)(d) TEU provides that one of the objectives of external action is to “foster the 
sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the 
primary aim of eradicating poverty”. Hence, even the EEAS which is established to enhance 
coherence across EU external action in general, is specifically required to respect the objectives 
of development policy while doing the former.70 Of course, the success or the extent of the 
success in achieving this requirement can only be determined by an investigation of the relevant 
norms, instruments and institutional dimensions of the other EU external policies discussed in 
this thesis on the one hand, and their coherence with their development counterparts discussed 
                                                 
67See The European Council, Council conclusions ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda 
for Change’ 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 14 May 2012, especially para 22. 
68Council Conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development, 18 November 2009, doc. 16079/09; also see Chapter 
Two of this thesis (at 2.5.2.). The other three areas are climate change, food security and migration (while finance 
is also included, it is actually entwined with trade). 
69Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a 
Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation for the period 2014-2020 (hereinafter DCI) [2014] OJ L77/44, 
Preamble, para 16. This regulation replaces Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation [2006] (OJ 
L378/41). 
70See more extensively Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.5.3.6.). 
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in this Chapter on the other hand.71 The objectives, instruments and institutional dimension of 
EU development cooperation policy will provide the benchmark for this as analysed below. 
 
3.2.2. The legal basis for EU development cooperation policy with special reference to 
SSA 
 
In contrast to other aspects of EU external relations, the legal basis for EU development 
cooperation policy towards SSA is not a matter of simple reference to a Treaty provision. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, the Union's interaction with SSA outside the CFSP 
framework is primarily governed by association agreements which are in substance trade and 
development agreements. This is one of the areas where the complexity and flexibility of 
foreign policy72 casts a grey shadow. EU external action is not devoid of such complexity and 
flexibility. In contrast, it is arguable that these are rife in EU external relations law and 
policies73 in the context of a Staatenverbund.74 With specific regards to the matter at hand, the 
discussion above reveals that EU development cooperation policy began prior to the Maastricht 
Treaty when the ex-Community Treaties contained no powers expressly relating to 
development co-operation. This was in contrast to trade which had an express legal basis in the 
Treaties right from the inception, but was entwined with development policy under the 
successive association agreements which are the norm in the context of EU external relations 
with SSA. As discussed in Chapter Two, the legal basis for the successive association 
agreements is usually the Treaty provision on association agreements presently Article 217 
                                                 
71Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that this aspect of coherence may not be certainly determinable (see Chapter 
Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.). 
72By its nature, foreign policy is in general resistant to 'static' legal rules due to the need for pragmatic responses 
to the ever evolving foreign policy needs of nation states (see for example, Hurd, D, 'Developing the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy' (1994) 70 IA 3, p 422; and De Baere, G, Constitutional Principle of EU External 
Relations (OUP, 2008), p 1, where he argues that foreign policy escapes any grasp of law). 
73On the complexity of EU external relations law and policies see for example Chapter One of this thesis at 1.6.).  
74On the Staatenverbund status of the EU, see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.1., especially fn 97. 
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TFEU.75 The nature of EU competence for association agreements76 is not clear-cut – a situation 
left unchanged at Lisbon. As also discussed in Chapter Two, association agreements can cover 
the entire subject matter of the Treaties,77 and even fields not already covered in the treaties.78 
However, the entwining of development policy and a core key policy like trade (which is 
arguably the primary provision of these agreements) means that these agreements could rightly 
be considered instruments of trade policy with development components.79 This would not 
detract from the requirement that trade policy shall take account of development objectives. For 
to see it as a detraction of this requirement would also mean that an institutional arrangement 
that puts EU trade institutions in policy making in the context of association agreements 
automatically runs contrary to that requirement.80 But, there is no doubt that the latter is not the 
case in so far as taking into account the objectives of development policy is a question of 
political will at the highest EU level. This remains the case even if meeting that requirement 
may only be a matter of extent.81 Furthermore, although the Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSPs)82 pursue a development policy aim, the ECJ held in the GSP case that this did not detract 
from the fact that they are trade instruments. 
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that these successive agreements signed in the context of EU 
                                                 
75Ex-Article 310 EC. 
76That is whether it is shared or exclusive (or even sui generis – see for example the CFSP discussed in Chapter 
Five of this thesis). 
77Illustrative is the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other part (hereinafter the 
Cotonou Agreement) (2000) OJ L317/3 (First Revision (2005) OJ L287/1; Second Revision (2010) OJ L287/3). 
As will be recalled from Chapter One, this has been referred to as 'a spaghetti bowl' due to its wide scope of 
coverage (see Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0., in particular fn 32). 
78Such as the pre-Maastricht EU development cooperation policy which was not provided for in the Treaties but 
has been at the core of the successive agreements between EU and SSA (however see Hoebink's argument at 3.2.1. 
above especially as it relates to fn 35). 
79See in general Chapter Four of this thesis. 
80Ibid. 
81Ibid. 
82For analysis of the GSP, see Chapter Four of this thesis (especially at 4.3.3). 
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external relations with SSA could legitimately also be regarded as primarily development policy 
instruments with trade components especially in the light of the objectives of the Cotonou 
Agreement.83 Indeed, the objectives of association as discussed in Chapter Two and also 
mentioned above equally reflect a development orientation in the first instance. In particular, as 
mentioned earlier, Macleod categorises association in the context of EU external relations with 
SSA as 'association as a type of development assistance'.84 In the case law of the ECJ, in order 
to qualify as a development cooperation agreement for the purposes of Article 130y of the 
Treaty, an agreement must pursue the objectives referred to in Article 208 TFEU.85 The fact that 
a development cooperation agreement contains clauses concerning various specific matters 
cannot alter the characterization of the agreement, which must be determined having regard to 
its essential object and not in terms of individual clauses. However, this is only provided that 
those clauses do not impose such extensive obligations concerning the specific matters referred 
to that those obligations in fact constitute objectives distinct from those of development 
cooperation.86 Based on this, the difficult question becomes whether the trade provisions in the 
association agreements signed in the context of EU external relations with SSA imposes 
extensive obligations concerning trade that in fact constitute objectives distinct from those of 
development cooperation.87 This is a controversial point88 especially bearing in mind that the 
objectives of development cooperation policy as provided in ex-Article 177 includes the 
integration of the developing countries into the world economy – an objective that primarily 
relates to trade and could potentially be incoherent with the key development objective of 
                                                 
83See 3.3.2 below. 
84Macleod, fn 2 above; also see Hoebink's argument at 3.2.1. above. 
85Ex-Article 177 (Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council (fn 40 above), para 37). 
86 Ibid., para 37, citing to this effect, Opinion 1/78 fn 1 above, para 56. 
87In this case poverty reduction, and in the long term eradication.  
88See Chapter Four of this thesis. As for other provisions on other fields, they are clearly ancillary to the principal 
objectives of the Agreement and are not therefore concerned with objectives separable from that of development 
cooperation and are, moreover, merely declaratory in nature (see Case C-268/94, fn 40 above, para 69). 
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poverty alleviation.89 Unfortunately, the rules on legal basis do not help in this case.90 
 
In any event, the implication of either of the two different interpretations is recognition of the 
co-existence of two key policies within the context.91 The fact that there is a difference in the 
nature of EU competences for trade and development respectively does not affect this 
conclusion.92 In practice, this issue of differences in the nature of EU competence for 
development policy and trade policy is circumvented in the context of association by the legal 
phenomenon of mixity.93 Also known as 'mixed competence',94 the practice of mixed 
agreements enables the EU and the Member States to negotiate, conclude and implement an 
international agreement whose subject matter falls within the competences of both without any 
precise delimitation of the undertakings entered into by the EU and by the Member States. 
                                                 
89See Martenczuk, fn 39 above, p 467. 
90See 2.3.3. above. However, in the India Agreement where development is also combined with trade both the 
provision on development cooperation competence and the Treaty provision on external trade competence are used 
and cited as the legal basis for the agreement (Council Decision 94/578/EC of 18 July 1994 concerning the 
conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on 
Partnership and Development [1994] OJ L223/23). The Council argued that the commercial aspect of the 
Agreement finds expression in commitments the scope and role of which in the scheme of the Agreement require 
recourse to a specific legal basis, namely Article 207 TFEU (ex-Article 133) (Case C-268/94, fn 40 above, para 
33). While Articles 2 to 4 of the Agreement are concerned in a general way with commercial relations and 
economic cooperation between the contracting parties, Articles 5 to 15 and 17 to 19 contain provisions on specific 
matters most of which are, however, linked to economic cooperation (para 42). The ECJ did not state whether it 
concurred or disagreed with Portugal's argument that Article 207 TFEU is redundant in that agreement (Case C-
268/94, fn 40 above, paras 78-79). 
91Although the content and the key concentration of the provisions of association agreements have respectively 
expanded and shifted over the years, the trade and development have remained at the centre. This is for the simple 
reason that development is potentially indefinite in scope and could subsume other fields of policy covered in the 
agreements except when it is constrained by the law (see for example Opinion 1/94 (WTO) [1994] ECR 1-5273, 
para 60: “[…] an unduly restrictive legal definition of development policy, failing to take into account of the 
necessity for a broad approach, could end up hindering the organisation and development of such a policy. On the 
other hand, a casual acceptance of the breadth of such a policy would allow the Community institutions to avoid 
the more restrictive rules for adopting external relations measures which have been established for other areas of 
Community law”). 
92As mentioned in the previous page, the nature of EU competence for association agreements is not clear-cut. 
However, the nature of EU competence for development cooperation policy is shared while the nature of EU 
competence for trade in exclusive). 
93See for example Kronenberger, V, 'Ensuring Coherence and Consistency: the role of the ECJ' in Blockmans, fn 
31 above, p 206, in particular fn 33; also see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.3., especially fn 164. 
94This is also known as 'joint competence' following the ECJ's use of this alternative phrase in Opinion 1/94 (see 
fn 91 above); and Opinion 2/91(Re ILO Convention 170) [1993] ECR 1-1061. 
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Effectively, mixity blurs the division of competence between the EU and Member States in the 
context of association agreements.95 
 
However, although it circumvents the question of competence, 'mixity' does not mean that the 
different policy fields especially trade policy and development policy, are entwined beyond 
distinction. In fact, the Court's reasoning in the EDF case96 supports this view. The Court did 
not suggest that mixed competence indicates a mixture of policies beyond distinction, but only 
that it is an internal question for the EU and its Member States.97 It follows that although trade 
and development are historically entwined in the successive association agreements between 
EU and SSA, EU trade policy and development policy towards the region as embedded in these 
agreements are not interwoven beyond distinction or separation. Indeed, recent developments 
including those that emerged on the back of Lisbon lend credence to this view. This is not 
simply a question of the retention of policy-specific objectives despite the amalgamation of 
external policy objectives in Article 21(3) TEU. Rather, there are other indicators. These for 
example include the removal of trade-related objectives from under the development 
cooperation provision in the Treaties,98 the recent developments in trade policy towards SSA in 
the context of negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs),99 and the 
developments in EU development policy per se as discussed below.100 Indeed, it may not be out 
                                                 
95As will be recalled from Case C-316/91 (EDF case) discussed above, the question of division of competence 
where intentionally blurred in practice is an internal question for the EU and its Member States. 
96Case C-316/91 (EDF) fn 40 above. 
97The ECJ reasoned that the question of the division of competence in the context of mixed agreements may 
actually depend on the interpretation of the agreement and on how in EU law powers are distributed between the 
Union and its Member States in the relevant fields covered by the agreement. While the issue prima facie centers 
on the division of competence between EU and the Member States, it nevertheless touches on the core competences 
involved in the case namely trade and development. 
98The new Article on trade policy namely Article 206 TFEU no longer features the integration of developing 
countries as an objective of the EU. 
99See Chapter Four of this thesis especially at 4.3.3. 
100This include developments in EU development policy in general (see 3.3.2. below), and towards SSA in 
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of place to argue that there is a conscious effort to disentangle trade and development in EU 
external relations law and practice.101 Of course, this is paradoxical in light of the inclusion of 
external trade in the EU’s common external action102 pursuant to Article 21(2) TEU. 
 
With specific regards to coherence, it is already clear that the amalgamation of EU external 
objectives103 under Article 21(2) is geared towards enhancing, if not ensuring coherence. 
Whether the paradoxical disentangling of trade policy and development policy aids coherence 
or hampers it is another matter, and one that may not be given to any easy conclusions. The 
reason for this position is mainly due to the complexity of the interaction between trade and 
development as discussed elsewhere in this thesis.104 This is compounded by the fact that 
development finance as provided for development projects in the developing partner countries 
of SSA is at all times considered a key development dimension of EU trade policy towards the 
region.105 In any event, in so far as policy coherence for development has been intensified vis-
a-vis its codification at Lisbon, the requirement of coherence of trade policy with development 
objectives has come to stay whether trade policy and development policy are uncoupled, or 
coupled as in the successive association agreements on EU external relations with SSA.  
                                                 
particular (see 3.3.3. below). 
101In fact, Woolcock explains that the Lisbon Treaty has finalised the separation of the two having dispensed with 
mixed-agreements in external trade policy (Woolcock, S, 'The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European 
Union External Trade Policy', Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS),  European Policy Analysis, 
2008, Issue 8, p 1, available at 
http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/In%20English/Analyses/Woolcock%20paper%20on%20impact%20
of%20Lisbontreaty%20on%20tradepolicy.pdf, accessed 15 November 2015). Indeed, the Lisbon amendment has 
removed the previous exclusion of EU development cooperation with the ACP group from the procedural legal 
basis for development policy as enshrined in Article 209 TFEU (ex-Article 179 EC). There is no further 
information regarding this anywhere in the Treaties, including the Declarations and Annexes attached to the 
Treaties. This indicates a possible departure from the practice of association agreements (see the next page below). 
102See Leal-Arcas, R, ‘The European Union’s new common commercial policy after the Treaty of Lisbon’ in 
Trybus, M, and Rubini, L, (ed.) The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European law and Policy (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012), p 263. 
103 Including trade objectives. 
104See Chapter Four of this thesis, where it is explained that such complexity is not peculiar to the EU. 
105See Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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At all times, Article 217 TFEU106 is the legal basis for the successive association agreements 
signed in the context of EU external relations with SSA.107 However, this is not the same as 
saying that Article 217 TFEU is the direct legal basis for EU development cooperation policy 
in general, and towards SSA in particular. As will be recalled from the above analysis, the EU's 
competence for association agreement is a non-specific competence framework which a mix of 
EU policies can be agreed under. Contrastingly, the substantive legal basis for the EU’s post-
Maastricht development cooperation competence108 is Article 208 TFEU.109 In terms of the 
procedural legal basis for this development policy, there is a difference between internal 
measures under Article 209 TFEU110 on the one hand, and agreements with third parties under 
Article 211 TFEU.111 EU development cooperation policy towards SSA was traditionally 
excluded from the procedure for the latter because of its special nature.112 Instead, only the 
provisions on the procedure for association agreements namely Article 218(2) TFEU113 and 
Article 218(6) TFEU114 applied in the context of EU development cooperation with SSA. 
Nevertheless, from a legal perspective, this does not mean that the provision on the framework 
of association agreement and those on the procedure for association agreements are the legal 
basis for EU development policy towards SSA. In contrast, in this specific context, the relevant 
provisions of the association agreements proves the veritable legal basis for development 
cooperation strategies with the region. As discussed earlier, although the substance of EU 
                                                 
106Ex-Article 310 EC. 
107See for example, Council Decision (2010/648/EU) of 14 May 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of the Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member 
States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 
[2010] OJ L287/1. 
108For the pre-Maastricht situation see 3.2.1. above. 
109 Ex-Article 177 EC. 
110 Ex-Article 179 EC. 
111Ex-Article 181 EC. The latter is often used in conjunction with Article 218 (2) TFEU (ex-article 300(2) EC) 
and Article 218(6) TFEU (ex-Article 300(3) EC). 
112Pursuant to ex-Article 179(3) – this provision was deleted at Lisbon (see fn 6 above). 
113 Ex-article 300(2) EC. 
114 Ex-Article 300(3) EC. 
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association agreements is in principle dependent on the consensual agreement of the EU and 
the Member States on the one hand, and a relevant third party on the other hand, the provisions 
of an association agreement become an integral part of EU law once agreed.115 In this regard, 
not only are they capable of having direct-effect in the EU legal order as other autonomous 
internal instruments, they can also serve as a legal basis for EU external action.116 Illustrative 
of particularly the latter, is the ECOWAS case.117 In this case, the ECJ affirmed that the 
integration of the campaign against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into 
Community development cooperation policy was established by the Cotonou Agreement, in 
particular Article 11(3) thereof.118 References were also made to relevant sections of the 
relevant Regional Indicative Programme (RIP)119 and also to the relevant Articles of Annex IV 
of the Cotonou Agreement, on the ‘Implementation and Management Procedures’ for 
development cooperation in this context.120 Overall, the ECOWAS case illustrates that the 
substantial legal basis for EU development cooperation with SSA will be found in the provisions 
of the Cotonou Agreement. The relationship between these and the legal basis for development 
cooperation provided in the Treaties121 is not clear. In the ECOWAS case where both the relevant 
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement and the Treaties were cited, the Court did not attempt a 
clarification of this particular issue. It can be argued that this is because the main issue in 
                                                 
115See in general Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.3. 
116Ibid. 
117Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR I-3651. 
118Ibid., para 38. 
119See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.3.3. below. 
120Ibid., paras 5-6. This is in line with the position established in Case C-268/94, fn 40 above that the agreements 
establish the framework of cooperation with broad objectives that are subsequently broken down into specific 
objectives and projects in the relevant instruments of strategy (see the instruments of EU development cooperation 
policy towards SSA at 3.4. below, and with specific regards to Mali at 3.5. below). 
121There is the substantive legal basis under Article 208 TFEU (ex-Article 177 EC) and the procedural legal basis 
under Article 209 TFEU (ex-Article 179 EC). The latter is often used jointly with Article 212TFEU. Illustrative 
for example is the DCI (fn 62 above); and Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (hereinafter Instrument 
for Peace and Stability) [2013] OJ L77/1. This succeeds Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability [2006] OJ L327/1 
which expired on 31 December 2013). 
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ECOWAS was not the question of the correct legal basis for development cooperation policy, 
but the delineation of the scope of competence between the CFSP and development cooperation 
policy.122 This apparent evasion is not a question of first for the Court seeing as it also did not 
bring clarity to the question of the accurate legal basis for development policy between Article 
209 TFEU123 and Article 211 TFEU124 in Portugal v Council. It is also noteworthy that the 
Commission suggested Article 209 TFEU125 as the legal basis for development cooperation 
policy in Portugal v Council.126 This is as opposed to Article 208 TFEU127 which was suggested 
in the ECOWAS case. Arguably, the flexibility and pragmatism employed to navigate the 
interaction between law and politics in EU external relations law and policies also marks the 
question of legal basis.128 This renders it impossible to say with certainty that coherence, 
especially as examined in the context of this study,129 is contingent on the question of legal 
basis. As for the practice of association agreement, as mentioned in the previous page, there are 
indications of a possible departure130 from this. This is especially the case in the context of EU 
external relations with SSA. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the five year renewable Cotonou 
Agreement expires in 2020, and while the EPA is already supplanting the trade dimension of 
the agreement, it is not yet clear how the development dimension will be organised. In general, 
changes regarding the European Development Fund (EDF) which is at the heart of the 
development aspect of the Cotonou Agreement is anticipated.131 Of course this will not affect 
                                                 
122Invariably, these are two different policy strands with potentially indefinite scope and objectives (see 3.3.2. 
below for the scope and objectives of development policy, and Chapter Five of this thesis (at 5.5.2.) for their 
CFSP counterparts). 
123 Ex-Article 179 EC. 
124 Ex-Article 181 EC. 
125 Ex-Article 179 EC. 
126At para 34. 
127 Ex-Article 177 EC. 
128See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.1. 
129See Chapter One of this thesis (especially at 1.3.) for the definition of coherence in the context of this study. 
In other contexts, the flexible navigation of issues might be considered incoherence. 
130 If not an indication of a clear departure. 
131The EDF is outside the EU budget and is rather based on internal agreements between the Representatives of 
the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council (This is different from 
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the objectives of EU development policy as will now be discussed. 
 
3.2.3. The objectives and scope of EU development policy with special reference to SSA 
 
The general objectives of EU external action including with special reference to SSA were 
discussed in Chapter Two.132 The aim of this section is to analyse the specific objectives of EU 
development cooperation with SSA which also gives an indication of the scope of EU 
development cooperation with the region. This is important for narrowing down the scope of 
analysis with a view to eventually examining coherence, especially policy coherence for 
development. Indeed, EU development policy is multidimensional and differentiated and goes 
beyond the context of EU external relations with SSA.133 This section also attempts to separate 
the objectives of development policy from their trade objectives counterpart in the context of 
EU external relations with SSA.134 
 
In general, where a legal basis in the Treaties for a field of external action is a substantive 
                                                 
the EU Council figurations mentioned in Chapter Two at 2.5.3.2.). For one such agreement see for example the 
Internal Agreement for the 11th EDF, fn 62 above. The EDF is tied to the Cotonou Agreement and it has been 
suggested that it will possibly be integrated in the EU budget after the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 
(see for example, Gielen, G, 'Development Cooperation and Negotiation in Practice' in Galluccio, M,  (ed.), 
Handbook of International Negotiation: Interpersonal, Intercultural and Diplomatic perspectives (Switzerland: 
Springer, 2015), p 408; and Gavas, M, 'Replenishing the 11th European Development Fund', Overseas 
Development Institute, Background Note, November 2012 (unnumbered document, first page), available at 
http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7904.pdf , 12 August 2015, where 
he posits that the EDF will apparently be integrated into the EU budget whether the 11th EDF becomes the last 
EDF, or the EDF continues beyond the lifetime of the Cotonou Agreement. 
132See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.4.2.  
133For the other different dimensions of EU development cooperation policy, see in general, Mold, fn 59 above; 
and Macleod, fn 2 above, Chapters 18 and 20; and Kaypten, P, J, G, and Van Themaat, V, Introduction to the Law 
of the European Communities (The Hague: Kluwer, 1989), Chapter XI.3; also see Maxwell, et al, European 
Development Report – A Prospectus (Mimeo Produced for DG Development, European Commission, 2006). 
134This separation may not be possible in the context of the nexus between development policy and security 
policy. In contrast to trade-development nexus, the security-development nexus is also tied to conceptual 
commonalities which are impossible to disentangle even by law (see Chapters Five and Six of this thesis). For 
example, it cannot be said that trade is a pre-condition for development or that development is a pre-condition for 
trade. But this is the sort of intimate nexus between development and security where each is acceptably a necessary 
pre-condition for the other. 
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provision, it provides the key starting point for the analysis of the objectives of a policy. 
However, from the foregoing, it can be argued that the legal basis for EU development 
cooperation with SSA lies outside the Treaties, and is rather located in the successive 
agreements between the EU and SSA.135 In this regard, the Cotonou Agreement as the 
contemporary association agreement for EU development cooperation policy with SSA 
becomes of crucial importance for the discussion of the objectives of EU development policy 
as it relates to coherence. In fact, the new primary objective of the post-Lisbon development 
cooperation under Article 208 TFEU namely ‘the reduction, and in the long term, the 
eradication of poverty’ has been the objective of the Cotonou Agreement right from the latter’s 
inception many years prior to Lisbon.136 Nevertheless, it is important to begin the analysis of 
the objectives of EU development policy from the provision of EU primary law. Indeed, as 
mentioned above, the Treaty provision on development cooperation was not entirely left out 
from the judgement in the ECOWAS case regarding the scope of EU development cooperation 
with SSA.137 Moreover, to begin the analysis of the objectives of EU development policy from 
the provision of the Treaties will help to illustrate the apparent disentangling of trade and 
development at Lisbon. In this regard, the core provision of EU primary law on EU 
development cooperation is Article 208 TFEU: 
 
“1. Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within 
the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action. The 
Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement 
and reinforce each other. Union development cooperation shall have as its primary 
objective the reduction, and in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union 
shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that 
                                                 
135On the capability of association agreements to influence EU external action see Chapter Two of this thesis at 
2.3.3. However see Hoebink's reference to 'associationism' at 3.2. above, especially fn 17. 
136Ibid.; and see Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement (as amended); also see the Instructions for the Programming 
of the 11th EDF,  fn 62 above, Brussels 15 May 2012, p 2. 
137See 3.2.1. above. 
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it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.138 
 
The wording of this provision is different from the original Maastricht provision on 
development cooperation.139 For example, the direct reference to ‘the smooth and gradual 
integration of the developing countries into the world economy’ as an objective of development 
cooperation is missing from Article 208 TFEU. This aspect which is arguably related in the first 
instance to trade140 is now incorporated as an objective of EU external action in general under 
Article 21(3) TEU. As mentioned earlier, this is an indication that the Lisbon Treaty may have 
undone the historical entwining of trade policy and development policy and their distinct 
objectives. It does not bear repeating that the Lisbon Treaty maintained policy-specific 
objectives despite the amalgamation of the objectives of EU external action under Article 21(3) 
TEU. 
 
Apart from the apparent separation of trade objectives from development policy objectives, the 
Lisbon Treaty also introduced a new core objective of development policy into the Treaties 
namely 'the reduction, and in the long term, the eradication of poverty'.141 However, as 
mentioned earlier, this new core objective of development policy is not necessarily new 
especially in the context of EU relations with SSA. Indeed, it can be argued that this became 
                                                 
138Author's emphasis. The paragraph 2 states that “The Union and the Member States shall comply with the 
commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other 
competent international organisations.” 
139Ex-Article 177 EC. 
140Illustrative is Article 34 of the Cotonou Agreement on the objective of the economic and trade cooperation: 
‘Economic and trade cooperation shall aim at fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into 
the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their 
sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries. [Author’s emphasis]. The 
last part of this sentence also illustrates that the trade aspect is aimed at the goal of sustainable development and 
poverty eradication. However, this recognition of the link between trade and development objectives in principle 
does not always translate into practice or better still is difficult to translate into practice (see for example the 
institutional distinction between trade and development in practice as discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis).    
141The related old wording is 'to foster … the campaign against poverty' (Ex Article 177(1) EC). 
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the primary objective of EU development policy from the year 2000 when the Cotonou 
Agreement was adopted.142 In the ECOWAS case,143 it was affirmed that the main pre-Lisbon 
objective of EU development policy under ex-Article 177(1) EC) was the reduction of 
poverty.144 This position did not derive its essence directly from the provision of ex-Article 
177(1) EC.145 Rather, the essence of this position came from Article 1 of Cotonou Agreement 
which emphasises the primary objective of poverty reduction, and in the long term, eradication, 
consistent with the objectives of sustainable development.146 Apart from the measurable MDG's 
which was added to the Cotonou Agreement147 in the wake of the European Consensus,148 the 
objectives of EU development policy is indefinite and all encompassing. It can be argued that 
this is necessary because any policy to assist developing countries must attempt to address as 
many of the individual factors hindering development as possible.149 In the specific case of 
development cooperation agreements, the objectives are usually generally broad frameworks 
for subsequent specific strategic objectives and it must be possible for the measures required 
for their pursuit to concern a variety of specific matters.150    
 
                                                 
142See 2.3.3. above especially fn 154 on how the provisions of association influences the scope of EU policies. 
143 Which significantly arose in the context of EU external action towards SSA. 
144Arts, K, and Dickson, A, ‘Conclusions: the potential and limits of EU development cooperation policy’ in Arts, 
K, and Dickson, A, (eds.) EU Development Cooperation: from model to symbol? (Manchester University Press, 
2004) argue that it is difficult to believe that this has not been the goal of the EU development policy all along (p 
150). 
145The only reference to poverty in that Article refers to the campaign against poverty in the developing countries 
(see fn 141 above). 
146The last part of the sentence which refers to 'the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy' 
has been intentionally cut out from here in line with the position of this thesis that trade objectives and development 
objectives can be separated. Indeed, it has been argued that the contemporary focus on poverty reduction and the 
MDGs have been the result of the general dissatisfaction in the development policy community with the effects of 
policies that were implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, aimed market liberalisation amongst others (see Hout, W, 
'EU Development Policy and Poverty Reduction: Conclusion and Recommendation' in Hout, W, EU Development 
Policy and Poverty Reduction: Enhancing Effectiveness (Ashgate, 2007), p 196. 
147Article 1 of Cotonou Agreement as amended by the 2010 revision (OJ L287/3). 
148European Consensus, fn 27 above, para 2: 'the primary and overarching objective of development cooperation 
is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the [MDGs]'. 
149See Peers, S, ‘Fragmentation or evasion in the Community’s development policy? The impact of Portugal v 
France’, in Dashwood and Hillion, fn 6 above, p 112. 
150Case C-268/94 fn 40 above, para 37. 
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The Cotonou Agreement illustrates this and goes beyond the economic and social development 
which marked the successive association agreements that preceded it. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, in contrast to the previous Agreements, the development cooperation dimension of the 
Cotonou Agreement outside trade covers political and security aspects including, human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance. Furthermore and most pertinently, it covers 
conflict prevention and other aspects of peace building and structural stability which would fall 
under civilian crisis management.151 These political and security aspects overlap in law and in 
practice with the objectives of the CFSP and the CSDP as discussed in Chapters Five and Six 
of this thesis respectively. In fact, Martenczuk suggests that Article 11 of the Cotonou 
Agreement potentially renders recourse to the instruments of the CFSP unnecessary or even 
impossible.152However, this is not to say that the indefinite theoretical and practical boundary 
for development cooperation policy eludes the grasp of law. From a legal perspective, the ECJ 
has given extensive interpretation to EU development cooperation policy.153 Indeed, it has done 
so especially since Maastricht which used the extensive language of the objectives of EU 
development cooperation policy to highlight that development cooperation was no longer 
limited to the original questions of economic and social development.154 It is since then that the 
aim of addressing all the causes of poverty and under-development started evolving as the 
primary objective of EU development cooperation policy. The 'new EU development policy' as 
laid down in the Agenda for Change is the most recent affirmation of this with its strong focus 
on poverty reduction through human rights, democracy and key elements of governance, and 
                                                 
151See Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement for the extensive provision on security. 
152Martenczuk, fn 39 above, p 468. 
153See Case C-377/12 Commission v Council [2014] Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 June 2014, 
especially para 37; Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 117 above, especially paras 64-67; Case C-403/05 Parliament v 
Commission [2007] ECR I-0000, para 57; Case C-268/94, fn 40 above, especially paras 13 and  56. 
154See Martenczuk, B, ‘Cooperation with Developing and Other Third Countries: Elements of a Community 
Foreign Policy’, in Griller, S, and Weidel, B, (eds.), External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the 
European Union (Springer, 2002), p 385-417. 
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inclusive and sustainable growth for human development.155 On the one hand, this could be 
seen as an attempt to address all the causes of poverty and under-development.156 However, on 
the other hand, it could be argued that this portrayal of all aspects of development cooperation 
as being poverty oriented gives the EU greater latitude in being able to justify its projects as 
being poverty-eradication oriented even when a programme has little direct connection with 
poverty reduction or has only a tangential impact.157 As Khaliq explains some of these aspects 
of development cooperation policy could be pursued as an end in themselves as opposed to 
where they will help to contribute directly to poverty reduction.158 He proposes a careful 
balance ‘in identifying and funding projects to ensure that the ultimate objective of poverty 
reduction is maintained but that other projects are also funded which create or support an 
environment in which the poverty reduction projects are as effective as they can be.159 However, 
while the latter may be easy to implement in practice, the former could prove a difficult task. 
Indeed, Khaliq acknowledges that one of the problems suffered by the EU’s approach to poverty 
reduction is lack of a succinct definition of poverty.160 In general, the EU still lacks, even if 
non-uniquely, the instruments to have a poverty screening on the activities which it finances 
under its aid programme.161 It is based on this particular problem that Hoebink acclaims that 
poverty reduction is the Achilles heels of EU development cooperation policy.162 Arguably, this 
poses a problem to the determination or assessment of policy coherence for development in the 
                                                 
155The evolutionary development does not detract from the fact that the primary objective of development policy 
is the fight against poverty, as enshrined in Article 208 TFEU and Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement. Indeed the 
Instructions for the Programming of 11th EDF (see fn 62 above) reiterates that the fight against poverty will remain 
the primary objective of the development policy of the EU, even though crises and profound changes in the 
international context in recent years have also forced the EU to sharpen its analysis, streamline its policy agenda 
and reinforce its operational instruments in support of inclusive and sustainable development (at p 2). 
156See Peers, fn 149 above, p 112. 
157Khaliq, fn 9 above, p 123. 
158Ibid. 
159Ibid, p 119. 
160Ibid., p 120. 
161Hoebink, P, 'The Coherence of EU Policies: Perspectives from the North and the South'   (2005) Commissioned 
Study, Center for International Development Issues Nijmegen, Brussels, p 4, para 9. 
162Ibid. 
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context of EU external relations law and policies in general, and towards SSA in particular. In 
any event, none of these mean that the theoretical and practical scope of EU development 
cooperation policy is beyond the grasp of legal analysis.163 
 
Indeed, if the scope of the objectives of development cooperation is legally indefinite, policy 
coherence for development will be meaningless or needless. As mentioned above, in tandem 
with the expansion of the objectives of EU development cooperation policy, the EU has made 
policy coherence for development a central pillar in its concerted fight against poverty. This is 
embraced even in the country-specific instrument of development cooperation policy. The Mali 
case-study illustrates the extent of the appreciation of this in the country-specific instrument of 
development cooperation policy. Of course, how this plays out in practice is another matter, and 
may or may not square with the relevant instrument of case study discussed below as the 
benchmark for the examination of the coherence of other EU policies with development 
objectives. 
 
3.3. The instruments of EU development cooperation with special reference to SSA 
 
The scope of the objectives of EU development cooperation analysed above, and the 
amalgamation of the objectives of EU external action in general under the post-Lisbon Article 
21 TEU prima facie render it difficult to delimit the instruments of EU development cooperation 
policy. Indeed, not only would it be nearly impossible to embrace all the instruments of EU 
development policy towards the region, it is also undesirable within the limited confines of this 
                                                 
163As the ECJ affirmed in Opinion 1/94: “[…] an unduly restrictive legal definition of development policy, failing 
to take into account of the necessity for a broad approach, could end up hindering the organisation and development 
of such a policy. On the other hand, a casual acceptance of the breadth of such a policy would allow the Community 
institutions to avoid the more restrictive rules for adopting external relations measures which have been established 
for other areas of Community law” (see Opinion 1/94 fn 91 above,  para 60). 
 115 
 
 
thesis. However, it is possible to identify two core instruments that are most relevant for the 
investigation of coherence in the context of this thesis. These are the successive association 
agreements which are briefly discussed as the key primary instruments of direct pertinence to 
the decision-making and implementation of EU development cooperation with SSA on the one 
hand, and the instruments that bear the EU’s specific approach to a country on the other hand.164 
The latter which is also of both institutional and objective pertinence provides an introductory 
baseline for the subsequent analysis of the instrument bearing the EU’s specific approach to 
Mali.165 In particular, the country-specific approach is the instrumental framework on which 
the coherence of other policies with the objectives of development policy can be assessed in the 
context of a case study in light of the differentiated approach to EU development policy.166 
 
3.3.3.1. The successive association agreements (prevalently the Cotonou Agreement) 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the primary framework for EU development cooperation 
policy with SSA is provided in the successive association agreements. The current instrument 
in this regard is the Cotonou Agreement, in particular Part 3, Title I and Part 4, and the relevant 
Annexes.167 In providing the objectives of development cooperation policy as discussed above, 
the instrument provides for the former to be pursued in an integrated approach incorporating 
economic, social, cultural, environmental and institutional elements.168 This integrated 
approach is aimed at providing a coherent enabling framework of support to country 
                                                 
164Although there are regional approaches, the regional approaches are designed along the lines of the 
geographical subregions of SSA which analysis is outside the scope of this analysis (see Chapter One of this thesis 
at 1.0. above, especially fn 19). 
165See 3.5.1. below. 
166See 3.3.3.1. below. 
167The Annexes and protocols are parts and parcel of the agreement and have the same legal status as the rest of 
the agreement (see Article 100 of the Cotonou Agreement on the status of the texts). 
168Article 20(1) Cotonou Agreement. 
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development strategies.169 Since this is primarily a framework instrument especially in relation 
to development policy,170 the development strategies are fleshed out in a Compendium on 
Development Cooperation Strategies171 attached to the Agreement. However, in practice, the 
areas covered in the compendium, as in the Cotonou Agreement, are not indiscriminately 
applicable to developing countries of the ACP in general, or indeed, to the countries of SSA in 
particular. As reaffirmed in the Agenda for Change, the EU runs a differentiated approach to 
development cooperation and aid allocation.172 This means giving priority to regions most in 
need, and within those regions, to countries most in need especially taking into account fragility 
and the security-development nexus.173 For example, while SSA attracts a special mention in 
the relevant EU instruments due to the level of poverty and the security-development nexus in 
the region,174 there is a further differentiation in the EU's approach to the countries of the region 
based on the same differentiation parameters.175 This is the main reason why the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) such as Mali attract special treatment as discussed below.176 In 
general, differentiation is considered the key to achieving maximum impact and value for 
                                                 
169Ibid. 
170This is in contrast to the trade provisions which would not normally require any further measures beyond the 
obligations in the association agreements. However, see the Cotonou Agreement regarding the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs). 
171See Article 20(2) of the Cotonou Agreement; and also European Commission (Directorate General – 
Development), the Compendium on co-operation strategies, partnership agreement between the Members of the 
group of African, Caribbean and Pacific states and the European Community and its Member States [signed at 
Cotonou, June 2000] , Brussels, 2001. 
172Agenda for Change, fn 62 above, para 4;  and also Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the 
implementation of the 11th European Development Fund [2015] OJ L58/1 (hereinafter Regulation on the 
Implementation of the 11th EDF), Article 3; DCI, fn 62 above, Preamble para 14. As mentioned earlier (at 3.1. 
above), EU development cooperation policy is mainly about aiding poverty eradication and sustainable 
development. 
173Ibid. 
174See the European Council, Council conclusions ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda 
for Change’ 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 14 May 2012, especially paras 1 and 15; and Agenda 
for Change, fn 62 above, para 4. 
175 Ibid.; also see Part 5 of the Cotonou Agreement, especially Chapters  1 to 3 thereto; and also the  Strategy for 
Security and Development in the Sahel, EEAS, 2011, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, accessed 12 January, 2013 
176See 3.5. below. While there is also a special differentiation in favour of Least Developed Landlocked Countries 
(LDLCs), this pertains mainly to trade relations and is therefore discussed as it relates to Mali in Chapter Four of 
this thesis. 
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money. Indeed, achieving maximum impact and value for money is very important to the EU. 
This is one of the reasons for the quest for coherence as discussed in Chapter One. Nonetheless, 
it is arguable that differentiation is a critical response to the criticism that the EU implements 
its development policy on a ‘one approach fits all’ perspective177 with a significant reductive 
effect on the impact of the policy on poverty reduction.178 In any event, EU development 
cooperation strategies are built around national development plans179 or similar comprehensive 
development documents, adopted with the involvement of national and regional bodies 
concerned.180 
 
It is noteworthy that in so far as EU development cooperation policy is mainly about financially 
aiding development strategies, differentiation in this context does not relate only to the strategic 
objectives but also to aid allocation.181 While there is a general financing instrument for 
development cooperation,182 and also other thematic financial aid instruments for EU external 
action in general,183 the key financial instrument for development cooperation under the 
successive association agreements signed in the context of EU external action towards SSA is 
the EDF.184 This special financial mechanism based on the special historical evolution of EU 
external relations with SSA185 is the financing instrument for the Cotonou Agreement and its 
                                                 
177See Khaliq, fn 9 above, p 121 – 122, including fns 182 and 183 on p 122. However, it will be remembered that 
the principle of alignment is an aspect of the Cotonou Agreement. 
178Ibid., p 120. 
179See Article 19 of the Cotonou Agreement; and also 3.4. below. 
180See for example Martenczuk, fn 20 above, p 202; also see the discussion on the National Indicative 
Programmes (NIPs) at 3.4. below. 
181See for example, Agenda for Change, fn 62 above, para 4. 
182See DCI fn 62 above. The DCI funds the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), adopted at the EU-Africa Summit 
on 8-9 December 2007 (JAES), see DCI Preamble, para 9. The JAES is discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
183For a list of those instruments for financing external action for the period from 2014 to 2020, see Regulation 
(EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules 
and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action, Preamble, para 1. 
184See for example, Internal Agreement for the 11th EDF, fn 61 above, especially Preamble, para 4. Developing 
countries that are parties to the Cotonou Agreement or funded by the EDF are expressly excluded from the DCI 
by virtue of Article 1(1)(a)(i)-(ii) of the DCI. 
185See 2.2.4 above. 
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development strategies.186 Although the EDF is rightly an instrument of EU development 
cooperation policy towards SSA,187 it is only a financing instrument. Hence, apart from its 
special procedure,188 it is similar to other financial instruments of EU external action which will 
not really be considered the same as the substantive instruments of EU external action. In this 
regard, although there have been clamours for the EDF to be brought under the EU budget189 
and in line with the general procedures that regulate the instruments for financing EU external 
action in general, it can be argued that the potential contribution of the latter to coherence is not 
significant.  This is for the main reason that the special status of the EDF operates on the 
peripheral of the norms, instruments and institutional procedures which are at the heart of the 
coherence discourse especially as selectively determined in the context of this thesis.190 In 
general, the issue surrounding the distinct procedure for the EDF borders on transparency,191 
and although this may be desirable, it is outside the scope of this thesis.192 
 
By and large, for whatever may be its other implications, the special status of the EDF does not 
constitute a point of divergence between say EU trade policy and EU development policy with 
                                                 
186See fn 171 above. 
187See in general, Tannous, I, ‘The Programming of EU’s External Assistance and Development Aid and the 
Fragile Balance of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO’ (2013) 18 EFARev 3, p 329. 
188See fn 171 above.   
189See for example the Final Report of the Working Group on External Action, CONV 459/02, para 56; and 
Martenczuk, fn 20 above, p 201. 
190See Chapter One of this thesis. 
191Since it is outside the EU budget which is co-managed by the Council and the European Parliament, the latter 
has a more limited role in the functioning of the EDF than in the development cooperation instruments financed 
by the EU budget. As regards the proposal for the Financial Regulation applicable to the 11th EDF, the European 
Court of Auditors welcomed a number of improvements, but maintained a general observation on transparency, 
considering that the complexity of the document entails a significant risk of legal uncertainty and errors (see 
European Parliament, European Development Fund, Joint development cooperation and the EU Budget: Out or 
In?, European Parliamentary Service, In-Depth Analysis, November 2014, p 1). Indeed, each EDF comes with its 
own procedure laid down for determining the allocation of funds and Member States’ contributions to those funds 
(see for example, Internal Agreement for the 11th EDF, fn 61 above, Preamble, para 4; and Regulation on the 
Implementation of the 11th EDF, fn 172 above, Preamble para 10; and also in general, Instructions for the 
Programming of the 11th EDF, fn 62 above). 
192The coherence of the different financial instruments of EU development policy is not the focus of this thesis. 
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SSA in practice.193 In contrast, the EDF is at the heart of EU development cooperation policy 
as it comprises trade and development in this context. Otherwise, where the difference in 
financing between development cooperation policy and the CFSP may be an issue for 
coherence, this is an issue which will equally arise between the CFSP and other development 
finance instruments that come under the general EU budget. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
a recent reform has made it possible for the EDF to use the same financial and administrative 
procedures as the DCI which is the central EU financial aid instrument.194 Overall, the EDF is 
not given to any special analysis in the context of this thesis, and will only be discussed as an 
integral aspect of the relevant substantive instruments of development policy and their 
institutional dimension as discussed below. 
 
3.3.3.2. EU Development Cooperation Indicative Programmes and Strategy Papers 
 
As mentioned above, beyond the framework association or partnership agreements, it is the 
region-specific and country-specific instruments of development cooperation policy which are 
most relevant to the investigation of coherence, especially policy coherence for development in 
the context of the focus of this thesis. These instruments are the Country Strategic Papers 
(CSPs) and the National Indicative Programme (NIPs) on the one hand, and Regional Strategic 
Papers and Regional Indicative Programme on the other hand.195 The legal provisions relating 
to these are found in Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement entitled ‘Implementation and 
Management Procedures’. Although the two groups of programming instruments are important 
                                                 
193Whether this will eventually be an issue in the light of the EPAs and the new EPA Development Programme 
(PAPED) discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis is something that lies in the future. 
194“EC – Development Assistance Committee Peer Review”, (DAC 2007), p 38, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/6/38965119.pdf accessed 28 February 2009. For the DCI, see fn 67 above. 
195The NIPs and RIPs are the equivalent of Multi-annual Indicative Programmes (MIP) under the non-EDF 
programmes such as those funded under the DCI (see Instructions for the Programming of the 11th EDF fn 61 
above, p 15 especially fn 9. 
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for addressing the question of coherence for the reasons discussed above, the latter two namely 
the RIP and the NIP are the most relevant to the coherence discourse.196 This is not simply 
because of its institutional implication for the question of coherence.197 Indeed, the two different 
groups hold the same institutional implications for the EU.198 However, the RIP and the NIP are 
expressly designated as the central document of the programming process for EU development 
cooperation with the different partner countries.199 In this regard, they are management tools to 
identify and define actions for attaining the objectives of EU development cooperation policy 
with a specific region or country respectively. As mentioned earlier, in practice, the 
development cooperation strategies which are usually set out in the RIPs and NIPs are built 
around regional and national development plans or similar comprehensive development 
documents, adopted with the involvement of the respective regional and national bodies 
concerned. However, this has most recently become a mutually reinforcing process where the 
priorities of the national development plans are also required to be consistent with the priorities 
of EU development cooperation policy.200 For example, in the context of the 'new EU 
development policy', the national development plans are required to be consistent with the 
proposed priorities outlined in the Agenda for Change Communication, including the EU's 
fundamental values.201 These include, human rights, democracy and good governance, as well 
as other values such as gender equality and respect for the rule of law. In this regard, it can be 
argued that the consistency required in the context of the 'new EU development policy' may not 
                                                 
196Hoebink, P, 'The Coherence of EU Policies: Perspectives from the North and the South' (2005) Commissioned 
Study, Center for International Development Issues Nijmegen, Brussels, p 9. 
197 See Article 9(3)(i)-(iii) of the EEAS Decision (fn 24 above) as also discussed at 3.4. below. 
198Ibid. 
199See the Instructions for the Programming of the 11th EDF, fn 61 above. 
200Ibid., para 4. For the debate surrounding this see for example, Koch, S, 'From Poverty Reduction to Mutual 
Interests? The Debate on Differentiation in EU Development Policy' [2015] 33 Development Policy Review 4, p 
479-502. 
201Ibid. 
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be so new after all, seeing as it is similar to the subsisting 'political conditionality'202 applied in 
EU development cooperation policy. Illustrative is the political conditionality under Article 96 
of the Cotonou Agreement in the context of EU development cooperation policy with the ACP 
group of states including the countries of SSA. However, there is a slight difference between 
the subsisting and the new. The former is a negative or ex-post conditionality which entails the 
use of pressure and enforcement - including a reduction or suspension of benefits – to obtain 
desired reforms or political changes from recipient governments in an ongoing donor-recipient 
relationship.203 In contrast, the latter is a positive or ex-ante conditionality which entails the 
imposition and fulfilment of laid out conditions prior to a donor-recipient agreement or 
partnership.204 Alternatively, it can also be argued that the two different dimensions are 
embraced in EU development cooperation policy in so far as the ex-ante conditionality is only 
a commitment on both the side of the donor and the recipient to the promotion of human rights. 
Indeed, this aligns with the two characteristics of EU human rights policy as established in the 
Resolution on Human Rights and Development.205 This includes active promotion of human 
rights and democratic principles through dialogue and financial assistance within the context of 
indicative programmes on the one hand, and the promotion of human rights through negative 
conditionality and restrictive sanctions in the case of violation of essential elements on the other 
                                                 
202This requires meeting some prescribed political conditions as set by donor. For a detailed discussion see in 
general, Molenaers, N, et al 'Political conditionality and foreign aid' (2015) 75 World Development, p 2–12; and 
with specific regards to the EU, see Portela, C, European Union sanctions and foreign policy: When and why do 
they work? (London: Routledge, 2010); and Fierro, E, The EU’s approach to human rights conditionality in 
practices (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003). 
203Also known as sanction, this is the more widely known type of political conditionality (see for example Stokke, 
O, Aid and political conditionality (London: Routledge,1995), p 12 where political conditionality is defined as; 
'the use of pressure, by the donor government, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or 
reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient'; also see Fierro, fn 202 above, p 131; and Schimmelfennig, 
F, and Sedelmeier, U, 'Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe' (2004) 11 JEPP 4, p 661–679, at p 670-671). In trade policy, sanctions refer to the withdrawal of 
trade benefits in order to force countries to comply with their international obligations to respect human rights 
(Zhou, W, and Cuyvers, L, 'Linking international trade and labour standards: The effectiveness of sanctions under 
the European Union’s GSP' (2011) 45 Journal of World Trade 1, p 63–85). 
204Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, fn 192 above, p 4. 
205See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.4.2. in particular fn 191. 
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hand. Indeed, the two can be said to interact in so far as the indicative programmes namely the 
RIPs and the NIPs are 'indicative' only and not entitlements.206 Their funding allocations are 
subject to revision in the light of developments not only in need, but also in performance. The 
implication is that benefits can be withdrawn in the event of breach of the relevant principles.207 
 
With regards to the RSP and CSP, although these are anticipated by the Cotonou Agreement,208 
they will only be needed in two situations in practice. For example, they will be needed where 
no agreement with the partner country or region can be reached to base the EU programming 
on the national or regional development plan respectively.209 Apart from this, they will also be 
needed where the national development plan does not provide a sufficient basis for 
programming by the EU, or if Joint Programming is not possible.210  It is not clear whether 
these situations occur often. But it is clear that these would be expected in regions or countries 
with limited capacity and/or political will.211 Where, the CSP is adopted, it is subsequently 
‘translated’ into a NIP, which lays out in budgetary terms programmes and projects to be 
undertaken.212 In any event, although it has been suggested that Mali's mentality of dependence 
on aid has limited the Country's ability to come up with nationally-owned development 
priorities,213 the following case study on Mali illustrates that the EU-Mali NIP for the 11th 
                                                 
206European Community (EC), EC profile, p 5 (source unknown). 
207Ibid. 
208See Article 8.3 of Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement; also see further information on the CSPs/RSPs 
available at http://www.acp-programming.eu/wcm/en/programming-references/country-and-regional-
programming/country-and-regional-strategy-paper-csprsp/what-is-a-csprsp.html, accessed 21 September 2012. 
209In accordance with the Cotonou Agreement, Annex IV, Articles 2 and 8. 
210See Instructions for the Programming of the 11th EDF fn 61 above.. 
211See DAC 2007, fn 194 above, p 70 where the situation is categorised into two cases namely when alignment 
may not be desirable (e.g. Myanmar, Zimbabwe), and when alignment is desirable but difficult (“shadow 
alignment”, e.g. DRC). 
212European Community (EC), EC Profile, fn 206 above, p 9. 
213Bergamaschi, I, 'Mali: Patterns and Limits of Donor-driven Ownership', Oxford University Global Economic 
Governance Programme, Global Economic Governance Working Paper 2008/41, p 9, available at 
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/GEG%20WP%202008_41%20Mali%20-
%20Patterns%20and%20limits%20of%20donor%20driven%20ownership%20-%20Isaline%20Bergamaschi.pdf 
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EDF214 was in fact adopted jointly. Overall, the indicative programmes and strategy papers do 
not only provide ‘strategic frameworks’ for EU assistance programmes, they are also designed 
to contribute to the overall coherence of external assistance policy with other EU policies 
amongst others. In this regard, they are comprehensive in approach, assessing the overall 
situation of a partner country with a view to an all-EU approach bordering on the construction 
of a united whole. Illustrative is the Mali NIP as discussed after the institutional dimension of 
EU development policy.215 Whether the coherence aimed at in the instruments is achieved in 
practice is another matter, and something that would greatly depend on what is legally 
permissible within the EU legal framework for external relations, as well as on the concerned 
actors including the Member States and the relevant EU institutions. 
 
3.4. The Institutional dimension of EU development cooperation policy towards SSA216 
 
     This section analyses the roles of EU institutions in the decision-making, implementation and 
enforcement of EU development cooperation policy towards SSA. This is with a view to 
subsequently determining coherence between this and other relevant policies investigated in 
this thesis, including with special regards to policy coherence for development. In doing this, 
the post-Lisbon changes are particularly highlighted especially the roles of the HR/VP and the 
EEAS where they arise. 
 
 
                                                 
214See Union Europeenne – Mali Programme Indicatif National 2014-2020. 
215See Union Europeenne – Mali Programme Indicatif National 2014-2020 (discussed at 3.4. below). However, 
the development cooperation instrument preceeding this was a CSP and a NIP combines together as was previously 
required (see Mali-Communaute europeenne, Document de strategies pays et programme indicatif national pour 
la periode 2008-2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-nip-mali-2008-2013_fr.pdf, 
accessed  25 October 2015. 
216A general overview of the EU institutional framework for coherence was provided in Chapter Two of this thesis 
(at 2.5.). 
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3.4.1. Institutions and policy making in the context of EU development cooperation with 
SSA: an overview 
 
The difficulty in separating EU development policy and EU trade policy was acknowledged at 
the beginning of this Chapter. This is due to the entwining of the two with the instrument of 
association agreements. The institutional procedure for policy-making in the context of 
association agreements is one of the situations where a separation between development policy 
and trade policy is onerous. However, some distinctions can be made. For example, from 
observation, it can be argued that the institutional procedure for association agreement applies 
more to trade than to development policy especially in the context of EU external relations with 
SSA. This is due to the fact that while the two are entwined under association agreements, the 
policy making for trade ends at this stage.217 This is not same for development policy for which 
only a broad framework is provided as discussed above. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, it is arguable that trade institutions are also more prominent at this stage of trade and 
development policy making. Therefore, a discussion of the institutional procedure at this stage 
of policy making in the context of association agreement is better carried out in Chapter Four 
where trade is discussed. This will better enable an assessment of the coherence of trade policy 
with development policy based on the analysis of the dimension brought by EU trade 
institutions in that procedure.218 Moreover, the stage where the discussion of the post-Lisbon 
EEAS becomes relevant is not at this stage of policy-making but at the implementing stage as 
will now be discussed. 
 
                                                 
217This would normally be the case unless new agreements are anticipated as is the case with the Economic 
Partnership Agreements provided for under the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (see Chapter Four of this 
thesis). 
218In this regard, the decision-making procedure for the EDF is also considered irrelevant. In general, as indicated 
above (at fn 191 above) the complexity of the EDF and its document entails a significant risk of legal uncertainty 
and errors. 
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3.4.2. Institutions and Implementation of EU development cooperation with SSA 
 
As is clear from the above analysis, the implementation and management of EU development 
cooperation policy with SSA is provided for in Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement 
appropriately titled ‘Implementation and Management Procedures’. Koning aptly explains that 
the delivery of the aid programme throughout the project cycle is jointly the responsibility of 
the ACP States and the EU.219As mentioned earlier, development cooperation policy is about 
financially aiding development through development strategies and the attendant programmes. 
Under this arrangement, the EU is responsible for preparing and adopting financing decisions 
on projects and programmes. In contrast, the contracts concluded for works and services remain 
national contracts which the recipient States alone are responsible for negotiating and 
concluding.220 The size of the aid component, which basically aims at improving the living 
conditions in the recipient States is determined by intergovernmental negotiations between the 
EU Member States. This takes place within the EDF Committee and is an aspect of the 
involvement of the Member States in the mixity dynamics, as is their involvement in the 
negotiation of the association agreements.221 Beyond this stage comes programming, and this 
is the implementing stage where the tasks incumbent on the EU are performed by the 
Commission and the EEAS who have to disburse aid on the basis of the NIP.222 As will be 
                                                 
219See Koning, A, 'Strengths and Weaknesses in the Management of the European Development Fund: 1995, 
ECDPM, Working paper, No. 8, p 19. 
220This division of powers between the EU and its partners in this context has been confirmed in case law (see 
for example Case 33/82 Murri Freres v Commission [1985] ECR 2759. 
221See Chapter Four of this thesis at 4.4. 
222Or a RIP as the case may be. In contrast, the responsibility incumbent on the Governments of the EU's 
development partners (in this case the countries of SSA) is performed by the National Authorisation Officers 
(NAO). The NAO is essentially responsible for the identification and preparation of projects and programmes, 
while the appraisal of projects or programmes is a joint responsibility. In this regard, although the Governments of 
the countries of SSA would usually be involved in some stages of the programming, their roles are irrelevant to 
answering the research question and are not part of the focus of the investigation. In the same vein, from this point, 
references will be made only to the NIP since the same process applies to it and the RIP, and it is still the NIP that 
the thesis concentrates on in the end due to the country case study. 
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recalled from above,223 the EEAS should seek to ensure that EU external programmes fulfil the 
objectives for external action as set out in Article 21 TEU, in particular in paragraph (2)(d) 
thereof, and that they respect the objectives of the Union’s development policy in line with 
Article 208 TFEU, in the light of policy coherence for development. However, it is noteworthy 
that how the EEAS will achieve these depends on the extent of the opportunity accorded to it 
in practice within the EU's traditional institutional constellation where it has just stepped in. As 
this study illustrates, any reductive impact of its influence has more to do with its exclusion 
from key policies that is relevant to policy coherence for development,224 than the fact of its 
complex interaction with the Commission in the context of development programming. Indeed, 
going by recent developments in its position in the development programming process, it is 
arguable that the EEAS is becoming more influential in development programming, if it has 
not become more influential than the traditional institutions previously occupying this forte.225 
 
To paint a clear picture of the different roles of the Commission and the EEAS with a view to 
a subsequent assessment of coherence of other external policies with development policy, it is 
generally preferable to follow the two key stages of the development project cycle namely 
Programming and Management. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
223See 3.1. above. 
224See for example Trade discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis. By virtue of Article 3(2) of the EEAS Decision, 
the EEAS and the services of the Commission shall consult each other on all matters relating to the external action 
of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions, except on matters covered by the CSDP [author's 
emphasis]. 
225See 3.4.2.1. below. 
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3.4.2.1. Programming: between the HR/VP, the EEAS, the Commission and EU 
Delegations 
 
Programming includes the preparation of the NIPs226 setting out the budget.227 As mentioned 
earlier, this thesis is not concerned with the coherence of financial instruments. In contrast, the 
study of the coherence of instruments in this thesis has to do with the substantive legal and 
political instruments of the relevant EU policies examined in this thesis. However, it is 
noteworthy that the references to financial programming are not different from the 
programming of the development strategies as it centres on the NIPs and their development 
objectives. 
 
Although the roles of the institutions as provided in the relevant legal instruments are not 
followed to the letter in practice,228 it is still necessary to analyse them in light of the primarily 
legal focus of this thesis. For example, in contrast to the pre-Lisbon dispensation in which both 
the programming and the management cycles fell under the responsibility of the Commission, 
the primary post-Lisbon provision on the role of the Commission in this context allocates only 
the management of programmes solely to the Commission.229 The programming process, as 
opposed to the management of programmes, falls under the shared responsibility of the 
                                                 
226Or the CSP and RSP where absolutely necessary (see the analysis on the previous page). 
227The Internal Agreement for an EDF sets the aggregate amount of Union aid to available under each EDF. It 
also defines the various financial envelopes of the EDF, the contribution key and the contributions to the EDF. The 
EDF procedures appear straightforward: 1) notification of the ACP State of the amount of available resources. 2) 
drafting an Internal Commission Policy paper. 3) preparing a draft NIP by the ACP State. 4) dialogue between 
ACP and EU on the draft NIP. 5) drawing up pre-programming document to inform the EU Member States. 5) 
discussion with the Member States in the EDF Committee. 6) drawing up of the NIP and preparation for signature 
(Nohlke, A, Aid Coordination Profiles (Konstanz: Constance University,  1992), p 22). 
228With specific regards to the EEAS see Erkelens, L, and Blockmans, S, Setting up the European external Action 
Service: An institutional act of balance, CLEER Working Papers 2012/1, p 9 and p 31; and  the Working 
Arrangements between Commission Services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in relation to 
external relations issues, SEC(2012) 48, 10 Jan. 2012 (‘Working Arrangements’). Signed on 13 January 2012 by 
the Secretary General of the Commission and the Chief Operating Officer of the EEAS, (unpublished SEC-
document). 
229Article 17(1) TEU. 
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Commission and the EEAS pursuant to Article 9 of the Council Decision on the EEAS.230 
However, some complexity arises as a result of the specific wording of the relevant provisions. 
For example, Article 9(3) EEAS Decision provides that the EEAS shall contribute to the 
programming and management cycle for the development strategies under inter alia, the EDF, 
and shall have responsibility for preparing the decisions of the Commission regarding the steps 
for developing the NIPs within the programming cycle. Furthermore, under the same Article, 
the HR/VP and the EEAS shall work with the relevant members and services of the Commission 
throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning and implementation, and all proposals 
for decisions will be prepared by following the Commission’s procedures and will be submitted 
to the Commission for adoption. Moreover, in a more complex twist, Article 9(4) provides that 
the proposals relating to programming for the EDF shall be ‘prepared jointly’ by the EEAS and 
the Commission ‘under the responsibility’ of the Commissioner responsible for Development 
Policy and shall be ‘submitted jointly’ with the HR/VP for adoption by the Commission.231 This 
does not in any way clarify what roles the EEAS and the Commission Services should take in 
the preparation of financial allocations and the NIPs within the framework of for example, the 
EDF. Koutrakos argues that the final outcome seeks to square the circle because even though 
the HR/VP is in principle responsible for the coordination of EU financial instruments,232 the 
management of the instruments falls within the responsibility of the Commission.233 The 
difference between coordination and management is not clear-cut. 
In any event, going beyond the complex legal provisions, the new programming framework 
provided in the Instruction for the Programming of the 11th EDF234 illustrates the existence of a 
                                                 
230See EEAS Decision, fn 24 above, especially Article 9. 
231bid., Article 9(4). 
232Ibid., Article 9(2). 
233 Koutrakos, P, 'Habemus European External Action Service' (2010) ELR Editorial, p 608. 
234 Instructions for the Programming of the 11th EDF, fn 62 above. 
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workable practical dimension to the interaction between the EEAS, the Commission and the 
EU Delegation in this context. This is based on a Working Arrangement signed between the 
Commission and the EEAS.235 In this regard, programming starts with EU Delegations in the 
relevant partner countries and regions submitting to relevant geographical Directors in the 
EEAS and The Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and 
Development (DG DEVCO)236 an analysis of the existing national or regional development 
plan as well as a proposal for the overall lines of the EU response, or where possible, a draft 
joint programming document.237 The EEAS and DEVCO will examine the assessment or the 
NIP/RIP and the proposal for the overall lines of the EU response submitted by the EU 
Delegation so as to ensure that the proposals are in line with relevant EU approaches, policies 
and priorities as required by the Agenda for Change.238 The EEAS will coordinate this process 
jointly with relevant DEVCO services and ensuring the involvement of all relevant Commission 
services and the EIB.239 The EEAS, in agreement with DEVCO, will then transmit instructions 
to the EU Delegation. Subsequently, and acting on the basis of the instructions provided by the 
EEAS in agreement with DEVCO, the EU Delegation will transmit a draft RIP or NIP to the 
EEAS and DEVCO who will again go through the same process as with the initial RIP or NIP. 
However, at this stage what the EEAS, in agreement with DEVCO, will transmit back to the 
EU delegation are the final instructions for the draft NIP. Once the final draft is received from 
                                                 
235See Working Arrangement, fn 228 above. 
236Hereinafter DEVCO. DEVCO is responsible for designing European international cooperation and 
development policy and delivering aid throughout the world (see 'About International Cooperation and 
Development - DG DEVCO', available at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/general_en, accessed 10 February 2016. 
237As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.6., the EU Delegations supports the EEAs on the ground. 
As the EU Delegation to Mali explains on their website, they play an important role in the analysis of the local 
situation (see Délégation de l’Union européenne en République du Mali, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/about_us/delegation_role/index_fr.htm, accessed 10 January 2015). When 
the EU Delegation, on the basis of its assessment, considers that the existing national or regional development plan 
cannot be the basis for the EU programming, it will submit to EEAS and DEVCO geographical Directors its 
assessment as well as a duly justified proposal to instead prepare a CSP/RSP.  
238See the above analysis.  
239This is within the context of Country/Regional Team Meetings (CTMs/RTMs) that the EEAS will organise. 
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the EU Delegation, the subsequent internal Commission process for the finalisation of the 
programming documents will then be taken forward as far as possible. The formal decision-
making process, involving all relevant Commission services, will take place upon the adoption 
of the necessary legal instruments, being the legal basis for the programming documents.240 
Effectively, the programming documents, including the indicative allocations therein, shall be 
approved by the Commission.241 This is the essence of the joint responsibility between the 
Commission and the EEAS provided for in the EEAS decisions. Of course this does not mean 
that there may not be internal wrangling, especially seeing as the newly established EEAS is 
clearly now formally responsible for this first stage of strategic programming.  However, this 
is not relevant in so far as any wrangling does not relate to incoherence in practice between EU 
external policies towards SSA especially as examined in this thesis. In contrast, it is noteworthy 
that the mandate of the Head of Delegation includes ensuring the application of the requirement 
of policy coherence for development in the programming process as a responsibility of that 
office.242 In this regard, programming can play a supplementary role in informing EU policy 
debates.243 It could look into how EU policy areas as diverse and potentially contradictory as 
trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration, security and development need to 
be shaped so that they do not undermine and where possible contribute to realising development 
objectives.244 Indeed, as discussed above, the programming instrument namely the NIP is an 
instrument for coherence. Of course, it has to be admitted that it may not always be possible to 
foresee some situations such as the eruption of violent conflict. For even in situations of 
                                                 
240 See programming steps 5 and 6 in fn 227 above. 
241 In accordance with the procedure set out in Article 14 of the Regulation on the Implementation of the 11th EDF 
(fn 160 above) pursuant to Article 7 of the same Regulation. Subsequently, the programming documents shall be 
endorsed by the ACP State or region concerned as stipulated in Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement.   
242'Reprogramming EU development cooperation for 2014-2020', ECDPM Discussion Paper, No 129, April 2012, 
p 9. 
243Ibid. 
244Ibid. 
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fragility, the eruption of violent conflicts will not always be expected. Overall, the programming 
process offer a window of opportunity to the EEAS to fulfil its mandate as the body established 
to ensure a more coherent external action. Nonetheless, the working arrangement between the 
Commission and the EEAS once more demonstrates the possibility and the potential of effective 
institutional dialogue. Undoubtedly effective institutional dialogue will aid coordination and 
improve coherence, albeit not necessarily the overall coherence in output. As trade and CDSP 
illustrate, some policies are still shrouded in specificity in a way that is well removed from the 
other external policies especially in practice, but also in law.245 
 
3.4.2.2. Management: entirely the Commission's forte (including within the EU 
Delegation) 
 
The next stage is the management stage which covers the technical contractual and final 
implementation of the programme set out in the NIP, monitoring and evaluation. The best 
illustration of this stage can be achieved with the relevant provisions of the Regulation on the 
Implementation of the 11th EDF.246 In this regard, the Commission shall assume the 
responsibilities of the Union as defined in Article 57 of the Cotonou Agreement.247 By and 
large, the Commission's implementation of programmes of development strategies agreed under 
the NIPs begins and ends with the disbursing of funds to recipient governments and /or Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) including for onward disbursement to members of the 
civil society. Arguably, the Commission will be doing this through the Commission's section of 
                                                 
245 See Chapter Four and Chapter Six. 
246 See Regulation on the Implementation of the 11th EDF, fn 172 above. 
247To that end, it shall implement the revenue and expenditure of the 11th EDF in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Implementing Regulation, under its own responsibility and within the limits of the 11 th EDF 
resources (Ibid, Article 16(1)). Furthermore, the commitment of expenditure shall be preceded by a financing 
decision adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 26 of the Implementing Regulation.  
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the relevant EU Delegation.248 In any event, the EU and its institutions are not practically 
engaged with the implementation of the development strategies of EU development policy. 
Hence, the security or conflict resolution dimension of EU development policy differs from the 
CSDP dimension in that the latter entails the EU's practical engagement as discussed in Chapter 
Six. The questions that arise with regards to coherence in their interaction are also discussed in 
that Chapter. 
 
3.4.2.2. Enforcement: Between the Commission and the Member States 
 
Using the Implementing Regulation of the 11th EDF as an indicator, monitoring is the key 
method for enforcement. Article 16(2) of the Implementing Regulation for the 11th EDF 
provides that the Member States shall cooperate with the Commission so that the 11th EDF 
resources are used in accordance with the principle of sound financial management. Otherwise, 
the Commission shall monitor the use of 11th EDF assistance by the ACP States, and the 
implementation of projects financed by the 11th EDF, having particular regard to the objectives 
referred to in Articles 55 and 56 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement.249 Pursuant to Article 
45 of the Implementing Regulation for the 11th EDF, the Commission shall provide the Member 
States with information on the operational implementation of 11th EDF resources as foreseen 
in Article 18 of the Implementation Regulation. The Commission shall also send that 
information to the Court of Auditors in accordance with Article 11(6) of the Internal Agreement. 
                                                 
248As discussed in 2.5.3.6. above, the EU Delegations administer development aid. However, the EU Delegations 
are not institutionally homogenous: ‘[...] Staff in delegations shall comprise EEAS staff and, where appropriate 
for the implementation of the Union budget and Union policies other than those under the remit of the EEAS, 
Commission staff [...].’ (Council Decision, Article 5(2); also see Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 1080/2010 
amending the staff regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the conditions of Employment of 
Other Servants of those Communities [2010] OJ L311/1, Article 96, second paragraph, which provides that an 
EEAS official working in a Union Delegation ‘[…] who has to carry out a task for the Commission as part of his 
duties shall take instructions from the Commission with regard to those tasks’). 
249Where it is concerned, the European Investment Bank (EIB) shall also engage in monitoring the management 
of the funds. 
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The HR/VP and the EEAS do not have any powers in this regard. This is surprising in so far as 
they are established to ensure coherence but do not have any monitoring or enforcement powers 
over and above the involvement of the EEAS in development policy programming. Arguably, 
this would detract from their potential oversight of coherence in the interaction between the 
distinct policies in general, and the coherence of other policies with development objectives in 
particular. It has been suggested that it would be particularly useful if a more intensive role 
could played by EU the Delegations in monitoring the actual effects of EU action in view of 
the knowledge gap observed above.250 They could do this in conjunction with the EEAS. 
 
3.5. Mali Case Study 
 
The framework of EU development cooperation policy has been discussed above. This section 
discusses Mali as a case study to illustrate EU development cooperation policy towards SSA. 
This is not to undermine the possible different dynamics and effects of EU development 
cooperation policy towards the different countries of SSA. However, as discussed in Chapter 
One, a case study enables a more direct analysis of law and practice. This case study of EU 
development cooperation policy towards Mali provides the benchmark against which coherence 
with other EU policies towards Mali will subsequently be measured including in the light of 
policy coherence for development. In so far as the institutional dimension of development 
cooperation policy is globally applicable to the region, the Mali case study focuses mainly on 
the instruments and objectives albeit not to the total exclusion of the institutional dimension. 
The latter will only be mentioned where it is necessary to buttress or emphasize a point. 
                                                 
250 ECDPM Discussion Paper, No 129, April 2012, fn 242 above, p 10. 
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3.5.1. Of the old and new EU development cooperation with Mali: a contextual 
background  
 
As discussed in Chapter One,251 Mali's cooperation with the EU began in 1958 when it was one 
of the first SSA associates under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome.252 The country became 
independent from France in 1960, and has been historically marked by poverty due to 
unfavourable geographical and economic demographics. The record of its poor development 
index started with its LDC status in 1971, but its location in the heart of a sub region disrupted 
by many conflicts has not helped its development projections and index. The poverty and 
security level of the country means that EU external action towards Mali is one that peculiarly 
requires a comprehensive approach, and this the EU has embraced over the years. However, the 
following analysis is focused on the most recent instrument of EU development cooperation 
with Mali, albeit not to the complete exclusion of relevant previous instruments.  Indeed, a 
distinction can be made between the old EU development cooperation with Mali and the new. 
There is no complexity in this.  
A reference to the old is just a way to acknowledge the EU's new approach to Mali in the wake 
of the violent security crisis that erupted in the country in 2012.253 Without any need to go 
further back in time, the old development cooperation with Mali could be represented with the 
Mali-EU instrument for development strategies preceding the current one.254 And without going 
into this instrument further than is necessary, it suffices to explain its core as is relevant for the 
depiction of the old that has been replaced by the new. Despite the controversy regarding the 
historical evolution of Mali's security crisis,255 there is no doubt that the country was stable 
                                                 
251See in particular Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0. 
252 Or what Hoebink describes as 'associationism' (see 3.2. above). 
253See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
254Mali-Communaute Europeenne, Document de strategies pays et programme indicatif national pour la periode 
2008-2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-nip-mali-2008-2013_fr.pdf, accessed  
25 October 2015. 
255See Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0. 
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prior to the manifestation of the recent crisis. It is therefore not particularly surprising that the 
10th EDF (2008-2013) had a narrow focus with a concentration only on two areas. The first 
was governance, in particular support to state and public sector reform. The second area of 
focus was support for economic development in the three northern regions of the country.256 
This is where the bridge happens between the old and the new. For with the start of the violent 
crisis, EU development aid funds were frozen especially when the al-Quaeda-linked insurgents 
seized control of the northern part of Mali in March 2012.257 Following a successful French-led 
intervention in January 2013, and the adoption by the Malian government of a ‘roadmap for 
transition’, the EU resumed its development aid programme for Mali in February 2013 in a 
move branded as 'a new European development aid doctrine' by EU diplomats.258 It has been 
suggested that this was part of the EU's 'new approach' to failed states.259 The re-establishment 
of development cooperation between Mali and the EU is branded as a new policy, as 
development funds are becoming available with fewer traditional strings attached.260 An EU 
diplomat is said to have captured it thus: “What is very interesting is that this is not the 
traditional conditionality, which is quite political or idealistic. Here the conditionality and the 
resumption of EU aid is gradual but with attention to priority needs. So the new doctrine differs 
from the previous doctrine.”261 Arguably, this is in line with the general new EU development 
policy as framed in the Agenda for Change discussed above. It is about differentiation based on 
                                                 
256Beyond this line of development aid, the EU is also said to have been implementing a number of other projects 
and programmes, including in the fields of culture, regional integration, rural development and food security. Some 
of these extra assistant are said to be difficult to track due to the attendant complexity of the aid portfolio (see 
Loquai, C, 'Supporting domestic accountability in developing countries: Taking stock of the approaches and 
experiences of German development cooperation in Mali', ECDPM Discussion Paper No 115, July 2011, p 52). 
In any event, these are immaterial to the coherence discourse in the context of these thesis. 
257See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
258See 'Europe takes a 'new failed' aid states approach in Mali', EurActive France, 13 march 2013, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/mali-new-eu-development-approach-news-518404, accessed 12 
September 2015. 
259Ibid. 
260Ibid. 
261Ibid. 
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needs albeit with a paradoxical requirement that national development plans align with EU 
development objectives and fundamental values. In this regard, the most immediate needs in 
Mali as identified by the EU include police, security and justice as well as the resumption of 
basic public services such as water, health and education. Another priority identified is the need 
for “roads to open up areas” in the north of Mali and 'anything that can help reconciliation 
between peoples'.262 It is noteworthy that not all of these are covered in the NIP for which there 
is a limit regarding the number of focal points to be covered as will now be discussed. 
 
3.5.2. The EU-Mali NIP263: the more-specific instrument of objectives of EU 
development cooperation policy towards Mali 
 
As discussed above, the new EU development policy is differentiated in approach and is based 
on the level of development with a partner country or region. The differentiation is therefore 
related to development policy strategies and objectives, and to the allocation of aid for these 
purposes. This means that the EU's development policy towards a country or a region can only 
be deciphered from the country-specific or region-specific instrument on the EU's specific 
approach to the country or region. In order to be able to assess the coherence of EU external 
policies, especially in the light of the requirement of policy coherence for development using a 
country case study, a determination of the specific instrument and objectives of EU 
development policy towards the country is inevitable. 
 
In contrast to the instruments and objectives of EU development policy towards a country or 
region, the institutional dimension of programming for EU development policy is global in 
approach. In this regard, it can be argued that it is the institutional process discussed above that 
                                                 
262Ibid. 
263Union Europeenne – Mali Programme Indicatif National 2014-2020. 
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would apply to the determination of the EU-Mali NIP. It does not make any difference that the 
EU-Mali NIP for the 11th EDF did not mention the EEAS at all, but rather refers to the joint 
programming process in which the European Commission and Mali undertook a national 
situation analysis to identify the key development concerns and the strategies to tackle them.264 
From a legal perspective, it is noteworthy, that the NIP is adopted in accordance with Article 2 
and Article 4 of Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement. Substantively, the NIP stresses that its 
objectives tallies with Mali's National Development Strategies as illustrated by both the text 
and the process of formulation of the NIP. In this regard, the focal sectors identified in the NIP 
meet the development priorities of Mali as set out in the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of 
Mali 2013-2014 (PRED), and in the Government Action Plan 2013-2018.265 These priorities 
are based on the challenges currently facing Mali266 as discussed above. It is these challenges 
which traverse economic, social political and security problems that form the strategic 
objectives of the current EU development policy towards Mali. With regards to the specific 
objectives, there are three main priorities namely 1) human rights, democracy and good 
governance; 2) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development and security; and 3) 
gender equality. The NIP acknowledges that these correspond the European Consensus and the 
values promoted in the Agenda for Change. Indeed, the latter requires that the new development 
policy towards any country or region will only cover three focal sectors, except in situations of 
fragility where a fourth sector can be considered. Indeed, a fourth sector on infrastructure was 
added in the current EU-Mali NIP because of the strategic interest of this sector in the situation 
                                                 
264Ibid. 
265 Union Europeenne – Mali Programme Indicatif National 2014-2020, p 8. 
266Ibid. For the relevant national instruments see respectively Republique du Mali, Plan pour la Relance Durable 
du Mali 2013-2014, Version Finale, 07 Mai, 2013, available at 
http://www.maliapd.org/IMG/file/pdf/DOCUMENTS_CLES/12.%20PRED/Plan_pour_la_Relance_Durable_du
_Mali__VF.pdf, accessed 12 July 2015, and Republique du Mali, Primature, Cabinet du premier Ministre, 
'Programme d'Actions du Gouvernement (PAG), 2013-2018', November 2013, available at 
www.primature.gov.ml/images/PAG_2013-2018.pdf, accessed 12 August 2015. 
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the country is currently experiencing.267 This is a clear illustration of differentiation. 
 
With specific regards to coherence, the NIP emphasises the need for the EU to compulsorily 
make a coherent and complementary use of all the instruments available to it to support Mali's 
development efforts.268 Specific reference is made to the CSDP as an example. This is not 
surprising in the light of the security-development nexus. Invariably, the intimate link between 
security and development means that the question of coherence between the pair is generally at 
the fore front of the coherence discourse. The practice also illustrates good reasons for this. For 
example, while highlighting the daunting challenge of coherence in conflict-affected and fragile 
states, DAC specifically stresses in a review that more coherence is required between the CSDP 
and the EU's longer term development programming.269 Ironically, the Sahel Strategy which 
links 'security and development' in the light of the security-development nexus was not 
mentioned in the EU-Mali NIP. This is striking as it has been suggested that the real indicator 
to assess the ethos and ideas of linking 'security and development' it espouses will be how much 
of these will make their way into the country and regional strategies.270 However, while this 
brings to mind the argument that the Strategy lacks political clout and engagement,271 it has to 
be remembered that a lack of reference to a strategy is not necessarily an indication that its 
                                                 
267Union Europeenne – Mali Programme Indicatif National 2014-2020, p 8. This was added at the express request of Malian 
authorities. 
268Ibid., p 9. 
269DAC Review, 2007, fn 194 above, p 68. The main case study used for an example in the DAC review was the 
DRC which prior to the Mali crisis was the key topical case study in the study of the CSDP practice and its 
coherence with other EU external policies, especially long term development programming. Similar to the case of 
the DRC, the EU's priority in Mali as stressed in the NIP is to encourage the development and stabilisation of Mali 
in the long term (Union Europeenne – Mali Programme Indicatif National 2014-2020, p 9). 
270Sherriff, A, 'The EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel – An indicator for the future of EU 
External Action?', ECDPM Talking Point Blog, 23 September 2011, available at http://ecdpm.org/talking-
points/eu-strategy-sahel-indicator-future-external-action/, accessed 12 January 2015. 
271See Ould-Abdallah, A, 'Why the Sahel urgently needs an EU-backed security framework', Europe's World, 15 
January 2014, available at http://europesworld.org/2014/01/15/why-the-sahel-urgently-needs-an-eu-backed-
security-framework/#.Vmpk2oR0N0s, accessed, 14 January 2015. 
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objectives are not taken into account.272 It is noteworthy that violent conflict is not 
programmable. 
 
With regards to trade, the NIP indicates that trade, along with regional integration will be 
facilitated by the EPAs. Further in this regard, it notes that the regional EPA will govern all 
commercial relations and aid for trade between the EU and Mali. It can be argued that this is 
another indication of the separation of trade from development by the EU. However, the 
requirement that trade respects the objectives of development in the light of policy coherence 
for development was not specifically mentioned in the EU-Mali NIP. Of course this does not 
hold the implication of absolving trade from the primary requirement of policy coherence for 
development. It also does not mean a submission to the view that the requirement is 
impossible.273 In contrast, it can be argued that this could stem from a belief that EU trade policy 
towards Mali is already coherent with development objectives.274 Indeed, the EU's Everything 
But Arms (EBA) initiative which is considered a development-oriented trade policy instrument 
for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) equally applies to Mali as an LDC.275 In this regard, the 
position of the EU-Mali NIP that the EPA will govern the trade relations between the EU and 
Mali is noteworthy as it highlights the relevance of the EPAs to the coherence discourse in the 
context of this study.276 
 
                                                 
272For example, it is clear that some of the areas covered in the NIP centre around some of the four complementary 
lines of action articulated in the Sahel Strategy (see Sherriff, fn 259 above for the view that the Sahel Strategy 
mainly recasts and links existing initiatives). As will be remembered from fn 257 above, the EU runs a complex 
aid portfolio in Mali covering different areas. 
273See Chapter Two of this thesis. 
274Of course, as discussed in Chapter Four, the coherence of trade policy with development objectives is 
invariably a question of extent (and the coherence of trade with development objectives is a different question 
from the coherence of the Common Agricultural Policy - which is an internal policy - with development or even 
trade policy). 
275Ibid. 
276Ibid. 
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As mentioned in Chapter One, Mali's high level of aid dependency for fighting poverty has 
made it a donor’s darling and a “testing ground” for new aid modalities. In terms of aid 
allocation, it has been suggested that Mali averagely receives some 1.5 per cent of total EU aid 
to the ACP, with EU aid accounting for 10 per cent of total Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) received by Mali.277 While this has not been confirmed in the course of this study, the 
result would not make any difference to the issue of coherence as examined in this thesis. 
Overall, this EU development policy towards Mali as crafted in the NIP, and the institutional 
dimension as provided in the primary legal instruments provides the benchmark for determining 
the coherence of other EU external policies with EU development policy towards SSA. 
However, being able to trace the contours of EU development policy towards Mali or being 
able to draw out its objectives is not the same as to say that a determination or assessment of 
the coherence of other EU external policies with the former is a simple task. As discussed above, 
not only is development an indefinite concept, its metonym poverty reduction or eradication 
are equally concepts that are difficult to measure and have understandably not been defined by 
the EU.278 Furthermore, there is in general a lack of sufficient evidence on the actual effects of 
EU policies in developing countries due to lack of investment in research.279 In this regard, it is 
arguable that the only possible assessment that can be conducted in this regard, at least for now, 
is the assessment of how the instruments of these other policies demonstrate that they have 
taken account of development objectives. It does not matter that this is a minimalist approach. 
In any event, the question of the coherence of other EU external policies with development 
objectives will at all times be a question of extent. Of course, this is different from the question 
of the overall coherence of the policies vis-a-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy 
                                                 
277Brigaldino, G, 'Managing European Aid Resources in Mali' in Carlsson, J, et al, (ed.) Foreign Aid in Africa: 
Learning from Country Experiences (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), p 132. 
278 See Khaliq, fn 9 above, p 120. 
279 ECDPM Discussion Paper, No 129, April 2012, fn 242 above, p 10. 
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option towards 'an all EU' approach. 280 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
The Chapter set out to analyse EU development policy towards SSA as a distinct field of EU 
external action towards the region with a view to a subsequent determination of coherence, 
especially policy coherence for development. This meant ultimately separating it from trade 
which it is historically and legally entwined with in this context. In general, it is submitted that 
the post-Lisbon law and practice render more plausible the argument that EU development 
policy towards SSA has always been separable from EU Trade Policy towards the region despite 
the historical intertwining of the two in the successive association agreements that regulates EU 
external relations with SSA. Both the theoretical framework of the Chapter and the Mali case 
study illustrate that EU development cooperation including in the context of EU external action 
towards SSA revolves mainly around development assistance by means of financial aid for 
strategies aimed at poverty eradication and sustainable development.  In this regard, the analysis 
further illustrates that although there is a central objective of EU development policy in general, 
the objectives and strategic priorities of EU development policy towards SSA centre on the 
distinct development needs and interests of the relevant recipient sub-geographic regions and 
countries of SSA. This is either mutually agreed or unilaterally determined by the EU, but in a 
process distinct from the procedure for the determination of EU trade policy towards the region 
as discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Against this background, it is posited that both the specific 
strategic objectives as stipulated in the relevant region or country-specific instruments and the 
general objective of EU development policy (the reduction and eradication of poverty) are 
                                                 
280 See Chapter One of this thesis at 1.3. 
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relevant to the determination of the coherence of other policies with development objectives 
depending on the EU policy for which policy coherence for development is assessed. In general, 
the Chapter provides the crucial benchmark that will facilitate comparison with the selected 
relevant strand(s) of EU external action towards SSA with a view to determining their 
coherence, including in the light of the requirement of policy coherence for development. In 
doing this, the Chapter discussed the norms, instruments and institutional dynamics of EU 
development policy towards the region, and especially highlighted the active involvement of 
the post-Lisbon body for coherence namely, EEAS in the procedure for development policy. 
These will enable a subsequent analysis of coherence across the identified EU policies towards 
the region, albeit with a specific focus on the requirement of policy coherence for development, 
and starting with the EU trade policy towards the region. This is the focus of the next Chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
4.0. EU Trade Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa: between trade interests and 
development objectives 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter demonstrated that EU development policy towards SSA is distinct from 
EU trade policy towards the region. There is no need to repeat the distinction-infused 
introduction provided in that Chapter in this introduction. In contrast, it suffices to emphasise 
the distinction of trade policy as recently expressed by the EU in a key policy instrument: “Trade 
policy has its own distinct economic logic and contribution to make to the external action of 
the Union […]. So the Union’s trade and foreign policies can and should be mutually 
reinforcing. This applies to areas such as development policy [...]”.1 This does not only 
distinguish trade policy from development policy but also reaffirms the need for coherence 
between the former and other policies including development policy. However, this is only a 
reference to the general requirement of coherence between EU external policies. As will be 
remembered from the last two Chapters,2 it is clear that other EU policies including trade are 
required to be coherent with development objectives over and above the reinforcement of each 
other towards the construction of a united whole. 
 
In line with the objectives of this thesis, this Chapter has one major aim. It provides analysis of 
EU trade policy towards SSA with a view to determining its coherence or extent of it, with 
development policy especially in the light of policy coherence for development, and using Mali 
                                                 
1Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Trade, Growth and World Affairs. Trade Policy as a Core 
Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, COM (2010) 612 final [hereinafter the 2020 Strategy]. 
2Chapters Two and Three. 
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as a case study.3 The analysis is also necessary for the purposes of completeness in the 
determination of coherence vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options. 
Trade policy is being investigated immediately after development aid policy because it is 
entwined with the latter under the original approach of EU external relations with SSA as 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis.4 
 
It is submitted that post as pre-Lisbon, the EU trade policy towards SSA remains distinctly 
specific even while embracing the nexus between trade and development. This specificity 
despite the amalgamation of EU external objectives at Lisbon is most clearly illustrated by the 
exclusion from trade policy, of the post Lisbon institution and body for coherence namely the 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) in the former's service. Against this background, it is argued 
that while the pre and post-Lisbon institutional bifurcation between EU trade policy and its 
development policy could compromise the coherence of trade norms with development 
objectives, the overall specificity of trade policy means that even institutional coherence will 
not prove an eternal panacea for the former. Furthermore, while highlighting the institutional 
potentials to enhancing the coherence of trade with development objectives despite the 
exclusion of the HR/VP and the EEAS, it concludes that the coherence of trade policy with 
development objectives beyond the acknowledgement of the need for same in the instruments 
of trade policy ultimately depends on the political will of the EU Member States. Nevertheless, 
it concedes that this is at all times a question of extent, and one whose answer may be as much 
difficult to determine as it will continue to be mired in controversy.5 This is mainly because of 
                                                 
3See Chapter Two of this thesis.  
4 See Chapters Two and Three of this thesis. 
5Invariably, this is different from the question of the overall coherence of EU policies towards SSA which is mainly 
a question of synergy and coordination as well as a sequential implementation of EU policies towards the 
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the sophisticated and complex nature of the interaction between trade and development in 
instrument and in practice as the Mali case study further illustrates, and also because of the 
indeterminacy of the requirement of policy coherence for development including with specific 
regards to trade, in EU external relations law.6 
 
This Chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides the contextual background 
to EU trade policy, and pertinently analyses the legal basis and the scope of its objectives with 
special reference to SSA. The latter also defines the limits of the scope of the analysis.7 The 
second section presents a pertinent overview of the instruments of EU external trade policy with 
special reference to SSA. This is followed by the discussion of the institutional dimension of 
EU trade policy with special reference to the region. This covers the institutional procedure 
both for unilateral and conventional instruments.8 With regards to the latter, the focus is 
primarily on the institutional procedure for trade policy-making in so far as this is the 
contemporary practice in the context of EU trade policy towards SSA vis-a-vis the evolving 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).9 However, in doing this, the dimension of the 
                                                 
construction of a united whole (see Chapter One of this thesis at 1.3.).  
6The indeterminacy of policy coherence for development in general is discussed in Chapter Two of thesis at 2.5. 
7See for example Eeckhout, P, EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2nd edn.), p 448, where he explains that  the scale 
and scope of aspects of EU trade policies is such that their studies cannot all be undertaken in even a book Chapter. 
8Ibid, p 447. 
9The EPAs are trade agreements which the EU and its African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partners agreed under 
Article 36(1) of the Cotonou Agreement to negotiate in order to bring their previously waived historical trade 
relations to conform with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as required (see 4.3.1. below). The 
WTO administers the contemporary multilateral trade agreements, settles disputes, provides a forum for new trade 
negotiations, surveys national trade policies and cooperates with other international bodies in drawing up of 
economic policies at the global level. It is noteworthy that WTO supersedes the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), a post-war period organisation set up in 1947 to help regulate the international economy and 
prevent a recurrence of the disastrous protectionist policies undertaken between the two World Wars. GATT was 
charged with overseeing international trade in goods and, in particular, the liberalisation of this trade by means of 
a negotiated reduction in tariff barriers. The GATT has been superseded by the WTO since 1995 with the latter 
maintaining the relevant GATT rules (Moussis, N, Access to European Union law, economies and policies 
(Rixensart: Euroconfidentiel,19th edn.), 23.4. available at 
http://europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/7/23/04/index.tkl?lang=en&all=1&pos=340&s=1&e=10, accessed 14 
January 2015. As mentioned in Chapter One, EU external action in the WTO is outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, this does not mean that reference to WTO is completely eschewed from this thesis. Indeed, some of the 
GATT-WTO rules are pertinent to this analysis, and there is no doubt that the WTO is a veritable legal framework 
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institutional procedure in the context of association agreement is also highlighted.10 Indeed, in 
so far as this analysis is with a view to determining coherence in the interaction between trade 
and development, it can be argued that the difference between the two policy-making 
procedures does not affect the result of the interaction between trade policy and development 
objectives as much as the institutional dichotomy between the two within the Commission.11 
Of course, this is not to say that institutional coherence would be an eternal panacea to any 
incoherence between trade and development.12 Nevertheless, in contrast to the institutional 
procedure for conventional instruments, the institutional procedure for unilateral instruments is 
relevant because of the application of the unilateral EU instrument to the country of case study 
namely Mali. Significantly, the unilateral instruments could also potentially apply to the region 
as a whole, as could the conventional EPAs.13 The fourth and final section centres on Mali as a 
case study.14 In so far as the institutional dimension is globally applicable to the region, the Mali 
case study focuses mainly on the pertinent instruments and norms of trade policy towards SSA 
as they apply to Mali.15 In particular, the position of Mali in-between the relevant EPA and the 
unilateral EU trade regime that applies to the country namely the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
is pertinently analysed in the light of policy coherence for development. The two different 
regimes could potentially apply to SSA as a whole. However, the focus of the analysis in this 
last section is completely on Mali and the peculiarity, or lack thereof, of the potential 
                                                 
for EU trade policy including in its relations with SSA. 
10As discussed in the previous Chapter, the policy-making for trade policy would usually end at this stage with 
no further need for implementation in contrast to development aid (see Chapter Three at 3.4.1. above).  
11See 4.4. below. 
12See the following analysis. 
13See the following analysis. The EPAs are differentiated according to the different economic groupings and sub-
regions within SSA (see Annex III attached to this thesis). 
14See 4.5. below. 
15The complexity of the issues at stake and the sophisticated nature of EU trade policy means that a pertinent 
focus is required within the limited confines of this Chapter. Indeed, the indeterminacy of the requirement of policy 
coherence for development especially with regards to trade means that a one by one analysis of the provisions of 
the relevant norm and instruments is as irrelevant as it is impossible within the limited confines of this Chapter. 
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implications of these trade instruments and their norms on the objectives of EU development 
policy towards the country.16 
 
4.2. The legal basis, scope of objectives and instruments of EU trade policy with special 
reference to SSA 
 
     The aim of this section is to discuss the legal basis and scope of objectives of EU trade policy 
with special reference to SSA. Invariably, the legal basis is imperative in so far as the thesis is 
first and foremost a legal analysis. However, both the legal basis and the objectives will aid the 
assessment of coherence with development policy, as well as provide a pertinent background 
for the subsequent analysis of the institutional structure and the instruments of EU trade policy 
towards SSA. Nonetheless, prior to a discussion of the legal basis and the objectives, it is 
imperative to provide a brief contextual background of EU trade policy as it relates to the focus 
of this thesis. 
 
4.2.1. EU trade policy and the coherence of EU external action: a pertinent background 
 
As indicated elsewhere,17 opinions vary regarding which EU external policy is the EU's external 
anchor. With specific regards to trade, it has not only been considered the EU's raison d’être,18 
but also Europe's most important contact with the world outside its borders.19 In general, 
whatever other reasons there may be for Europe's integration, it can be argued that trade was 
                                                 
16As discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. It is noteworthy that this does not entail an assessment of the 
Union's success at achieving broad development goals which Peers explains is a question that lies beyond the 
scope of a legal analysis and rather one for policy analysts (see Peers, S, Fragmentation or Evasion in the 
Community's Development Policy? The Impact of Portugal v Council' in Dashwood, A, and Hillion, C, The 
General Law of EC External Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p 112). 
17See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.2. 
18See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.1. and Chapter Three at 3.2. 
19DG Trade, European Communities, 'What is Europe's Trade Policy?' (Publications Office, 2009). 
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the principal element at the heart of it,20 and also the key driver of the integration process.21 
Similarly, it could be concluded that the external aspects of trade are also at the core of the 
Union's interaction with the outside world.22 
 
In contrast to development policy which was discussed in the previous Chapter, there is no 
controversy regarding the evolution of the EU's competence for external trade. However, 
historically, the Treaties do not make direct reference to ‘EU trade policy’. Rather, EU trade 
policy is framed within the context of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP).23 As will be 
recalled from Chapter Two of this thesis, the CCP was imperative for the external protection of 
the developing internal market with uniform measures.24The establishment of the CCP was 
based on three principles namely, a common external tariff, common trade agreements with 
third countries and the uniform application of trade instruments across Member States.25 A 
customs union where all restrictions are removed in trade between Member States required a 
single external border and a distinct single trade policy26 towards the different parts of the 
world.27 It also required a single voice within the modern international system of trade rules as 
primarily regulated by the WTO.28 Due to its normative and practical proximity to the goal of 
                                                 
20See Chapter Two of this thesis. 
21See Okigbo, P, C, N, Africa and the Common Market (London: Longman, 1967), p 17-22 where he listed the 
different types of economic grouping tried in Europe prior to the establishment of the Common Market. 
22Or at the centre-piece of EU's external policies (see Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 439). 
23See Title III of the TFEU on the CCP; also see Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 447.   
24The key provisions of which are presently in Article 28 TFEU (ex-Article 23 EC, ex-Article 9 EC) and Article 
30 TFEU (ex-Article 25, ex-Article 12). 
25 Meunier, S, and Nicolaidis, K, ‘The European Union as a Trade Power’ in Hill, C, and Smith, M, (ed.) 
International Relations and the European Union (OUP, 2005). 
26See 'What is Europe's Trade Policy?' (Publications Office, 2009), fn 19 above. 
27This was required by the definition of a customs union in the GATT (see fn 9 above). On the relations of customs 
union to the growth of trade see GATT, Article XXIV, para 8(a); also see Viner, J, The Customs Union Issue (New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950); and Meade, J, The Theory of Customs Union 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Lipsey, R, G, The Theory of Customs Union: a General Survey (1960) 70 
Economic Journal 279, 496 – 513. 
28See fn 9 above. 
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the internal market, the CCP, and hence trade was made a field of exclusive EU competence 
right from its origin.29 This exclusivity has been further reaffirmed at Lisbon with previously 
contested aspects of the CCP brought under the exclusive competence of the EU.30 In general, 
the essence of exclusive EU competence is that the Member States no longer have any power 
to legislate on trade matters or conclude international trade agreements.31 Nonetheless, this is 
only in principle. For as Eeckhout especially notes, this needs to be qualified with regards to 
practice.32 EU external trade policy interacts with other aspects of foreign policy wherein the 
competence of the Member States subsists. For example, in the specific case of SSA, trade 
policy does not only occasionally interact with the CFSP and the CSDP,33 but also traditionally 
interacts with development policy as discussed in Chapter Three.34 These are fields of EU 
external policy wherein the competences of the Member States subsists in varying dimensions 
but in any event with the direct implication that Member States are directly involved in policy-
making or implementation as may be required. This is a clear reflection of the EU's 
Staatenverbund character and perhaps the overall flexibility of EU external relations law and 
practice.35 It follows that with specific regards to trade, the EU's exclusive competence does 
not mean the complete exclusion of EU Member States from policy-making and 
implementation. The development leading to the involvement of EU Member States especially 
in the context of EU external relations with SSA has been discussed in Chapter Three and will 
                                                 
29Article 3(1)(e) TFEU. 
30Former exceptions which came under exclusive EU competence at Lisbon include sensitive areas such as trade 
in cultural, social, educational, and health related services. 
31Only the EU can legislate in these regards (see Chapter Two of this thesis on the delineation of EU external 
competences). 
32See for example Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 439. 
33See in general for example, Larik, J, Much More than Trade: the Common Commercial Policy in a Global 
Context’ in Evans, M, and Koutrakos, P, Beyond the Established Legal Orders (Oxford: Hart, 2011). Indeed, in 
general, EU trade policy interacts with overall EU foreign policy (see for example Koutrakos, P, Trade, Foreign 
Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart, 2001); Leal-Arcas, R, 'The European Union's new 
common commercial policy after the Treaty of Lisbon' in Trybus, M, and Rubini, L, (ed.) The Treat of Lisbon and 
the Future of European Law and Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), especially p 277.   
34Also see Chapter Two; and more generally the following analysis. 
35See Chapter two of this thesis. 
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not be repeated here.36 Suffice it to state that this involvement of EU Member States, whether 
avoidable or not, holds implication for the coherence of EU external action towards SSA in 
particular. However, this may not always be about the historical relations between some EU 
Member States and the region as discussed elsewhere.37 Contrastingly, with specific regards to 
the coherence of trade with development objectives, it can be argued that this is in general about 
the trade and economic interests of EU Member States.38 This does not detract from the 
assertion that the coherence of trade norms with development objectives is at all times a 
question of extent especially in the light of the indeterminacy of the requirement of policy 
coherence for development in this context. 
 
Although a detailed analysis of the EU's activities within the WTO is outside the scope of this 
thesis, references to the WTO cannot be completely excluded from this thesis.39 This is because 
the EU's bilateral trade policy is in practice shaped by the modern international system of trade 
rules as primarily regulated by the WTO. In general, the blue print and evolution of the CCP 
had taken place against the backdrop of the GATT rules which has been superseded by the WTO 
rules.40 Suffice it to state that EU trade policy including towards SSA has evolved in tandem 
with the developments in the multilateral system of trade rules since the era of association under 
                                                 
36Apart from this qualification, the general position is that the determination of trade rules, and the negotiation 
and conclusion of trade agreements is an exclusive EU competence, whether these are at the bilateral level with 
regions and countries or at the multilateral level within the WTO framework. 
37See Chapter Two of this thesis, especially at 2.2.4.  
38Of course, this is not to say that EU Member States all have the same views regarding EU's external trade (see 
4.4.2.2. below especially fn 215). But in general, the benefits of external trade is for all EU Member States as a 
result of free movement of good, and ultimately ensuring the coherence of EU trade with development objectives 
would require EU Member States to sacrifice some of their trade interests (see Khaliq, U, Ethical Dimensions of 
the Foreign Policy of the European Union A Legal Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 139; also see 
the following analysis). It is noteworthy that this is different from the question of coherence across EU policies 
which is not generally for a lack of resolve on the part of the Member States, the EU, and its institutions but could 
be put down to deeper structural causes bordering on institutional and legal limitations. (See Chapter 8 of this 
thesis). 
39See fn 9 above. 
40Ibid. 
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the Treaty of Rome.41 However, it can be argued that this a mutually reinforcing process seeing 
as there are developments in the multilateral system of trade rules that may have been preceded 
with developments in the EU. For example, although the modern international multilateral 
system of trade rules as conducted under the auspices of the WTO has come to advocate the 
idea that trade policy generally ‘is no longer about trade’,42  this 'developmentalisation' of 
international trade or the attempt to 'developmentalise' international trade was preceded by the 
EU's trade-driven poverty alleviation approach43 especially towards SSA.44 Generally, the EU 
remains an exponent of the theory that 'trade is development'.45 However, whether it is still 
leading in this regard is another matter. As the following analysis illustrate, EU trade policy, 
including towards SSA has evolved. The substantial evolution of EU trade policy especially 
with regards to its objectives is not neutral to the question of coherence in EU external action 
towards SSA. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that trade raises questions regarding policy 
coherence for development for which there are no easy answers. For example, trade is first and 
foremost a commercial policy with commercial and economic aims albeit required to take into 
account development objectives in the light of the asymmetrical economic relations between 
the developed and the developing worlds.46 This raises a question regarding the extent of the 
link required between trade and development for trade policy to be adjudged coherent with 
development objectives. This is a question to which there are no easy answers, and to which it 
                                                 
41See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.2.4.  
42Under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) an organisation 
born out of frustration with the GATT system’s perceived inability to respond to developing country concerns (see 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx, accessed 12 September, 2015). The First UNCTAD was held in 1964. 
43See Khaliq, fn 38 above, p 130 where he talks about the EU's trade-driven poverty alleviation approach. 
44See the successive agreements signed in the context of EU external relations with SSA from the Yaounde 
Conventions to the Cotonou Agreement (see Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0 above, in particular, fns 29 and 31); 
also see in general the following analysis. 
45European Commission, 'How economic partnership agreements benefit both consumers and producers in Europe 
and developing countries', p 2, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_151010.pdf, accessed, 12 
January, 2014 
46Illustrative is the successive Trade and Development Rounds of the WTO which have been part of international 
trade for more than 50 years. The (current) Doha Round was launched in 2001 as a direct successor of the previous 
Uruguay rounds (see 'What is Europe's Trade Policy?”, fn 19 above). 
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is unsurprising that the EU has not provided any clarification. Overall, the paradoxical 
relationship between trade and development and their existence in what have been described as 
'a sort of an uneasy melange'47 mark their interaction not only in the field of EU external 
relations law and policies48 but also in the context of the modern international multilateral 
system of trade rules.49 Nevertheless, it is widely agreed that trade should not impact negatively 
on development, and should in fact promote the latter in the light of policy coherence for 
development. This may be more so in the context of EU external relations law and policies 
where although largely indeterminate, policy coherence for development is particularly a legal 
requirement with a strong political impetus.50 
 
4.2.2. The legal basis for EU trade policy 
 
    EU trade policy is framed within the context of the CCP which has a wide scope.51 Pre-Lisbon, 
                                                 
47Pilegaard, J, Between coherence and fragmentation: the EU’s everything but arms initiative (Copenhagen: 
Political Studies Press, 2006), cited in Elgstrom, O, and Pilegaard, J, 'Imposed Coherence: Negotiating the 
Economic Partnership Agreements' (2008) 30 EI 3, 363 – 380, p 370. 
48Ibid., also see for example Carbone, M, 'Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for 
Development' (2008) 30 JEI 3, p 323-342; Heydon, K, 'Trade and Development: Some implications for EU Trade 
Policy' in The Next Decade of EU Trade Policy: Confronting the Challenge (London: ODI, 2012), p 24 - 25; and 
Mold, A, and Page, S, 'The Evolution of EU Development Policy – Enlargement and a Changing World' in Mold, 
A, (ed.) EU Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges for the 21st Century (Amsterdam University 
Press, 2007), p 11-28. 
49See for example, Trade Negotiation Issues in the Cotonou Agreement, Agriculture and Economic Partnership 
Agreements (New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2003), p 3; and 
Rodrik, D, and Rodriguez, F, 'Trade Policy and Economic Growth: a Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National 
Evidence', NBER Working Paper 7081, April 1999 (May 2000, ed.) (New Jersey: Institute of Advanced Studies, 
School of Social Science,), p, 6-7, available at https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Research/trade-policy-
economic-growth.pdf, accessed 06 January 2015. 
50See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.; and in particular EU Commission of the European Communities. 
2005,‘Communication from the commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee’, Policy Coherence for development, Accelerating progress towards attaining the 
Millennium Development Goals, COM (2005) 134 Final, Brussels, para 3-4. 
51For a detailed analysis of the scope of the CCP including in the wake of the Lisbon amendment, see Leal-Arcas, 
R, 'The European Union’s Trade and Investment Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon', (2010) 11 J. World Investment 
& Trade 463, 484–94 (2010); Leczykiewicz, D, 'Common Commercial Policy: The Expanding Competence of the 
European Union in the Area of International Trade', (2005) 6 German L. J. 1673, 1674–78; Bungenberg, M, 'Going 
Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon', (2010) 1 Eur. Yearbook Int'l Econ. L. 123; Krajewski, 
M, External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and More Democratic Common 
Commercial Policy? 42 CML. Rev. 91, 108–19 (2005); Van den Berghe, F, 'The EC’s Common Commercial Policy 
Revisited: What does Lisbon Add?', (2009) 4 Global Trade and Customs J. 275 et seq. 
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the CCP was covered by ex-Articles 131- 134 EC. While ex-Article 131 established the 
objectives of the CCP,52 ex-Article 133 distilled the type of measures that could be adopted for 
the pursuit of those objectives under the framework of the CCP.53 Effectively, ex-Article 133 
was the substantive legal basis for EU trade policy pre-Lisbon. It embodied the EU's 
competence for the CCP and the mechanisms of the Union's external trade policy both in its 
bilateral and multilateral dimensions. In contrast, ex-Articles 133(2) and 300 EC embodied the 
procedural legal basis under that legal dispensation. In the post-Lisbon era, Article 207 TFEU 
(ex-Article 133 as amended) embodies the substantive and procedural legal basis for the CCP. 
Substantively, Article 207 TFEU (ex-Article 133 as amended) provides as follows: 
 
‘The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and 
trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial 
aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect 
trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common 
commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of principles and objectives 
of the Unions’ external action.’54 
 
     The words in italics reflect the Lisbon amendments. These significant amendments subject the 
CCP to the sympathy of the principles and objectives of EU external action under Article 21 
TEU, and in line with the amalgamation of EU external objectives in Article 21(2) TEU. 
Nevertheless, this provision on the CCP reflects the primarily commercial and economic nature 
of the CCP which is mainly about tariff rates, and tariff and trade agreements relating to the 
                                                 
52See 4.2.3. below. 
53Ex-article 133: ‘The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard 
to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures 
of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or 
subsidies.' 
54Article 207 TFEU (ex-Article 133 EC) as amended. The words in italics were added by the Lisbon Treaty. 
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many dimensions of contemporary international commerce. With specific regards to trade, the 
provision refers to trade in goods and services, the achievement of uniformity in export policy, 
measures of liberalisation and measures to protect trade.55 
 
Ultimately, the legal basis for EU trade policy is different from the legal basis for EU 
development policy as discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. However, as discussed in that 
Chapter, in the context of EU trade and development cooperation with SSA, neither the 
substantive nor the procedural legal basis for EU trade policy is highlighted in the relevant trade 
and development instruments. This is due to the historical framing of this special trade and 
development cooperation under the framework of association agreement. It is not necessary to 
repeat the developments surrounding the use of association agreements in this context as this 
has been discussed in the previous Chapter. In contrast, it suffices to capture the essence of that 
analysis in order to focus the present analysis more appropriately. In this regard, it will be 
remembered that the circumvention of the question of competence for trade and development 
by means of mixity under the framework of association agreements imports the legal basis for 
association agreements into the equation.56 Put differently, while Article 207 TFEU (ex-Article 
133) at all times provides the legal authority for the EU's external trade negotiations, the specific 
                                                 
55The last of this, namely measures to protect trade is outside the scope of this analysis, as are the commercial 
aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment (FDI), ‘aid for trade’ and the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP)  which is validly a separate policy, and an issue which the Commission rightly or wrongly refuses 
to deal with as an aspect of the relevant instruments of EU trade policy in the context of EU external relations with 
SSA (see Berthelot, J, 'Why ECOWAS should not sign the EPA', Solidarité, 12 July 2014, p 2, available at 
http://www.academia.edu/7888087/Why_ECOWAS_should_not_sign_the_EPA_1, accessed 30 July 2015. 
56Article 217 TFEU (ex Article 310 EC). See for example, Council Decision (2010/648/EU) of 14 May 2010 on 
the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership 
Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first 
amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 [2010] OJ L287/1; also see a detailed analysis in Chapter Three of this 
thesis at 3.2.1.  
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type of trade agreement envisioned57 affects the Treaty provision invoked.58 By implication, 
where a legal basis bordering on the type of agreement is singularly chosen without any 
reference to Article 207 TFEU, controversy would arise regarding which policy is at least 
primarily engaged.59 This was the situation in the pre-EPA trade and development cooperation 
in the context of EU external relations with SSA as discussed in the previous Chapter. Overall, 
whether the traditional practice of association agreement will continue is difficult to say.60 In 
any event, as also discussed in that Chapter, what the latter course and the attendant embrace of 
policy-specific legal basis portend for coherence, especially policy coherence for development 
in the context of EU external relations with SSA may not be of much significance in comparison 
with the former practice.61 For whether trade and development are separated or entwined in 
instruments, neither do their institutional dimensions unite nor does the complexity and uneasy 
melange in their interaction wane. This is because EU trade policy has at all times been marked 
by specificity despite its interactions with broad foreign policy and strategic objectives.62 While 
the distinct institutional dimension of trade policy as discussed below illustrates the specificity 
of trade policy, the EPAs negotiated in the context of EU external relations with SSA as ever 
betray much about the existence of trade and development in an uneasy melange. 
 
                                                 
57For example whether they are preferential or reciprocal, etc. 
58Aggarwal, V, and Fogarty, E, 'Between Regionalism and Globalism: European Union Interregional Trade 
Strategies' in Aggarwal, V, and Forgaty, E, (ed.), EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p 28. 
59See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.2.1. 
60But, it appears unlikely in the light of recent developments. Indeed, a departure from the traditional  practice 
association appears imminent (see Woolcock, S, 'The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union 
External Trade Policy', Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS),  European Policy Analysis, 2008, 
Issue 8, p 1, available at 
http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/In%20English/Analyses/Woolcock%20paper%20on%20impact%20
of%20Lisbontreaty%20on%20tradepolicy.pdf, accessed 15 November 2015). 
61See 4.3.2., 4.3.3. and in general 4.4. below. 
62Including in the context of association agreements. 
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When it comes to these EPAs, the answer to the question of legal basis is equally not exactly 
clear cut. Even though these are primarily free trade agreements (FTAs) ultimately aimed at 
trade liberalisation,63 practice shows that the legal basis for their conclusion in this context is 
not fixed and easily determinable. Arguably in keeping with the traditional development 
orientation of EU trade policy of EU trade policy towards its partners in SSA, the EPAs are 
framed within the Cotonou Agreement64 as aspects of EU development instruments.65 However, 
in the warm-up to the negotiation of EU-West Africa EPA, the Commission posited that the 
EPAs as foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement were about negotiating trade and trade-related 
issues only.66 In this regard, the Commission explained that it did not have the mandate from 
EU Member States to enter negotiations or agreements on development assistance as part of an 
EPA.67 Although things eventually took a different turn as could be seen with the West Africa 
EPA Development Programme (PAPED),68 this development does not answer the question 
regarding the interaction between trade and development especially in the context of EU 
external relations with SSA.69 Nevertheless, this does not mean that it may not help to explain 
                                                 
63FTAs are bilateral treaties that liberalize trade between the parties by abolishing nearly all tariffs and other 
obstacles to trade (Marceau, G, & Reiman, C, When and How is a Regional Trade Agreement Compatible with the 
WTO?' (2001) 28 Legal Issues of Econ. Integration 297, 302). On the elements of FTAs see 4.4.1. below. 
64See for example Doc. ACP/61/063/01 (DG E II) ‘The ACP-EC Action Plans for the negotiation of the Economic 
Partnership Agreements in the Framework of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement’ as endorsed by the Joint ACP-
EU Ministerial Trade Committee on 14 May 2001, Brussels, 23 May 2001.  
65See Articles 34-37 of the Cotonou Agreement; and Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 
European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus on Development’, [2006] OJ C46/1 (hereinafter 
the European Consensus), para 36; also see Mandelson, P, ‘Statement to the Development Committee of the 
European Parliament’, Brussels, 17 March 2005. 
66See ECDPM, 'EU Commitments on Aid for Trade and EPAs' (2006) 5 TNI 6, p 1. 
67Ibid. 
68See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on West Africa's EPA Development Programme 
(PAPED), Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 17 March 2014); also see Proposal for a Council Decision 
on the signing and provisional application of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the West 
African States, ECOWAS and the UEMOA, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of 
the other part /* COM/2014/0576 final - 2014/0265 (NLE), Document 52014PC0576, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014PC0576, accessed 15 September, 2015 (hereinafter EU-
West Africa EPA). 
69The relationship between the EPAs and PAPED appears to be the same relationship between the successive 
agreements signed in the context of EU external action towards SSA and the EDF  (see Council Conclusions on 
PAPED, fn 68 above, para 4 which points out that support for “PAPED will be delivered and implemented in the 
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the lack of uniformity in the legal basis for the EPAs. For example, although some of the earlier 
pre-negotiation instruments indicated Article 207 TFEU (ex-Article 133 EC) as the legal basis 
for the EPAs originating from the Cotonou Agreement,70 the eventual EU-West Africa EPA have 
a combination of legal basis that includes Article 207 TFEU which is for trade, and Article 208 
TFEU (ex-Article 177 EC) which is the legal basis for development policy.71 Indeed, in a 2008 
Parliamentary Question, the European Parliament (the EP) had indicated that the proper legal 
basis for each (interim) EPA will be determined according to the content of the agreement 
concerned.72 In general, while the EPAs are FTAs and hence primarily trade instruments, the 
historical interaction between EU trade policy and development policy in the context of EU 
relations with SSA still trails them. However, this time around, the substantive legal basis for 
trade policy and development policy are reflected rather than circumvented with the legal basis 
for association agreements namely Article 217 TFEU (ex-Article 310 EC). However, this is not 
to say that it can be said with certainty on which legal basis the EPAs would in general all be 
concluded barring the primarily engaged legal basis for trade policy namely Article 207 
TFEU.73 In any event, it would be remembered that the pragmatism and flexibility embraced to 
                                                 
framework of the Cotonou Agreement, notably the 11th EDF National and Regional Indicative Programmes […]’; 
and also Ramdoo, I, and Bilal, S, 'Economic Partnership Agreements: West Africa Seals a Deal at the 11th Hour', 
ECDPM Talking Points blog, 27 January 2014, available at http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/economic-partnership-
agreements-west-africa-seals-deal/, accessed 26 April 2015). On the EDF which is a development aid instrument 
not a trade instrument per se see Chapter Three of this thesis. 
70See for example Council Decision of 20 November 2008 on the signature and provisional application of the 
interim agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the Central Africa Party, of the other part (2009/152/EC) [2009] OJ L57/1 
(having regard to Articles 133 and 181 in conjunction with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 
300(2) thereof); and Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007 applying the arrangements for 
products originating in certain states which are part of the ACP provided for in agreements establishing, or leading 
to the establishment of the Economic Partnership Agreements [2007] OJ L348/1. 
71See for example EU-West Africa EPA, fn 68above. 
72Parliamentary Questions, Reply, [2009] OJ C 999/ 01. In this regard, the EP also indicated that the Council 
intended to conclude the interim EPAs with the members of the Caribbean Forum ‘on the basis of Articles 57(2), 
71, 80(2), 133(1), (5) and (6) and 181 in conjunction with the first and second subparagraphs of Article 300(3) of 
the EC Treaty.' These include the legal basis for trade, and other fields that are relevant for trade namely movement 
of capitals, transport, and economic, financial and technical cooperation. The latter which are also areas of 
exclusive EU competence are to be covered by the Agreement. 
73There are also differences with the EPAs regarding 'non-exclusion' clauses (see for example See Lerch, M, 
'Environmental and social standards in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with West Africa: A 
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manage complexity in the context of EU external relations with SSA extends to the question of 
legal basis.74 Significantly, a major aspect of the complexity in this context is the interaction of 
trade and poverty alleviation or development in the objectives of EU trade policy – an 
interaction that could potentially enhance policy coherence for development in relation to trade, 
but may not equate to same adequately in practice. 
 
4.2.3. The scope of objectives of EU trade policy with special reference to SSA: between 
commercial and development objectives75 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the amalgamation of the objectives of EU external action under 
Article 21 TEU does not mean that there are no longer specific objectives for the different 
strands of EU external action. In general, the first indication of the specific objectives of a 
policy is usually the legal basis bearing the EU competence to act in the particular field covered 
by the policy.76 In the case of EU trade policy which is framed under the CCP, its explicit 
objectives can only be deduced from the general objectives of the CCP as enshrined in Article 
206TFEU (ex-Article 131 EC). The objectives of the CCP as are considered a necessary 
corollary to the customs union77 are captured within the aims of the latter. In this regard, the 
aims of the customs union is 'to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious 
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and 
on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers'.78At the heart of 
                                                 
comparison to other EPAs', Directorate General for External Policies, In-Depth Analysis, prepared at the request 
of the European Parliament's Committee on Development, April 2015 available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/303_expoida(2015)549040_/303_expoi
da(2015)549040_en.pdf, accessed 23 October, 2015.   
74See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.3.  
75The reference to development objectives here is not to suggest that trade policy interacts only with development 
policy. In contrast, the reference is made because of the historical direct interaction between the objectives of the 
two policies especially in the context of EU external relations law and policies. 
76See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.3.  
77See Chapter Two of this thesis 2.1.  
78Article 206 TFEU (ex-Article 131 EC). 
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the explicit objectives spelt out in this provision is the liberalisation of trade and investment. 
The liberalisation of investment was codified at Lisbon. Contrastingly, the liberalisation of trade 
was there right from the origin in the Treaty of Rome.79 Indeed, the origin of the objective of 
trade liberalisation as pursued in the GATT is the international political and legal background 
of the EU customs union.80 Article 1 of GATT spells out the most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
principle which requires equal treatment of trading partners. However, GATT also provides for 
derogations from MFN to accommodate regional economic integration based on preferential 
terms of trade within the region concerned.81  Such regional integration must however take the 
form of a customs union or a Free Trade Area (FTA).82 While these two different regional trade 
arrangements hold different implications for the nations involved, both are ultimately fashioned 
to contribute to trade liberalisation and thereby avoid hindering trade. For example, FTAs are 
reciprocal preferential market access agreements which require the liberalisation of trade 
between the parties through the removal of quantitative restrictions and other barriers to trade, 
as well as the elimination of duties on "substantially all trade" within a "reasonable length of 
time" pursuant to Article XXIV GATT.83 In the same vein, albeit contrastingly, the customs 
union include the prospects of a CCP and a common external tariff (CET),84 and possibly a 
                                                 
79See Eeckhout fn 7 above, p 11. 
80See fn 9 above. 
81This is in recognition of the potential benefits flowing from closer integration as espoused in economic theory 
(see Viner, fn 27 above; for an alternative view see in general, Bhagwati, J, The World Trading System at Risk 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) Ch. 5). 
82FTA is used in this Chapter for Free Trade Area. In contrast FTAs are used for Free Trade Agreements – the 
legal instrument for the former. 
83In practice, these terms remain loosely defined in the WTO, and there is yet no agreement among the major 
trading nations of the world regarding this (see Okigbo, fn 21 above, p 18, where he also explains that although 
80% has been canvassed in the GATT discussions, this has not been generally accepted). As discussed below, this 
has in fact been a source of controversy in the EPA negotiations between the EU and some countries of SSA (see 
for example, Diouf, A, 'The ACP Advantage: Interpreting GATT Article XXIV and Market Access Implications 
for EPAs', (2009) 8 Trade Negotiation Insights 7).   
84In an FTA, each party retains autonomy in its commercial policy or tariff policy towards third countries. For 
more on the difference between customs union, FTA and other possible economic arrangements see Okigbo, fn 21 
above, p 18 – 22. 
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deeper integration.85 Evidently, the Fathers of the Union choose to set up a customs union.86 
This is the background to the objectives of the CCP and EU trade policy as expressly provided 
in the successive Treaties. And these objectives centre on trade liberalisation, and are primarily 
about market access and economic objectives.87 These are different from the objectives of 
development policy which evolved in an ad hoc manner outside the Treaties88 and primarily 
centre on poverty alleviation and eradication.89 Of course, this last statement does not detract 
from the potentials of trade policy to contribute to development policy and foreign policy in the 
wider sense on the one hand, and from the potentials of trade instruments to serve as instruments 
of development policy and wider foreign policy on the other hand.90 In fact, the WTO rules also 
allow the application of a General System of Preferences (GSP)91 to developing countries albeit 
without discrimination. However, this is different from the special trade preferences which have 
also been applied under the framework of the EU's trade-driven poverty alleviation approach 
especially towards SSA. This approach which is not necessarily related to policy coherence for 
                                                 
85See Okigbo, fn 21 above, p 22; and Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.2. above. 
86Ibid. However, although the Union is a customs union, it could also enter into customs union agreements with 
other partners (see Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 449). For example, it signed customs union agreements with Turkey 
and neighbouring micro-states in Europe such as San Marino and Andorra (see Cremona, M, 'The European Union 
and Regional Trade Agreements', in Hermann, C, and Terhechte, J, P, (eds.) (2010) 1 European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law, p 245; and the Commission's information on the 'Legal Framework(s) for Preferential 
Origin' available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_775_en.htm, 
accessed 24 March 2015). 
87Both the unilateral EU policies and FTAs illustrate this. And if this has always been implicit in some case, it is 
now made explicit in the European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the World. A Contribution to the 
EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, COM (2006) 567 Final, Brussels, 4 October 2006 (hereinafter Global Europe); 
and the European Commission, DG Trade, September 2013, 'Trade Negotiations Step by Step', in particular p 3.  
88See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.1.  
89See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.3.2.  
90See p 155 above. 
91The GSP are preferences granted without reciprocity, and entails a partial or full reduction or suspension of 
customs duties on imports from developing countries (Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 451). The GSP was developed at 
the instigation of UNCTAD The underlying problem (as then believed) was that developed country demand for 
developing country commodities was less than developing country demand for developed country industrial goods. 
This meant that developing countries simply had little to offer in trade negotiations, and they were consequently 
unable to win substantial concessions from developed countries (‘Prebisch Report’, Towards a New Trade Policy 
for Development: Report by the Secretary General of the Conference on Trade and Development (1964)), p 18; 
also see Bartels, L, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’, (2007) 18 EJIL 4, p 730. 
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development92 started its evolution even before the primarily trade liberalisation objective of 
international trade were to be neutralised by the post-GATT concept of international trade in 
which development aims play a major role.93 From a legal perspective, the use of an instrument 
of the CCP or trade to promote development objectives was affirmed by the ECJ in Opinion 
1/78 and the GSP case. This legalised the EU's embrace of the economic theory that 'policies 
toward foreign trade are among the more important factors promoting economic growth and 
convergence in developing countries',94 alongside the theory that 'integration into the world 
economy is the best way for countries to grow.'95 As will be remembered from the previous 
Chapter, the latter become an aspect of the objectives of EU development policy at Maastricht, 
and of the Cotonou Agreement which regulates EU trade and development cooperation with 
SSA. However, this does not mean that development policy is itself entwined with trade 
policy.96 Indeed, to insinuate such,97 would be tantamount to asserting that the subjection of the 
CCP to a general framework of EU external relations traversing non-economic EU external 
action objectives and principles98 implies interweave of the different fields of EU external 
policy beyond distinction. In fact, to accept such an insinuation would be to accept the 
redundancy of the requirement of policy coherence. But, it is clear that none of these two 
                                                 
92Unless it is a case of  'doing' PCD without even knowing it as espoused in Krätke, F, 'Policy coherence: a sensible 
idea lost in translation?', Monday 11 November 2013, last modified on Monday, 24 November 2014, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/11/policy-coherence-global-
development-zero-sum-game, accessed 24 October, 2015. 
93As devised under the auspices of UNCTAD (see fn 42 above). This is the background to the WTO global trade 
rounds (see fn 46 above). Since then, the WTO helps to shape and maintain a system of global trade rules that not 
only keeps the global economy open for trade, but also reflects and respects the special needs and concerns of 
developing countries. 
94IMF, World Economic Outlook, Washington, DC, May 1997, p 84; also see Krueger, A, 'Why Trade 
Liberalisation is Good for Growth,' The Economic Journal, 108, September 1998, 1513-1522, p 1513. 
95Fischer, S, 'Lunch Address Given at the Conference on 'Promoting Dialogue: Global Challenges and Global 
Institutions', American University, Washington, DC, April 13, 2000. 
96MacLeod, et al, The External Relations of the European Union Communities (Oxford: Clarendon Place, 1996), 
p 272. As submitted above, development policy and trade policy are de jure and de facto distinct from each other 
even if they may interact in practice where developing countries are involved. 
97Even apart from the analysis in the previous Chapter. 
98Under Article 21 TEU. 
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scenarios is the case. With specific regards to the first, as mentioned earlier, the EU trade policy 
is at all times marked by specificity. Nevertheless, it could legally expand in its interaction with 
other EU policies due to its open-ended and evolutionary nature as the ECJ pronounced in 
Opinion 1/94.99While this pronouncement may have been made with reference to scope, the 
relationship between scope and objectives of a policy means that this open-ended and 
evolutionary nature extend to the objectives of trade policy. Significantly, the expansion of trade 
objectives into development policy in the interaction between trade policy and development 
policy does not equate to policy coherence for development. In fact, it is worthy of note that 
trade liberalisation could run contrary to the objectives of development policy and could 
potentially hamper development.100 However, while this would prima facie equate to 
incoherence, in reality, a lot would depend on what the EU is willing to concede in the context 
of its asymmetrical economic and trade relations101 with its developing partner countries 
including those of SSA. In this regard, it is noteworthy that there is apparently an evolving 
general detour from the traditional practice of using trade agreements mainly for development 
and security objectives to strictly economic objectives.102 This is best illustrated by a recent 
Commission Communication.103 This makes it clear that EU external trade policy should be (or 
is) primarily geared towards the EU’s economic objectives.104 Whether (or to what extent) this 
                                                 
99See for example Opinion 1/94, fn 64 above, para 41; also see Jacobs, F, ‘The completion of the internal market  
v the incomplete common commercial policy’ in Konstadinidis, S (ed.) The Legal Regulation of the European 
Community’s External Relations after the completion of the internal market (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), p 3. 
100See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.4.2. above (especially fn 206) on the tension between development policy 
objectives and the objective of integration into the world economy which is primarily a trade objective with trade 
liberalisation at its core; also see Stigltiz, J, and Charlton, A, Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can Promote 
Development (OUP, 2005), p 15. 
101See for example Case 104/81 Hauptzollant Mainz v C. A. Kuferberg & Cie KG C. A. (1982) ECR 3641; and 
Case C 149/96 Portuguese Republic v Council [1999] ECR 1-8395). 
102Heron, T, and Siles-Bru ̈gge, G, 'Competitive liberalisation and the ‘global Europe’ services and investment 
agenda' (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 2, 250–266; and  De Ville, F, and Orbie, J, ' The European 
commission’s neoliberal trade discourse since the crisis: legitimizing continuity through subtle discursive change' 
(2014) 16 British Journal of Politics and International Relations 1, 149–167. 
103See 2020 Strategy, fn 1 above; also Global Europe, fn 87 above. 
104It offers the reasons that the EU is engaging in the contemporary FTAs namely domestic economic policy 
considerations, the ineffectiveness of existing trade agreements to meet the EU’s economic objectives, the 
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stance applies to EU trade policy towards SSA is not clear and may not yet be determined with 
certainty in the light of the mainly inconclusive relevant EPAs and the confusion surrounding 
them.105 At all times, a difficult but integral aspect of the discourse on coherence in the 
interaction between trade and development objectives in the context of EU relations with SSA 
is the place of development finance in this interaction.106 As discussed below, this is an 
unresolved question. For even though, the EU runs a trade-driven poverty approach in this 
context, it appears that the trade benefits are lacking as it relates to poverty alleviation while 
the latter which is a metonym of development appears to be located in the financial aid 
instruments. Illustrative are the instruments of EU trade policy towards the region. 
 
4.3. The Instruments of EU external Trade Policy with special reference to SSA – a 
pertinent overview 
 
As a distinct policy, the EU trade policy has its own unique instruments even though they could 
contribute to, or sometimes double as development instruments as discussed above. In this 
regard, this section does not attempt to cover all the instruments of EU trade policy. Indeed, 
such unlimited coverage is not only unnecessary but also impossible within the limited confines 
                                                 
unsuccessful completion of the Doha Development Round, and the trade policy of the EU's main competitors (Ibid; 
also see Cremona, fn 86 above, p 246). 
105If the Global Europe, fn 87 (p 10-12) is anything to go by, the EPAs can go either way. Indeed while the 
CARIFORM EPAs appears to be strict trade agreements by virtue of their legal basis, the EPAs negotiated in the 
context of EU external action towards SSA has a development dimension (see 4.3.1. above). In so far as trade 
relates to development, differentiation is also an aspect of EU trade policy (see for example, Woolcock, S, 
'Differentiation within reciprocity: the EU approach to preferential trade agreements.' (2014) 20 Contemporary 
Politics 1, 36–48; and also Ahnlid, A, and Elgstro ̈m, O, Challenging the European Union: the rising powers and 
the United States in the Doha Round' (2014) 20 Contemporary Politics 1, 77–89) who also discuss how the EU 
maintains differentiation in trade negotiations so that commercial competition and sector interests are relatively 
more important in FTAs with emerging markets and high-income developing countries, whereas norms and 
institutional factors are relatively more important in shaping those with least-developed or low-income developing 
countries. For the status of the EPAs negotiated under the Cotonou Agreement, see European Commission, 
Overview of EPA Negotiations, updated September, 2015, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf, accessed 21 October, 2015 (hereinafter 
Overview of EPAs). 
106See 4.3.1. below. 
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of this thesis.107 In particular, this section does not cover instruments relating to anti-
dumping,108 anti-subsidy109 and trade barriers.110 In contrast, the section discusses the 
instruments that are considered pertinent for the analysis of the coherence of EU external 
relations law and policies towards SSA, especially in the light of policy coherence for 
development. As mentioned above, at the heart of the customs union is a common external 
customs tariff. The CCT provides for common customs duties on imports.111 However, these 
are not without exemptions or derogations as they EU may deem fit within the confines of 
international trade law. The derogations as they apply to the EU partners in SSA are at the heart 
of the key instruments of EU trade policy towards SSA which are pertinent to the investigation 
of coherence in EU external action towards the region. These can be categorised into 
autonomous preferential arrangements and conventional preferential trade agreements. Both 
type of arrangements are relevant to the coherence discourse in the context of this study. This 
                                                 
107See for example Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 447-448 where he explains that even a book Chapter cannot possibly 
accommodate an unlimited coverage of the instruments of EU external trade policy. 
108See Council Regulation 265/2009 on common rules for imports from countries not members of the European 
Community [2009] OJ L343/51. 
109See Council Regulation 597/2009 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the 
European Community [2009] OJ L188/93; for further analysis see for example Adamantopoulos, K, Pereyra-
Friedrichsen, M, J, EU Anti-Subsidy Law and Practice (Bembridge: Palladian Law Publishing, 2001). 
110See for example Council Regulation 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common 
commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in 
particular those established under the auspices of the WTO [1994] OJ L349/71; and Council Regulation 2641/84 
on the strengthening of the commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial 
practices [1984] OJ L252/1; also see Bronckers, M, and McNelis, N, 'The EU Trade Barriers Regulation Comes 
of Age' in Bogdandy et al, (eds.) European Integration and International Co-ordination-Studies in Transnational 
Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p 55. Indeed, 
Instruments signed in the context of the WTO is already automatically outside the scope of this thesis in so far as 
EU-WTO relations is outside the scope of this thesis. Other legal instruments not covered here include the general 
import regulation (see Council Regulation 260/2009 on the common rules for imports [2009] OJ L84/1); and the 
general export regulation (Council Regulation 1061/2009 establishing common rules for export [2009] OJ L291/1). 
The basic principle of these instruments (albeit subject to some exceptions) are freedom of importation and 
freedom of exportation respectively. 
111The current version of the CCT and the prevailing rates of duty is enshrined in Council Regulation on the tariff 
and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (Council Regulation 2658/87 [1987] OJ L256/1). 
This consists of autonomous and conventional rates of duty. (Eeckhout fn 7 above, p 449). In sum, the autonomous 
rates are the original rates set in 1968 which may contemporarily be hardly applicable, as it may have in practice 
taken a back seat in the light of the conventional rates negotiated in the multilateral trade rules. One of these is the 
conventional rates negotiated in the GATT. These 'bound' duties negotiated in the GATT are applied to all imports, 
including those from non-WTO members (Volker, E, L, M, Barriers to External and Internal Community Trade 
(Kluwer, 1993), p 51. 
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is because they would both potentially apply to the country of case study namely Mali, and 
perhaps even also to SSA in general.112   
 
4.3.1. The EPAs and the successive association agreements signed in the context of EU 
external relations with SSA: between trade and development 
 
As discussed above,113 the successive association agreements signed in the context of EU 
external relations with SSA are not only categorised as trade and development cooperation 
agreements, but could actually be justifiably labelled either trade instruments or development 
instruments.114 Having said that, the fact remains that they primarily embody trade rules while 
providing a framework for the subsequent definition of development strategies as discussed in 
Chapter Three. Evidently, this would apply to all the agreements beginning from Yaoundé I and 
II115 to the Lomé regimes of association,116 and all through to the Cotonou Agreement.117 
However, on the whole, these pre-EPA agreements shifted from an originally reciprocal trade 
agreement under the Yaoundé regimes to the non-reciprocal special trade preference of the 
Lomé regimes.118 The latter which were superimposed on the Cotonou Agreement were not 
                                                 
112Although the negotiations for the EU-West Africa EPA were closed in February 2014, and the text of the 
agreement was subsequently initialled and endorsed by the relevant parties, the signature process remains ongoing 
with a country like Nigeria still hesitant to sign the agreement (see Overview of EPAs, fn 105 above). Indeed, this 
EPA is still being queried with some calling for the region as a whole to be granted the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
regime which the EU offers to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) including Mali (see 4.3.3.2. below). 
113See 4.1.; and 4.2.; and also Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.3.  
114The latter can be deduced mainly from case law (see for example, Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] 
ECR 1-6177; and a case like Case 45/86 Commission v Council (GSP) [1987] ECR 1493; and Opinion 1/78 (Re 
the draft Agreement on Natural Rubber) [1979] ECR 2871); and also Case C-316/91 European Parliament v 
Council (EDF) [1994] ECR 625. 
115Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States 
associated with that Community, signed at Yaoundé on 20 July 1963 (Yaoundé I) [1964] OJ L93/1430; Convention 
of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with 
that Community, signed on 29 July 1969 (Yaoundé II) [1970] OJ L282. 
116Lomé I Convention [1976] OJ L25/1; Lomé II Convention [1980] OJ L347/1; Lomé III Convention [1986] OJ 
L86/3; and Lomé IV Convention [1989] OJ L229/1 (amended [1998] OJ L156/3. 
117The Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the 
one part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other part (hereinafter the Cotonou 
Agreement) (2000) OJ L317/3 (First Revision (2005) OJ L287/1; Second Revision (2010) OJ L287/3). 
118In general, 'special relations' are understood negatively as being the opposite of reciprocity (Holdgaard, R, 
External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal Discourses (The Hague: Kluwer 
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compliant with WTO rules119 because they were discriminatory preferences, and did not fall 
under any of the derogations to the MFN principle as discussed above.120 From an EU law 
perspective, it is noteworthy that the ECJ established a difference between association which is 
based on (or expresses) the Community's 'generosity' and contains an imbalance or asymmetry 
in substantive obligations on the one hand, and association based on formal reciprocity (or 
reciprocity in implementation of obligations) which is the result of rational pursuance of self-
interest between the contracting parties on the other hand.121 However, it is noteworthy that 
whether the agreements emerge as non-reciprocal as was the Lomé regimes of association, or 
reciprocal as was the case with the Yaoundé regimes of association and the EPAs as 
contemporarily negotiated, they are in different degrees framed with development concerns and 
objectives in mind as expressed in the relevant provisions of the instruments. Perhaps this could 
be regarded as a case of doing policy coherence for development without knowing.122 But it 
does not relate to policy coherence for development as contemporarily expressed and 
required.123 
 
By and large, whether an agreement emerges as normatively reciprocal or non-reciprocal in the 
context of EU external relations with SSA is not an undeniable reflection of the interaction 
                                                 
Law International, 2008), p 302). 
119See fn 7 above. 
120It is the legal and the international political pressure stemming from this that primarily led to the quest by the 
EU and its trade partners to create a WTO compliant agreement vis-a-vis reciprocal EPAs pursuant to Article 36(1) 
of the Cotonou Agreement. 
121See for example Case 104/81 Hauptzollant fn 101 above; and Case C 149/96 Portuguese Republic v Council, 
fn 101 above). As discussed above, the present and future of EU external relations with SSA may no longer be 
organised under the framework of association but this does not change this principle espoused by the ECJ. 
122Kratke, F, 'Policy coherence: a sensible idea lost in translation', The Guardian, Monday 11 November 2013, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/11/policy-
coherence-global-development-zero-sum-game, accessed 12 September 2015. 
123The evolution of the latter on the back of the original focus of the coherence between the non-CFSP and CFSP 
external action was discussed earlier. 
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between the trade norms and development objectives in practice. For what matters and is 
usually lacking is the existence of a veritable favourable concession granted by the EU or 
extracted by its partners.124 For example, the reciprocity of the Yaoundé trade regimes, did not 
involve products that were competitive in their respective markets.125 In this regard, Bartels 
suggests that the principle of reciprocity in this context was only 'ideological' and 'theological', 
and essentially hard to identify in practice.126 However, from another perspective, it can be 
argued that what obtains in this context could be the application of the principle of reciprocal 
rights and obligations in its global nature and relative to the balance of advantages.127 For 
example, it can be argued that the EDF could be considered a major, if not the main instrument 
of EU’s reciprocity for its trade interests in SSA. Of course, this is not a claim that the EU and 
its SSA (or ACP) partners considered (or consider128) the EDF an instrument of reciprocity and 
generally often tacitly agree accordingly. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the sanctions 
applied in the face of breach of political conditionality by the countries of SSA under Article 
96 of the Cotonou Agreement are usually measures involving the suspension of financial aid 
and not any trade benefits.129 A pertinent illustration of this can be seen in the recent suspension 
of financial aid to the country of this case study namely Mali.130 Furthermore, and with specific 
                                                 
124Ibid. 
125See Bartels, L, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’, in Cremona, M, (ed.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2008), p 137. 
126Ibid. 
127Okigbo, fn 21 above, p 120-121; also see Case C-87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana 
delle Finanze (Brescaini) [1976] ECR 0129, para 22; Macleod, fn 96 above, p 309; Agwu, F, ‘Reciprocity and its 
implications in international relations’ in Eze, O, (ed.) Reciprocity in International Relations (Lagos: NIIA, 2010), 
p 31; Barker, J, International law and international relations: International Relations for the 21st Century (London: 
Continuum, 2000), p xv. 
128The EDF remains a major instrument of EU external action towards even if the relationship between this and 
the new PAPED is not clear (see fn 69 above). 
129Bartels, fn 125 above, p 153 (the Cotonou Agreement is only cited here for illustrative purposes. In contrast to 
the Yaoundé trade regime, the Cotonou Agreement is a non-reciprocal trade regime).  In general, trade sanction is 
outside the scope of this thesis, mainly because coherence has been researched with regards to EU trade sanctions 
(see for example, Portela, C, and Orbie, J, 'Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and foreign 
policy: coherence by accident?' (2014) 20 Contemporary Politics 1, 63–76). 
130See 3.5. below. 
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regards to the Yaoundé era, Garrity131 posits that the EDF is the reason SSA countries were 
often lukewarm in their support of proposals aimed at the reform of the international trade 
system.132 Reference could also be made to the Nigeria-EC Agreement of 1965.133 In the course 
of negotiating this agreement, Nigeria did not accept the EDF limb as granted to the original 
associates.134 And, in what appears to be more than a mere coincidence, Nigeria secured more 
advantageous trading arrangements with the EU without endangering her own commercial 
interests.135 According to Okigbo, “[t]he dissociation of the trade needs of Nigeria in relation 
to Europe from her development needs provided an unequivocal answer to those who had 
condemned the concept of association as inseparable from the politics of aid.”136 Significantly, 
Nigeria is yet to ratify the EU-EPA West Africa which also has the PAPED financial aid as its 
development dimension.137 However, whether these financial aid dimension138 can rightly be 
considered the development dimension of EU trade policy so that the latter is at all times 
deemed coherent with the objectives of development policy is doubtful.139 As Khaliq rightly 
                                                 
131See Garrity, M, ‘Africa and the European Economic Community’, (1971) 2 RBPE 1. It is noteworthy that this 
is not peculiar to EU external relations with SSA. For example it has been explained that when African 
governments were faced with either challenging the U.S. Position in cotton through the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism and negotiating directly, they chose the latter for fear of retaliation by the U.S. through cuts in foreign 
aid to their countries (see Bergamaschi, I, 'Mali: Patterns and limits of Donor-driven Ownership', Oxford Global 
Economic Governance, Working Paper 2008/41), p 27. 
132Ibid., p 103. Indeed, there was never any recourse to the legal mechanism for dispute resolution under the 
Yaoundé Convention in search of a solution to the unfavourable aspects of EU trade policy. Whether the flexibility 
of the legal obligations (see Chapter Two of this thesis) had something to do with this is not clear. 
133The Nigerian Agreement never entered into force, and was also not published in the Official Journal (Peers, fn 
16 above, at fn 7). 
134See Okigbo, fn 21 above, p 132. 
135Ibid. 
136Ibid. 
137See fns 68 and 69 above. 
138Indeed, it can be argued that the need for change in the context of EU trade relations with SSA was more of an 
implicit acknowledgement of the failure of this particular example of development through trade than of the 
pressure to conform to the WTO rules. 
139However, see Concorde, 'The EPA between EU and West Africa: who benefits?' , Spotlight Report 2015 Policy 
Paper, p 4, available at http://www.concordeurope.org/images/Spotlight_2015-TRADE-EPA-April_2015-EN.pdf, 
accessed 25 September 2015, where a lack of commitment on the part of the Union regarding financial aid is 
counted as a contributory factor for the conclusion of incoherence; also see here it is described as a piece in the 
puzzle of a development vision  (Dalleau, M, and Seters, J, Operationalising the EU-West Africa Development 
Programme: moving beyond the paper work', (2011) ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 121, p 4.   
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points out, trade is widely regarded as the most powerful instrument available to alleviate 
poverty.140 Obviously the EU is acquainted with this as its historical trade-driven poverty 
alleviation approach illustrates. Nevertheless its old approach which has avowedly failed, is the 
one in which trade is entwined with development aid policy without any significant trade benefit 
to the EU's partners in SSA. In 2005, the EU Trade Commissioner in his report to the EP 
submitted that “the old-style preference regimes between Europe and developing countries have 
not provided a pathway out of poverty”.141 Arguably, the EU on the back of this acknowledged 
the need to separate development finance from trade. For, in 2006 the EU announced that it is 
moving its trade relations with the ACP group to comply with WTO rules on reciprocity in the 
context of the EPAs because it believes that “What matters to the ACP countries is real trade 
[…] that provides secure jobs and lifts people out of poverty”.142 This sounds like a recognition 
and renunciation of the traditional link between trade and financial aid in this context. Of 
course, whether this is mutual is another matter. As discussed above in relation to the legal basis 
for the EPAs, the financial aid dimension is once again tied to the EPAs with SSA as apparently 
instigated by the SSA partners of the EU. In any event, the prospects of 'real trade' or a strict 
adherence to 'trade for trade' will depend on what the region can bring to the table, and whether 
they are able to identify the current needs of the EU, including for example, energy.143 In 
                                                 
140Khaliq, fn 38 above, p 130 (citing Bhagwati, J, In Defence of Globalisation (OUP, 20015) p 55). Indeed, this 
is so much so that a right to trade is being proposed (see for example Stiglitz, J, and Charlton, A, The Right to 
Trade: Rethinking the Aid for Trade Agenda (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2013). 
141Mandelson, P, 'Remarks to the Trade Committee of the European Parliament', May 2005 cited in Sicurelli, D, 
The European Union's Africa Policies (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p 84. This does not mean however that there 
were no benefits at all accruing to the ACP group under the Lomé trade regimes (see Bartels fn 125 above, p 150-
151 for some of the substantial value of the Cotonou preferences for the ACP). 
142Cited in Sicurelli, fn 141 above, p 84; indeed a right to trade is being proposed (see for example Stiglitz and 
Charlton, fn 99 above). 
143As Abass notes (albeit in relation to security), there is little the EU can do if its African partners are not willing 
or able to take greater responsibility (Abass, A, ‘EU Crisis Management in Africa: Progress, Problems and 
Prospects’ in Blockmans, S, (ed.), The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (The 
Hague: TMC Asser, 2008), p 342). SSA boasts of two oil giants namely Nigeria and Angola, and some other 
smaller producers such as Gabon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Somalia. According to the 2012 World 
Economic Report of the IMF, Nigeria’s rising oil output will probably expand 7.1 percent this year, compared with 
7.2 percent in 2011, while Angolan growth is set to accelerate to 9.7 percent from 3.4 percent. 
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general, this might not be as simple as it sounds in practice seeing as trade negotiations bring 
into play different dynamics. For example, an identified EU need might not be generally 
demographic to the region as a whole, and it has to be appreciated that what favours one country 
might not necessarily favour other countries in the same region. Illustrative is the special 
situation of LDCs including Mali as discussed below, and in general, the complexity 
surrounding the negotiation of the EPAs in the context of EU trade relations with SSA.144 
 
Having said that, it is doubtful whether the failure of trade arrangements or preferences should 
automatically lead to a conclusion of incoherence. This would especially be the case when the 
incapacity of the recipient developing countries to respond to opening of the EU market along 
with other exogenous determinants that could affect their international trade145 are taken into 
account. However, whether this last statement completely absolves the EU of any charges of 
incoherence in relation to the impact of its trade policy on development objectives is another 
matter.146 Indeed, as discussed below with specific regards to Mali as a case study, although the 
benefit of any level of access to EU market at all times depends on the recipients' capacity to 
respond to the further opening of the European markets and on if there is a demand for products 
for which they can meet the supply,147 there is no doubt that the EU can do more by way of 
concessions even within the confines of the rules of the WTO. Without denying a lack of a 
                                                 
144Furthermore, in the context of EU-West Africa EPA, Nigeria is hesitating to sign the agreement because of 
what it portends specifically for this country according to national economic assessment; also see the next page 
for other reasons that may make jeopardise the negotiation position of the EU's developing country partners. 
145Rodrik and Rodriguez, fn 49 above, p 4. 
146Charges of incoherence abound (see for example Berthelot, fn 55 above; and Concorde, fn 138 above). 
However, it appears the EU does not share this view. For example, the EU most recently launched a new study 
that details how EU trade policy has had a positive impact in terms of policy coherence for development (see 
Assessment of economic benefits generated by the EU trade regimes towards the developing countries, Brussels, 
Belgium, 6 JULY 2015, available at http://erd-report.com/events/trade-report-launch-event/, accessed 04 July 
2015). 
147Khaliq, fn 38 above, p 134. 
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comprehensive vision of how to link trade and development,148 it has to be conceded that there 
are a couple of things the Union can do to make its trade policy towards SSA more 
'development-friendly', and hence more coherent, over and above acknowledging policy 
coherence for development in the relevant trade instruments. From this perspective, WTO 
compatibility can be crossed out from the list of challenges facing EU external trade policy as 
it relates to the requirement of policy coherence for development. Indeed, without denying that 
concession and coherence are at all times questions of extent, it must be admitted that the key 
challenge to the coherence of EU trade policy with development objectives is the economic 
needs and interests of the EU and its Member States. Illustrative is not only the procedure for 
trade policy-making,149 but also the pertinent contemporary EPAs as discussed below with a 
specific focus on Mali as a case study.150 Significantly due to Mali's LDC status,151 it could 
potentially choose between the EPA on the one hand, and the EBA under the unilateral EU GSP 
as it applies to LDCs on the other hand.152 Hence the relevance of the latter in the context of 
this thesis as will now be discussed. 
 
4.3.2. General System of Preferences (GSP) – the autonomous instrument of EU trade 
and development policy towards SSA 
 
The GSP is an autonomous measure albeit legally based on GATT.153 As mentioned earlier,154 
they are preferences granted without reciprocity, and instigated by the acknowledgment of the 
                                                 
148Holden, P, 'Tensions in the discourse and practice of the European Union’s Aid for Trade' (2014) 20 
Contemporary Politics 1, 90–102; also see Von Moltke, K, ‘Implications of the Cotonou Agreement for Sustainable 
development in the ACP countries and beyond’ (Canada: IISD, 2004), p 22-23, where he explains that although 
there is a near universal recognition of the significance of the intersection between trade, development and the 
environment, as often expressed with the notion of ‘sustainable development’, turning this recognition into 
practical policy prescriptions remain elusive. 
149See 4.4. below. 
150See 4.5. below. 
151See Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0. above, especially fn 54. 
152See 4.5. below. 
153Decision of 25 June 1971 L/3545, BISD 18 Supp. (1972) 24 (cited in Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 451). 
154At fn 91 above. 
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unequal bargaining power between developed and developing countries.155The EU's system of 
GSP was first established in 1971,156 but the scheme presently in operation is found in 
Regulation 978/2012.157 
 
The GSP is a trade policy instrument adopted in the framework of the CCP,158 and consists of 
the full or partial reduction or suspension of the customs duties set out in the CCT.159 Its key 
aim is to support developing countries' exports to the EU and so facilitate their integration into 
international markets. But it is also aimed at assisting developing countries in their efforts to 
reduce poverty and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to 
generate additional revenue through international trade which can then be reinvested for the 
benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies.160 In general, 
the GSP is arguably the clearest illustration of the use of instruments of trade policy to promote 
development policy objectives in the field of EU external relations law and policies.161 In fact, 
it has been described as a trade instrument that began its life as the poor relation of EU 
development policy.162 
 
The scheme’s tariff preferences covers three separate regimes consisting of a general regime 
                                                 
155Ibid. 
156Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 451. 
157Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 [2012] OJ L303/1 
(the repealed regulation is Council Regulation 732/2008 applying a scheme of generalized tariff preferences for 
the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) 1933/2006 
and Commission Regulations (EC) 1100/2006 and (EC) 964/2007 [2008] OJ L211/1(hereinafter GSP Regulation). 
158Ibid; also see Case 45/86 Commission v Council (GSP) [1987] ECR 1493. 
159Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 451. 
160Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, Preamble paragraph 7. 
161For example, as discussed above with specific regards to the association agreements signed in the context of 
EU external relations with SSA, the instruments are not clearly classified as trade or development instruments. 
162Stevens, C, 'The Proposed New GSP: Turning Away from Multilateralism' in The Next Decade of EU Trade 
Policy: Confronting the Challenge (London: ODI, 2012), p 22. 
 173 
 
 
and two special arrangements.163The first regime is the standard arrangement (‘GSP’) granted 
to all those developing countries which share a common developing need and are in a similar 
stage of economic development.164 It also takes account of the fact that the development, trade 
and financial needs are subject to change and ensures that the arrangement remains open if the 
situation of a country changes.165 The second regime is the specific incentive arrangement 
(‘GSP+’) which offers additional trade incentives to developing countries already benefitting 
from GSP to implement core international conventions on human and labour rights, sustainable 
development and good governance.166 It offers additional tariff reductions to those offered by 
the general GSP,167 and hence gives improved access in comparison to the latter.168 The third 
regimes is the EBA initiative. The most generous of the three regimes, the EBA offers full duty 
free, quota free access for all products except arms and ammunition for 49 LDCs.169 It is 
noteworthy that 43 of these LDCs are in SSA, and this includes Mali the country of case study 
in this thesis.170 The EU considers the EBA to be its major contribution to poverty-alleviation 
through trade.171 However, whether this has worked in the context of EU external relations with 
                                                 
163Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, Preamble paragraph 8. This is in consonant with the EU's differentiated 
approach (see for example, Global Europe, fn 87 above; and Chapter Three of this thesis). 
164The GSP provides for duty reductions on about 66% of products in EU customs tariff code or tariff lines 
(European Commission, Memo, 'Revised EU trade scheme to help developing countries applies on 1 January 2014, 
Brussels, 19 December 2013, p 2). 
165Regulation Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, Article 1(2)(a), and Preamble paragraph 9. For example, if the 
products under GSP become competitive and do not need support to access the EU market, they can lose 
preferential treatment. This is known in EU trade policy jargon as “graduation” from the GSP 
166Ibid., Article 1(2)(b); Preamble paragraph 11. 
167European Commission, Memo, 'Revised EU trade scheme to help developing countries applies on 1 January 
2014, Brussels, 19 December 2013, p 2. 
168Furthermore, in contrast to the GSP, products under GSP+ cannot be graduated because the beneficiaries are 
vulnerable countries with a non-diversified base. 
169Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, Article 1(2)(c), and Preamble Paragraph 16.  This is on 99% of all tariff lines.  
170See European Commission, 'Everything But Arms (EBA) – Who benefits?', 10 October, 2014, p 2, available 
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/tradoc_152839.pdf, accessed 21 September 2015. 
171Khaliq, fn 38 above, p 133; also see Faber, G, and Orbie, J, 'Everything But Arms: Much More than Appears 
at First Sight' (2009) 47 JCMS 4, 767-787. Indeed, the recent report by the EU on the effect of its trade policy on 
development objectives (see fn 144 above) was mainly based on the GSP and the EBA. However, see in general, 
Freres, C, and Mold, A, 'European Union Trade Policy and the Poor: Towards Improving the Poverty Impact of 
the GSP in Latin America' in Hout, W, EU Development Policy and Poverty Reduction: Enhancing Effectiveness 
(Ashgate, 2007), p 33 – 46 where they explained that there is a failure to establish a link between GSP and poverty 
reduction. 
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SSA is contestable.172 In any event, in line with the provisions of the Treaties and the 
requirement of policy coherence for development, the GSP regulation recognises that the CCP 
is to be consistent with and is to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of 
development cooperation, laid down in Article 208 TFEU, in particular the eradication of 
poverty and the promotion of sustainable development and good governance in the developing 
countries.173 Nevertheless, when it comes to assessing the coherence of trade policy with 
development objectives, these autonomous regimes are at the same place with the conventional 
instruments in so far as the relationship between trade and development is invariably unsettled, 
and in so far as acknowledging policy coherence for development in an instrument may not 
automatically translate to coherence of the norms with development objectives. Having said 
that, it should be noted that in so far as Mali is only torn between the EPAs and the EBA, it is 
these two which are pertinently discussed in relation to Mali as a case study below.174 In this 
regard, it should further be noted that the complex interaction between the relevant EU 
institutions for trade and development is not a feature of the unilateral instrument (such as the 
GSP/EBA) as it is of the conventional trade instruments (such as the EPA). Nevertheless, both 
hold implications for coherence in so far as they equally illustrate the distinction between trade 
and development, and perhaps how the potential of achieving the coherence of trade policy with 
development objectives is affected by the interests of EU Member States in the course of trade 
policy making. 
 
                                                 
172See Bartels, fn 125 above, p 158 where he explains that in 2006, over half of all EBA imports were accounted 
for by non-SSA LDCs; also see below. 
173Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, Preamble paragraph 4. 
174Of course, this does not mean that GSP may not be mentioned as is necessary. 
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4.4. The institutional dimension of EU trade policy with specific reference to SSA 
 
This section analyses the roles of the institutions in the decision-making, implementation and 
enforcement of EU trade policy with a view to determining policy coherence for development 
in this Chapter, and subsequently, coherence between these and the other relevant policies 
investigated in this thesis. It draws from the general overview of EU institutional framework 
for coherence provided in Chapter Two of this thesis. In doing this, the slight difference between 
the institutional procedures for autonomous and conventional instruments of EU trade policy is 
highlighted in so far as both types of instruments are relevant to the coherence discourse 
especially in the context of this analysis. With regards to the former, as discussed above, the 
GSP which is relevant to the coherence discourse in the context of this research is an 
autonomous instrument. With regards to the latter, although the focus is primarily on trade 
policy-making which comes into play because of the EPAs, the dimension of the institutional 
procedure in the context of association agreements is also highlighted as indicated in Chapter 
Three.175 Indeed, in so far as this analysis is with a view to determining coherence in the 
interaction between trade and development, it can be argued that the difference between the 
procedures for trade policy-making and association does not affect the result of the interaction 
between trade and development as the institutional dichotomy between the two policies within 
the Commission. The Lisbon changes are also highlighted especially the greater involvement 
of the EP and the lack of any involvement by the post-Lisbon bodies for coherence, namely 
HR/VP and the EEAS. At all times, the chances of opacity,176 and the reality of the interaction 
                                                 
175As discussed in the previous Chapter, the policy-making for trade policy would usually end at this stage with 
no further need for implementation in contrast to development aid (see 3.4.1. above). See the introduction to this 
Chapter for the reason why the dimension brought by the practice of association agreements to trade policy making 
is relevant despite the fact that the practice of association agreements may phase out as argued above. 
176See Lerch, fn 73 above for the view that even the formulation of the contemporary EU-West Africa EPA was 
opaque even if no less effective; also see Aggarwal and Forgaty, fn 58 above, p 30 for the view that it can be 
particularly difficult to define a coherent set of procedure and processes whereby broad EU trade policy is made. 
This does not detract from the fact that a recent WTO report applauds the EU’s positive role in maintaining an 
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between the Union and the Member States in trade policy decision-making,177 should be borne 
in mind. As discussed earlier, this involvement of the Member States in trade policy making 
despite the Union's exclusive competence in this field of policy is not surprising in light of the 
Union's Staatenverbund nature.178 
 
4.4.1. Decision-making for autonomous instruments 
 
Article 207(2) TFEU simply provides that the EP and the Council, acting by means of 
regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) shall adopt the 
measures defining the framework for implementing the CCP. Eeckhout notes that there is a 
distinction here between CCP regulations laying down general legislative provisions 
concerning trade policy, such as the GSP regulation discussed above, and implementing 
instruments laying down provisions for specific cases,179 such as trade defence instruments and 
anti-dumping legislation. As mentioned earlier, the latter two instruments are outside the scope 
of this analysis. Hence, the institutional distinction between regulations laying down general 
legislative provisions concerning trade policy and the implementing instruments of trade policy 
is not explored further in this analysis.180 Similarly, a description of the OLP is not necessary 
for the focus of this thesis.181 It suffices to state here that the OLP entails the Commission's 
                                                 
open and transparent global trading system (See WTO Trade Policy Review, 'The European Union', 
WT/TPR/S/317, 18 May, 2015). 
177See Frohlich, H, 'EU Trade Policy' in Waldenberger, F, (ed.), The Political Economy of Trade Conflicts: the 
Management of Trade Relations in the US-EU-Japan Triad (Heidelberg: Springer, 1994), p 20. 
178See Chapter Two of this thesis. 
179Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 458. 
180It suffices to state that Article 291 TFEU provides that implementing powers shall be conferred on the 
Commission (or, in duly justified specific cases... on the Council' where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed. For the rules governing implementing Acts see Regulation (EU) No 
182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers [2011] OJ L55/13. 
181Indeed, it is mainly relevant to internal policy making.  
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right of initiative for proposals, and the co-decision power of the Council and the EP both of 
which have to agree with and adopt the final instrument following a series of readings by these 
last two institution. This is a change from the pre-Lisbon situation where the Council simply 
acted on a proposal from the Commission without any involvement by the EP. However, while 
the involvement of the EP has come to be generally acknowledged as a positive development 
with regards to internal policies of the EU, it can be argued that this involvement could also aid 
coherence in EU external action. In particular, it could aid the coherence of EU trade policy 
with development objectives especially in the context of autonomous instruments. For as 
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis,182 although the EP is not assigned any specific formal 
role with regards to coherence, the general responsibility on the institutions to ensure coherence 
under Article 13 TEU applies to it. In practice, apart from the work of its Development 
Committee, the EP most recently created a standing Rapporteur for PCD which is aimed at 
pointing out potential incoherencies in EU policies, and at ensuring that the effects of new 
European legislation on developing countries are taken into account during the lawmaking 
process.183 At all times, the EP's co-decision power could make a difference to the coherence 
of trade policy with development objectives in so far as the existence of that power alone could 
elicit greater cooperation from the Council representing the EU Member States and their 
interests. As for the Councils' voting system as it relates to the assessment of policy coherence 
for development, this is discussed under the procedure for conventional instruments in so far as 
it is the same in autonomous instruments as in conventional instruments of EU external trade 
policy. 
 
 
                                                 
182See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.4.  
183Ibid. 
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4.4.2. Decision-making for conventional instruments of EU external trade policy 
including in the context of association agreements184 
 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, although trade and development are entwined under the 
successive association agreements signed in the context of EU external relations with SSA, a 
discussion of the institutional procedure at the stage of policy making in the context of 
association agreement is better carried out in this Chapter where trade is discussed. This is 
because it is mainly trade policy that is determined at this stage while only the general 
framework of what amount to development policy is defined at this stage. Otherwise, the 
analysis of the dimension brought by EU trade institutions in the procedure for association 
agreements, and the analysis of the institutional procedure for trade will better enable an 
assessment of the coherence of trade policy with development policy. 
The Treaties provide for the regular treaty-making procedure in Article 218 TFEU. This bears 
the procedure for association agreements.185 However, the process by which trade agreements 
are proposed (or initiated), negotiated and agreed differs slightly from this general Treaty-
making procedure provided in Article 218 TFEU. By virtue of Article 207(3) TFEU, trade 
agreements are subject to some special procedural modifications. Woolcock categorises the 
process of trade agreements into three different steps or stages namely initiation, negotiation, 
and conclusion.186 This stages apply to association agreements. In principle, this process 
involves three EU institutions namely, the Commission, the Council and the EP,187 even though 
the latter only became involved in trade policy agreements by virtue of the Lisbon changes.188 
                                                 
184See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.4.1.  
185With a specific reference made to it in Article 218(6)(a)(i) TFEU. 
186Woolcock, S, 'Trade Policy: A Further Shift towards Brussels' in Wallace, et al. (eds.) Policy-Making in the 
European Union (OUP, 2010) 381, at 387–93; also see in general 'Trade Negotiation Step by Step' fn 87 above. 
187Article 207(3) TFEU. 
188Article 218 (6)(a)(iv). 
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However, this is not to say that the institutional procedure for trade policy making especially in 
the context of association agreement is clear cut enough as to determine the involvement of the 
institutions with certainty.189 This of course puts the assessment of institutional coherence in 
context. 
 
4.4.2.1. The initiation of proposal for conventional trade instrument - the Commission's 
forte 
 
Similar to the OLP, the proposal to launch a trade negotiation must come from the Commission 
pursuant to Article 207(3) TFEU. As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the Commission 
is comprised of different DGs. For the purposes of trade policy, the relevant DG is DG Trade, 
which proposes the launch of negotiations for trade agreement with an external party. This 
includes the EPAs. In the pre-EPA era of EU external relations with SSA when association 
agreement was the practice, the proposals for the trade and development cooperation originated 
from DG Dev, which had a trade division.190 Whether this meant the elevation of development 
objectives above EU trade objectives is difficult to say. For although there were more years of 
non-reciprocity than the years of reciprocity under that dispensation, there is no clear difference 
between them in terms of their impact on development.191 Under the current dispensation, the 
trade division of DG Dev has been transferred to DG Trade, and it is the latter that has the 
mandate for the EPA proposals.192 As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the decoupling of the 
two in 2000 entailed a separation of decision-making with the trade regime no longer considered 
an aspect of development aid. This was also followed by a corresponding reduction of the 
                                                 
189See fn 176 above. 
190See Elgström, O, & Pilegaard, J, 'Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements' (2008) 
30 European Integration 3, 363-380, at p 370; also see Sicurelli, fn 141 above, p 105; Hudson, A, ‘Case Study: 
Economic Partnership Agreements’, para 3, available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2798.pdf, 
accessed 15 August, 2012); and House of Lords, EU Committee, fn 55 above, para 114. 
191See the above analysis. 
192Ibid. 
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development focus of DG Trade. The House of Lords EU Committee reports that their 
separation renders the need for coherent policy-making in these two areas correspondingly 
greater.193 And this, especially in light of policy coherence for development.194 However, the 
subsequent greater concentration on trade objectives is not in doubt as the EPAs illustrate. This 
is the case even though DG Trade has to conduct inter-service consultations with other DGs in 
order to take their concerns and interests into account.195 Indeed, beyond the inter-service 
consultations, the Commission is also expected to hold a public consultation on the content and 
options for any trade agreement and to conduct an assessment of the impact of any such deal 
on the EU and on the potential partner.196 This is (or should ideally be) an aspect of the 
formation of the National Indicative Programs (NIP) discussed in Chapter Three of this 
thesis.197 In this regard, it can be argued that the EU is usually already (or expected to be) aware 
of the impact of a trade policy course on the development objectives of a potential partner or 
beneficiary prior to a trade offer or agreement. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that the 
practice does not always align with the legal-institutional provisions. For example, the EU has 
been accused of failing to conduct an unbiased assessment of the impact of the EU-West Africa 
EPAs which it finances,198 and also of failing to commission a current impact assessment to 
ensure that the EU-West Africa EPAs initialled in 2014 will support development 
objectives.199This flouts policy coherence for development which requires the clear articulation 
                                                 
193House of Lords, EU Committee, fn 55 above, para 114. 
194Ibid., para 118. 
195See 'Trade Negotiations Step by Step', fn 87 above, p 3. 
196Ibid., In general, the Commission’s proposals both with regards to internal and external actions are the result 
of an extensive consultation process, which may be conducted in various ways  such as impact assessment, reports 
by experts, consultation of national experts, international organisations and/or non-governmental organisations, 
consultation via Green and White Papers, etc. (see Ordinary Legislative Procedure “Step by Step”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/text/index_en.htm, accessed 15 April, 2015). 
197House of Lords, EU Committee, fn 55 above, Appendix 7; and  EU Mechanisms that promote policy coherence 
for development Scoping Study, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Studies in European 
Development Co-operation Evaluation No 2, Maastricht, July 2005 (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 
2006), p 43. 
198Berthelot, fn 55 above, p 1. 
199Concorde, fn 139 above, p 4. 
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of reasons for acting in a manner which could impact negatively on developing countries in 
order that counter-arguments may be advanced.200 As the House of Lords EU Committee 
affirms, the process requires transparency so that there is no second-guessing whether the 
assessment of the potential impact of trade on development was carried out or not. Invariably, 
a trade policy proposal requires approval at the political level from the College of 
Commissioners in order for DG Trade to recommend to the Council the opening of negotiations 
and request the Council’s authorisation for negotiations.201 It is noteworthy that this would be 
the case even in the pre-EPA context of association agreements in so far as it is actually the 
rules of trade that are negotiated while the framework of EU development aid policy is 
unilaterally laid alongside the former once agreed. However, while the relevant Council 
configuration that would be engaged in Trade policy making is the Trade Council,202 it would 
be expected that the Development Council203 would also be involved where it were an 
association agreement. In the context of association agreements, an ACP Working Group of the 
Council which is responsible for development affairs in the ACP countries would also be 
involved. As discussed above, the EPA is a free trade agreement, and if the ACP Working Group 
is involved in the light of the development-orientation of the EPAs, it will have to be only in 
relation to the PAPED which is not a trade instrument.  
 
4.4.2.2. From authorisation to negotiation – between the Commission, the Council and 
the EP 
 
In any event, by virtue of Article 207(3) TFEU, the Council can accept or reject the proposal 
                                                 
200House of Lords, EU Committee, fn 55 above, para 123. 
201See Article 8 Commission Decision 2010/138, Amending its Rules of Procedure [2010] OJ L55/60. 
202However, see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.2. especially fn 280. 
203Ibid. 
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by a qualified majority vote (QMV).204 This voting rule which also apply to the autonomous 
instruments of trade policy requires only that 55% of Member States (16 out of 28) vote in 
favour, and that the proposal is supported by Member States representing at least 65% of the 
total EU population.205 It can been suggested that the QMV neutralises the influence of the 
Member States and empowers the Commission's agenda-setting power for EU trade policy.206 
However, this may not be of global effect in this context. For while this could be the case in 
relation to negotiating the different positions of EU Member States,207 it can be argued that it 
does not relate to the global outcome of the norms of external trade policy as they could impact 
on the coherence of trade with development objectives. Further arguably, were the Commission 
in the helm of affairs in agenda-setting for trade policy without the encumbrance of the interest 
of the Member States, the coherence of trade policy with development objectives would be 
easier to achieve. For example, at least two clear illustrations have been provided of where EU 
Trade Commissioners pronounced their commitment to trade policy coherence with 
development only to backtrack at the influence of Member States.208 Based on this, it can be 
argued that although the existence of inter-institutional co-operation on paper does not 
automatically alter the differing institutional cultures of the different Commission DGs,209 
                                                 
204QMV is the general voting procedure for every aspect of EU trade policy except when the decision relates 
specifically to the fields listed in Article 207 (4) TFEU (these are not relevant to the focus of this thesis). 
205This took effect from 1 November 2014, and replaces the former QMV comprising the votes of the Member 
States weighted very roughly according to their respective population (see Qualified Majority, a new rule from 1
 
November 2014, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/, 
accessed 03 August 2015). 
206See for example Hayes-Renshaw, F, et al, 'When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly' (2006) 
44 JCMS 161, 184–85; and in general Tsebelis, G, & Garrett, G, 'Agenda-Setting Power, Power Indices and 
Decision Making in the European Union', (1996) 16 International Rev. L. Econ. 345. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy 
that regardless of the voting procedure prescribed in the Treaties, Member States in general strive to decide by 
consensus, and try to avoid voting in the Council as much as possible (see De Baere, G, Constitutional Principles 
of EU External Relations (OUP 2008), p 81). 
207As Frohlich (fn 177 above, p 20) explains, the various Member States of course do not have identical trade 
policy objectives; also see in general, Da Conceição-Heldt, E, 'Variation in EU Member States’ Preferences and 
the Commission’s Discretion in the Doha Round', 1(2011) 8 Journal of European Public Policy 403and also 
Nugent, N, The Government and Politics of the European Union (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2006), p 376). 
208Khaliq, fn 38 above, p 132. 
209Mackie, J, cited in House of Lords, EU Committee, fn 55 above. 
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effective negotiation leading to a more favourable stance on trade policy coherence with 
development objectives could easily be achieved between these institutions. Indeed as Mackie 
posits, it is only a rigid adherence to institutional culture that will lead more and more to 
"disjunction rather than collaboration".210 And it appears that such rigid adherence is not 
necessarily systemic to the Commission. For example, DG Dev was successful in pushing for 
a change in the proposal of DG Agriculture during the reform of the EU Sugar regime in 
2005.211 Assisted by the Council's decision on policy coherence for development, DG Dev had 
refused to accept the original proposal of DG Agriculture and it was modified to make it more 
compatible with development purposes.212 Of course, such an effective coordination might 
depend on the intensity of inter-institutional relations. But at least it is possible. The position of 
DG Dev regarding the EU-West Africa EPA was not established in the course of this study. 
However, it appears that its role is in general minimal and mainly confined to issues regarding 
funding support to the EPA vis-a-vis the EDF.213 At all times, the power to accept or reject a 
proposal rests with the Council which is not only the representative of EU Member States but 
also assures that the interests of the Member States are protected.214 
 
Following the Council's authorisation, the Commission would launch the negotiation and also 
negotiate on behalf of the Union pursuant to Article 207(3) TFEU. Clearly this would be DG 
Trade. And this would be the case at all times in so far as it is the rules of trade that is negotiated 
whether in the context of the EPAs or the pre-EPA association agreements. For even in the 
                                                 
210Ibid. 
211House of Lords, EU Committee, fn 55 above, para, 122. 
212This is only used as an analogy here in so far as the Common Agricultural Policy is outside the scope of this 
study (see fn 55 above). 
213Khaliq, fn 138 above, p 137. As will be remembered from footnote 69 above, the relationship between the EDF 
and PAPED is not clear. 
214See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.2. 
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context of the latter when DG Dev only harboured DG Trade, the technicality of trade would 
mean that only trade experts would be involved in the negotiation.215 However, this is not to 
say that DG Dev would be completely excluded in that context. Indeed, it appears that its 
involvement in that context was well used to enhance the coherence of trade policy with 
development objectives, and was more representative of an all-EU approach with the attendant 
inspiration of confidence on the other party. Indeed, Hudson highlights a particular confusion 
that arose in the course of the negotiation of the EU-West Africa EPA. At the heart of this 
confusion is that West Africa had assumed that the EU's negotiator was speaking on behalf of 
the whole Commission (on behalf of the EU), only to become shattered when they discovered 
that DG Trade is unable to deal with development issues.216 Indeed, Stevens explains that trade 
negotiations are conducted by trade officials not trade economists with the implications that the 
negotiations are treated as a mercantilist exchange of ‘concessions’ in line with the perspective 
of the former.217 
 
At all times, the Commission must conduct the negotiation within the framework of such 
directives as the Council may issue to it, and in consultation with the Council's special Trade 
Policy Committee (Article 133 Committee).218 This Committee protects the interests of the 
                                                 
215Invariably,  although it is in principle possible to hold a mixed negotiation divide between the EU and Member 
States' part, with different negotiators for each part in the context of mixed agreement as is traditionally the case 
in the context of EU relations with SSA, the practice indicates that most mixed agreements are negotiated as non-
mixed agreements (with the Commission in charge), albeit with a greater role for Member States’ representatives 
(Koutrakos, P, EU International Relations Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2006), p 216). Forwood argues that for third 
countries, including those of SSA, the complication is that the real negotiation is the intra-Union one between the 
EU and the Member States, so that once an intra-Union common position is reached, the Union and Member States 
adopt, a ‘take it or leave it’ approach (see Forwood, G, ‘The Road to Cotonou: Negotiating a Successor to Lomé’ 
(2001), 93 JCMS, 3, pp. 423 – 442). 
216Hudson, fn 190 above. 
217Stevens, C, 'Economic Partnership Agreements: the end of the Beginning' in The Next Decade of EU Trade 
Policy: Confronting the Challenge (London: ODI, 2012), p 26. 
218This categorisation was based on the pre-Lisbon Article which provides for this special Committee. Post-
Lisbon, it would be more appropriate to refer to this Committee as Article 207 Committee seeing as the provision 
is now in Article 207(3) TFEU subparagraph 3. 
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Member States in the trade negotiation process219 once again illustrating the Staatverbund 
character of the Union. In fact, to ensure that it keeps to its original mandate, the Commission 
must also report regularly to this Committee220 on the progress of the negotiation.221 Although 
the Commission must also report to the EP on the heels of the Lisbon changes, the EP's 
influence at this stage might be only nominal even though it feels strongly for development.222 
The relevant EP Committee for trade is the International Trade Committee (INTA), even though 
the Development Committee can give its opinion.223 In general, the EP's only real power with 
regard to enhancing policy coherence for development in the context of conventional 
instruments might rest only in its role in the last stage of policy-making namely the conclusion 
of agreement. 
 
4.4.2.3. Concluding negotiation – between the Council, the Commission and the EP 
 
In the event of a successful negotiation the Commission can agree with the external party on 
the content and text of the agreement and the Council may authorise the Commission to sign 
the agreement on behalf of the EU. Subsequent to signing the agreement, the Commission will 
submit the agreement to both the Council and the EP who must both give their consent for the 
agreement to enter into force. The Council decides by a QMV, and the EP by a simple majority 
                                                 
219See Hayes-Renshaw, F, and Wallace, H, The Council of Ministers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p 
90–94. 
220Woolcock, fn 186 above, p 389). 
221Article 207(3) TFEU subparagraph 3. The EP became a part of this process by virtue of the Lisbon 
Amendments 
222As mentioned earlier, the EP has a Development Committee and a Rapporteur for Policy Coherence for 
Development (see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.4. above). 
223See European Parliament, Recommendation on the draft Council decision concluding the interim agreement 
with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of 
the one part, and the Central Africa Party, of the other part (14757/2012 – C7-0369/2012 – 2008/0139(NLE)),  A7-
0190/2013, May 2013, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-0190+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN, p 5/12. 
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vote.224 This differs from the trade and development cooperation agreements signed as 
association agreements where the Council adopts the decisions relating to association 
agreements by unanimity, and only with the assent of the EP.225 Ultimately, in contrast to the 
pre-Lisbon situation in which only the Council have the power to adopt trade decisions, and 
only with the assent of the EP in the context of association agreements, the Lisbon Treaty 
requires the consent of the EP for the conclusion of conventional trade agreements and 
association agreements. It is noteworthy that consent requires the EP's agreement on the 
international accord but does not enable the EP to modify the content of the instrument under 
consideration.226 Nevertheless, this power is not meagre and actually has far reaching effects. 
Indeed, most recently the EP withheld its consent on the SWIFT Agreement and made 
renegotiations with the US necessary.227 Whether, it could do same for trade is difficult to say 
in the light of the very political nature of this policy.228 For example, even the controversial EU-
West Africa EPA which the EP has been urged not to ratify because of apparent incoherence 
with development objectives229 has been charged of opacity in its formulation.230 
 
4.4.3. The implementation of EU trade policy – between the Commission and Member 
States? 
 
Because EU trade agreements are mainly rules and measures applied by setting standards, it is 
difficult to allocate implementing power for EU external trade policy to any EU institution.231 
                                                 
224Article 218(6)(a)TFEU. In contrast to QMV (fns 204 and 205 above), a simple majority is a majority of the 
Member States. 
225Article 218(6) TFEU (ex Article 300(2) EC). 
226Woolcock, fn 60, p 1. 
227See Monar, J, 'The Rejection of the EU-US SWIFT Interim Agreement by the European Parliament: A Historic 
Vote and its Implications', (2010) 15 EFARev. 143–51) 
228See Chapter Two of this thesis, and also the above analysis. 
229See for example, Concorde, fn 138 above, p 2. 
230See fn 73 above. 
231However, see the power of the EP and the council to adopt the measures defining the framework for 
implementing the common commercial policy pursuant to Article 207(2) TFEU. 
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In practice, the CCT is left to the Member States whose national authorities will apply the 
relevant provisions of the CCT232 including the derogations discussed above.233 This is clearly 
different from the implementation of development policy, with the implications that the 
coherence of trade policy with development objectives is a matter that belongs to the decision-
making stage of trade policy either within the context of association agreements or in the 
context of the EPAs. 
 
4.4.4. Enforcement of EU external trade policy – limited to internal effects 
 
    As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the ECJ has played a major role in deciding on the 
outer limits of EU competence in EU external relations, and whether this is exclusive or shared. 
However, by virtue of Article 218(11) TFEU, a Member State, the EP, the Council or the 
Commission may obtain the opinion of the ECJ as to whether an agreement envisaged is 
compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement 
envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised.234 With 
specific regards to coherence, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Courts jurisdiction (or lack 
thereof) with regards to coherence is yet to be determined. Overall, the law as it relates to policy 
coherence for development, as to the overall coherence of EU external policies is still mired in 
complexity and subject to a great extent to the political dynamics of EU external relations. 
Moreover, with specific regards to the interaction between trade and development, the ECJ has 
previously refused to delve into assessing coherence where the CCP is involved. In both the 
                                                 
232See Eeckhout, fn 7 above, 452 – 454. 
233See for example, European Commission (Directorate General, Taxation and Customs Union), 'Note to 
Delegates to the Customs Code Committee (Origin Section) - Consequences of the ending of preferential tariff 
treatment granted under the Cotonou agreement; arrangements in force from 1 January 2008', Brussels, 21 
December 2007 TAXUD/C/5/RL D(2007) 14475. 
234Furthermore, the ECJ could enforce the relevant directly effective rights of individuals under the agreements 
(see for example Bresciani, fn 172 above). 
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Gran Padano Cheese case235 and the Banana case,236 the ECJ considered the determination of 
coherence as a political question for the political branches of the Union to decide, not a legal 
question for the Court.237 In the Banana case where development interest were engaged albeit 
along with other interests,238 the ECJ expressly deferred to the institutions.239 Clearly the Court 
considers that it is not desirable to hold the EU and its institutions to a fixed position in a flexible 
world of foreign policy.240  
 
4.4.5. On the HR/VP and the EEAS 
 
It is already clear from the above analysis that there is no role in EU trade policy for the HR/VP 
and the EEAS in her service. Indeed not even an indirect participation in trade policy 
formulation is granted these respective post-Lisbon institution and body for coherence. For 
example, as indicated in Chapter Two of this thesis, even though the other policy-specific arms 
of the Council are chaired by the HR/VP, this is not the case for the Trade Council. The HR/VP 
or her representatives do not chair any of the Council Committees or Working Parties for 
trade.241 Post as pre-Lisbon, these are chaired by the six-monthly rotating Presidency. Of course, 
this complete exclusion of the HR/VP and the EEAS from trade is in contrast to their 
involvement in development policy programming. The reason for this exclusion is not clear 
                                                 
235Case 263/87, Denmark v. Comm’n [1989] E.C.R. 1081. 
236Case C-280/93, Germany v Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-04973. 
237See for example Eeckhout, P, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations (OUP: 2004), p 447. 
238These include development, agriculture, trade policy, fundamental rights, compliance with the Union’s 
international obligations and the principles of non- discrimination. 
239“[…] where the Community legislature is obliged, in connection with the adoption of rules, to assess their 
future effects, which cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly 
incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question . . . The 
Court' s review must be limited in that way in particular if, in establishing a common organization of the market, 
the Council has to reconcile divergent interests and thus select options within the context of the policy choices 
which are its own responsibility.” (Case C-280/93, fn 236 above, at 88–81). 
240Of course, the overall foreign policy and political nature of trade is subject to little or no doubt. 
241See Annex I to the Council Rules of Procedure annexed to Council Decision of 1 December 2009 adopting the 
Council's Rules of Procedure (2009/937/EU) [2009] OJ L325/35.  
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especially when the Lisbon Treaty has amalgamated the objectives of EU external action as it 
did under Article 21(2) TEU. Arguably, the lack of any clear reason for this exclusion may not 
be unconnected with the fact that it may be unconvincing - such as the issue of institutional turf 
battles discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis.242 Indeed, such a reason would never make sense 
in light of the need for coherence as discussed in Chapter One of this thesis. This illustrates the 
specificity of trade policy despite the Lisbon changes, including the amalgamation of EU 
external policy objectives under Article 21(2) TEU. Suffice it to state that the specificity of EU 
trade policy post as pre-Lisbon means that ensuring its coherence with development objectives 
will as ever require political will, and this mainly from the Member States.243 
 
4.5. Mali Case Study 
 
The framework of EU trade policy including with special reference to SSA has been discussed 
above. Similar to the Mali case study on development policy in Chapter 3, this section discusses 
Mali as a case study to illustrate EU trade policy towards SSA. Further similar to the case study 
on development policy, this is not to undermine the possible different dynamics and effects of 
EU trade policy towards the different countries of SSA. This case study of EU trade policy 
towards Mali would aid a more specific assessment of policy coherence for development in 
addition to the overall framework provided above. Because the institutional dimension of trade 
policy is globally applicable to the region, the Mali case study focuses mainly on the 
instruments and the norms albeit not to the total exclusion of the institutional dimension. As 
indicated in the previous Chapter, the latter will only be mentioned where it is necessary to 
buttress or emphasise a point. It is noteworthy that even though there may be measures that 
                                                 
242At 2.4.1.  
243See the above analysis. 
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Mali can take to help its international trade244 including with the EU, these are not the focus of 
this analysis which main concentration is the coherence of EU trade policy with development 
objectives. 
 
4.5.1. Of Mali's Economy and International Trade with the EU: a contextual 
background 
 
Mali is a landlocked West African LDC. As discussed in Chapter One, it was one of the first 
associates of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome being a former French colony. Mali's cooperation 
with the EU began in 1958 and the Union has remained one of its three main trading partners.245 
Following its independent from France in 1960, Mali benefitted from the general trade regime 
under the successive Yaoundé and Lomé trade regimes discussed above. However, as a LDC, 
Mali later came to enjoy the preferential treatment granted to developing countries in general 
and LDCs in particular. For example, from 1995, Mali benefitted from the extensive market 
access granted to all LDCs by the EU within the special regimes of the GSP. Furthermore, from 
2001 when the EBA was introduced under the GSP,246 Mali also came under the market benefits 
of the EBA which provides duty free and quota free access to the EU market for all products 
from LDCs, except arms.247 However, it is noteworthy that the impact of this non-reciprocal 
preferential treatment is limited owing to the small number of products exported by Mali, 
                                                 
244See for example, World Trade Organisation (WTO) Trade Policy Reviews: First Press Release, Secretariat and 
Government Summaries Mali: Press release, Press/TPRB/88, November 1998, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp88_e.htm#The%20Secretariat, accessed 11 February 2015 where it 
is reported that Mali has been advised to diversify its exports, lower the charges levied on exports and extend its 
WTO commitments in order to take advantage of multilateral trade liberalisation and attract foreign investment. 
Mali operates restrictive taxes, special authorizations and prohibitions that are unlikely to encourage exports. For 
example, exports of precious substances in the unprocessed state are prohibited, and sales of these substances in 
the processed state are subject to the 3 per cent service provision contribution 
245The other two are Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. But Switzerland is a major outlet for Malian cotton (See WTO 
Trade Reviews, fn 244 above). 
246See Regulations 416/2001 [2001] OJ L60/43 (of March 2001). 
247See above. 
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namely raw materials that are generally subject to zero or very low MFN import duties in the 
importing countries. In general, Mali's exports cover only about half of its imports, leading to 
a chronic trade deficit. For example, from the EU, Mali imports capital goods, building 
materials and chemicals and pharmaceuticals. This is on a high side compared to Mali's export 
to the EU. Suffice it to state that the country's major export are cotton248 of which it is the 
biggest producer in SSA, gold,249 and livestock products.250 Out of these three products, cotton 
is the country's largest export earner with some 40% of rural households in Mali, or 2.5 million 
people reportedly dependent on it. With specific regards to coherence, it follows that at least 
cotton is a key export area where 'real trade' could make a difference for development, and 
where an unencumbered access to the EU market can spell a clear adherence to policy coherence 
for development. However, in contrast, it has been suggested that huge subsidies to EU farmers 
have ensured that Mali does not get a fair price for cotton.251 Furthermore, it is suggested that 
eliminating these subsidies would boost West African cotton prices by 12.9% - and that 
translates into an annual loss of $250m a year to farmers in Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Chad.252 Having said that, it is noteworthy that this cannot rightly be adjudged a lack of 
adherence to policy coherence for development as investigated in this thesis. In the framework 
of EU external relations law and policies, the subsidies cannot rightly be considered an issue 
bordering on coherence in the interaction between trade and development.253 A pertinent focus 
                                                 
248 50 per cent of its merchandise export earnings. 
249 17 per cent of its merchandise export earnings. 
250WTO Trade Policy Review, fn 244 above; also see Loquai, C, 'Supporting domestic accountability in 
developing countries: Taking stock of the approaches and experiences of German development cooperation in 
Mali', ECDPM Discussion Paper No 115, July 2011, p 7. 
251The cotton subsidy issue is not peculiar to the EU. China, India and the US also grant cotton subsidies (see 
Bunting, M, 'The Great Cotton Stitch-Up – Fairtrade Foundation lifts lid on Mali's entrenched poverty', The 
Guardian, 15 November, 2010). In general, the prices for cotton have been driven down over the last 40 years – 
losing half of its value when adjusted for inflation. 
252Ibid. 
253The subsidy is an element of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), an internal EU policy that is outside 
the scope of this thesis (see fn 55 above). The CAP has earned criticism for its market distortions against 
developing countries. However, it is also criticised for the same effects against EU small farmers (see for example, 
'The Greek Government's Position on Future CAP Reform', made available by the NGO CAP2020, available at 
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of an assessment of the coherence of EU trade policy with development objectives in Mali 
would centre on the EBA and the EPAs as contemporarily negotiated. In doing this, it should 
be remembered that one of the limitations of this research254 is the fact that while the country 
case study makes for manageability, the attendant limitations cannot be denied in so far as there 
are as much differences as similarities in the countries of SSA.255 Only the EPA that relates to 
Mali namely EU-West Africa EPA is covered in this Chapter as is pertinent. 
 
4.5.2. Mali: between EBA and the EPAs,256 or no choice? 
 
As discussed above, under Article 36(1) of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU and the ACP states 
agreed to conclude the EPAs.257 Although, these will be WTO-compatible trading arrangements 
that will remove progressive barriers to trade between them and enhance cooperation in all areas 
relevant to trade, the EPAs are framed as trade and development instrument under the Cotonou 
Agreement. The latter retains the non-reciprocal preferences of the Lomé regime while 
providing for transitional measures in the face of the proposed EPAs. The EU and the ACP 
States including the countries of SSA were originally committed under Article 37(1) of the 
Cotonou Agreement to conclude EPA agreements by 31 December 2007 or by a further date if 
extended pursuant to Article 37(4). Furthermore, Article 37(5) of the Agreement states that 
negotiations of the EPAs ‘will be undertaken with ACP countries which consider themselves in 
a position to do so’. Martenczuk258 posits that this introduces a measure of subjective evaluation 
                                                 
http://cap2020.ieep.eu/member-states/greece, accessed 16 July, 2015). In general, the coherence of CAP with 
development policy is a different topic that would require a separate research. 
254See Chapter One of this thesis at 1.6.  
255Indeed, with specific regards to trade policy, the EPAs are negotiated along the various regional economic 
groups around which the countries of SSA are organised (see Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0., especially fn 19). 
256Specifically EU-West Africa EPA. 
257See Article 36(1) of the Cotonou Agreement. 
258Martenczuk, B, 'From Lome to Cotonou: The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement in a Legal Perspective' (2000) 
5 EFARev., 461 – 487,  p 477. 
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into the obligations taken upon by ACP countries. Indeed, the negotiation of the EPAs has 
proven to be contentious and long drawn especially in the case of SSA.259 Suffice it to state that 
the negotiation in this context has been hunted by the traditional paradox created by the attempt 
to interweave trade policy and development policy.260 As argued above, this is not the same as 
policy coherence for development. Yet, there is no doubt that the two are related, and if well 
applied in practice and beyond acknowledgement in the instruments, would yield similar if not 
same result. In this regard, although the Cotonou Agreement provides that the non-reciprocal 
trade preferences of Lomé IV shall be maintained during the preparatory period leading up to 
the entry into force of the new trading arrangement, the unending extension to the original 
calendar261 due to contention occasioned changes accordingly.262 Detailed arrangements to 
apply from 1 January 2008 to products from the countries in question were set out in the Market 
Access Regulation (MAR).263 This was a bridging solution for countries that had concluded the 
EPA agreements but were not yet in a position to apply these EPAs because they were awaiting 
ratification. Essentially, the Regulation unilaterally anticipated the duty free access that the EU 
offered in the EPAs. However because of the extensions caused by the contentions in the 
negotiation of the EPAs, the EU withdrew the MAR's benefits from those countries that had not 
taken the necessary steps towards ratification of the EPAs concluded with the EU.264 Instead, 
                                                 
259It is noteworthy that the countries of the CARIFORUM (Caribbean country members of the ACP group) have 
all signed their individual EPAs. 
260The contentions which relate mainly to WTO rules and other issues that relate to development are discussed 
below (4.5.3.). 
261Negotiations began in 2004 and were expected to be completed by December 31, 2007. However, due to a lack 
of comprehensive agreement the deadline was moved to the end of 2008. This deadline has also been missed, as 
has a subsequent one for 2009. 
262Indeed, the first regional interim EPA within the SSA region was only agreed in June 2013 between the EU 
and four Eastern and Southern African (ESA) states namely, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. It 
was endorsed by the European Parliament on 17 January 2013 and is currently awaiting ratification (further 
information available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=863, accessed 29 January 2013). 
263Council Regulation (EC) No. 1528/2007, 'Market Access Regulation'. 
264See Regulation (EU) no 527/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 as regards the exclusion of a number of countries from the list of regions 
or states which have concluded negotiations [2013] OJ L165/59. These countries are removed from Annex I to 
Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 where they were added on concluding an EPA. The regulation took effect from 1st 
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in compliance with the WTO rules, and in fairness for other developing countries outside the 
Cotonou framework, the EU would apply the GSP to these countries.265 
 
In contrast to the non-LDC ACP states which must sign the EPA or come under the GSP, the 
Cotonou Agreement stipulates that the LDCs are not obliged to sign an EPA in order to retain 
their present level of access to the EU. Because of the fragility of their economies, they can 
choose to keep their existing non-reciprocal trade preferences even if they do not wish to open 
their own markets to the EU.266 The implication of this in practice is the application of different 
trade instruments and preferences to the different countries even within the same economic sub-
region of SSA. While this could rightly be deemed a factor of incoherence in so far as it renders 
regional integration almost impossible in SSA,267 it also constitutes incoherence in another 
pertinent way. For example, in West Africa (or ECOWAS) where there are 3 non-LDCs forced 
                                                 
October, 2014. So far, only Cameroon is benefitting from the MAR because it started to provisionally apply the 
EPA between the Union and Central Africa (Council Decision of 20 November 2008 on the signature and 
provisional application of the interim agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Central Africa Party, of the other part 
(2009/152/EC) [2009] OJ L57/1) as of 4 August 2014. Following its conclusion and ratification, the interim EPA 
with Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) started to be provisionally applied as of 14 May 2012 between the EU 
and Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles and Zimbabwe (Council Decision of 13 July 2009 on the signing and 
provisional application of the Interim Agreement establishing a framework for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement between the Eastern and Southern Africa States, on the one part, and the European Community and its 
Member States, on the other part (2012/196/EC) [2012] OJ L111/1; Interim Agreement establishing a framework 
for an Economic Partnership Agreement between the Eastern and Southern Africa States, on the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, on the other part [2012] OJ L111/2). 
265For example, although Comoros and Zambia initialled the interim ESA EPA, they have neither signed nor 
ratified it yet and therefore their exports to the EU are governed by the GSP. The same applies to Nigerian as it has 
not ratified the EU-West Africa EPA. Other interim EPAs that have not been applied yet include SADC - Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland; ECOWAS - Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire; EAC - Burundi, Kenya, Ruanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda (see DG Taxation and Customs Union, 'The Countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP)' available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_785_en.htm. 
accessed 15 May 2015. 
266'Regional Economic Partnership Agreements', ECDPM,  Cotonou Infokit 14, 2011, p 2; however, see Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007 applying the arrangements for products originating in certain 
states which are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States provided for in agreements 
establishing, or leading to the establishment of, Economic Partnership Agreements [2007] OJ L348/1, Article 7 
where the EU specifies that it is preferable that LDCs which are also ACP States base their future trade relationship 
with the Community on Economic Partnership Agreements. 
267Regional Integration is an aspect of development policy in this context. 
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to open their market to EU's exports on account of the EPA with the EU,268 and 12 LDCs not 
forced to open their market to EU's exports on account of the EBA, not only would regional 
integration and its prospects for development be hampered, but also even the arguably better 
position of the LDC's under the EBA269 are endangered. Hence, for an LDC like Mali in West 
Africa, there may not be an option than to join the EPA so as not to truncate the process of 
regional integration. This is foreseeable since one of the reasons why Nigeria is yet to ratify the 
EPA is the existence of two different schemes of tariff.270  Effectively, although Mali is not 
directly compelled by the Union to choose the EPA over the EBA, it is nevertheless placed in a 
position in which it may have no choice than to do so. From all indications, it is not clear which 
of the instruments Mali presently benefits from. For while the Commission lists the country to 
be under the EBA, the EU-Mali National Indicative Programme (NIP)271 refers to the EU-West 
Africa EPA as the instrument regulating EU trade relations with Mali. From the perspective of 
the development community, this would be anti-development. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the 
development community is of the view that the EU should extend the EBA to the whole of West 
Africa instead.272 However, as mentioned above, the EU is of the view that the LDC's will be 
in the same position under the EPA as under the EBA. It is not clear whether this is in terms of 
benefit or loss. As Bartels explains, despite the generous preferences of the EBA, in 2006 over 
                                                 
268See EU-West Africa EPA, fn 68 above. 
269As mentioned above, the EU regards the EBA as its most effective trade instrument for development. 
270EU-West Africa EPA was endorsed by ECOWAS Heads of State and Governments  in July 2014 (see Final 
Communique: Forty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, 
ECOWAS Press Release, No: 134/2014, 10 July 2014, Accra, Ghana, para 15-17, available at 
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=134&lang=en&annee=2014, accessed 12 September 2015). Yet, three 
countries of West Africa namely Nigeria, Burkina Faso and The Gambia are yet to ratify this agreement. Nigeria 
argues that this will not only paralyse internal trade and blow up regional integration, but will also increase the 
costs of controlling the rules of origin as LDCs will be forced to protect themselves from the re-export of products 
entered duty free in the 3 non LDCs of West Africa. This it says will in turn open the door to enormous tax evasions, 
and add to the loss of tariff revenues particularly in Nigeria, following the implementation of ECOWAS Common 
External Tariff (CET). Nigeria presently benefits from the GSP, while the other two countries benefit from the 
EBA (see European Commission, Practical guide to the new GSP trade regimes for developing countries). On the 
rules of origin (see 
271See Chapter Three of this thesis. 
272See Concorde, fn 139 above; and also Berthelot, fn 55 above. 
 196 
 
 
half of all EBA imports into the EU were accounted for by non-SSA countries.273 While there 
is no specific data on Mali in this regard, the recent choice of the withdrawal of development 
aid over trade preferences as sanction illustrates that EU trade relations with Mali is not 
economically significant to the latter. If this is the case, it may not make a difference especially 
for Mali, and perhaps to the other LDCs of West Africa, which way the pendulum swings. 
Herein is a major dilemma for the assessment of policy coherence for development in relation 
to EU trade policy towards SSA. While Mali is used as a case study, its situation may not apply 
across the board in West Africa and in SSA as a whole.274 In general, it has to be conceded that 
unlike more developed countries of SSA like Nigeria, and perhaps other LDCs even, there is 
no doubt that Mali justifiably or unjustifiably requires help in order to become integrated into 
the world economy and to derive the benefits of that integration to the fullest to aid its 
development. Indeed, under the integrated programme of technical assistance for LDCs set in 
place by WTO and other organizations, Mali has requested assistance in various fields. These 
include the introduction of trade finance and export promotion structures, the search for foreign 
trade and investment partners, quality control, trade information collection and management, 
and rationalization of customs procedures. These are supply-side, human and institutional 
constraints which inhabits the ability of a country to trade.275 Mali is also particularly 
landlocked – a feature which hinders its ability to better integrate in the global trading system. 
                                                 
273Bartels, fn 125 above; Indeed, in 2012 UNCTAD Report indicated that China accounted for 26.4% of the SSA 
LDC Exports surpassing the EU (at 20.4%). In general, it is arguable that Europe's historical trade relations with 
SSA is under threat in the light of the emergence of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). For a 
recent discussion relating to this see for example Oliver, M, and Zgovy, E, The Impact of China and India on Sub-
Saharan Africa: Opportunities, Challenges and Policies (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2011). For some, 
albeit not all the reasons for the lack of success with the EBA, as perhaps with other EU preferences towards SSA 
see 4.5.3. below. 
274This is a key limitation of this study (see1.6. Above). 
275These are some of the constraint that contributed to the erosion of preference under the successive association 
agreements in addition to the imperfection of the systems (see Garrity, fn 131 above, p 102; also see Goodman, S, 
“EEC: The Economic of Associate Membership”, JDS (January 1969), p 140-141; and Lister, M, The European 
Community and the Developing World (Aldershot: Gower, 1988), p 53-55). 
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For example, the transit of export and import goods through the territory of at least one 
neighbouring State and the frequent change of mode of transport result in high transaction costs 
and reduced international competitiveness.276 To address these human and institutional 
constraint depends on the availability of financial support,277 and it is trade issues like this that 
could benefit from the added value of the EDF or PAPED. Indeed, while this cannot take the 
place of 'real trade', it may be undeniably needed for real trade to evolve. This will be financially 
aiding trade. And the answer to the question of how this relates to policy coherence for 
development as it relates to trade is as clear as the answer to the question of what exactly is the 
relationship between the key financial instruments of EU development policy in the context of 
EU external relations with SSA and EU trade policy towards the region on the one hand, as well 
as how much concession the EU would be expected to make to be deemed to have done enough 
with regards to adherence to policy coherence for development. Of course, the EU cannot 
realistically be expected to completely sacrifice its trade and economic interests on the altar of 
its commitment to a favourable integration of the developing world into the world economy or 
to development policy.278 However, there is still much that the EU can do to alleviate some of 
the trade policy-oriented difficulties which are arguably as much present in the EBA context for 
Mali, as they are in the conventional EPAs which the country could potentially embrace. At all 
times, these would depend on what EU Member States are willing to concede vis-a-vis the EU, 
including in the light of the need to conform to WTO rules. 
 
 
                                                 
276Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Landlocked%20Developing%20Countries/UN-recognition-of-the-problems-
of-land-locked-developing-countries.aspx; accessed 27 June 2015. 
277As discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, the role of EU development aid in this regard is debatable. 
278See Article 21(2)(e)TEU and Article 3(5) TEU; and also Article 19 Cotonou Agreement. 
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4.5.3. Of the EPAs, the conformity to WTO rules and the concessions for development  
Although the key controversy that surrounded the negotiation of the EPAs in the context of EU 
external relations with SSA were mainly about conformity with the WTO rules, at the centre is 
how the application of these rules could be applied in a way that respects or takes into account 
development objectives.279 For example, the question of liberalising "substantially all trade" 
within a "reasonable length of time" could be interpreted in a way that is either more favourable 
or less favourable to development. The EU had initially requested for 80% (liberalisation of 
trade) over 15 years (as reasonable length of time). However, following years of contention 
regarding this position,280 the EU agreed on a flexible interpretation of the threshold required 
to liberalise substantially all trade, in order to be compatible with the rules of the WTO. In 
recognition of the special characteristics of West Africa, a deal was struck at 75% of trade to be 
liberalised over the next 20 years. While this is considered significant for the overall relations 
between EU and the region,281 its significance for the assessment of coherence should not be 
forgotten. For this can be adjudged an attempt to adhere to policy coherence for development 
in so far as development was the reason behind this concession. Nevertheless, this is not to say 
that the EU cannot conveniently do more to enhance policy coherence for development.282 For 
example, it has been argued that the issue of guaranteed entry to the EU market over and above 
market access on a tariff free and quota free basis is a long standing issue that is often 
neglected283 despite its potential to contribute to poverty alleviation and hence improve the 
coherence of trade policy with development objectives.  At the heart of this is that EU market 
                                                 
279See Articles 2(3) and 53(3) of the EU-west Africa EPA. 
280The EPA negotiations had been on-going for about 12 years. 
281See for example, Ramdoo and Bilal, fn 69 above. 
282See Concorde, fn 139 above; and also Berthelot. fn 55 above; and also in general European Parliament, 
Economic Partnership Agreement EU-ACP: Facts and Key Issues, Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary 
Democracy, 2011. 
283McQueen, M, 'EU Preferential Market Access conditions for least Developed Countries', Intereconomics, 
March/April 2002, p 102. 
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entry is governed by a different set of rules depending on the product a preference country 
wishes to export to the EU markets. The pertinent key rules in this regard are the sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) rules284 and Rules of Origin (RoO).285 These apply both to LDCs and non-
LDCs, and hence will apply to EU trade with Mali and indeed SSA whether they benefit from 
the EBA or the EPAs. The implication of these rules is that market access on a tariff free and 
quota free basis is not the same as guaranteed market entry.286 Hence, they have rightly or 
wrongly been considered hidden restrictions which dilute whatever benefits is conferred by 
duty and quota free access granted by the EU to ACP exports.287 This is not to say that there are 
no good reasons for these rules. For example, there is no doubt that SPS are necessary for good 
reasons, namely health and food safety. Similarly, the RoO has as its principle aim, to ensure 
that the benefits of the agreement go to the recipient countries and that the preferences are not 
abused by other third party countries.288 Nevertheless, international trade experts have revealed 
that the rules sometimes go beyond what is necessary and hence substantially limit the potential 
value of the offer to the EU's trade partners.289 Indeed, with particular regards to the SPS, the 
principle of equivalence290 does not reflect the required asymmetry. In the same vein, the 
                                                 
284Article 25 – 31 EU-West Africa EPA, fn 68 above, (and also Annex D to that instrument). 
285Article 2 EU-West Africa EPA, fn 68 above, (and also Annex A to that instrument). 
286'Trade Negotiation Issues', fn 49 above, p 67. 
287Smith, H, European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and what it is not (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p 189-
190. 
288See Trade Negotiation Step by Step, fn 87 above, p 3; also see Eeckhout, fn 7 above, p 453. 
289See for example, McQueen, fn 283 above; and also see Onguglo, B, F, 'Developing countries and unilateral 
trade preferences in the new international trading system', in Mendoza, M, R, et al (ed.) Trade Rules in the Making: 
Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 
Press/Organization of American States, 1999) Chapter 4 (what is cited here is from an independently numbered 
copy of this work, p 4), where he explains the different dimensions of RoO namely the origin criteria, consignment 
conditions and documentary evidence.  The origin criteria is normally defined in terms of the goods that are wholly 
produced and manufactured in a beneficiary country, or goods that have been sufficiently worked, processed and 
transformed into a new and different article.  The local content requirement can go as high as 60 per cent, 50 per 
cent, or lower at 35 per cent. Many schemes allow for the local content qualifying benchmark to be cumulated 
from various beneficiary countries or the preference-giving country. Clearly, this will always be a question of 
extent. 
290This requires that each Party shall accept the SPS measures of the other Party as equivalent, even if such 
measures differ from their own or those that are used by third countries marketing the same product (Article 28 
EU-West Africa EPA, fn 68 above). 
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complexity and complications arising from many variations of RoO as they apply to different 
products and countries has also been deemed in need of review and simplification due to the 
anti-development high cost associated with it. These are some of the issues that they EU could 
address in a bid to enhance the coherence of trade policy with development objectives. Indeed, 
the EU is committed to simplification and review of the RoO as part of the EPAs by virtue of 
Article 37(6) of the Cotonou Agreement. But as Nigeria's reason for not ratifying the EU-West 
Africa EPA illustrates, a mutually satisfactory end has not been reached with regards to the 
review and simplification of the RoO in the light of policy coherence for development. As will 
be remembered from Chapters Two and Three, policy coherence for development is about 
taking into account the development objectives of the developing country partners of the EU. 
Effectively, the needs of the latter should be the guiding principle. However, having said that, 
it has be reiterated that realistically, this will at all times remain a question of extent especially 
in the light of the indeterminacy of policy coherence for development as its relates to trade. 
Overall the assessment of policy coherence coherence for development in the interaction 
between trade and development is as complex as the interaction between the two. The 
interweave of trade and development is only circumstantial and does not detract from the 
specificity of EU external trade policy.  Against this background, it has to be accepted that there 
is no simple way of evaluating the coherence of trade policy with development objectives, more 
so in the context of the EU's complex and elaborate system of regional trade agreements and 
preferences.291 Moreover, due to the indeterminacy of policy coherence for development which 
renders coherence at all times a question of extent, it may well have to be accepted that any 
incoherence in this context could be explained as what Hoebink defined as political or economic 
based on conflicting interests and complexity of issues.292 The only remedies are to tolerate 
                                                 
291McQueen, fn 283 above, p 103. 
292Hoebink, P, 'The Coherence of EU Policies: Perspectives from the North and the South' (2005) Commissioned 
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incoherence, mitigation, compensation, additional/flanking policy.293  
 
 4.6. Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing, there can be little or no doubt that post as pre-Lisbon, the EU trade policy 
towards SSA remains distinctly specific even while embracing the nexus between trade and 
development. This specificity despite the amalgamation of EU external objectives at Lisbon is 
most clearly illustrated by the exclusion from trade policy, of the post Lisbon institution and 
body for coherence namely the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service. Against this background, 
it is argued that while the pre and post-Lisbon institutional bifurcation between EU trade policy 
and its development policy could compromise the coherence of trade norms with development 
objectives, the overall specificity of trade policy means that even institutional coherence will 
not prove an eternal panacea for the former. Furthermore, while highlighting the institutional 
potentials to enhancing the coherence of trade with development objectives despite the 
exclusion of the HR/VP and the EEAS, it concludes that the coherence of trade policy with 
development objectives beyond the acknowledgement of the need for same in the instruments 
of trade policy ultimately depends on the political will of the EU Member States. Nevertheless, 
it concedes that this is at all times a question of extent, and one whose answer may be as much 
difficult to determine as it will continue to be mired in controversy. This is mainly because of 
the sophisticated and complex nature of the interaction between trade and development in 
instrument and in practice as the Mali case study further illustrates, and also because of the 
indeterminacy of the requirement of policy coherence for development including with specific 
                                                 
Study, Center for International Development Issues Nijmegen, Brussels, p 19. 
293Ibid. The last remedy again brings to mind the question of the relationship between trade and development aid, 
especially as it relates to policy coherence for development. 
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regards to trade in EU external relations law. While the latter may equally apply to the other 
policies, it can be argued that the complexity and sophistication of the interaction between trade 
and development means that the challenge of policy coherence for development as it relates to 
trade is different from the same challenge in the interaction between development and foreign 
and security policy as will now be discussed. 
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Chapter Five 
5.0. The CFSP in SSA: navigating the security-development nexus and what Mali 
illustrates about the diplomatic F and S1 of an indefinite CFSP 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The question of coherence of EU external action in general, and the coherence of other EU 
external policies with development objectives2 take a different turn in the face of EU foreign 
and security policy. This is not only because of the inextricable nexus between development 
and security,3 but also because of the complex dynamics of EU foreign and security policy 
under the CFSP framework. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis,4 post as pre-Lisbon, the CFSP 
remains ‘subject to distinct rules and procedures’ despite the amalgamation of EU external 
objectives at Lisbon.5 However, this does not mean that there is a clear delineation of the 
Union's CFSP competence. Indeed, in contrast to the equally indefinite scope of EU 
development policy,6 the outer boundaries of the Union's CFSP competence may be beyond the 
grasp of law.7 Nevertheless, this last statement does not imply the submergence of all other EU 
external policies under the CFSP in practice.8 Particularly illustrative is the context of EU 
external action towards SSA where a wide array of EU external policies are engaged. While 
two of the core policies of EU external action towards SSA have been discussed in the last two 
Chapters of this thesis,9 the present Chapter and the next centre on the CFSP and the CSDP 
                                                 
1For an example of the distinction between the foreign (F) and security (S) dimensions of the CFSP see Trybus, 
M, European Union Law and Defence Integration (Oxford: Hart, 2005), p 306 where he also distinguishes between 
these and the D (defence policy) dimension; also see Missiroli, A, ‘European Security Policy: The Challenge of 
Coherence’ (2001) 6 EFARev, 177), p 184 for the same lines of distinction.  
2Policy coherence for development (see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.1.1., 2.5.1.2. and 2.5.2.). 
3See the following analysis at 5.2.3. 
4See in general Chapters One and Two of this thesis. 
5Article 24(1) TEU. 
6See Chapter Three of this thesis especially at 3.2.3. 
7See the following analysis at 5.2.3. 
8And the present statement does not detract from the possibility of same (see the following analysis, especially at 
5.2.3.). 
9See Chapter Three on development policy and Chapter Four on trade policy. 
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respectively.10 As indicated in Chapter One,11 although it is not uncommon to see the CFSP 
used as an umbrella term that also covers EU activities under the CSDP,12 the latter is de facto 
functionally distinct from the CFSP.13 Undoubtedly, there is a commonality of S to both the 
CFSP and the CSDP as they together embody what is more generally known as ‘EU security 
policy’.14 However, the latter distinctly provides the Union with an operational capacity for 
civilian missions and military operations and hence centres mainly on the S including as it 
relates to the D.15 Contrastingly, the CFSP mainly revolves around the diplomacy in F especially 
as it relates to the economic and political dimensions of the S16 even though it is generally 
indefinite in scope.17  
 
                                                 
10The Chapter which comes after the CSDP does not centre on a policy but on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
- an instrument aimed at enhancing coherence in EU external action towards Africa in general. The last Chapter is 
the Conclusions to this thesis.  
11See Chapter One of this thesis at 1.0. above. 
12 Which is veritably an integral part of the former. 
13The distinct functional and institutional logic of the CSDP is discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis at 6.4.  
14See for example, Missiroli, fn 1 above. 
15See Chapter Six of this thesis (especially at 6.1.) including with regards to the distinction between the S and the 
D (and also with regards to the exclusion of the latter from the scope of the analysis). 
16In importing security into EU external action, Article 30(6)(a) of the Single European Act refers to 'political and 
economic sides of security'. The economic aspect of security ‘deals with armaments […] industrial products whose 
trade is determined to a great extent by economic considerations’. In contrast, political aspect of security ‘focuses 
on how state entities construct their position in the broader geopolitical environment through unilateral initiatives 
or participation in multilateral institutional mechanisms’ (Koutrakos,  P, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence 
(Oxford: Hart, 2001), p 166; also see Van Vooren, B, and Wessel, R, EU External Relations Law, Text, Cases and 
Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p 384 where they simply divided the key CFSP objectives between 
'political' (reinforcing democracy and respect for human rights) and 'diplomatic' (preventing and solving conflicts, 
coordinating emergency situations). Although they also added 'economic' (support of economic reforms and 
regional objectives), and 'legal objectives' (supporting the development of the rule of law and good governance), 
as the following analysis illustrates, this Chapter is mainly concerned with the 'diplomatic' which is also arguably 
political especially in the context of the analysis of security. Having said that, it has to be noted that a definition 
of the concept of security is eschewed from this enquiry as the concept is an essentially contested one in that it is 
so value-laden that it has no one correct answer (Gallie, W, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society (1956) 56 N.S. P 167-98. In fact, the ECJ posits that ‘security’ can even be a matter of 
perception rather than hard fact (Case C-120/94 Commission v Greece (re: Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia) [1996] ECR 1-1513, at para 54). In the same vein, the concept of foreign policy does not merit a 
definition in so far as it is only a conceptual framework in this context (see for example Allen, D, ‘Who speaks for 
Europe’ in Peterson, J, and Sjursen, H, (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge, 1998,) 
p 44: ‘Foreign policy is primarily about the definition of ends, or objectives, and only then about deciding how to 
pursue them…Foreign policy, therefore, is best seen as an attempt to design, manage and control external activities 
[...] so as to protect and advance agreed and reconciled objectives.’ Indeed, as explained in Chapter One (at 1.0. 
particularly at fn 3), it is arguable that EU external action in general is foreign policy.  
17See Chapter Five of this thesis (at 5.2.3).  
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This Chapter examines EU external action towards SSA under the CFSP framework with a view 
to determining how it relates to policy coherence for development, and also the overall 
coherence of EU external action vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options. 
In doing this, the Chapter does not seek to account for the entirety of CFSP actions in SSA. 
Rather, the enquiry centres on the norms, instruments and institutional aspects of the CFSP18 
especially as they relate to the preventive diplomacy of the political dimension of S in the F.19 
As a central theme of this thesis, the dimension brought by the post-Lisbon High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) is also discussed. Although the CFSP has been briefly distinguished from the CSDP, it 
is noteworthy that neither can be extensively discussed without references being made to the 
other. Consequently, while the following analysis is mainly focused on the CFSP, the CSDP is 
mentioned as is necessary.20 
 
The Chapter submits that the Lisbon Treaty entrenches the indefinite and potentially illimitable 
scope of the Union's CFSP competence which continues to depend on distinct rules, instruments 
and institutional procedures post as pre-Lisbon. In doing this, it especially highlights the 
invariably inextricable overlap between the relevant norms of the CFSP and development 
objectives, and suggests that the unsettled question of hierarchy in the context of the security-
development nexus theoretically implies that policy coherence for development as it relates to 
the CFSP may amount to a façon de parler (mere rhetoric). Against this controversial 
suggestion, it argues that the invariably inextricable nexus between security and development 
could in any event also imply that the work of the HR/VP and the EEAS under the CFSP could 
                                                 
18However, see the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) in Chapter Seven of this thesis.  
19See fns 1 and 15 above. 
20The reverse is also the case as can be seen in Chapter Six of this thesis on the CSDP. 
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automatically be considered compliant with the requirement of policy coherence for 
development if not development measures by other means. However, using Mali as a case study, 
the Chapter illustrates that while the EU can boast of long term CFSP conflict preventive 
measures which revolve around the S as an extension of the F, these are mainly regionally-
focused and are not necessarily always complemented with urgent ad hoc and targeted CFSP 
diplomatic measures as may be required for the construction of a united whole vis-à-vis synergy 
in the sequencing of policy options available to prevent violent crisis. Markedly, it concedes 
that although the use of ad hoc and targeted CFSP measures may be constrained by resource 
limitations, and perhaps an element of deference or indifference based on the historical factors 
discussed in Chapter Two,21 these do not detract from the attendant implications for overall 
coherence of EU external action towards SSA. It also does not from the fact that the influence 
of the HR/VP and the EEAS regarding the relevant unfavourable factors may be quite limited, 
if at all possible.22 
 
Similar to the last two Chapters, the first section of this Chapter provides the contextual 
background to the CFSP, and pertinently analyses the legal basis and the scope of its objectives 
with special reference to SSA. The latter also provides another opportunity to further delimit 
the scope of analysis as it relates to the CFSP in this Chapter.23 The second section presents a 
pertinent overview of the instruments of the CFSP diplomacy as it relates to security with 
special reference to SSA. This is followed by a pertinent discussion of the institutional 
dimension of CFSP in the third section. The fourth and final section centres on Mali as a case 
                                                 
21 See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.2.4.  
22Invariably, the field of diplomacy as an aspect of foreign policy is one often mired in secrecy so that all 
instruments at play may sometimes be difficult to determine existentially. This analysis is only concerned with 
overt instruments. 
23See the previous page for some delimitation. 
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study. Apart from the general discussion of policy coherence for development in the framework 
part of the Chapter, a case study of the CFSP in Mali will also aid the assessment of the overall 
coherence of EU external action vis-à-vis synergy in sequencing of the policy options available 
to resolve a crisis.24 Similar to the previous two Chapters,25 the case study focuses mainly on 
the pertinent instruments and norms of the CFSP towards SSA as they apply to Mali.26  
 
5.2. The legal basis, scope of objectives and instruments of the CFSP with special 
reference to SSA   
 
This section aims to discuss the legal basis and scope of objectives of the CFSP with special 
reference to SSA. Invariably, the legal basis is imperative in so far as the thesis is first and 
foremost a legal analysis. However, both the legal basis and the scope of objectives will aid the 
assessment of coherence, and also provide a pertinent background for the subsequent analysis 
of the instruments and institutional structures of the CFSP with special reference to SSA. 
Nonetheless, prior to a discussion of the legal basis and the objectives, it is imperative to provide 
a brief contextual background to the CFSP as it relates to the focus of this thesis.27  
 
 
                                                 
24See for example, European External Action Service, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, EEAS, 
2011, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, accessed 12 January, 2013 (hereinafter  
the Sahel Strategy); also with specific regards to the Mali crisis, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
members insisted on the sequencing of the options available to resolve the crisis, including political and diplomatic 
efforts (Zounmenou, D, 'Is a Military Intervention in Mali a Realistic Option?', ISS Today, Institute of Security 
Studies, South Africa, 25 June 2012, available at  https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/is-a-military-intervention-in-
mali-a-realistic-option, accessed 15 November 2015. 
25On development policy and trade policy respectively. 
26 Essentially, it does not revisit the institutional dimension since this is globally applicable to the region. 
27As discussed at Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.3.2.), the CFSP evolved differently from EU trade and 
development cooperation with SSA under the ex-Community. Hence, its distinct evolutionary background 
becomes a pertinent contextual background even if only to the extent of a brief mention. Indeed, it is arguable that 
many of the legal and institutional distinctions between the CFSP and the non-CFSP external action have their 
origins in their distinct historical backgrounds (Vanhoonacker, S, ‘The Institutional Framework’ in Hill, C, and 
Smith, M, (ed.) International Relations and the European Union (OUP, 2005), p 68). 
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5.2.1. The CFSP and the coherence of EU external action towards SSA: a distinct 
contextual background 
 
The discussion in this section does not aim to provide a ‘legal’ history of the CFSP.28 Rather, it 
provides the background to some of the principles and politico-historical characteristics that 
continue to shape the distinctiveness of the CFSP with implications for coherence especially in 
the context of EU external action in SSA.  
 
Although the field of EU external action in general could be regarded as foreign policy,29 there 
is no doubt that the CFSP is the anchor of EU foreign and security policy even if not 
incontestably the anchor of EU external action in general. Generally, the origin of EU foreign 
policy as it relates specifically to the CFSP has been traced back to the failed European Defence 
Cooperation (EDC).30 Arguably, this is because the EDC was the first attempt by the relevant 
countries of Europe to integrate for international political ends beyond (and even before) the 
economic integration under the ex-Community.31 However, the EDC was originally defence 
oriented32 and could veritably be distinctly linked to what is today the CSDP framework.33 
Indeed, post-EDC, foreign policy coordination was continued through the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) albeit still outside the framework of the ex-Community.34 The pertinent 
modalities of the EPC and how it morphed into the CFSP has been discussed earlier on35 and 
                                                 
28This has been done before (a selection includes:  Trybus, fn 1 above, especially Chapters 1 and 2; Koutrakos, fn 
16 above, especially Chapter 2; and Zwaan, J, ‘Foreign Policy and Defence Cooperation in the European Union: 
Legal Foundations’ in  Blockmans, S, (ed.) The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal 
Aspects (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008), Chapter 2.  
29See fn 16 above. 
30See Trybus, fn 1 above. 
31Ibid. 
32Ibid. 
33Albeit not without metamorphosing through the Western European Union (WEU) as discussed in Chapter Six 
of this thesis (see in particular at 6.2.1). 
34See Chapter Two of this thesis, especially at 2.2.3. 
35Ibid. 
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does not merit a revisit in this section.36 In contrast, it suffices to state that this 'political 
cooperation machinery which deals on the intergovernmental level with problems of 
international politics'37 was recognised as 'distinct from, and additional to the activities of the 
institutions of the Community which are based on the juridical commitments taken by the 
Member States in the Treaty of Rome.’38 Although it can be argued that the CFSP as it emerged 
on the back of the EPC is based on legal commitments,39 these are not the same as juridical 
commitments.40 This is not surprising bearing in mind the nature of foreign policy in a strict 
sense. The field of foreign policy in general is considered a special domain in which 
governments defend their rights to take decisions as they see fit both for the protection of their 
sovereignty and their national interests.41 Because it revolves around strategies of international 
interactions that require flexibility, foreign policy is said to elude any grasp of law.42 Although 
EU foreign policy in the strict sense as practised under the CFSP can be distinguished from 
‘international mechanisms of conduct of foreign policy,’43 this would arguably be as much with 
regards to the requirement of greater flexibility as to other related matters. Indeed, for a polity 
which consists of 28 Member States, EU foreign policy is significantly more complex than it is 
for States.44 Nevertheless, because the EU is a legal entity which owes its existence and its 
functioning to law, the policies of its external relations are embedded in law even if they are 
                                                 
36This does not mean that the EPC will no longer be mentioned in the course of this analysis. 
37See Bulletin of the European communities, No 9-1973, p 18. 
38Ibid. Juridical commitments are usually marked by the administration of law and the possibility of judicial 
proceedings. 
39See 5.3. and 5.4. below. 
40See 5.4. below. 
41See Wessel, R, ‘Differentiation in EU foreign, Security, and Defence policy: Between Coherence and Flexibility’ 
in Trybus, M, and White, N, (ed.) European security Law (OUP, 2007), p 226); also see Smith, M, ‘Diplomacy by 
Decree: The Legalisation of EU Foreign Policy’ (2001) 39 JCMS 1, p 79-104. 
42De Baere, G, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (OUP, 2008) p 1; also see Hurd, D, ‘Developing 
the common foreign and security policy ‘(1994) 70 IA 3, p 422. 
43Koutrakos, fn 16 above, p 15. 
44Khaliq, U, 'The external action of the European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon' in Trybus, M, and Rubini, L, 
(ed.) The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), p 260. 
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arguably determined by politics.45 This applies to the CFSP even though the way it is governed 
by law may be limited by the constraints of politics more than the non-CFSP EU external 
relations. In fact, despite the legalisation of the CFSP, it has been contended not only that all 
CFSP instruments are political in nature,46 but also that the scope and nature of EU’s powers 
under the CFSP in general do not lend themselves to strict legal analysis.47 Indeed, even the EU 
has found it hard to categorise the nature of its CFSP competence which does not expressly fall 
under the shared or exclusive categories of EU competences.48 In any event, as discussed in 
Chapter Two albeit with specific regards to the requirement of coherence, the EU is assessed 
according to its own commitments.49 By and large, it is noteworthy that the difference between 
the EU's juridical commitments under the non-CFSP external action and the non-juridical 
commitment under the CFSP affects the requirement of coherence in EU external action.50  
 
If EU external relations law is regarded as incomprehensible and impenetrable by traditional 
legal standards,51 the law as it relates to the CFSP is a major contributory factor in this regard. 
                                                 
45See Peers, S, 'EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Association', in 
Dashwood, A, and Hillion, C, The General Law of EC External Relations, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 
p175; also see in general, Lister,M, The European Community and the Developing World (Aldershot: Avebury, 
1988); and also Hill and Smith, fn 27 above. 
46See for example, Fact Sheets on the European Union, European Parliament, 2009, p 34.  
47See Eeckhout, P, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (OUP, 
2004), p 145; also see for example, Van Elsuwege, P, 'EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: 
In Search of a New Balance between Delimitation and Consistency' (2010) 47 CMLRev. 987-1019, where he points 
out that 'mutual (political) solidarity' of the Member States (which is at the heart of the CFSP pursuant to Article 
24 TEU) is not a traditional normative legal concept.  
48See Article 2-6 TFEU; also see for example Koutrakos, fn 16 above, p 1 where he described the CFSP as sui 
generis. In contrast, it has also been muted that the Union's CFSP competence might be shared (see Bono, R, 'Some 
Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order' (2006) 43 CMLRev 337, at 364.  The failure to provide clarity with regards 
to the CFSP competence has been criticised Denza, E, 'Lined in the Sand: Between Common Foreign Policy and 
Single Foreign Policy' in Tridimas, T, and Nebbia, P, (eds.), EU Law for the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004), 259, p 266-7; also see House of Lords, European Union Committee, European Union – Ninth 
Report, Session 2002-2003, para 52 where it is also suggested that this may have been politically motivated. 
49See Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.5.3.7.), particularly p 89. 
50This would mainly be the case with the requirement of coherence as it relates to synergy in the sequencing of 
available policy options (see the following analysis). 
51Holdgaard, R, External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal Discourses 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008), p 2. 
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This is not only because the Union embarked on legalising what traditionally eludes the grasp 
of law,52 but because it is also doing this in an undeniably difficult context of a Staatenverbund53 
of 28 nation States with varying foreign policy interests. The difficulties are not made easier by 
the creation of a sui generis54 common foreign and security policy. It coexists with the foreign 
and security policy of Member States55 while providing the later an enabling framework to 
adopt and implement a common stance without undermining their national sovereignty.56 
Suffice it to state that the 'common' of the C in the CFSP57 is distinct from the notion of same 
as applies to the non-CFSP external relations.58 This neither means that the image of the CFSP 
as a purely intergovernmental form of international cooperation can be sustained in the light of 
the Treaty provisions,59 nor that the legal and political requirement of coherence, including 
policy coherence for development apply any less to the CFSP than the non-CFSP external 
action.60 Rather, although the requirement of coherence has gone beyond the initial need to 
                                                 
52See the previous page. 
53See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.1. 
54See fn 48 above; also see Chapter Two (at 2.3.1.), especially at fn 112. 
55It is noteworthy that the Treaties preserve the competence of the Member States to conduct their foreign and 
security policies (see Declaration 13 concerning the CFSP and Declaration 14 concerning the CFSP annexed to 
the Treaties).   
56Indeed, the new Article 24(2) TEU provides that '[…] the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common 
foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the 
identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of 
Member States' actions'. On their part, the Member States are required to support the Union’s external and security 
policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and to refrain from any action which 
is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations (Article 24(3) TEU (ex-Article 11(2) TEU). It has been suggested that this implies that Member States 
are bound by a positive obligation to actively develop the CFSP (see Hillion, C, 'Tous pour un, un pour tous! 
Coherence in the External Relations of the European Union', on Cremona, M, (ed.) Developments in EU External 
Relations Law (OUP, 2008) p 30).  
57Also see the CSDP as discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
58Such as the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) as discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
59See for example Van Vooren and Wessel, fn 16 above, 397. In this regard, Trybus has since explained that EU 
policies are better seen as either more intergovernmental or more supranational as opposed to definite extreme 
categorisations using 'intergovernmental' or 'supranational' (see Trybus, fn 1 above). 
60However, it is noteworthy that policy coherence for development takes another dimension in the context of the 
CFSP, if not also the CSDP. This is mainly due to the inextricable nexus between security and development (see 
the following analysis; and also Chapters Three and Six of this thesis).  
 212 
 
 
manage the interaction between the CFSP61 and the non-CFSP external action,62 the 
requirement of coherence between the two at all times remain a critical aspect of the coherence 
discourse. Significantly, equally at all times, the potential role of institutions in enhancing 
coherence is recognised even while the segregation of the institutional procedures of the two 
aspects of external action is maintained. Illustrative is the introduction at Lisbon of the HR/VP 
and the EEAS for the purposes of enhancing coherence between the ever separate CFSP and 
non-CFSP external action, as well as across EU external policies in general.  
 
5.2.2. The legal basis for the CFSP  
 
As indicated in Chapter One, it would be too simplistic to regard the legal and procedural 
distinction between the CFSP and the non CFSP as the primary issue at the heart of the 
coherence discourse in EU external action. However, this distinction remains relevant in so far 
as it is one of the key challenges facing the Union in its quest to construct a coherent external 
action especially towards SSA. In this regard, one of the major marks of the maintained dual 
EU external action in the post-Lisbon era is the division of the core substantive and procedural 
provisions of the CFSP and non-CFSP external action between the TEU and the TFEU 
respectively.  
The EU's competence for the CFSP and the scope of objectives of same is enshrined in Article 
24 TEU.63 In particular, this Article provides that 'the Union's competence in matters of [CFSP] 
shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security [...]'.64 
                                                 
61Here meaning EU foreign policy in a strict sense - which incorporates the political and diplomatic dimensions 
of security as its extensions. 
62From the former's time under the EPC framework till its present time under the CFSP framework. 
63Ex-Article 11 TEU as amended. 
64The second part of this provision says 'including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might 
lead to a common defence' (see Article 24(1) TEU (ex-Article 11 TEU) as amended), subparagraph 1. This second 
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Furthermore, the Article provides that 'the Union shall conduct, define and implement a [CFSP], 
based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the 
identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree 
of convergence of Member States' actions'.65 Beyond these expression of the union's general 
CFSP competence,66 Article 24 TEU67 also bears the core institutional procedure for the CFSP.68 
It follows that this Article could be regarded as the substantive and procedural legal basis for 
the CFSP.69 However, in so far as the legal basis for fields of activity under the CFSP is 
concerned, the relevant provisions are those that specify the various modus operandi of the 
CFSP. While these are generally listed together in Article 25 TFEU, it is the subsequent Articles 
which bear the legal (or political) implications70 of the different modus operandi that are often 
listed in the relevant final CFSP instruments in practice.71 Having said that, it has to be 
remembered that the flexibility and pragmatism of EU external relations law and practice 
extends to the question of legal basis.72 Effectively, there are CFSP instruments of diplomacy 
for which there are no express indication of their legal basis.73  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
part of the provision clearly relates to the CSDP.  
65 And these, 'within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action' (Article 24(2) TEU). 
66Which are further discussed below as they relate to the scope of objectives of the CFSP (see 5.2.3.) 
67Ex-Article 11 TEU as amended. 
68Article 24(1) TEU (ex-Article 11 TEU as amended), subparagraph 2 (this and other pertinent provisions relating 
to the CFSP are discussed below at 5.4.). 
69However, this does not extend to international agreements (see Article 218 TFEU). 
70See 5.2.1. above regarding the legalisation of foreign policy; and also 5.2.3. below on the pertinent provisions 
regarding CFSP instruments. 
71Illustrative are some of the pertinent CFSP instruments for SSA discussed below (see 5.2.3. below).  
72See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.2.2. However, it is noteworthy that Article 352 (4) TFEU (dubbed the 'rubber 
paragraph') ‘cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common foreign and security policy’). 
73See 5.2.4. below. 
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5.2.3. The scope of CFSP objectives with special reference to SSA: of an indefinite 
foreign and security policy, and the security-development nexus 
 
The transition from the EPC to the CFSP74 is not only a transition from ‘informal’ cooperation 
to closer ‘legal’ cooperation but also an expansion from ‘all major questions of foreign policy’, 
to ‘all areas of foreign and security policy’.75 Arguably, this is more a formal expression of the 
Union's venture into security as a dimension of foreign policy than an attempt to define the 
limits of EU foreign policy. Indeed, although the evolution of the security dimension of foreign 
policy is often attributed to the CFSP,76 there is evidence that EPC practice was not limited to 
collective economic sanctions and condemnation of human rights violations. Rather, the CFSP 
extended to active diplomacy including the active sending of observers and mediators into areas 
of conflict.77 Without needing to define the notion of security,78 there is no doubt that both the 
resolution of active conflict and conflict prevention fell within the ambit of the EPC. Indeed, as 
mentioned above, the notion of security,79 is a generic term which can assume many functions. 
In this regard, it can be argued that EU foreign and security policy was as unclearly delineated 
in scope under the ECP framework80 as it presently is under the CFSP framework. In fact, post-
Lisbon, the Treaties simply provide that the Union 'shall conduct, define and implement a CFSP 
[...]'.81 Beyond this, there is no specific allocation of any objectives to the CFSP. This is a change 
from the pre-Lisbon era when the CFSP had its own distinct objectives, and these provided the 
main starting point for the analysis of its scope.82 The original CFSP objectives which are now 
                                                 
74As discussed at 5.2.1. above. 
75Ex-Article 11(1) TEU. 
76However, see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.1. 
77See in general, Denza, E, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the Union (OUP, 2002), p 41-48. 
78See fn 16 above. 
79As the notion of foreign policy (ibid.). 
80Koutrakos, fn 16 above, p 9.  
81Article 24(2) TEU; Article 2(4) TEU: ‘the Union shall have the competence to define and implement a CFSP 
[...]’. 
82Essentially, in the pre-Lisbon era, the CFSP was objective-centred, and beyond the broad reference to ‘all areas 
of foreign and security policy’ did not provide any other indication of its scope of coverage outside its stated 
objectives (see Eeckhout, fn 47 above, p 141; and also Dashwood, A, ‘Article 47 TEU and the Relationship 
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integrated with all the other EU external action goals under Article 21(2) TEU include:  
 
‘[…] to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union […]; to strengthen the security of the Union in always; to preserve 
peace and  strengthen international security […]; to promote international 
cooperation; to develop and  consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and  fundamental freedoms.’83 
  
Despite the fact that the Treaties did not link these directly to the CFSP at Lisbon, Dashwood 
explains that the CFSP potentially retains these original distinct objectives even if integrated 
with other objectives of EU external action under Article 21(2) TEU.84 Indeed, otherwise, the 
distinct rules and procedures of the CFSP become either unnecessary or reserved only for the 
CSDP, with the former seen as a policy aspect that has disappeared. Of course, the prevalent 
practice runs contrary to this last part of the last sentence.85  
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that the objectives are not only in-exhaustive,86 but are also 
worded in very broad terms which are open to interpretation.87 As Dashwood notes, ‘[…] there 
is no way of anticipating in detail the range of actions it may be found appropriate for the Union 
to take in order for, for instance to safeguard its own security or to help maintain that of the 
international community’.88 Similarly, it can be argued that the promotion of international 
                                                 
between first and second pillar competences’ in Dashwood, A, and Maresceau, M, Law and Practice of EU 
External Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 73; but also see Wessel, R, The European Union's 
Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999), p 59 for the contrasting 
view that it is not necessarily the case that the objectives of a policy coincide with the areas it purports to cover). 
83Ex-Article 11 TEU.  These objectives are currently found in Article 21(2)(a-c) TEU. 
84Dashwood fn 82 above, p 102; also see Chapter Two for the same line of argument regarding how the different 
EU external policies retain their distinct objectives despite the amalgamation of EU external objectives in Article 
21(2) TEU. 
85Although every CSDP action falls under the ambit of the CFSP legal framework, not all CFSP actions are CSDP. 
86See Trybus, fn 1 above, p 64 who posits that the words ‘all areas of foreign and security policy’ indicates that 
this list of objectives is not exhaustive. 
87See Koskenniemi, M, ‘International Law Aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in Koskenniemi, 
M, (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) p 28. 
88Dashwood, fn 82 above, p 73.   
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cooperation is all-encompassing. Indeed, not only does Peers suggest that even the decision 
over the types and contents of agreement adopted under the ex-Community might be construed 
as foreign policy matters under the CFSP,89 Wessel equally explains that the CFSP objective of 
international cooperation includes development cooperation.90 Although the latter has been 
challenged in the post -Lisbon context,91 this does not detract from the fact that the CFSP is 
indefinite post as pre-Lisbon. The power lies with the Council to define its scope in practice 
pursuant to Article 24(2) TEU and 2(4) TEU.92  
 
The main concern in the pre-Lisbon era was to ensure that the CFSP did not encroach on the 
non-CFSP dimension of EU external action under the ex-Community pursuant to the non-
affectation clause in favour of the latter.93 However, this pre-Lisbon dynamic has been changed 
                                                 
89See Peers, fn 45 above, p175; also see Hillion, C, ‘Common Strategies and the Interface Between E.C. External 
Relations and the CFSP: Lessons of the Partnership between the E.U. and Russia’ in Dashwood and Hillion, fn 45 
above, p 290) for the suggestion that since the creation of the CFSP at Maastricht, EU external action including 
under the ex-Community framework are shaped in the light of CFSP principles.  
90See Wessel, fn 82 above, p 67; and Eeckhout fn 47 above, p 153 where he explains that it has never been the 
Council’s intention to exclude any areas of external action, apart from a specific area like trade, from under the 
CFSP; and also Cremona, M, ‘External Relations and External Competence: the emergence of an integrated policy’ 
in Craig, P, and De Burca, G, (eds.), European Union Law: An Evolutionary Perspective (OUP, 1999), p 171-173; 
and for a contrastingly reverse view, see Arts, K, and Dickson, A, ‘EU development cooperation: from model to 
symbol?’ in Arts, K, and Dickson, A, EU Development Cooperation: from Model to Symbol (ed.) (Manchester 
University Press, 2004), p 7, where they posit that EU development policy has CFSP aspects. Having said that, it 
is noteworthy that Member States are not allowed to conduct development cooperation measures under the CFSP 
framework (Wessel, fn 82 above, p 67). Arguably, such limitation on the CFSP is only in relation to legal 
instruments (for example, the ECJ have apparently distinguished CFSP acts ‘which by their nature, are capable of 
having legal effects’ (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission (Kadi) [2008] ECR 1-06351, para 202); also see Case C-91/05 Commission 
v Council (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR I-3651, paras 33 and 60 for reference to CFSP ‘measure having legal effects). 
In practice, there are CFSP instruments (such as Declarations and Action Plans) which do not have any legal effect 
(see 5.3.3. below). Significantly, these type of instruments traverses development cooperation and the CFSP in 
scope of coverage. As discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis this makes it somewhat difficult to categorise the 
Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) for which these type of instruments are used.  
91This is mainly because of the unresolved question of hierarchy regarding the relationship between security and 
development (see the next page below), and the procedural implications of this (see 5.4. below). 
92See fn 90 above; also see Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415 P (Kadi), fn 90 above, at para 202, where the ECJ 
explained its role as ensuring ‘that acts which according to the Council fall within the scope of the common foreign 
and security policy […]'. [author's emphasis); also see in general, Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 90 above. It follows 
that the pre-Lisbon criticism of the failure to provide clarity in this regard (see for example Denza, fn 48 above, at 
266-267) remains valid in the post-Lisbon era.  
93As enshrined in ex-Article 47 TEU. This is mainly with regards to CFSP acts which by their nature, are capable 
of having legal effects (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415 P (Kadi), fn 90 above, para 202).  
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by the introduction of a 'mutual' non-affectation clause at Lisbon.94 This development prima 
facie renders the two dimensions of external action equal. However, with specific regards to 
coherence, there is a difference between the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon dynamics of regulating 
the interaction between the CFSP and non-CFSP external action. For example, in the pre-Lisbon 
era, it may not have stimulated as much thinking as it would today that: 
  
 
 
‘[…] if an expansive definition (and practice) [of CFSP instruments] is adopted, 
the CFSP  remit would probably extend to the [non-CFSP dimension of EU 
external action]. In other  words, consistency and coherence may eventually 
materialise but somewhat at the  expense of the [non-CFSP] dimension.’95 
 
 
Indeed, in the pre-Lisbon era, the non-affectation clause in favour of the non-CFSP external 
action meant that it was not legally possible to stretch the CFSP to cover the non-CFSP fields 
of external action especially expressly.96 Contrastingly, the mutual non-affectation clause 
introduced at Lisbon implies a different dimension to the indefinite scope of the CFSP. 
Arguably, the post-Lisbon CFSP has no legal boundaries, and being illimitable in scope, could 
not only delve into any aspect of EU external action, but also potentially displace the non-CSFP 
dimensions of external action. This may seem more of a theoretical than a practical point. But 
in an ever evolving Union,97 which is clearly a Staatenverbund,98 it would be safe to say that 
                                                 
94See Article 40 TEU. Whether this renders obsolete the distinction between CFSP acts with legal effects and 
those without (see fn 90 above) is difficult to say.  
95Missiroli, fn 1 above, 177, p 183. This is similar to the position of the ECJ in Opinion 1/94 (WTO) [1994] ECR 
1-5273, para 60 with regards to the scope of development policy (see 3.3.2. above); Krenzler, H, and Schneider, 
H, ‘The Question of Consistency’ in Regelsberger, E, et al (ed.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: from EPC 
to CFSP and Beyond (London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p 139-140.  
96See to that effect, ex-Article 47 TEU; and Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 90 above. It is noteworthy that the 
Council had argued in this case that ex-Article 47 TEU was intended to protect the CFSP and non-CFSP 
competences equally (at para 43). But, this argument was not accepted by the ECJ. 
97See Chapter One of this thesis at 1.6.  
98See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.1. 
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developments that tilt the balance of power further in favour of the Member States cannot be 
completely ruled out.99  
 
Pertinently, the dilemma regarding the scope of the CFSP relates mainly to development 
policy.100 This is due to the intensity of the nexus between security and development.101 It is not 
the focus of this section to engage with the wide-ranging debate associated with the security-
development nexus.102 Rather, it suffices for the purposes of this analysis to capture what is at 
the heart of the concept namely that there can be no security without development, and vice 
versa.103 The import of this in practice can be surmised in two sentences. On the one hand, 
policies towards security may legitimately become part of development policy in so far as they 
will contribute to development by enhancing security. On the other hand, policies towards 
development may legitimately become part of security policies in so far as they will increase 
security by enhancing development. There is no controversy about this104 - as there is regarding 
                                                 
99As discussed below, the CFSP procedure is more intergovernmental than the procedure for the non-CFSP 
external action. The latter is more supranational (see especially trade policy as discussed in Chapter Four of this 
thesis). 
100It is doubtful that the CFSP will ever stretch as far as to subsume trade policy (indeed, see fn 92 above; and 
also Chapter Four of this thesis in general on the specificity of trade policy).  
101See for example, Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 90 above. For more on the security-development nexus see for 
example Klingebiel, S, (ed.), New Interfaces between Security and Development: changes concepts and 
approaches (Bonn: Dt. Inst. für Entwicklungspolitik, 2006); Stewart, F. ‘Development and Security’ (2004) 4 CSD 
3, p 261 — 288; and Page, J, ‘Three Issues in Security and Development’ (2004) 4 CSD 3, p 299-308; and also 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
‘Is it ODA? Note by the Secretariat’, Working Party on Statistics, 2001; for a contrasting view see Beall, J, et al,  
'On the Discourse of Terrorism, Security and Development' (2006) 18 JID, p 51–67; and with specific regards to 
the EU context see Robinson, C, ‘Integration and integrity in EU policies for security and development’, an 
assessment prepared for the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in 
Europe (APRODEV), published in New interfaces between security and development: changing concepts and 
approaches (Bonn: German Development Institute (DIE), 2006). 
102Ibid. 
103Ibid. 
104Illustrative are the relevant instruments of EU development and security policies including those that are 
specific to EU external action towards SSA (see for example, Joint Statement by the Council and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Commission on European Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’ [2006] OJ C46/1; and A Secure 
Europe in a Better World--European Security Strategy’ (hereinafter the EU Security Strategy), Brussels, December 
12, 2003; EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, endorsed at the Goterberg European Council, 
June 2001, available at www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.pdf , accessed November 19, 2011, para, 3-4; and 
with specific regards to SSA see Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and 
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whether the focus should primarily be on development as a precondition for security or on 
security as a precondition for development.105 Significantly, the EU is considered to align with 
the latter even if its partners would prefer the former.106 In this regard, while it may be 
controversial, it can be argued that the issue of policy coherence for development as it relates 
to the CFSP amounts to a façon de parler in the light of the unsettled question of hierarchy 
between security and development. This is more so when the EU is judged by its own 
standard.107 Nevertheless, it does not detract from the fact that a failure to adopt a CFSP measure 
when necessary for coherence vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options 
to resolve a crisis would arguably constitute a breach of policy coherence for development. 
 
Undoubtedly, the intense nexus between security and development mainly exists in the context 
of EU external action towards SSA.108 Suffice it to state that SSA elicits what can be described 
as a 'European security continuum',109 and this, since the post-Cold War era when the region 
was mired in internecine conflicts with disruptive and undermining effects on EU development 
activities in the region. Although conflict prevention was not mentioned in the objectives of the 
                                                 
Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other part 
(hereinafter the Cotonou Agreement) (2000) OJ L317/3 (First Revision (2005) OJ L287/1; Second Revision (2010) 
OJ L287/3), especially Articles 1 and 11; and the Cairo Plan of Action attached to the Cairo Declaration which 
followed the Africa-Europe Summit (Cairo, 2000).  
105See for example, Nkundabagenzi, F, ‘L’Union Europeenne est la Prevention Des Conflits Africains’ (Brussels, 
Les Rapports du Grip 2000) where he explains that while the EU primarily focuses on security as a precondition 
for development, the SSA partners of the EU considers development as a precondition for security; also see Onah, 
F, ‘The Lome, Cotonou and the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership Agreements in Comparative Perspective’ in Eze, 
O, and Sesay, A, (ed.), Africa and Europe in the 21st Century (Lagos: NIIA, 2010), p 30; ‘Towards a Joint Africa-
Europe Partnership Strategy: The EU-Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective’ Issue Paper 1, ECDPM, 
December, 2006, p 2. 
106Ibid. Specifically, the EU Security Strategy directly expresses the view that 'security is the first precondition 
for development' (see EU Security Strategy, fn 104 above, p 13). 
107See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.7. Of course, this controversy has not been resolved otherwise. 
108See fns 104 and 105 above; and also Chapter Three of this thesis. As indicated in Chapter One at 1.2., Mali as 
a specific case study for the examination of coherence in the law and policies of EU external action towards SSA 
is marked by fragility occasioned by poor development index and violent conflicts. In essence, Mali is a 
representation of the fragility of SSA as a whole vis-à-vis poor development index and violent conflicts, even if 
these are in varying degrees. 
109Shepherd, A, 'The European Security Continuum and the EU as an International Security Provider' (2015) 29 
Global Issue 2, p 156-174. 
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CFSP,110 it eventually evolved as the overarching aim in that 'security continuum' albeit not 
without complicating 'the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the Union as a security 
provider.'111 By and large, by the year 2000, ‘conflict prevention’ and all it connotes,112 was not 
only made a part of EU development cooperation with the countries of SSA,113 but was also 
pursued as an aspect of foreign and security policy under the CFSP framework.114 Hence, while 
the security-development nexus was being addressed within development cooperation, this did 
not stop similar programmes of conflict prevention under the CFSP framework. Having the two 
competing frames breeds inter-institutional conflicts in relation to the Union's security and 
conflict prevention programmes.115 However, these relate mainly to the internal constitutional 
question of competence. Illustrative is the recent case of ECOWAS116 which in fact arose in the 
context of EU external action towards SSA. Significantly, in this case, the ECJ did not only 
confirm the arguably illimitable scope of the CFSP as an overarching framework especially in 
relation to the security-development interface,117 but also the need for coherence between the 
CFSP and non-CFSP activities in this regard.118  
 
 
 
                                                 
110Of course, it would fall under the CFSP objective of promotion of international peace and security. 
111See Shepherd, fn 109 above; and also in general Chapter Six of this thesis. 
112Think the scope of the objective of promotion of international peace and security (and see in this regard Chapter 
Six of this thesis). 
113See Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement; and in general Chapter Three of this thesis. 
114And indeed, the CSDP. 
115Sicurreli, D, ‘Framing security and development in the EU Pillar structure: How the views of the European 
Commission affect EU Africa policy’ (2008) 30 European Integration 2, p 217-234, at 221. 
116Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 90 above.  
117See 5.3.1. and 5.3.2. below. This is further illustrated by the pertinent key instruments of the CFSP as it relates 
to SSA. Although it is not the focus of the next section, it is noteworthy that the instruments may be helpful in 
clarifying the scope of the CFSP (Wessel, fn 82 above, p 70; and, Eeckhout, fn 47 above, p 143). 
118Case C-19/05 (ECOWAS), fn 90 above, paras 84-88, and 107-109; also see 5.4. below on the institutional 
dimension of the CFSP and on whether the inter-institutional conflicts ended at Lisbon. 
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5.3. CFSP instruments for diplomacy with special reference to SSA119 – a pertinent 
analysis 
 
In contrast to the non-CFSP external action, the conduct of CFSP does not rely on legislative 
acts.120 Rather, it relies on other type of instruments and decisions which are non-legislative.121 
It is not necessary to go into the pre and post-Lisbon categorisation of the CFSP which are 
arguably as ambiguous as the Union's CFSP competence.122 Indeed, as indicated earlier123 the 
Chapter does not attempt to account for the entirety of CFSP instruments in relation to SSA.124 
Rather, it concentrates on instruments that are most pertinent to the discussion of policy 
coherence for development and the determination of coherence as it relates to synergy in the 
sequencing of available policy options with a specific focus on CFSP diplomacy. Even then, 
                                                 
119One major factor that prima facie distinguishes EU external action under the CFSP framework in SSA from its 
action under the non-CFSP competence is the distinct instruments of the CFSP. In the light of the illimitable scope 
of the CFSP, it would be impossible to survey all the instruments of the CFSP in the context with EU external 
action towards SSA in any coherent way. Instead, this analysis will concentrate on the main themes in the study of 
coherence especially as it relates to the security-development nexus and with a particular focus on diplomacy.  
120By virtue of Article 24 TEU, legislative acts that arise by virtue of the ordinary legislative procedure under the 
non-CFSP competences are expressly excluded from the CFSP. 
121The previous categories of CFSP decisions under ex-Article 12 TEU included principles of and general 
guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, Common Strategies, Common Positions, Joint Actions, and 
systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy. This was changed at Lisbon to the 
following: ‘(a) […] general guidelines (b) […] decisions defining (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union; (ii) 
positions to be taken by the Union; (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points 
(i) and (ii); (c) […] systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy’ under Article 25 TEU 
[Author’s emphases]. Clearly, what used to be known as Common Position and Joint Action have been renamed 
so that these are now respectively known as decision defining actions to be undertaken by the Union and decision 
defining positions to be taken by the Union. Furthermore, the Treaties have dropped the use of what was formerly 
known as Common Strategies. It has been suggested that this was expunged from practice long before the Treaty 
of Lisbon (see De Beare, fn 42 above, p 115). Nevertheless, the current Article 22 TEU bears semblance to the 
former provision on Common Strategy under ex-Article 13 TEU (this is discussed in relation to the JAES in 
Chapter Seven of this thesis). Otherwise, the common strategy as provided for under ex-Article 13 TEU was never 
used in the context of EU external action towards SSA. In any event, it is noteworthy that these are not the only 
instruments available for CFSP actions. For example, the products of systematic cooperation are found in 
Presidential Declarations, or in ‘Declarations’, ‘Council Conclusions’, and other 'Council decisions', and Action 
Plans’ which are never linked to any legal bases. These could be regarded as CFSP ‘political instruments’ (see in 
this regard De Baere, fn 42 above, p 113; Denza, fn 79 above, p 134-136; and Koutrakos, P, EU International 
Relations, (Hart), p 403). There are also other instruments which relate specifically to active CFSP diplomacy such 
as demarches, restrictive measures (sanctions), political dialogues and active sending of observers and mediators 
into areas of conflict (see 5.2.3 above in relation to the EPC).  For a comprehensive list of CFSP instruments, see 
Germany's Foreign Affairs Office website available at  http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Europa/Aussenpolitik/GASP/InstrumenteGASP_node.html, accessed 20 June 2016. 
122Ibid. On the ambiguity of the categorisation of CFSP instruments see De Baere, fn 42 above, p 123 where he 
specifically criticises the general designation of all CFSP instruments with the umbrella term of 'decisions'.  
123At fn 119 above. 
124These would have entailed discussing all the instruments listed at fn 121 above as they relate to SSA.  
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not all the instruments of diplomacy are covered. In particular, the investigation concentrates 
on Decisions especially in relation to the overarching instrument of the CFSP towards SSA and 
the appointment of the EU Special Representative (EUSR).125 The overarching instrument of 
the CFSP towards SSA is embedded in the Decision previously known as Common Position.126 
The appointment of the EUSR would usually be embedded in the Decision formerly known as 
Joint Action.  
 
 
5.3.1. The CFSP Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa:127 an overarching 
CFSP instrument for EU external action towards SSA  
 
Common Positions define positions to be taken by the EU with regards to a particular matter of 
a geographical and/or a thematic nature.128 It binds the Member States requiring them to ‘ensure 
that their national policies conform to Union positions’.129 However, it also defines positions to 
be taken by the EU with regards to 'a particular matter' of 'a geographical and/or a thematic 
nature'. Hence, it also holds the prospects of enhancing the overall coherence of EU external 
action even if the relevant provision of the Treaties does not directly reflect this.130 
Substantially, 'a particular matter' with a root in the CFSP framework could have many branches 
and possibly extend to non-CFSP external action. Pertinently illustrative is the Common 
                                                 
125The latter aids the determination of coherence as it relates to synergy in the sequencing of available policy 
options. This is not to deny the fact that there may be other instruments which are not easily determinable 
existentially in the light of the culture of secrecy that generally permeates the field of diplomacy (see fn 121 above). 
126See fn 121 above. 
127See Council Common Position 2005/304/CFSP on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa 
and repealing Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP) on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 
Africa [2005] OJ L97/57 (hereinafter 'Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa). The latter was preceded 
by the first two Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa (Council Common Position 97/356/CFSP 
concerning conflict prevention and conflict resolution in Africa [1997] OJ L153/1; Council Common Position 
2001/374/CFSP of 14 May 2001 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa [2001] OJ 
L132/1). 
128Article 29 TEU (ex -Article 15 TEU).  
129Ibid. In this regard, it fosters vertical coherence between the Union and the Member States. As indicated in 
Chapter One of this thesis (at 1.3.) vertical coherence is outside the scope of this thesis. 
130Article 29 TEU (ex -Article 15 TEU). 
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Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa.131 This is the key CFSP instrument encapsulating EU 
strategic objectives in SSA,132 and in that, an illustration of the illimitably all-encompassing 
scope of the CFSP vis-à-vis the potentially all-encompassing notion of conflict prevention. As 
indicated above,133 although conflict prevention is not expressly listed as an objective of the 
CFSP in the Treaties, it eventually evolved as the overarching aim in the 'European security 
continuum'. If the notion of conflict prevention complicates 'the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of the EU as a security provider', it is because it borders on a 'security 
continuum' traversing all stages of conflict, and by implication all aspects of EU external 
policies.134 Indeed, the Common Position on conflict Prevention in Africa addresses conflict 
prevention and security holistically135 including with direct references to trade and development 
cooperation.136 Suffice it to state that the notion of conflict prevention can rightly be regarded 
as a metonym for EU security policy in its comprehensive form.137 It does not only blur the 
                                                 
131See fn 127 above. 
132For this view, see Whitman, R, ‘The EU and Sub-Saharan Africa: developing the strategic culture of the 
Union’s Foreign Security and Defence Policy’ Paper presented at the 2009 EUSA Biennial Conference, April 23-
25 2009, Los Angeles, p 12 (whether this is in relation to both the CFSP and non-CFSP competences is debatable). 
Indeed, although the Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa makes reference in its title to Africa (as 
opposed to SSA), the fact that the instrument mainly applies to SSA is not difficult to understand in the light of 
the prevalence of the security-development nexus in the region. In fact, Article 6(4) of this Common Position lists 
the relevant African sub-regional organisations which are those in SSA. 
133At 5.2.3.  
134See for example, Preamble, para 8, Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 127 above: 'Effective 
conflict prevention requires strategies to create enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international 
environment, and comprehensive and balanced aid and developmental assistance programmes to alleviate the 
pressures that trigger violent conflict; the importance of economic factors in conflicts in Africa, as well as the 
potential of diplomatic and economic measures for the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts also have to 
be taken into account'; and also see Article 1(5) of the same instrument 'The EU shall develop a proactive, 
comprehensive and integrated approach, [...]. As a part of this, and to enhance capacity for early action, a yearly 
survey shall continue to be drawn up [...], so as to identify and monitor potential violent conflicts and presenting 
the policy options necessary to prevent their outbreak or recurrence.'; also see EU Security Strategy, fn 104 above, 
p13; and for example Chapter Three and Chapter Six of this thesis on development policy and the CSDP 
respectively (in contrast to these, it is arguable that the contributions of trade policy, if any, to conflict prevention 
is arguably only indirect (see Chapter Four of this thesis). For more on EU conflict prevention policy see in general, 
Kronenberger, V, and Wouters, J, (ed.) The European Union and Conflict Prevention. Policy and Legal Aspects 
(The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2005, p 208). 
135Ibid.; also see in general, Articles 1 – 12 of the Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 127 
above.  
136See Article 5, Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 127 above; and also fn 135 above.  
137See European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU's comprehensive approach to 
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distinction between prevention, management and resolution, but also the distinction between 
preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peacekeeping.138 Invariably, the security-
development nexus is central to the discourse especially in the light of the requirement of policy 
coherence for development. In this regard, the Common Position on conflict prevention in 
Africa expressly recognises the interdependency of development and security.139 However, for 
all it may cover in principle, the Common Position on cannot on its own foster coherence 
between the CFSP and development policy in practice. Indeed, the paradox of the Common 
Position is that even though it could refer to all areas of EU external action and their mutual 
complementarity,140 it is in general declaratory in form and content,141 and can be described as 
a guideline142 for the whole of the EU.143 By implication, it confines coherence to the political 
will of the relevant institutions.144 
 
Having said that, it has to be remembered that the main focus of the analysis in this Chapter 
with a view to determining coherence in EU external action towards SSA is specifically on 
preventive diplomacy as it relates to the political dimension of security. This will now be 
                                                 
external conflict and crisis, Brussels, 11, December, 2013, JOIN (2013) 30 final; and Kronenberger and Wouters, 
fn 134 above. 
138Author's emphasis. Indeed, the first Common Position on conflict prevention in Africa was adopted following 
the European Council’s recognition of the importance of preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping in Africa (see Council Conclusions on preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peace keeping 
in Africa, 4/12/1995). It is noteworthy that all emphasis on preventive diplomacy in the body of the analysis and 
in this fn are the author's. 
139See for example Preamble, paras 8 and 9 Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 127 above. 
140See for example, Preamble, para 6, Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 127 above; and 
Article 3 Common Position 2000/420/CFSP concerning EU support for the Organisation of African Unity peace 
process between Ethiopia and Eritrea [2000] OJ L161/1. 
141Koskenniemi, fn 87 above, p 32; Wessel, fn 82 above, p 179. 
142See Krenzler and Schneider, fn 95 above, p 139. 
143See Whitman, fn 132 above; Eeckhout, fn 47 above, p 153; and Wessel, R, ‘The inside looking out: consistency 
and delimitation in EU external relations’ [2000] 37 CMLRev 1148-9, p 1155). For example, the Common Position 
on Africa ‘notes that the Commission intends to direct its action towards achieving the objectives and priorities of 
this Common Position, where appropriate by pertinent Community measures’ (Article 13 of Common Position).  
144This does not detract from the controversial argument made above regarding the potential theoretical 
implication of the unsettled question of hierarchy between security and development.  
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pertinently discussed. 
 
5.3.2. CFSP Joint Actions and coherence:  between long term measures and ad hoc 
diplomacy 
 
CFSP Joint actions are also directed to the Member States and commits them in the positions 
they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.145 It is therefore mainly an instrument for vertical 
coherence between the EU and Member States.146 However, this does not mean that it ignores 
the requirement of coherence between EU external policies, especially between the CFSP and 
non-CFSP dimensions of EU security policy.147 Indeed, similar to Common Positions, Joint 
Actions usually refer to the requirement of coherence across EU policies including with the 
institutional responsibility in that regard.148 Effectively, the instruments often highlight in 
principle the complementarity and required synergy between the CFSP and non-CFSP 
competences. But of course, as the ECOWAS case illustrates, the formal recognition of the need 
for coherence and the relevant institutional responsibility in the instruments is not always 
supported with productive institutional dialogue for effective coordination in practice.149  
                                                 
145Article 28 TEU (ex-Article 14 TEU as amended). They are directed at the Member States which they bind in 
principle. However see Chapter Six of this thesis. 
146An issue outside the scope of this thesis.  
147See for example, Article 9 Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on the European Union’s contribution to 
combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP [2002] OJ L191/1; and also Article 4(2) Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP implementing Joint 
Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to a European Union contribution to ECOWAS in the framework of the 
Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons [2004] OJ L359/65.  
148For example, the ECOWAS Joint Action provides that ‘[...] the Council and the Commission shall be 
responsible for the consistency of the Union’s activities in the field of small arms […]’ (Article 9). In the same 
vein, the annulled Council decision implementing the ECOWAS Joint Action provides that ‘[…] The Presidency 
and the Commission shall submit to the relevant Council bodies regular reports on the consistency of the European 
Union's activities in the field of small arms and light weapons, in particular with regard to its development policies, 
in accordance with Article 9(1) of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP’ (Article 4(2)) Council decisions implementing 
ECOWAS Joint Action).  
149Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 90 above. In this case the Commission contested the Joint Action on Small Arms 
in relations to ECOWAS (see fn 147 above) along with Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP which implements it 
(see fn 147 above). The control and elimination of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is one of the conflict 
prevention measures identified in the Common Position for Africa (see Article 7, Common Position for Conflict 
Prevention in Africa, fn 127 above). The Common Position was to be conducted at both the regional (African 
Union) level and sub-regional levels (see Annex II attached to this thesis) pursuant to Article 4  of the Common 
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In any event, the similarity between Joint Action and the Common Position does not blur the 
distinction between the two. Joint Action is more action-oriented and specifically targeted.150 
For example, in the context of EU external action towards SSA, the Common Position defines 
the general approach of the EU to the relevant themes and the region. Contrastingly, the 
actionable measures to achieve concrete aims in this regard are often laid out in Joint Actions. 
Illustrative for example, is the Joint Action on Small Arms151 which was challenged in the 
ECOWAS case.152 However, beyond this type of long term actionable technical and financial 
support, Joint Action is also relied on for ad hoc measures of conflict prevention. While this 
would mostly be the case for CSDP operations,153 it is also the case for active preventive 
diplomacy under the CFSP. With regards to the latter, the EU may for example, deploy a 
specially appointed European Union Special Representative (EUSR)154 for meditative shuttle 
                                                 
Position (also see Preamble, para 2 of same). The issue of small arms is a typical example of an issue which lies 
at the heart of the nexus between development policy and security policy especially in the context of EU external 
action in SSA. Measures to combat small arms could rightly be pursued from both under the non-CFSP 
development cooperation, and the security policy under the CFSP framework. In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
contrary to the Commission's position that the control and elimination of small arms and light weapons falls under 
development policy, the ECJ only annulled the contested CFSP measure for its own defects namely its link to 
sustainable development both in its aim and content (Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), paras 96-99, and 107-109); also 
see Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP recital 1 on the reference to sustainable development as an objective albeit 
along with peace and security; and Article 8 and 9 of Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP which the ECJ also 
referred to in reaching a decision that the Council Decision was a development measure adopted on a wrong legal 
basis (CFSP) and hence should be annulled for infringement of ex-Article 47 TEU in that it should have been 
adopted under the ex-Community legal basis: ‘[…] For, according to settled case-law, the legal basis for an act 
must be determined having regard to its own aim and content [...] (see to that effect, Case C-94/03 Commission v 
Council , paragraph 50)’ (para 106)). However, the Court considered unnecessary an examination of ‘the pleas as 
to the alleged illegality of the Joint Action’ (Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), fn 90 above, at para 111). It is not clear 
why the Court preserved the Joint Action. However, what is clear is that the objective of the Joint Action is not 
expressly linked to development. Furthermore, it is arguable that the Joint Action was treated as a policy document 
of general guideline aimed at the EU as a whole. In this regard, it was to be implemented through both the CFSP 
and non-CFSP institutional competences similar to the Common Position discussed above. In fact, the ECJ 
expressly recognised that the objectives of the Joint Action could be pursued both under the CFSP and the non-
CFSP competences (Case C-91/05 (ECOWAS), at paras 84-88). It is arguable that the import of this point is lost in 
the post-Lisbon deletion of the provision which allowed for the implementing of this type of CFSP decisions with 
a non-CFSP measure. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the fact that the duality of the procedures and 
instruments of EU external security policy was upheld. However, this was not done without recognition of the 
need for coherence between the two aspects, and the institutional responsibility in that regard. 
150This is in contrast to the mainly declaratory and guideline nature of the Common Position.  
151 See Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP, fn 147 above. 
152 See fn 90 above. 
153See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
154See Article 33 TEU; for a good list of some relevant Joint Actions see Ambos, A, 'The Institutionalisation of 
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diplomacy155 as will now be discussed in the institutional analysis. 
 
5.4. The institutional dimension of the conduct of CFSP with a special focus on 
diplomacy  
 
Similar to the related sections in the previous Chapters, this section enunciates the role of the 
relevant EU institutions in decision making, implementation and enforcement of the CFSP with 
a view to determining coherence including policy coherence for development, and coherence 
vis-a-vis synergy in the sequencing of policies. The latter specifically focuses on CFSP 
diplomacy as indicated above. In doing this, highlight is placed on the roles of the HR/VP and 
the EEAS – acceptably the institutional bridges between the Council and the Commission which 
respectively represent the key players in the CFSP and non-CFSP external action as discussed 
in Chapter Two of this thesis. Invariably, it has to be remembered that the complex dynamics 
of EU external action in general is often ameliorated with institutional flexibility and 
pragmatism in practice.156 Indeed, it is arguable that this would be more so in the complex 
context of the legalised high politics of the CFSP as discussed above,157 and in the light of the 
                                                 
CFSP and ESDP' in Reynolds, C, et al, (eds.) EU Foreign Policy: from Rhetoric to Reality (Brussels, PIE, 2004), 
p 174. However, see with regards to the post-Lisbon umbrella term of 'decisions', Council Decision 2013/133/CFSP 
of 18 March 2013 appointing the European Union Special Representatives for the Sahel  OJ L75/29 (hereinafter 
EUSR for the Sahel). 
155Shuttle diplomacy is the process of serving as an intermediary between parties in a dispute (see for example 
Lenczowski, G, American Presidents and the Middle East (Duke University Press: 1990), p 131). This is a 
continuation of the active diplomacy of the EPC era which included the active sending of observers and mediators 
into areas of conflict (see 5.2.3. above). However, the role of EUSR is not limited to this. Some are also appointed 
to provide a political backing to a CSDP operation. Although, the substance of the mandate of an EUSR depends 
on the political context of the deployment, the mandate is often coded in a Joint Action. Other forms of EU 
representative role include representations that can be handled either by the Commission, the Presidency, the 
‘tandem’ formula (also known as the ‘bicephalous’ Presidency), or the ‘Troika’ formula (see Smith, M, ‘The quest 
for coherence: institutional dilemmas of External Action from Maastricht to Amsterdam’ in Sweet, A, et al, (ed.) 
The Institutionalisation of Europe (OUP, 2001), p 178). 
156See Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.5.3.); and also the analysis of the institutional dimension of development 
policy and trade policy (as discussed in Chapters Four and Five respectively). 
157See Chapter Two of this at 2.1.  
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security development interface.158  
 
5.4.1. CFSP decision making: between the Council and the HR/VP159 
 
CFSP proposals originated from the Commission and the Member States in the pre-Lisbon 
era.160 However, post-Lisbon, they may originate from any Member State, the HR/VP, or the 
HR/VP with the Commission’s support.161  
 
Effectively, the Commission was stripped of any independent power of initiative under the 
CFSP at Lisbon. However, this may have little or no implications for coherence.162 Arguably, 
the role of the HR/VP as a Vice President of the Commission could potentially remedy any 
effect of the perceived disjunction from the Commission at Lisbon.163 Moreover, as discussed 
above,164 the Commission and the EEAS are already working together under development 
                                                 
158Indeed, although the Sahel Strategy arguably leans more towards security in its attempt to conflate EU security 
and development strategies, there is no express indication of its legal basis in the Treaties (for the relationship 
between legal basis and institutional procedure, see Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.3.3. above). 
159In so far as the CFSP is mainly intergovernmental in approach, there is no need to distinguish between the 
Council and the Member States for the purposes of decision-making under the CFSP. Furthermore, as indicated in 
Chapter Two, since the European Council assumes the overarching role of defining the strategies and objectives 
of EU external action in general, it is not necessary to investigate how it does this in relation to the specific policies.  
160Except for matters of urgency when it also fell within the remit of the Council Presidency (ex-Article 22 TEU). 
161Except in matters of urgency in which the HR/VP of her own motion or at the request of a Member State may 
convene Council meeting pursuant to Article 30 TEU (ex-Article 22 TEU as amended). 
162This is not to say that it will not affect the Commission’s traditional influence in shaping EU-Africa policies 
(see Sicurelli, D, The European Union's Africa policies: Norms, Interests, Impacts (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p 
217-234; and Hewitt, A, and Whiteman, K, ‘The Commission and development policy: bureaucratic politics in EU 
aid – from the Lomé leap forward to the difficulties of adapting to the twenty-first century’ in Arts and Dickson, 
fn 90 above, p 133); and also Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, (COM(2011)331 of 08 March 2011. This may 
be hard for the Commission which have a much longer presence in SSA than any other EU institution. 
163However, it is noteworthy that her position as the Vice President of the Commission does not mean that the 
HR/VP is representing the Commission in the Council. As explained in Chapter Two (at 2.5.3.5.), the HR/VP is 
only bound by Commission procedure only when he or she is exercising her Commission-related responsibilities 
(Article 18 (4) TEU); also see Erkelens, L, and Blockmans, S, ‘Setting up the European External Action Service: 
An institutional act of balance’, CLEER Working Papers 2012/1, pp 9, 13 and 31 where they suggest that the 
HR/VP is in practice marginalised in the Commission and arguably has accepted to act according to the mandate 
provided to her by the Commission President despite the provisions of the Treaties.  
164At 5.3.2. above; and also in Chapter Three (at 3.4.2.1). 
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policy. In any event,165 it is arguable that the work of the HR/VP (and the EEAS) under the 
CFSP could be considered automatically coherent with development policy in the light of the 
intense nexus between security and development.166 
 
The CFSP decision-making rests on the Council by virtue of Article 26(2) TEU.167 Similar to 
other fields of external action, the Council is supported in CFSP policy making by the Council 
preparatory bodies168 including Working Groups and Special Committees as well as the Council 
General Secretariat. In contrast to ACP Working Group for development policy and Article 113 
Committee for trade policy,169 the specific Council working Group for EU external action 
towards SSA under the CFSP framework is the Africa Working Party (COAFR).170 This remains 
                                                 
165Including whether the requirement of policy coherence in relation to the CSFP is accepted as a façon de parler 
or not. 
166Of course, this is in any event different from the question for overall coherence of EU external action vis-à-vis 
institutional coordination and synergy in the sequencing of available policy options (see 5.5. below and also 
Chapter Eight of this thesis in general). 
167Pre-Lisbon, the Commission was 'fully associated' to the CFSP (by virtue of ex-Article 18(4) TEU) and even 
attended the meetings of the different Council Working Groups and configurations of the Council (as the 29 th 
Member State as discussed in Chapter Two at 2.5.3.3.). Whether this remains the case post-Lisbon has not been 
established. This is in contrast to the association of the European Parliament (EP) in the CFSP which never 
participated in the CFSP decision-making but has nevertheless been able to influence the CFSP on critical 
occasions through its reports, debates and budgetary powers (Van Vooren and Wessel, fn 16 above, p 376). Post-
Lisbon, the EP may ask questions and make recommendations to the Council and to the HR/VP pursuant to Article 
36 TEU (ex-Article 21 TEU). In this regard, the HR/VP shall also consult the EP on the main aspects of and basic 
choices of the CFSP and inform it on how those policies evolve, as well as take its views into consideration. There 
is no indication of what is meant by ‘main aspects and basic choices’. However, according to Van Vooren and 
Wessel (fn 16 above), the EP's influence is limited to the general guidelines as opposed to concrete decisions (p 
376). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the fact that the EP shall only be informed ‘on how those policies 
evolve’ would seem to indicate that this is not at the stage of decision-making but rather as a matter of regular but 
a posterior briefing (see European Parliament Report on the Annual Report from the Council to the European 
Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP including the financial implications for the general 
budget of the European Communities, 2003, para 2). In general, although the EP (which can debate on the CFSP 
twice a year) can express its views on coherence as it relates to the CFSP, this can only be done after the fact.  
168For a list of the post-Lisbon Council preparatory bodies see Council of the European Union, Doc. 11903/11, 
Brussels, 22 June 2011. 
169See respectively Chapter Three of this thesis (at 3.4. above) and Chapter Four (at 4.4.). 
170This was from an earlier research in 2011 (COAFR is the French acronym for this geographical and thematic 
(CFSP) Council Working Group (see 
www.se2009.eu/en/meetings_news/2009/7/8/africa_working_party_coafr.html, accessed December 29, 2011). 
However, according to the Council's website, COAFR is 'responsible for the management of EU external policy 
towards SSA sub-Saharan Africa, including its 46 countries, the African Union and other sub-regional 
organisations' (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/africa-working-party/, accessed 
27 February 2016). 
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the case post as pre-Lisbon.171  
 
Post-Lisbon, COAFR is attached to the EEAS Africa Desk, however where its preparatory work 
goes to en route to the Council is not certain. For example, as explained earlier, the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)172 is the highest Council Committee. However, the 
CFSP falls under the remit of both COREPER and the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC).173 The latter ‘shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the [CFSP] 
and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council’ without 
prejudice to the competence of COREPER under Article 240 TFEU.174 Although the role of the 
PSC is arguably more pronounced in the context of CSDP crisis management,175 this does not 
detract from the fact that its role in the non-CSDP foreign and security policy renders the 
question of the highest Council Committee for the CFSP a question that cannot be concluded 
with certainty. Indeed, although the relationship between the two in the CSDP framework is 
discussed elsewhere,176 the relationship between the two in the non-CSDP CFSP is free from 
controversy. For example, Van Vooren and Wessel state that the relevant Working Groups report 
to the PSC on all CFSP matters.177 Contrastingly, De Baere makes reference to a 1992 working 
arrangement between the PSC178 and COREPER. Under this, the former focuses on substance 
                                                 
171Even though it may not always be concluded with certainty the institutional dynamics at play (especially in the 
light of the evolving use of comprehensive instruments; also see the reference to institutional flexibility and 
pragmatism in practice above; and for example Council of the European Union, 'Note from the General Secretariat 
of the Council to Delegations' on the Council conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020),  Brussels, 
20 April 2015 (OR. en) where many preparatory bodies were mentioned including COAFR, ACP Working Group, 
CFSP/PESC amongst others).  
172Article 16(7) TEU: ‘A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council’; also see Article 240TFEU; Article 19(1) Rules of 
Procedure of the Council attached to the Council Decision adopting the Council Rules of Procedure (2009/ 
937/EU) (2009) OJ L 325/35); and Chapters Three and Four of this thesis.  
173Article 35 TEU (ex-Article 25 TEU). 
174Ibid. 
175See Chapter Six of this thesis (at 6.4.1.). 
176Ibid. 
177Van Vooren and Wessel, fn 16 above, p 372. 
178Then PoCo. 
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and political analysis while the latter looks at the institutional, legal, financial, and non-CFSP 
aspects of the questions on the table, refraining from altering or editing the opinion of its PSC 
colleagues.179 Effectively, it could be 'speculated' that COREPER would be involved in 
preparatory work on general guidelines and long term declaratory instruments of the CFSP.180 
This will not stop the PSC from acting when necessary for ad hoc urgent CFSP measures.181 
Thus, each route could still aid coherence if well utilised. However, as the Mali case study 
illustrates, the urgent ad hoc CFSP measures are not always distinctly employed.182 This could 
be due to the dearth of resources.183 It could also be due to the hesitation of Member States 
which together share the responsibility for putting the CFSP into effect with the HR/VP, using 
national and Union resources.184 The latter185 could be justified by the former, and the former 
could be justified in the light of the security-development nexus which arguably reduces policy 
coherence for development to a façon de parler in relation to the CFSP.186  
 
In any event, whether through COREPER or the PSC, the CFSP proposal gets to the Council 
for decision-making purposes pursuant to Article 26 TEU. The relevant Council configuration 
                                                 
179De Baere, fn 42 above, p 133. 
180Such as those relating to conflict prevention discussed above. 
181However, by virtue of Article 30(2) TEU (ex-Article 22(2) TEU, the HR/VP could go direct to the Council in 
cases requiring a rapid decision. 
182It appears to be used more under the CSDP crisis operations.  
183For example, the CFSP budget is small and there is a limit to the extent to which it can be spent on African 
projects (see House of Lords Report, at fn 48 above). In this regard it may be easier for the EU to devise the long 
term comprehensive security and development strategies as these can draw from development funds primarily for 
security measures secondarily aimed at promoting development.  
184Article 26(3) TEU (ex-Article 13 TEU as amended). The responsibility for taking the decisions required for 
ad hoc CFSP measures of conflict prevention also lies on the Member State (Article 30(2) TEU (ex-Article 22(2) 
TEU as amended). 
185Especially if untainted by the historical factors discussed in Chapter Three (at 2.2.3.); also see 5.5.2. below. 
186This would be more the case were COREPER certainly excluded from the CFSP even though it is specifically 
tasked with ensuring policy coherence for development (see Chapter Three at 2.5.3.2.). It is noteworthy that in 
contrast to the PSC which is chaired by a member of the EEAS representing the HR/VP, COREPER is not chaired 
by a representative of the HR/VP but remains under the Chair of the rotating Presidency (see Council of the 
European Union, Doc. 11903/11, Brussels, 22 June 2011, Annex III). However, as mentioned above, the view that 
security is a precondition for development is not a commonly shared one (see p 229 above especially at it relates 
to fn 105 above). 
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in this regard would be the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC).187 As discussed above,188 this is the 
post-Lisbon Council configuration for EU external action in general.189 Arguably, this would 
provide a good opportunity to enhance coherence between the CFSP and the non-CFSP external 
action. This is more so when FAC is chaired by the HR/VP.190 The EEAS supports the HR/VP 
in her capacity as the President of FAC ‘without prejudice to the normal tasks of the General 
Secretariat of the Council’ (GSC).191 It is not clear what is meant by the ‘normal tasks’ of the 
GSC.192 In any event, it is not difficult to decipher that whatever influence the HR/VP and the 
EEAS may wield would ultimately depend on the political will of the Council which is the 
decision-maker.193 The Council adopts the CFSP decisions by unanimity,194 which of course 
would not always be easy to arrive at. Indeed, in addition to the uncertain role of COREPER in 
the CFSP and the fact that it is not Chaired by a representative of the HR/VP,195 the HR/VP and 
the EEAS have mainly been using the comprehensive security and development instruments as 
their policy manual as of course would have been approved by the Council. As indicated above, 
                                                 
187Article 16(6) TEU. Prior to Lisbon, the Commission would usually sit as the 29th Member State in the Council 
(see 2.5.3.3.). Whether this remains the case post-Lisbon has not been established.  
188In Chapter Two (at 2.5.3.2.). 
189Pursuant to Article 16(6) TEU. It has been suggested that it is the General Affairs Council (GAC) which 
prepares the strategic CFSP guidelines since the GAC and not the FAC that prepares and ensures the follow-up of 
the work of the European Council pursuant to Article 16(6) TEU (see for example, Erkelens and Blockmans, fn 
163 above, p 12). However, this is discussed in relation to the JAES in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
190Indeed although her Chair position is not tantamount to membership of the Council for decision-making 
purposes, her FAC Chair position still creates a potential avenue for the HR/VP to enhance the unity and coherence 
of EU external action with the Council pursuant to Article 26(2) TEU (ex-Article 13(3) TEU as amended). Of 
course, this may only by with persuasive reminders to the latter (see Erkelens and Blockmans, fn 163above, p 13 
where it is rightly argued that the HR/VP is not a member of the Council, and accordingly does not play any part 
in the Council’s decision-making). She also cannot enforce (see 4.3. below).  
191EEAS Decision, recital paragraph 3 and Article 2(1). 
192However, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace suggest that it ‘may […] be interpreted narrowly as the normal tasks 
of technical and logistical assistance expected of the usual sort of secretarial support bodies. Alternatively, they 
may be interpreted widely, to include all aspects of assistance, be they technical, logistical, advisory or even 
mediatory […]. In any event, the narrow interpretation […] is ruled out by the rather peculiar nature of the Council 
[…]’ (Hayes-Renshaw, F, and Wallace, H, The Council of Ministers (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), at p 119-
120).  
193For example, in relation to policy coherence for development, were the Council of the opinion that security is 
a precondition for development, this would render the question of policy coherence a façon de parler as 
controversially theorised in this thesis. 
194Article 30 TEU. 
195See the previous page. 
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this is a different path from the development programming discussed in Chapter Three.196 In 
this regard, it can be argued that although the post-Lisbon legal changes and the introduction of 
the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service are positive developments with the potentials of 
enhancing coherence between EU external policies, the inextricable nexus between security and 
development means that their responsibility towards policy coherence for development would 
arguably be discharged simply by virtue of their work under the CFSP.197  
 
5.4.2. CFSP implementation198 with special reference to SSA: between the HR/VP, the 
EEAS and the Member States 
 
In contrast to the pre-Lisbon dispensation,199 the post-Lisbon Treaties provide that the HR/VP 
shall conduct the CFSP200 and ensure the implementation of decisions adopted by the European 
Council and the Council.201 The HR/VP also shares the responsibility for putting the CFSP into 
effect with the Member States, using national and Union resources.202 It is not clear what the 
different roles of the HR/VP specifically entail in detail.203 However, it is clear that she 
implements the CFSP with the support of the EEAS which is tasked with supporting the HR/VP 
in fulfilling her mandate.204  
                                                 
196See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.4.2.1. 
197As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.5.2), policy coherence entails the need for other EU policies 
to be shaped so that they do not undermine and where possible contribute to realising development objectives. As 
discussed in Chapter Four (at 4.4.), the HR/VP and the EEAS are excluded from trade policy.  
198It is noteworthy that the distinction between CFSP policy-making and implementation is not always clear. 
199The implementation of CFSP acts and decisions was the responsibility of the Presidency by virtue of ex-Article 
18(2) TEU (see for example the annulled Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP or the ECOWAS decision, at fn 147 
above). The Presidency was assisted in this task by the Secretary General of the Council (ex-Article 18(3) TEU) 
which was also the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HRCFSP). This is not to say 
that the Commission was completely excluded from implementing CFSP measures (it was 'fully associated in the 
CFSP tasks by virtue of ex-Article 18(4) TEU (see p 247 above and also the ECOWAS Decisions discussed at fn 
147 above).   
200Article 18 TEU.  
201Article 27(1) TEU.  
202Article 26(3) TEU.  
203For example, it is not clear what the difference is between 'conduct', 'implement' and 'put into effect' especially 
since the HR/VP is not a decision- maker. 
204See the EEAS organisational chart for the relevant EEAS African desks managed by Nicolas Westcott 
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Of course, as mentioned above, the limited formal competences of the Commission in the CFSP 
area have not led to the Commission being completely passive in this area. For example, Van 
Vooren and Wessel explain that while the Commission's role in the implementation of the CFSP 
is formally non-existent,205 practice from the outset nevertheless showed an involvement of the 
Commission in the implementation of CFSP decisions.206 This they further explain is not least 
because other measures were in some cases essential for effective implementation of CFSP 
policy decisions.207 While there is an indication that the Commission would rather implement 
security policy measures it adopts under the non-CFSP external action than implement them as 
CFSP measures in the pre-Lisbon era,208 the post-Lisbon comprehensive instruments have 
arguably led to a blend that calls for the EEAS and the Commission to work together in the 
context of the comprehensive security and development instruments. Illustrative is the Sahel 
Strategy. However, the blend has to be placed in context in the light of the fact that the 
comprehensive instruments are not intended to mix all the policies into one minestrone.209 
Furthermore, as the Mali case study illustrates, the Sahel Strategy was not mentioned in the 
'comprehensive' development programming instrument for Mali which the EEAS also prepares 
jointly with the Commission.210In general, the roles of the EEAS and the Commission in 
implementing the CFSP will centre mainly on technical and financial assistance in accordance 
with the provisions of legal CFSP instruments such as the common position on conflict 
                                                 
(available at http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf, accessed 12 February 2016). 
205Van Vooren and Wessel, fn 16 above, p 375. This is because the delegation of executive competences from the 
Commission is prevented by the fact that CFSP acts are not legislative acts (Article 29 TFEU). 
206Van Vooren and Wessel, fn 16 above, p 375. 
207Ibid. 
208Based on the question of using the correct legal basis (see for example the ECOWAS case fn 90 above). 
209The comprehensive instruments still de-compartmentalises the policies but only tries to facilitate synergies and 
timely sequencing between them. Indeed, as explained in Chapter Two, the HR/VP and the EEAS does not replace 
the traditional institutions but are actually to function as bridges between them with the aim of enhancing if not 
ensuring coherence. Of course, this does not explain the Sahel Strategy which the Commission was actively 
engaged in it evolution, but its final document that emerged post-Lisbon expressly originated from the EEAS.  
210See further the Mali case study at 5.5. below. In fact, the relationship between the two 'comprehensive' 
instruments is not clear.  
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prevention in Africa and the annulled ECOWAS decision discussed above, as well as the 
comprehensive instruments. To assist them in this regard is the EU Delegations which does not 
only analyse the local situations but also implements EU foreign policy211 and conduct political 
dialogue.212   
 
Apart from the EEAS and the Commission with the EU Delegation in their support, the HR/VP 
can also avail herself of the use of a EUSR in the implementation of the CFSP. EUSRs supports 
the work of the HR/VP in troubled regions and countries and acting as the 'voice and face of 
the Union, play an active political role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of 
law. They are therefore relevant for enhancing coherence especially as they could be quickly 
deployed for active preventive diplomacy and mediation to forestall the break out of violent 
conflicts. Certainly, this is not to say that their deployment is a guarantee that a crisis would be 
averted. However, in the context of this study, the focus is not necessarily on the end result of 
EU policies but whether the EU has adhered to the standard or requirement it set for itself 
regarding the coherence of its external action. In this regard, where necessary the appointment 
of EUSR could have a synergistic effect in the sequencing of available policy options in 
situations of instability. However, since the appointment of a EUSR is done with the use of the 
legal instrument formally known as Joint Action,213 the final decision to appoint one does not 
fall under the remit of the HR/VP and depends completely on the Member States.214 Her power 
in this regard ends with convening an extraordinary meeting of the Council either of her own 
                                                 
211See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.2.6.). 
212See Délégation de l’Union européenne en République du Mali, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/about_us/delegation_role/index_fr.htm,  accessed  12 January 2016). 
Arguably, this would mainly be at the level of civil society as there are other higher institutions of the EU for 
political dialogue. 
213See above. 
214Arguably, this is decision-making cum implementation. 
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motion, or at the behest of a Member State in matters of urgency.215 Arguably, this therefore 
does not make a significant change to the pre-Lisbon era when convening for urgent matters 
fell under the remit of Council Presidency.216 As the Mali case study illustrates, an appointment 
may cover a sub-region rather than a specific country depending on the dimension of the 
conflict or as tied to a comprehensive instrument.217  
 
5.4.3. Institutions and enforcement 
 
The major roles of the ECJ in the field of EU external action have been mentioned above.218 
With specific regards to the CFSP, Article 24(1) TEU and Article 275 TFEU rule out the Court’s 
jurisdiction as regards this field of EU external policy.219 In this regard, although the Court has 
jurisdiction over Article 40 TEU220 on the mutual protection of the CFSP and non-CFSP 
external action so that each does not affect the procedures and the extent of the powers of the 
institutions of the other, there is no form of legal enforcement in relation to the CFSP in general. 
                                                 
215Within 48 hours or shorter period (Article 30(2) TEU (ex-Article 22(2) TEU as amended)). 
216The Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State (ex-Article 22(2) 
TEU). 
217See 5.5. below. 
218See for example, 4.4.4. above. 
219Except as regards sanctions on individuals or ‘legal base’ arguments (see Article 275 TFEU). The exclusion of 
the ECJ is not new and started from the onset (Case C-167/94 Grau Gomis and Others [1995] ECR 1-1023). Of 
course, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Member States had always wanted the CFSP to be shielded from what 
some perceived as 'judicial activism' (see for example Van Vooren and Wessel, fn 16 above, p 376; and also see to 
this effect the reference to the role of the Court in the expansion of the scope of EU external policy competence in 
Chapter Two of this thesis). In fact, pre-Lisbon, CFSP decisions were considered international law decisions (see 
for example, Case C-203/07,Greece v Commission [2007] OJ L155/10, para 62: ‘The provisions of [Title V of the 
EU Treaty] give rise to rights and obligations governed by international law’; also see Denza , fn 77 above, p 55; 
and Bono, fn 48 above, p 364; Krenzler and Schneider fn 95 above, p 147; Wessel, fn 84 above, p 154-155; 
Macleod, I, et al, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford: Clarendon Place, 1996), p 418). 
The legal implications of the Joint Action as an international law decisions has never been fully explored, and it is 
doubtful that an internal EU matter will be subjected to external judicial review or enforcement. In any event, it is 
arguable that the consideration of CFSP decisions as international law decision applied in the context of the 
traditional distinction between the ex-Community law and the intergovernmental areas, and is therefore no longer 
tenable in light of the Lisbon changes and the evolution of EU law to absorb what used to be Community law. 
Indeed, it is arguable that once a decision is made under this EU instrument, it becomes EU decision and no longer 
the decision of the Member States. 
220Ex-Article 47 TEU as amended. 
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However, it is noteworthy that the Court recently asserted a wider jurisdiction over the CFSP, 
arguing that the rule in the Treaty was its ‘general jurisdiction’, and so Article 275 TFEU was 
a ‘derogation’ which had to be ‘interpreted narrowly’.221 The Court argued that it did have 
jurisdiction to consider issues of procedure as distinct from substance.222 It is doubtful whether 
this would extend to the requirement of coherence which already is beleaguered with the 
unsettled question of the Court's potential jurisdiction and issues bordering on enforceability.223 
Certainly, this is a further limitation to the other weak institutional provisions regarding the 
requirement of coherence. Indeed, although the Council, the HR/VP and the Commission are 
tasked with the responsibility for ensuring the overall coherence of EU external action in 
general, it is clear that the Commission do not 'guard' the CFSP as it does the non-CFSP 
competences and the Treaties in general.224 Furthermore, similar to other areas of external 
action, the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service do not have any monitoring or enforcement 
powers in the CFSP not to talk of an independent power to regulate the Council which is also 
the Member States in this context. In general, as discussed above,225 the nature of the CFSP 
means that Member States are not obliged to adopt decisions or to act.226  
 
                                                 
221See Case C-658/11 European Parliament v Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 24 June 2014. 
222The reason being that the procedural legal basis for CFSP treaties is Article 218 TFEU - a provision outside 
the scope of the CFSP rules as such (Peers, S, 'The CJEU ensures basic democratic and judicial accountability of 
the EU’s foreign policy', EU Law Analysis, 24 June, 2014, available at 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/the-cjeu-ensures-basic-democratic-and.html, accessed 15 October, 
2015). 
223See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.2.4.). 
224See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.3. above. Although the European Parliament is not excluded from 
enhancing the coherence of EU external action, its influence on the CFSP is equally limited as discussed above 
(see fn 167 above). 
225At 5.1. 
226With specific regards to the requirement of policy coherence for development, as discussed above, there may 
be a liberty to construe security measures as development measures in the light of the intense nexus between 
security and development. Hence rendering the question of policy coherence for development with regards to the 
CFSP a façon de parler.   
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5.5. CFSP preventive diplomacy and Mali in the light of the country's recent crisis: a 
case study 
 
On the back of the framework of the CFSP discussed above, this section discusses Mali as a 
case study for the conduct of the CFSP in SSA with a view to determining the overall coherence 
across EU policies.227 It is noteworthy that this is unavoidably a short case study.228 This is not 
only because of the inextricable nexus between security and development, but also because the 
crisis in Mali and the security situation in the country is a most recent development without a 
long history that is different from the general development situation of the country as discussed 
earlier.229 However, apart from these, it is arguable that the beginning and progression of the 
Mali crisis may not have left enough room for ad hoc EU preventive diplomatic measures under 
the CFSP framework. Perhaps, the crisis evolved quickly towards the level of violent crisis 
requiring measures under the CSDP instead.230 Nevertheless, this does not reduce the relevance 
of the discussion of the CFSP with a special focus on preventive diplomatic measures to the 
determination of coherence of EU external action towards SSA.  
 
                                                 
227 Ibid. 
228That is in comparison to the case study in the last two Chapters. 
229Mali's development index and EU development policy towards the country was extensively discussed in 
Chapter Three. However, it would be recalled from Chapter One of this thesis (at 1.1.) that the history of Mali’s 
instability is mired in controversy with one view considering the country as one with a history of stability, while a 
contrasting view considers the country as one that has been repeatedly subjected to political, economic and 
ecological turmoil since independence. In any event, it is noteworthy that a recent empirical research reveals that 
the EU was seen firmly as a non-political donor mainly involved in managing development projects, including 
with state actors, but not engaging in political discussions or on questions related to conflict or security prior to 
the crisis (Davis, L, 'Reform or Business as Usual? EU Security Provision in Complex Contexts: Mali' (2015) 29 
Global Society 2, 260-279, at 266). 
230See Chapter Six of this thesis at 6.5. Of course, there is a difficulty with using this as a case study for the 
determination of coherence in EU external action towards SSA vis-à-vis the construction of a united whole based 
on synergy in the sequencing of the policy options available to resolve a crisis. This is because the speed of 
progression of crisis is not always the same. In general, as acknowledged in Chapter One of this thesis (at 1.6.), 
while the country case study of Mali makes for manageability, the attendant limitations cannot be denied in so far 
as there are as much differences as similarities in the countries of SSA. Same would apply to the progression of 
crisis which would always depend on the context of each crisis.  
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5.5.1. The Mali crisis in context  
 
Although it is possible that the Mali crisis could be traced back to some historical or political 
factors that may have occurred in Mali years before eruption of the recent outbreak of conflict, 
these are outside the limited scope of this analysis. Rather, the analysis focuses on the 
immediate background to the current crisis which in any event cannot be separated from the 
general fragility of the Sahel.231 Generally marked by poverty and fragility, the entire Sahel 
region has in recent times been struck by a severe multi-dimensional crisis and volatility 
reportedly exacerbated by the region's location as an uncontrolled passageway between the 
troubled Maghreb in the north and the piracy-afflicted Gulf of Benin in the South.232 The Sahel 
Strategy was a response to these challenges and a host of others which had security implications 
not only for the people of the region but also for Europe and Europeans due to the geographical 
proximity of Europe to the region.233 Although the Sahel Strategy is the key framework for EU 
action at both individual and collective levels to help countries in the wider Sahel-Sahara region 
address key security and development challenges, Mali's recent crisis has placed that country 
at the centre of EU action in the Sahel.234 However, while the Strategy responds directly to some 
of the long-term causes of conflict in Mali and the broader region, it could not forestall the 
                                                 
231As discussed earlier (in Chapter One of this thesis at 1.2. above), the Sahel Strategy is the key framework for 
EU action at both individual and collective levels to help countries in the wider Sahel-Sahara region, including 
Mali, address key security and development challenges.   
232Ibid. 
233Ibid. Suffice it to state that the EU and its Member States have vested interests in the region's progress and 
stability. As could be gleaned from the Sahel Strategy, the EU had been advocating a 'comprehensive security and 
development approach to respond to the complexity of the challenges in the Sahel since 2008. The Sahel Strategy 
was the final outcome as it emerged from the EEAS in 2011: “The EU has been advocating a comprehensive 
security and development approach to respond to the complexity of the challenges in the Sahel since 2008. A joint 
paper (14361/10) on the security and development in the Sahel was drafted by the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat General, following the options paper (COREU SEC 750/09 of 7 April 2009), and joint fact finding 
missions to Mauritania, Mali and Niger, at the political and technical level. Following the rapid and serious 
deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel […], the Foreign Affairs Council of 25 October 2010 invited the 
High Representative to draw up, in association with the Commission, a Strategy on the Sahel, in response to which 
a Joint Communication by the commission and the HR was presented on 08 March 2011” (the Sahel Strategy, fn 
24 above, p 2, at fn 1). 
234See Chapter One of this thesis at 1.1. above; also see  
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eruption of the Mali crisis which could directly be traced back to the revolt of the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)235 in January 2012. The MNLA cause was a 
clamour for self-determination and hence a separatist cause.236 Armed with a huge cache of 
arms left over from the Libya conflict,237 the MNLA overpowered the Malian army on many 
occasions. Although the self-determination cause of the MNLA sharply contrasts with the 
propositions of the right wing Islamist group - Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the 
MNLA found allies in AQIM. The latter which is suspected to have links with Al Qaeda, had 
been causing carnage in the Northern part of Mali.238 In an ironic twist of fate, the Malian army, 
either out of frustration in the face of the double onslaught239 or out of sheer political ambition 
turned against the Malian government. A few days before the Mali presidential election in 22 
March 2012, the Malian Army successfully executed a coup. This was the beginning of 
international involvement in the Mali conflict. The coup was broadly condemned by the 
international community including the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS),240 the African Union (AU),241 the EU,242 and the UN.243 With the refusal of 
ECOWAS and the AU to accept the legitimacy of the military junta, the latter were compelled 
to transfer power to an interim national government which would organise an election. 
However, the chaos created by the coup provided the right-wing Islamists with the opportunity 
                                                 
235MNLA is the French acronym with which the movement is widely known. 
236In general, its members are reportedly made up of returnee rebels from Libya where they had been part of Col. 
Muammar Gaddafi's security forces (BBC New Africa, 20 January 2012, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16643507, accessed 10 February, 2013).  
237Dioura, C, and Diarra, A, ‘Mali army abandons northern town after rebel attack’, REUTERS, Edition: US, 31 
March 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/31/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE82U0DG20120331, 
accessed 10 February, 2013. 
238The Sahel Strategy, fn 24 above (at p1). 
239They had accused the government of giving them inadequate resources to fight the rebels (Ibid). 
240ECOWAS Press release, N°: 074/2012, Abuja, 22 March 2012.  
241AU Peace and Security Council, 316th Meeting, Communique, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXVI), Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia,  3 April, 2012, para 4. 
242European Union, ‘Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Coup d’etat in Mali’, A 
142/12, Brussels, 22 March, 2012. 
243Security Council Press Statement on Mali conflict, SC/10590 AFR 2359. 
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to unleash terror on a wider scale. Thus, the conflict intensified, causing further deterioration 
of the security situation with grave humanitarian and human rights implications. This ultimately 
called for peacekeeping dimension of conflict prevention244 over and beyond the need for long 
term measures and ad hoc preventive diplomatic measures under the CFSP framework.  
 
On 1st September 2012, the interim government of Mali requested the assistance of ECOWAS 
in quelling the rebellion and in combating terrorism. Thence through successive requests by 
both the interim government of Mali and ECOWAS, the matter reached the UN. The requests 
was for an UNSC resolution authorising an international military stabilisation force to assist the 
armed forces of Mali acting under Chapter VII as provided by the UN Charter.245 On October 
12, 2012, the UNSC unanimously adopted at the first instance, the UNSC Resolution 2071. 
This was an authorisation for ECOWAS and the AU to develop a plan for military intervention 
in Mali and to report back to the UNSC within 45 days.246This Resolution also included a call 
on the international community including the EU to get involved in the resolution of the conflict 
in Mali.247   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
244Under the CSDP framework as discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
245See Security Council, Resolution S/RES/2071 (2012), adopted by the Security Council at its 6846th meeting, 
on 12 October 2012. 
246Ibid, para 7. 
247Ibid, para 9 (see further Chapter Six at 6.5.). In so far as the relevant measures required at this stage are CSDP 
measures, the EU's response at this stage of the crisis is discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis on the CSDP. In 
contrast, in line with its aim, this Chapter focuses on the EU's response under the CFSP framework between the 
long term measures of EU external action for conflict prevention and the peacekeeping stage of the CSDP. As 
discussed above, this is neither to say that a relevant CFSP measure must necessarily prevent the outbreak of a 
violent crisis, nor is to say that the EU is solely responsible for conflict prevention in SSA in general, or Mali in 
particular. On the legal implication of the relevant agreement between EU and the countries of SSA under the 
Cotonou Agreement, see Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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5.5.2. The EU's response (or lack thereof) to the Mali crisis under the CFSP framework 
beyond the guideline measures 
 
Some long term instrument of EU external action towards SSA under the CFSP framework 
were discussed above. These are mainly general guidelines or overarching frameworks which 
are not targeted to any specific crisis. Essentially, they provide the basis on which further actions 
could be resorted to in the CFSP framework248 including in the light of the security-
development nexus. As discussed above, the inextricable nexus between security and 
development could render the requirement of policy coherence for development a façon de 
parler in the context of the CFSP. However, whether CFSP measures are accepted as 
development measures by other means or the activities of the HR/VP and the EEAS under the 
CFSP framework are regarded as equating to policy coherence for development, these are 
different questions from whether the relevant instruments of the CFSP framework are employed 
synergistically in terms of the sequencing of policy options available to resolve a crisis for the 
construction of united whole. Undoubtedly, the achievement of the latter will also contribute to 
policy coherence for development in so far as it protects the ulterior intention of development 
policy whether development is inextricably linked to security or not.  
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that the usefulness of the long term instruments of the CFSP 
to the Mali crisis arguably ended (even if only for the time being) in March 2012 when the Mali 
coup was hatched and was duly condemned by the EU249 similar to other international 
organisations.250 Arguably, the EU had from then till September of the same year when the 
conflict intensified to the stage of requiring peacekeeping, to implement its ad hoc preventive 
                                                 
248And perhaps development policy framework of EU external action. 
249See p 252 above. 
250See the above analysis. 
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diplomacy measures under the CFSP framework. Of course, the condemnation of the coup by 
the HR/VP is a diplomatic foreign policy measure. But how far this goes to the heart of the 
prevention of a conflict is not immediately clear from a legal perspective.  
 
In general, although the general CFSP framework instrument discussed above acknowledges 
the need for political dialogue and preventive diplomacy, the EU's reaction between the onset 
of the eruption of the Mali crisis and its full blown stage bordered on highlighting the key role 
of ECOWAS, AU and the UN in alleviating the crisis, and especially on a strong support to the 
meditative role of ECOWAS.251 Patently, the EU could have appointed a EUSR at this stage, 
but it was not until March 2013 after the conflict has simmered down following Operation 
Serval by France252 that an appointment of EUSR was made, and this for the Sahel region in 
general.253 Although it cannot be concluded with certainty that an earlier and timely 
appointment254 would have forestalled the progression of the crisis to the extent requiring 
military intervention, it could be deduced from the impact of the eventual appointment of the 
EUSR for the Sahel that the former would have been helpful even if the extent may not be 
known. In fact, Davies explains that the EUSR made an important contribution to the peace 
process and was, reportedly, able to draw on his experience and networks in the region to 
contribute momentum to the process and to maintain communication with key regional 
stakeholders.255 And this, despite the fact that his mandate emphasises the EU’s supporting role 
to others in peace processes, rather than the more direct engagement envisaged for some EUSRs 
                                                 
251See for example Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Mali/Sahel, 3159th Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 23 April 2012 (Brussels, 2012); and Council of the European Union, Council 
Conclusions on Sahel, 3157th Foreign Affairs Meeting, Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2012 (Brussels, 2012).  
252See Chapter Six of this thesis at 6.5. 
253See EUSR for the Sahel, fn 154 above. This is in line with the Sahel Strategy (see fn 24 above) 
254Even one which is specific to Mali. 
255Davies, fn 229 above, p 264. 
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elsewhere.256 Even the government of Mali was reportedly pleased that the EU engaged at that 
time.257  
 
Whether the lack of an active preventive diplomacy under the CFSP framework at the earlier 
stage is a significant loss of opportunity or not, it could go down as a lost opportunity for 
constructing a united whole vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of policy options available to 
resolve a crisis and ultimately enhance, if not ensure coherence, including policy coherence for 
development. Indeed, although the EUSR was appointed for the Sahel as a region, his mandate 
centred mainly on the Mali crisis,258 and pertinently include: 
  
'to actively contribute to the implementation, coordination and further   
development  of the Union’s comprehensive approach to the regional crisis, on 
the basis of its Strategy, with a view to enhancing the overall coherence and 
effectiveness of Union activities in the Sahel, in particular in Mali'.259 
 
In view of these, it may therefore be wondered why the EU did not engage initially in Mali 
using EUSR. As indicated above, this could be due to resource limitations. However, it could 
also be due to the hesitation of Member States who are charged with the responsibility for 
conducting the CFSP with the HR/VP using national and Union resources. But while resource 
limitation can influence a decision by the Member States not to adopt a relevant measure, this 
could sometimes only be the partial reason. For example, as discussed in Chapter Two, the 
historical background of EU relations with SSA continue to trail the relationship between the 
                                                 
256Ibid. 
257Ibid., p 271. 
258See for example Article 2(3) EUSR for the Sahel, fn 154 above: 'Initial priority shall be given to Mali and to 
the regional dimensions of the conflict there.’ also see Article 2(4); and most of Article 3. 
259Article 3(1)(a) [author's emphasis]. 
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two. While the EU Member States at the heart of the historical relations between Europe and 
SSA are arguably keen to Europeanise their foreign policy, their 'European reflex for SSA' is 
not always matched by the 'European reflex' of other Member States who traditionally had no 
Africa policy. Of course, the former have more interests in SSA than the latter and the fact that 
the CFSP arrangements do not force the Member States to adopt a common policy260 means 
that a CFSP action may not always be possible. Having said that, it could be argued from a legal 
perspective that the Member States may be acting illegally if they renege from their obligations 
under the adopted legal CFSP decisions. For example, while the  provisions of the Treaties that 
require them to support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a 
spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and to refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations261 does not force the Member States to adopt CFSP instruments, it is arguable that they 
are bound to the provisions of any instrument that they do adopt. This would mean that the 
Member States are bound to the provisions of the Common Position on Conflict prevention in 
Africa which requires the coherent use of all the instruments available to the EU, including 
preventive diplomacy, for conflict prevention. However, as indicated above, although the legal 
and political requirement of coherence, including policy coherence for development does not 
apply any less to the CFSP than they apply to the non-CFSP external action of the Union, the 
CFSP is way outside any possible regulation like the latter.262  
 
Overall, it may be that EU Member States were not keen on the Mali crisis primarily due to 
resource limitations or due to this and indifference (or even deference to Member State(s) that 
                                                 
260At 5.2.1. above. 
261Pursuant to Article 24(3) TEU (ex-Article 11(2) TEU).  
262However, see the discussion in Chapter Two of this thesis at 5.2.4.  
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are more affected by the crisis). In fact Davies explains that Mali which was a former French 
colony has long been a priority for French, and to a lesser extent Spanish foreign policy, and 
that both countries tried to push for more EU engagement for some time without much success 
until the deaths of European hostages prompted more interest from other states, notably the UK. 
Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis,263 although it was subsequently to gain the 
support of some other EU Member States, it was France which arguably have more vested 
interest in Mali than any other EU Member State that eventually took the initiative to answer 
the call for military intervention in Mali after it failed to convince other EU Member States on 
the need to respond to that call. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
The Chapter set out to analyse the CFSP with special reference to SSA, and ultimately with a 
view to determining the question of policy coherence and also the coherence of EU external 
action towards the region vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of policies. The Chapter submitted 
that the Lisbon Treaty entrenches the indefinite and potentially illimitable scope of the Union's 
CFSP competence which continues to depend on distinct rules, instruments and institutional 
procedures post as pre-Lisbon. It especially highlighted the invariably inextricable overlap 
between the relevant norms of the CFSP and development objectives, and suggested that the 
unsettled question of hierarchy in the context of the security-development nexus theoretically 
implies that policy coherence for development as it relates to the CFSP may amount to a façon 
de parler. Against this controversial suggestion, it argued that the invariably inextricable nexus 
between security and development could in any event also imply that the work of the HR/VP 
                                                 
263At 6.5.3. 
 247 
 
 
and the EEAS under the CFSP could automatically be considered compliant with the 
requirement of policy coherence for development if not development measures by other means. 
However, using Mali as a case study, the Chapter illustrated that while the EU can boast of long 
term CFSP conflict preventive measures, these are mainly regionally-focused and are not 
necessarily always complemented with ad hoc and targeted CFSP measures which may be 
required for the construction of a united whole vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of policy 
options available to prevent violent crisis. In this regard, it concedes that although the use of ad 
hoc and targeted CFSP measures may be constrained by resource limitations, and perhaps an 
element of deference or indifference based on the historical factors discussed in Chapter Two, 
these do not detract from the attendant implications for overall coherence of EU external action 
and for policy coherence for development, as well as from the fact that the influence of the 
HR/VP and the EEAS regarding the relevant unfavourable factors may be quite limited. 
Significantly, same factors and implications are arguably at play in the context of the ad hoc 
and targeted security measures of the CDSP as discussed in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
6.0. The common Security and Defence Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: the EU or 
Member States? 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In line with the aim of this thesis and the relevant previous Chapters on pertinent EU policies 
towards SSA, this Chapter investigates EU external action towards SSA under the CSDP 
framework with a view to determining the overall coherence of EU external action and the 
coherence of this policy with development objectives using Mali as a case study. As will be 
recalled from the relevant previous Chapters of this thesis,1 the CSDP is an integral part of the 
CFSP2 which was discussed in the preceding Chapter.3 Nevertheless, the former is de facto, if 
not de jure functionally distinct from the CFSP.4  
 
In general, the CSDP is a distinct policy comprising three elements namely armaments policy, 
collective defence, and crisis management.5 This Chapter is not concerned with the first two 
elements which are not direct aspects of EU external action towards SSA.6 Rather, it is 
                                                 
1See Chapters One, Two and Five of this thesis. 
2Article 42(1) TEU (ex-Article 17(1) TEU). The CFSP covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating 
to EU’s security, including the CSDP (Article 24(1) TEU (ex-Article 11(1) TEU).  
3Chapter Five.  
4In fact, an idea was put forward at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to establish the security and 
defence policy as a Fourth Pillar in that pillar structure, even though this option was eventually dropped (see 
Heisbourg, F, ‘European Defence: Making it Work’, ISS Chaillot Papers 42, September 2000, p 27). However, as 
mentioned in the previous Chapter, although the CFSP and the CSDP are functionally distinct, none of them can 
be extensively discussed without references being made to the other. In particular, in so far as the CSDP is an 
integral part of the CFSP and is embedded in that legal framework, its discussion is not void of extensive mention 
of the CFSP.  
5See Heisbourg, fn 4 above, p 2, where he distinguishes between crisis management and other aspects of the 
CSDP; also see Trybus, M, ‘With or without the EU Constitutional Treaty: Towards a Common Security and 
Defence Policy’ (2006) ELR 145, p 146. The Treaty provisions covering the three different elements are all found 
under Section 2 of Chapter I Title V TEU on the CSDP. 
6However, see CSDP Handbook (Vienna/Brussels: European Security and Defence College (ESDC), 2010) p 58 
where it is suggested that ‘the mutual assistance clause’ (an aspect of the collective defence) prioritises ‘operations 
to fight armed aggression inside and preventively also outside the EU’). In any event, this is outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
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concerned with the third element namely crisis management. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the concept of crisis management arguably represents the external dimension of providing 
security by EU through all the means available to it.7 However, this Chapter is specifically 
concerned with crisis management under the CSDP framework.8  
 
In doing this, the Chapter does not seek to account for the entirety of CSDP actions in SSA. 
Rather, in line with the focus of this thesis, the enquiry centres on the norms, instruments and 
institutional aspects of the CSDP. This is with a view to determining the issue of policy 
coherence for development in this Chapter. However, it is also with a view to determining the 
overall coherence of EU external action based on the construction of a united whole vis-a-vis 
synergy in the sequencing of available policy options as subsequently discussed in Chapter 
Seven. As a central theme of this thesis, the dimension brought by the post-Lisbon High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) is also discussed.  
 
The Chapter submits that although the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP and is embedded 
in the latter's framework as codified at Lisbon, its specificity is illustrated not only by its distinct 
scope of objectives which was widened at Lisbon but also by its distinct institutional procedure. 
Against this background, it argues that while there is an overlap between the scope of the CSDP 
and development policy, the question of policy coherence for development even as a facon de 
parler may not arise with regards to the strictly short term ad hoc CSDP measures as with trade 
                                                 
7See Blockmans, S, ‘An Introduction to the role of the EU in Crisis Management’ in Blockmans, S, (ed.) The 
European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague: TMC Asser, 2008), p 9. 
8See Trybus, M, European Union Law and Defence Integration (Oxford: Hart, 2005), p 306 where he explains 
that crisis management is the CSDP aspect closest to foreign policy and an aspect of security policy as a form of 
foreign policy. 
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and CFSP instruments which are long term measures. Nevertheless, using Mali as a case study, 
it concedes that this does not mean that the question of policy coherence for development is 
irrelevant in the context of the CSDP as it relates to the determination of coherence based on a 
constructive whole vis-a-vis synergy in the sequencing of policy options available to resolve a 
crisis or conflict. Furthermore, it submits that in any event the potentials for the HR/VP and the 
EEAS to enhance coherence as it relates to the CSDP may be quite limited if not non-existent 
in the light of the specific objectives and institutional procedure of the CSDP.  
 
The structure of this Chapter follows that of the last three Chapters on specific policy. The first 
section provides the contextual background to the CSDP, and pertinently analyses the legal 
basis and the scope of its objectives with special reference to SSA. The second section presents 
a pertinent overview of the instruments of the CSDP with special reference to SSA. This is 
followed by the discussion of the institutional dimension of the CSDP with special reference to 
the region in the third Section. The fourth and final section centres on Mali as a case study. 
Apart from the discussion of policy coherence for development in this Chapter, a case study of 
the CSDP in Mali will aid the subsequent assessment of the overall coherence of EU external 
action especially as it relates to the construction of a united whole vis-a-vis synergy in 
sequencing of available policy options.9 Similar to the previous three Chapters, the case study 
focuses mainly on the pertinent instruments and norms of the CSDP towards SSA as they apply 
to Mali. It therefore does not revisit the institutional dimension since this is globally applicable 
to the region. However, this does not mean that the institutional dimension is completely 
eschewed from mention where necessary.  
 
                                                 
9See Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
 251 
 
 
6.2. The legal basis, scope of objectives and instruments of the CSDP with special 
reference to SSA  
 
Although the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP, its distinct functional logic comes with a 
distinct legal basis and scope of competence. This section discusses the legal basis and scope 
of objectives   of CSDP crisis management with special reference to SSA. Similar to the 
previous EU policies investigated, these provide the legal background to the subsequent 
discussion of the relevant CSDP procedures as well as the framework for the Mali case study. 
However, prior to these, the section briefly examines the distinct factors around which the 
CSDP evolved, as well as the political developments that eventually led to the decision to 
establish an operational CSDP. These are influential on the nature of the normative framework 
of the CSDP. They therefore form part of the essential background for an understanding of the 
factors that affect coherence as it relates to the CSDP especially in the context of EU external 
action towards SSA. Furthermore, they also illustrate the specificity that absolves the CSDP 
from any expectation of substantial adherence to the requirement of policy coherence for 
development in contrast to the context of the CFSP where this requirement is nevertheless 
arguably a facon de parler.10 
 
6.2.1. Beyond the CFSP: a pertinent contextual background to CSDP crisis management  
 
As discussed above,11 although the origin of EU foreign policy as it relates to the CFSP in 
general has been traced back to the European Defence Community (EDC),12 the latter which is 
                                                 
10See Chapter Five of this thesis. 
11At 5.2.1. 
12The EDC has been briefly touched upon in Chapter Five of this thesis as the first step in the evolution of a 
foreign policy framework under which EU Member States would formulate and put forward a common foreign 
and security stance on the international scene. For the present analysis, suffice it to point out that it was a strictly 
defense-oriented organisation which failed mainly due to its ‘supranational’ tendency. However, though the EDC 
failed, its understanding is considered a sine qua non for a proper understanding of security and defence policy as 
it continues to evolve in the EU. Indeed, it is doubtful whether there is any comprehensive study or commentary 
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strictly defence-oriented could veritably be distinctly linked to what is today the CSDP 
framework. Indeed, following the failure of the EDC, the defence aspect was not only separated 
from the mainstream of integration pursued through the EEC/EC,13 but also from the path of 
political cooperation from which the CFSP latter evolved.14 Defence was pursued separately 
through the now defunct Western European Union (WEU).15 Similar to the EDC, the WEU was 
a defence organisation. However, in line with the post-Cold War shift from classical ‘defence’ 
to ‘security’,16 the WEU eventually adopted a security policy by way of what are known as the 
Petersberg Tasks.17 These are nevertheless military-oriented security activities and are therefore 
also associated with defence.18 During this time, the WEU was recognised as a potential channel 
for the coordination of military means by the EU especially for EU external action towards 
SSA.19 Arguably, this was due to sensitivities regarding the incorporation of the military-
                                                 
on EU security and defence policy that does not discuss or at least make reference to the EDC.  
13See Chapters One and Two of this thesis. 
14See Chapters Two and Five of this thesis. 
15The now defunct WEU was a regional organisation formed by the European Member States of the Northern 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Turkey (in this regard, membership in the EU was not a requirement for 
membership in the WEU). For further information on the WEU see http://www.weu.int/, accessed 25 February 
2011. 
16See Trybus, M, and White, N, (ed.) European Security Law (OUP, 2007), p 4 for analysis of the reason behind 
these shifts. Invariably, classical self-defence is about territorial self-defence from potential external aggression 
(see Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter). 
17See Trybus, M, ‘The vision of the European defence community and a common defence for the European Union’ 
in Trybus and White, fn16 above, p 31). The Petersberg Tasks which are presently in Article 43(1) TEU (see the 
scope of the CDSP at 6.3. below) were originally set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial 
Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992.  
18Duke, S, ‘CESDP: Nice’s overtrumped success’ [2001] 6 EFA. Rev155, p 157; Roper, J, ‘Defining a common 
defence policy and common defence’ in Roper, J, and Martin, L, (ed.) Towards a common defence policy (Paris: 
WEU, ISS, 1995), p 8. The Petersberg Tasks were for  a long time referred to as ‘decisions with defence 
implications’ under ex-Article 17(3) TEU (also see Wessel, R, ‘The State of Affairs in EU security policy: the 
breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice’ (2003) 8 JCSL, p 274, 288); and Von Kielmansegg, G, S, ‘The Meaning of 
Petersberg: Some Considerations on the Legal Scope of ESDP Operations’, (2007), 44 CML. Rev., p 629-630; and 
also Martenczuk, B, ‘Community Cooperation Policy and Conflict Prevention’ in Kronenberger, V, (ed.) The 
European Union and the International Legal Order – Discord or Harmony? (The Hague: TMC Asser, 2001), p 
209; and Blockmans. S, 'An Introduction to the role of the EU in Crisis Management' in Blockmans, fn 7 above, p 
1. The concept of ‘security’ does not exclude ‘defence’ (see 5.1. above).  
19However, despite the presence of EU Member States with a relevant history in the region, the WEU was 
‘conspicuously absent’ in SSA (see Lenzi, G, ‘WEU’s Role in SSA Africa’ in Vasconcelos,  A,  et al, ‘WEU’s Role 
in Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa’, (1995) ISS, Chaillot Papers 22, p 7, and 
37–38). Indeed, in general, it has been suggested that the only official request of the EU in the first half of the 
nineties to make use of WEU capabilities concerned the support for the EU administration of the Bosnian town of 
Mostar  in 1994  (see Blockmans, fn 7 above, p 2). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the WEU was ‘devoured’ 
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oriented Petersberg Tasks into the EU framework. Indeed, although they eventually evolved 
into an aspect of EU security policy,20 the incorporation of the military-oriented Petersberg 
Tasks into the EU framework was affected by additional factors beyond those that affected 
cooperation under the wider CFSP. The nature of these factors forms the pivot around which 
the distinct character of the CSDP and its implications for coherence revolves. For example, the 
main factor that worked against cooperation in foreign and security policy under the wider 
CFSP in general is the issue of national sovereignty.21 In contrast, when it came to cooperation 
in matters with military or defence implications, the issue went beyond mere sovereignty to 
include the military and strategic culture of the Member States.22 Of specific pertinence to crisis 
management were issues of national dispositions or sensitivities to the use of force, the 
projection of power, and the legitimacy of intervention.23 Indeed, it did not only take Europe's 
general dissatisfaction with the disappointing inaction of the EU during the Yugoslavia wars,24 
                                                 
by the EU to give birth to the CSDP (see in general Wessel, R, ‘The EU as Black Widow: Devouring the WEU to 
Give Birth to a European Security and Defence Policy’ in Kronenberger, fn 18 above, writing with regards to the 
ESDP the precursor of the CSDP). 
20Von Kielmansegg, G, S, ‘The European Union’s competences in defence policy – scope and limits’ (2007) 32 
ELR 2 above, p 217; also see Duke, fn 18 above, at fn 26; and Trybus, fn 8 above, p 306. They were for the first 
time incorporated into the EU framework in Amsterdam (see 2.1. above) by virtue of ex-Article 17(2) TEU. 
21See Chapter Five of this thesis. For example, the focus of post EPC and pre-CFSP debate was how the Member 
States can establish, ‘[…] an institutionalised framework which on the one hand would enable them to adopt and 
effectively implement a common stance without, on the other hand, undermining their national sovereignty over 
the exercise of foreign policy’ (Koutrakos, P, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006) p 18). 
22See Tsagourias, N, ‘EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues’ in Trybus and White, fn 16 
above, p 132: ‘Member States have different military traditions, dogmas, and capabilities’ (at p 132 he specifically 
notes that France and the UK, have a long history of military activism). With regards to the external projection of 
national security and defence capability, France and Britain have always remained the two Member States with 
the most significant power-projection interests and capabilities in military terms (Piris, J, The Lisbon Treaty: A 
legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p 266). 
23These were areas of deep divisions between Member States in terms of their approaches to security (Menon, A. 
‘Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten’ (2009) 85 IA 2, p227). There has also been a reference to the 
‘peacekeepers’ and the ‘war fighters’ (see Grevi, G, et al, ‘Introduction’ in Grevi, G, et al (ed.) ‘European Security 
and Defence Policy: 10 years after (1999-2009)’, Paris, ISS 2009, p 13). In fact, as one commentator emphatically 
notes the ‘political divergences between Member States on the Union’s very legitimacy in defence matters were 
structural, permanent and irreconcilable, notwithstanding the diplomatic discourse to which the […] Treaties […] 
bear witness’ (Gnesotto, N, ‘Preface’, in Heisbourg, fn 4 above at v). Indeed, an EU Member State namely 
Denmark expressly opted out of matters with defence implications by virtue of a declaration attached to the Treaties 
(See Article 5 of Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, annexed to the TEU and the TFEU). 
24During this wars which happened in the EU’s direct sphere of influence, NATO was led by the US in taking 
military control while the EU was inert due to what has been described as the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ (see 
Hill, C, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’ (1993) 31 JCMS 505-
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but also the proactive persuasion and leadership of the two EU Member States with the most 
significant power-projection interests and capabilities in military terms25 for the evolution of 
the CSDP to start within the EU framework. Arguably, the former led to the success of the latter. 
Suffice it to state that the relevant two Member States namely France and Britain was able to 
successfully push their Saint Malo Declaration of 199826 to the EU agenda.  Significantly, this 
was a culmination of successive earlier attempts by the two to 'Europeanise' their security 
policies towards SSA.27  The Declaration which was adopted as an EU objective six months 
later at Cologne28 mainly stressed that: ‘[…] the Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness 
to do so, in order to respond to international crisis […].’ This was the impetus for the Helsinki 
                                                 
328; and also Hill, C, ‘Closing the capabilities-expectations gap?’ in Petersen, J, and Sjursen, H, (eds.) A Common 
Foreign policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP (London:Routledge, 1998), p 18-38. 
25See fn 22 above. 
26Available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/joint-declaration-on-eu-new01795, accessed 12 
March 2011. 
27As will be recalled from Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.2.4., these two EU Member States have a strong and 
enduring historical relations with SSA dating back to years before European integration. It has been suggested that 
France arguably began to Europeanise its SSA policy by seeking European legitimation at the Corfu European 
Council in June 1994 despite the UN's prior legitimation of its operation in Rwanda. Subsequently, a Franco-
British initiative was presented after a summit held in Chartres in November 1994 with the objective of supporting 
peacekeeping mechanisms in Africa, both in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and sub-regional 
frameworks. While the OAU/United Nations (UN) relationship was recognised as paramount in all phases, the 
WEU was to `mobilise the European support' and to `coordinate European contributions'. In May 1995, the WEU 
Lisbon Council stated ministers' `interest in the initiative taken by France and the [UK]’ (see Vasconcelos, A, 
‘Should Europe Have a Policy on Africa?’ in Vasconcelos, fn 19 above). This was the background to the first 
Council Common Position 97/356/CFSP concerning conflict prevention and conflict resolution in Africa [1997] 
OJ L153/1 (see Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.3.1. and especially, at fn 130). Saint-Malo became their next 
convergence. Post Saint-Malo the Anglo-French Summit at Le Touquet in February 2003 declared a need to 
‘propose to [their] partners that the EU should examine how it can contribute to conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping in Africa, including through EU autonomous operations, in close cooperation with the UN’ (see 
Anglo-French Summit (2003a) Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence, Le 
Touquet 4 February 2003; and also Anglo-French Summit (2003b) Declaration on Franco-British cooperation in 
Africa, Le Touquet. 4 February 2003 – a statement which addressed a wide variety of tools for fostering stability 
in SSA, including the need to prevent conflict and/or re-establish peace, both of which are ‘of constant concern’ 
(these declarations are cited in Vasconcelos). As will be recalled from Chapter Six of this thesis, the Treaties 
preserve the power of the Member States to conduct their foreign, security and defence policies. The Member 
States are also not unconscious of this. For example, most recently, the British Prime Minister David Cameron 
proclaimed that ‘Britain and France are, and will always remain sovereign nations, able to deploy [our] armed 
forces independently and in [our] national interest when we choose to do so (BBC News, “Cameron and Sarkozy 
hail UK-France defence treaties” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/moblie/uk-politics-11670247, accessed, 
12 December 2010).   
28The Cologne European Council, June 1999. 
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Headline Goal 2003 which was adopted by the European Council with the plan of setting up an 
autonomous EU operational capacity supported by credible means and decision-making 
institutions.29 The goal included a plan for a joint military ‘European Rapid Response Force 
(ERRF)’.30 The forces were, inter alia, to be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary 
command and control.31 Although this prima facie seems close to creating a European army, it 
was expressly stated that the latter was not the intention.32 In any event, the goal of creating the 
ERRF was never realised.33 Instead, other flexible capability mechanisms evolved,34 with 
implications for coherence.35 And this can equally be said of the successfully established but 
specifically distinct decision-making institutions.36 Suffice it to state that the sensitivities to the 
military-oriented aspects of security only led to their incremental introduction into the Treaties. 
Invariably, this is not without the accommodation of legal and operational flexibility that 
continues to blight crisis management under the CSDP with implications for coherence in 
practice37 as discussed below,38 and further illustrated with Mali case study.39 
 
                                                 
29European Council, Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999; this 
was amongst many other decisions on the strengthening of the common European policy regarding security and 
defence policy (Wessel, R, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective 
(The Hague: Kluwer, 1999), p 273). 
30Helsinki Headline Goal (available at  
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf, accessed 10 
August 2-13). 
31Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy 
on Security and Defence, Annex 1 to Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions (cited in Trybus, fn 8 above, p 97 
at fn 23); also see Wessel, fn 29 above, p 276.  
32See Blockmans, S, and Wessel, R, ‘The European Union and Crisis Management: Will the Lisbon Treaty make 
the EU more effective?’, CLEER Working Papers 2009/1, p 44; and also Wessel, fn 29 above, p 274. 
33Not even after a subsequent Headline Goal 2010 was adopted in 2010 has this been remedied. 
34See 6.4.2. below.  
35Ibid.  
36See 6.4.1. below. 
37See for example, Okemuo, G, ‘The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali and the consistency of EU-Africa 
policy’ [2014] 34 LLR 3, 217-240. 
38On the legal aspect see 6.3. below; and on the operational see 6.4.2. below. 
39See 6.5. below; and also further Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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6.2.2. The legal basis for CSDP crisis management with special reference to SSA  
 
In line with its incremental introduction into the EU framework, there was no distinct CSDP 
section in the relevant pre-Lisbon Treaties beyond the general CFSP section.40 However, ex-
Article 17(1) TEU of the Amsterdam Treaty provided for the ‘progressive framing of a common 
defence policy’ and ex-Article 17(2) TEU covered the Petersberg Tasks.41 Wessel considers 
Article 17(1) as the appropriate legal basis for CSDP crisis management.42 In contrast, after 
considering this as a possibility, Von Kielmansegg opines that Article 17(2) TEU on the 
Petersberg Tasks ‘seems to offer firm grounds’.43 In any event, these arguably refer only to the 
substantive legal basis for CSDP crisis management.44 Otherwise, there is no other way to 
explain the express indication of ex-Article 14 TEU as the legal basis for CSDP crisis 
management in the pre-Lisbon era.45 As will be recalled from the previous Chapter, ex-Article 
14 TEU on the Joint Action was the general CFSP legal basis for ‘operational action by the 
                                                 
40Compare example ex-Article 17 TEU with Article 42 TEU to 46 TEU. 
41See 6.3.2. below. 
42Wessel, fn 29 above, p 287. 
43Von Kielmansegg, fn 18 above, p 629. 
44See 2.3. above for the distinction between substantive and procedural legal basis. 
45This is well illustrated by the pre-Lisbon CSDP crisis management in SSA (see for examples Council Joint 
Action 2005/557/CFSP on the European Union civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission 
in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS) (2005) OJ L188/46; Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP on the European 
Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ARTEMIS) [2003] OJ L143/50; Council Joint 
Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process (EUFOR DRC) [2006] 
OJ L116/98; Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Republic of 
Chad and in the Central African Republic (Tchad/RCA) [2007] OJ L279/21; Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP 
on the European Union military coordination action in support of UN security Council resolution 1816(2008) (EU 
NAVCO) [2008] OJ L252/39; Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali Coast 
(EUNAVFOR Somalia, also known as ATALANTA) [2008] OJ L301/33; Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP on 
the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’) 
[2004] OJ L367/30; Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP on the European Union police mission undertaken in 
the framework of reform of the security sector (SSR) and its interface with the system of justice in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) [2007] OJ L151/46; Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP on the 
European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) (EUSEC) [2005] OJ L112/20; Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP on the European Union 
mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) [2008] OJ 
L40/11). There are usually also references to ex-Article 28 on financing and sometimes ex-Article 25 on the 
Political and Security Committee where relevant (on the Political and Security Committee see 6.4. below). 
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Union’ where an international situation so requires. Crisis management falls under this 
description. Nevertheless, it is arguable that this does not provide an adequate legal justification 
for the choice and express indication of ex-Article 14 TEU as the sole legal basis for pre-Lisbon 
crisis management while ex-Article 17(2) TEU which provided for the Petersberg Tasks46 was 
only referred to in follow-up decisions for ‘launching’ the operations47 subsequent to the 
adoption of the Joint Action. Wessel considers this striking from a legal perspective48  and 
appears justified by the post-Lisbon law and practice. Post-Lisbon EU competence and 
therefore substantive legal basis for CSDP crisis management is outlined in Articles 42 TEU49 
and 43(1) TEU.50 By virtue of Article 42 TEU 
 
‘The [CSDP] shall be an integral part of the [CFSP]. It shall provide the 
Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military 
assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for 
peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international 
security in accordance with the principle of the [UN] Charter. The 
performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities 
provided by the Member States.’51 
                                                 
46See 6.3.2. below. 
47The decision to launch an operation usually follows the main decision for a Joint Action (see for example 
Council Decision 2008/101/CFSP on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Republic of 
Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA) [2008] OJ L34/39; Council Decision 
2003/432/CFSP on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(2003) OJ L147/42; This is not peculiar to SSA, but was for example also the case in the EU military operation in 
Macedonia (FYROM) and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Council Joint Action 
2002/210/CFSP [2002] OJ L70 (cited in Wessel, fn 29 above, p 284 where he also suggest the contrasting view (at 
p 286) that the use of ex Article 17(2) TEU as a legal basis for the follow-up decision on the launching of EUFOR 
Macedonia was an indication that the Council seemed to have come to ‘the realisation’ that ex-Article 17 TEU was 
more appropriate as the legal basis for EU crisis management). 
48Wessel, fn 29 above, p 287. 
49Ex-Article 17(1) TEU as amended. 
50Ex-Article 17(2) TEU as amended. 
51Author's emphasis to highlight the fact that these are at the heart of the CSDP crisis management. The dimension 
of capabilities as provided by the Member States is discussed at 6.4.2. below. On another note, it is noteworthy 
that the reference to the UN is not accidental. The UN is the apex institution with responsibility for international 
peace and security, and the UN Charter forms the foundation on which the CSDP as a core aspect of European 
security architecture is built (see Trybus, fn 8 above, p 15). Indeed, the commitment of European integration 
projects to the objectives of the UN is regularly spelt out in the preamble of the respective Treaties and the relevant 
Treaty Articles as well as other core EU documents. However, it has been suggested that the pledges by the EU to 
act in accordance with the UN Charter is of no legal significance. This is because Article 103 of the Charter 
explicitly stipulates that Charter provisions prevail in case of a conflict with other international agreements (see 
Wessel, fn 29 above, p 65). In any event, it is not clear how the EU’s commitment sits with the autonomy of the 
EU legal order as espoused by the ECJ (see for example T-85/09 Kadi v Commissions (Kadi II) [2010] ECR II-
5177; and De Burca, G, ‘The EU, the European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’ , 
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The crisis management tasks which are included in the notions of ‘peace-keeping’ and ‘conflict 
prevention’,52 are further expanded in Article 43(1)TEU: 
 
‘The tasks referred to in Article 42(1) in the course of which the Union 
may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament 
operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance 
tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict 
stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, 
including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism.’ 
 
 
Arguably, Article 43 TEU completes and covers Article 42(1) TEU on CSDP missions.53 Thus 
Article 43 TEU is an adequate substantive legal basis for CSDP crisis management post-Lisbon. 
However, in practice, it is used in conjunction with Article 28 TEU (ex-Article 14 TEU) on 
'operational action'.54 In the same vein, Article 43(2) TEU is specifically used for follow-up 
decisions55 similar to its predecessor – ex-Article 17(2) TEU. Pertinently, both the substantive 
and procedural legal basis for CSDP crisis management illustrate the specifically ad hoc nature 
                                                 
(2009) 1 HILJ, 51). Conversely, it is not clear how the autonomy of the EU legal order sits with Article 103 of the 
UN Charter. In any event, everything the EU has done in the field of security are linked to UN objectives (Report 
on the implementation of the EU Security Strategy – providing security in a changing world’ Brussels, S407/08, 
December 2008, Executive Summary, para 12). In fact, CSDP military operations has been differentiated into three 
categories as they relate to UN operations namely: stand-alone operations that are mandated by the Security 
Council with no simultaneous UN-led deployment, stand-by operations with the objective of supporting a pre-
existing UN-led operation, and rapidly deployed bridging operations of relatively short duration preparing for the 
arrival of an UN-led operation. This link to the UN does not affect the independent character of CSDP operations 
as the autonomy of EU action has been stressed as a core concept (see Cramer, P, ‘Reflections on European 
Effective Multilateralism and the use of force’ in Koutrakos, P, and Evans, M, (eds.) Beyond the Established Legal 
Orders (Oxford: Hart, 2011), p 240). The question of coherence between the EU and the UN is outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
52Ibid. 
53On the scope of CSDP crisis management objectives, see 6.3.2. below.  
54See for example EUTM Somalia (see for example Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union 
military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM) [2010] OJ L44/16; and Council 
Decision 2010/565/CFSP on the European Union Mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector 
reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) [2010] OJ L248/59). 
55See for example, Council Decision 2011/537/CFSP amending and extending Decision 2010/576/CFSP on the 
European Union Police mission undertaken in the framework of reform of the security sector (SSR) and its 
interface with the system of justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL DR Congo) [2011] OJ L236/8. 
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of the CSDP. The direct implication of this, is that there is no room for the substantive 
accommodation of policy coherence for development under the CSDP framework. Of course, 
this is not to say that the question of coherence based on a constructive whole vis-a-vis synergy 
in the sequencing of policy options available to resolve a crisis does not relate to policy 
coherence for development.56 
 
6.2.3. The scope of objectives of CSDP crisis management with special reference to SSA 
 
Similar to the incorporation of the CSDP into the Treaties, the scope of CSDP crisis 
management including in SSA has de facto taken an incremental path from its origin in the 
WEU. In this regard, the initial group of specified tasks as first incorporated in Article 17(2) 
(viz the Amsterdam Treaty) includes 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'. No changes were made 
to these, at least de jure, till Lisbon. As explained in the previous two pages, while Article 42(1) 
indicates that peacekeeping, conflict prevention and overall strengthening of international 
security are at the heart of CSDP crisis management, Article 43(1) spells out the relevant tasks 
to be used in this regard. These include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks 
of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict 
stabilisation’.57 These are the essence of CSDP crisis management and are also to a certain 
extent representative of the scope of the latter. However, it is noteworthy that the Lisbon Treaty 
brings the scope of the CSDP crisis management up to date by incorporating what are already 
aspects of practice including the civilian aspects of crisis management.58 The latter which was 
                                                 
56See for example 6.5. below; and further Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
57Author's emphasis to illustrate the Lisbon additions to the original Petersberg Tasks. 
58See Piris, fn 22 above, p 275 where he opines that the list of tasks was brought ‘up to date’. This would imply 
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established in 2000 to complement the military aspects of the CSDP framework covers four 
priority areas namely police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian 
administration and civil protection.59 Similar to the military aspects of crisis management, the 
specific capabilities in these four fields are mainly for EU-led autonomous missions, or in 
operations conducted by lead agencies such as the UN.60 This was arguably inspired by the 
evolving comprehensive EU approach even if it morphed into this from the Commission's 
attempt to enhance and better coordinate EU crisis management tools under development policy 
framework on the one hand, and the Member States’ non-military crisis response tools on the 
other hand. Indeed, in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS)61 recognised that ‘in almost 
every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos,’ and therefore 
emphasised that: ‘[the EU] should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might 
include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and 
security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.’62  
                                                 
that the Lisbon changes in this area are a formal confirmation of what already exists in practice. 
59See Civilian Crisis Management, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/civilian-
crisis-management?lang=en, accessed 21 December 2011. (Schuyer, J, ‘The Civilian Headline Goal 2008: 
Developing Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities for the EU’ in Blockmans, fn 7 above, p 135). For example, 
the UK employs non-military crisis response tools under its Department for International Development (DFID). It 
is noteworthy that while the UK seems to be more widely known for its bilateral development oriented security 
policies, it is no longer the only EU Member State that conducts such policies. For example, Germany recently 
developed its "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building" 
(Aktionsplan"ZivileKrisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung") (Bundesregierung2004) with 
priority tasks that have a number of clear links to SSA (Klingebiel, S, ‘Converging development and security 
policy? New approaches in Africa’, German Development Institute (DIE), 2006, p 138, available at 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=96188), accessed 19 April 2012. This was therefore a clear move towards vertical 
coherence. However, this plan for coordination arguably morphed into conducting civilian missions under the 
CSDP framework quite apart from the security aspects of development policy. 
60Or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).  
61A Secure Europe in a Better World--European Security Strategy’ (ESS), Brussels, December 12, 2003. 
62Ibid., p 12. In this regard, SSR as a part of broader institution building is undertaken ‘within the framework of 
democratic principles, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, in particular in countries in 
transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace’ (see Article 10 of See Council Common Position 
2005/304/CFSP on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa and repealing Council Common 
Position 2004/85/CFSP) on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa [2005] OJ L97/57 
(hereinafter 'Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa). The latter was preceded by the first two Common 
Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa (Council Common Position 97/356/CFSP concerning conflict prevention 
and conflict resolution in Africa [1997] OJ L153/1; Council Common Position 2001/374/CFSP of 14 May 2001 
concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa [2001] OJ L132/1). 
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Having said that, it is noteworthy that it is difficult to capture the exact scope of the objectives 
of the CSDP. This is not solely because 'shall include' as used in Article 43(1) is an indication 
of an inexhaustible list. There are no generally accepted interpretations for the different 
concepts used in the field of international peace and security.63 In practice, most of the concepts 
are recognisably wide in their areas of coverage and could serve as a ‘catch-all’ phrase. 
Nevertheless, apart from the notion of conflict prevention which acceptably covers the three 
different stages of conflict prevention, management and resolution,64 most of the concepts in 
Article 43(1) TEU could conveniently be categorised into measures for the active stage of crisis 
on the one hand, and post-conflict stage on the other hand. For example, the latter which is 
represented as 'post-conflict stabilisation' would generally cover any measure aimed at 
preventing a relapse into war.65  Apart from this, the other concepts such as ‘joint disarmament 
operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peace-making would mainly cover the stage of active crisis. For 
example, humanitarian missions are aimed at protecting the population and securing the supply 
of their basic needs in times of emergency.66 Conversely, rescue task missions aim to evacuate 
and liberate individuals from emergency or crisis situations.  
 
With regards to peacekeeping, although in its wider meaning it could cover any crisis 
                                                 
63Wider Peacekeeping (London: HSMO, 1995), xii). 
64Prevention, management and resolution (see Chapter Five of this thesis). Prevention is outside the scope of the 
Chapter. 
65See Duke, S, and Courtier, A, EU peacebuilding: concepts, actors and instruments’, CLEER Working Paper 
2009/3, p 4. This concept is also interchangeable with peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, post conflict 
rehabilitation, stabilisation, institution building and state building (Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, in her keynote address, 
‘The future of international security interventions: prospects and challenges’ at the 4th Annual Workshop of the 
Women in International Security (WIIS), Fredericton, CA, May 5, 2011). It is not clear why this is tied to 'tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management' in Article 43(1) TEU. 
66Von Kielmansegg, fn 18 above p 629. This would usually involve the deployment of military forces albeit only 
for the protection and the defence of the mandate not for the purposes of ending the conflict. Humanitarian missions 
is different from humanitarian aid or assistance which is a financial assistance provided by the EU's Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) to alleviate suffering where it becomes acute (presently provided for in Article 214 TFEU).  
 262 
 
 
management activity conducted during the stage of active crisis and even beyond,67 the concept 
as traditionally evolved from the UN entails military intervention operations conducted during 
the active phase of crisis in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace and security.68 These 
are normally mandated by the UN.69 In this regard, it is noteworthy that there is no functional 
difference between peacekeeping and peace-making as an aspect of ‘combat forces in crisis 
management' under the EU CSDP framework. For in contrast to the meaning of peacemaking 
in the UN context,70 peacemaking in the EU CSDP framework specifically connotes the use of 
military force for peace enforcement71 as would only be mandated by the UN. Arguably, due to 
the sensitivities discussed above,72 ‘peace-making’ was historically used as a device to avoid 
mentioning ‘peace enforcement’.73 In any event, it is with the above executive missions and 
military advisory as well as technical assistant tasks of the CSDP crisis management74 that the 
                                                 
67See in general Tsagourias, fn 22 above, where all the dimensions of EU crisis management under the CSDP 
framework are discussed under this heading. 
68See for example, Cramer, fn 51 above, p 229. However, peacekeeping operations have been defined as 
operations distinctly carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or 
maintain peace and security wherein the use of force is limited to self-defence and defence of the mandate (see 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines (United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, New York, 2008) 31-35; also Wider Peacekeeping, fn 63 above, xii); also see, 
‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace’, A/50/60-S/1995/1(1995), paras 34-5 where peacekeeping is said to be ‘a 
civilian instrument for attaining humanitarian and peace-maintaining objectives that uses military symbols’. 
69See Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP fn 50 above (not a humanitarian or stabilising operation per se, this 
was a stand-by military operation in support of a pre-existing UN-led operation). 
70Where 'peace-making' refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities 
and negotiate a peaceful settlement (see Basic Facts about the United Nations (NY: UN DPI, 1998), p 69; also see 
Neuhold, H, ‘The United Nations System for the peaceful settlement of international dispute’ in Cede, F, and 
Scharipa-Berhmann, (eds.), The United Nations: Law and Practice (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001), p 59.  
71See Blockmans, fn 7 above, p 9; Naert, F, ‘ESDP in Practice: Increasingly Varied and Ambitious Operations’ in 
Trybus and White, fn 16 above, p 95-96; also see Von Kielmansegg, fn 18 above, p 643 that peacemaking is a 
military oriented task with such limitless scope as to give the Union the flexibility needed in the open and long-
term process of its evolution into an actor of security and defence policy. 
72At 6.2.1. above. 
73See Duke and Courtier fn 65 above, p 39.  
74See Article 43(1) TEU; also see Council of the European Union, Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and 
Security in Africa, Doc 10538/4/04, Brussels, 16 November 2004 (hereinafter CSDP Action Plan for Africa), 
especially p 2.  Although, the CSDP Action Plan for Africa refers to this as well as to financial dimensions of EU 
support to peace and security in Africa, the latter is deemed outside the scope of this Chapter in so far as it could 
conveniently fall within the CFSP or the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) discussed in the next Chapter. Indeed 
while EU crisis management in SSA beyond the Cotonou Agreement/EU development policy (see Chapter Three 
of this thesis) could further be divided into CFSP support for peace and security within the framework of the JAES 
on the one hand, and support for peace and security within the framework of the CSDP on the other hand, some 
aspects of the CSDP are practically linked into the CFSP/JAES framework (see in general Helly, D, ‘A European 
 263 
 
 
analysis in this Chapter is concerned. 
 
6.3. The instruments of the CSDP with special reference to SSA 
 
That the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP does not bear repeating. Hence, although this 
does not blur the functional distinction between the two, such distinction is neither rigid nor 
does it lead to an attendant rigid differentiation between the instruments of their modus 
operandi. Indeed, the two key instruments that determines the modus operandi of the CFSP,75 
would apply to the CSDP even if sometimes in a functionally different way.76  
 
6.3.1. The CFSP Common Position on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
in Africa:77 the key normative background to the CSDP with special reference to SSA. 
 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa78 
is the EU’s general approach to conflict prevention and resolution in Africa.79 It sets out the 
Unions's general commitment to conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and 
the varying approaches for achieving these, albeit not without with an express indication of how 
these would apply to each pertinent EU external policy. However, it is arguable that the latter 
could be deduced from the provisions of the Treaties and from a general understanding of the 
objectives and/or functional dimensions of the different policies. For example, it is not difficult 
to deduce that the Union's contribution to the prevention, management and resolution of violent 
                                                 
Perspective’ in Pirozzi, N, (ed), ‘Ensuring Peace and Security: Implementing the EU-Africa Partnership’, (2010) 
Quaderni IAI, English Series, 17, p 58; Assanvo, W, and Pout, C, ‘The European Union (EU): African Peace and 
Security Environment’s Champion?’ (2007) Points de Vue, 27 November, p 19-25).  
75See 5.3. above. 
76For example, the legal implications of a Joint Action may sometimes not be same for the Member States under 
the CSDP framework, as it is would be under the CFSP framework (see 6.4.3. below on CFSP crisis management 
implementation). 
77Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 62. 
78Ibid. 
79At 5.3. 
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conflicts in Africa 'through enhanced dialogue with, and support for, the [African Union] and 
sub-regional organisations'80 and other long-term conflict prevention and peace-building 
initiatives81 would fall outside the scope of the CSDP crisis management. In the same vein, it 
is not difficult to deduce that the commitment that 'the EU and its Member States shall continue, 
on a case-by-case basis, to consider deploying their own operational means for conflict 
prevention and crisis management in Africa, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of 
the [UN] in close cooperation with UN activities in the region […]’82 is an aspect that falls 
completely within the CSDP crisis management framework. This contrasts from the Union's 
commitment to 'support, over the long term, the enhancement of African peace support 
operations capabilities, at regional, subregional and bilateral levels', which demonstrably may 
take place both within the context of the CSDP and in other dimensions such as the JAES.83   
 
In the light of the general guideline approach of the Common Position on Conflict Prevention 
in Africa, sub-instruments drawing from this would be expected. In this regard, the Union's 
approach to crisis management operations under the CSDP framework is generally defined in 
the CSDP Action Plan for Africa.84 It is noteworthy that this Action Plan is a clear illustration 
that the dividing line between the CFSP and CSDP is not rigid and may not always be clear 
especially with regards to the technical aspects of the latter.85 For example, the Action Plan 
covers both ‘[CSDP] advisory or executive missions in the framework of African led operations 
or [UN] peacekeeping operations’86 and the technical and financial dimensions of EU support 
                                                 
80Article 1(1) Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 62 above. 
81Article 1(4), Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 62 above. 
82Article 6 Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 62 above.  
83See Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
84See fn 74 above.  
85Further illustrative is the scope of crisis management tasks under the CSDP framework (Article 431(1) TEU). 
86Doc 10538/4/04, fn 74 above, p 2. 
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to peace and security in Africa.87 While the latter could be implemented both within the CSDP 
framework and other frameworks of EU external action towards SSA, the former which is 
strictly about direct deployments for both military and civilian aspects covering the 
inexhaustible scope of CSDP tasks as discussed above is specific to the CSDP, and hence the 
main focus of this analysis. Significantly, this is functionally different from the security policy 
aspects of development policy which mainly centres around funding including for technical 
support relating to the relevant security-related activities. Suffice it to state that while there may 
be conceptual overlap between the two dimensions of EU security policy, this does not translate 
to functional overlap. Hence what is required between the different dimensions is coherence 
based on the construction of a united whole vis-a-vis synergy in their sequencing as is necessary. 
As mentioned above, in the light of the specific ad hoc functionality of the CSDP crisis 
management, the question of policy coherence would not arise with regards to the CSDP beyond 
the outcome of the determination of coherence based on the construction of a united whole vis-
a-vis synergy in their sequencing as is necessary for the resolution of conflict.88  
 
6.3.2. The Joint Action89 as an instrument of CSDP crisis management operations  
 
Article 42(1) and Article 43(1) and the above analysis shows that the CSDP crisis management 
is mainly mission or operation-oriented in nature.90 The military operations and civilian 
missions are the Union's response tool for direct intervention in a violent conflict or crisis. 
                                                 
87See fn 74. 
88See Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
89The difference between this and Common Positions has been discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis (at 5.3.3.). 
It will only be mentioned in this Chapter if necessary. 
90The notion of 'operation' is traditionally used for military-oriented aspects of security policy, while the notion 
of 'mission' is mainly used for civilian aspects of security policy as well as for military advisory and assistance 
tasks. 
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Hence the reason why the instrument of Joint Action91 is mainly used in the context of CSDP 
crisis management.92 This is an instrument mainly designed for operational actions in the 
CFSP/CSDP framework.93 It therefore differs from the guideline-oriented Common Position 
defining the general approach.94 As discussed in the previous Chapter,95 the CFSP legal 
framework under which the CSDP operates requires a specific level of commitment from EU 
Member States. They are required to support the Union’s external and security policy actively 
and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and to refrain from any action 
which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive 
force in international relations.96 But they are not compelled to adopt a common policy or to 
act.97 In this regard, even the adoption of a common position defining a common approach does 
not import a legal obligation to adopt a Joint Action for an operational action. This is as true for 
the non-CSDP CSFP as the CSDP.98 However, with specific regards to the CSDP, although the 
'[CSDP] shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military 
assets', the Union 'may' use them on missions.99  
 
With specific regards to EU external action towards SSA, although it was not mentioned in the 
previous Chapter, it is particularly worth noting in this Chapter that the Union's commitment to 
conflict prevention and peace and security in general has always been qualified with the 
principle of African ownership.100 Indeed, it is arguable that while this applies across the board, 
                                                 
91See Article 28 TEU; Article 25(b)(1). 
92See 5.3.3. above.  
93See Article 28 TEU; Article 25(b)(1). 
94See 5.3.2. above; and also 6.3.1. above. 
95 5.2.1. 
96Article 24(3) TEU (ex-Article 11(2) TEU).  
97See Wessel, fn 29, p 287. 
98Indeed, it could be more the case in the latter due to the higher sensitivity to this aspect of security policy.  
99Article 42(1) TEU. 
100See the Cotonou Agreement; and also Preamble paragraph 1 of the Common Position on Conflict Prevention 
in Africa, fn 62 above. 
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it may be of greater import in the context of the CSDP. This is because of the controversial 
nature of military interventions in its different variations,101 and also the difficulties of the 
human resource capabilities required for the different aspects of CSDP crisis management102 
including the military and civilian aspects.103 Moreover, although the EU expresses its 
preparedness to become involved, whenever necessary, in crisis management in Africa with its 
own capabilities, notwithstanding its commitment to African ownership,104 it equally confirms 
its recognition of the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United 
Nations.105  
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that in general, Joint Action for 'operational action' is not 
scarce in EU external action towards SSA. In contrast, the EU has conducted a wide array of 
military and civilian operations in SSA,106 sometimes in the same country if necessary.107For 
                                                 
101Military intervention as a conflict resolution mechanism is always controversial due to the principle of national 
sovereignty (see for example, Zounmenou, D, 'Is a Military Intervention in Mali a Realistic Option?'25 June 2012, 
ISS, Pretoria Office, available at  
 https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/is-a-military-intervention-in-mali-a-realistic-option, accessed 15 
December 2015).  
102See Hill, fn 24 above, on the 'capability-expectation gap'.  
103See 6.4.2. below. These are peculiar to the CSDP, and do not apply to the non-CSDP CFSP actions. It is 
important to note that although a mixed military-civil operation is possible in practice, this is not discussed further 
than the present mention as they are of no extra value to answering the research question. Moreover, there are 
difficulties with identifying what a mixed-instrument entails. For example, the only officially designated mixed 
civil-military operation is the EU civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in Darfur (see 
AMIS II Darfur, fn 45 above). However, EUSEC DRC and EU SSR Guinea Bissau (fn 45 above) have also been 
listed as mixed civilian-military operations by some sources (see for example the CSDP Handbook, fn 6 above, p 
62; and Simon, L ‘Command and Control? Planning for EU military Operations’, ISS Occasional Paper January 
2010, No 81, p 32; also see Piris, fn 22 above, p 270). Nevertheless, most sources regard these two as civilian 
operations by listing  only AMIS II Darfur as a mixed civilian-military operation (see for example Hoffmeister, F, 
‘Inter-pillar coherence in the EU’s civilian crisis management’ in Blockmans, fn 7 above, p 176; Naert, F, ‘Legal 
Aspects of EU Military Operations’ (2011) 15 JIP1, p 218-242, at 218; also see Council website. Elsewhere in 
SSA, the EU has also conducted a CSDP SSR mission in Guinea Bissau which was not attached to any prior 
conflicts (see Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP, fn 45 above).  
104Article 1(3) of the Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 62 above. 
105Preamble paragraph 3 of the Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, fn 62 above. 
106See for example, fn 45 above. 
107Naert, fn 71 above, p 95. Invariably, an operation can also cut across the different aspects of the tasks. 
Illustrative is Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia (see Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP fn 45 above). The aim 
of this operation includes contribution to the protection of vessels of the World Food Program (WFP) delivering 
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example, Operation ARTEMIS was followed by EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL 
‘Kinshasa’).108 This was followed by an EU mission to provide advice and assistance for SSR 
in the DRC (EUSEC DR Congo).109This latter mission was eventually to run parallel with a 
subsequently launched EU Police Mission undertaken in the framework of SSR and its interface 
with the system of Justice in the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo).110 The synergy in sequencing these 
different dimensions would be coherence in action. However, as the Mali case study illustrates, 
the synergy in sequencing of policy actions available to resolve a conflict or crisis does not 
always happen. This could be due to some of the reasons mentioned above including the dearth 
of resources,111 and ‘capabilities-expectations gap'.112 However, it could also be due to what 
Arbour refers to as the fear of intervention without an end,113 which could in the specific case 
of SSA may be underlined by a possible element of deference to Member States with pertinent 
historical affinity with the region.114 Of course, these are additional factors to the limitations 
caused by the operational flexibility of CSDP crisis management as will not be discussed.   
 
6.4. Decision-making, implementation and enforcement of CSDP crisis management: the 
Member States or the Member States?  
 
Similar to the previous Chapters in which other EU external policies have been analysed, this 
section discusses the decision-making, implementation and enforcement of CSDP crisis 
                                                 
food aid to displaced persons, contribution to the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising the Somali coast, and 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and robbery of the Somali coast.  
108See Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP, fn 45 above. 
109See Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP, fn 45 above. 
110See Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP, fn 45 above. 
111The strength of this point is however reduced in the light of the fact that the financial crisis had not started 
when the EU failed Darfur (see in general Okemuo, fn 37 above). For an analysis of the Darfur crisis see and the 
Union's failure to act  see in general, Miller, L, and Bock, C, ‘Again, Never: The EU's Failure to Act in Darfur’, 
[2004] 2 JEA 4. 
112See Hill, fn 24 above. 
113See Arbour, L, ‘10 Conflicts to Watch in 2013’ Foreign Policy, 27 December 2012. 
114Based on the historical factors discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.2.4.). 
 269 
 
 
management.115  What will become apparent here is that the relevant institutions of decision-
making and the mechanisms of implementation differ from those in the other areas of EU 
external action towards SSA analysed in the preceding Chapters of this thesis.116 Indeed, in 
contrast to the equally legalised high politics of the CFSP, the CSDP is distinctly specific even 
to the extent that the institutional flexibility and pragmatism used ameliorate the complex 
dynamics of EU external action is arguably inapplicable to CSDP crisis management in practice. 
The CSDP has a Crisis Management Procedure.117 Having said that, it is noteworthy that this 
will not be the main focus of this analysis. The reason is that this will not do more than further 
illustrate the specificity of CSDP crisis management which a simple discussion of the ordinary 
decision-making procedure of same illustrates. In this regard, the latter centres on the key 
institutional procedures leading to the adoption of a ‘Decision’ (formerly Joint Action) which 
is the legal instrument and core mandate for CSDP crisis management operation as discussed 
above. Similar to previous Chapters and in line with the aim of this thesis, special highlight is 
placed on the roles of the HR/VP and the EEAS at her service with a view to determining their 
                                                 
115As is already clear by now, this dimension of each policy is often globally applicable and will sometimes only 
be different with reference to Council working Groups which can sometimes be geographical. 
116See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.4. and Chapter Four of this thesis at 4.4. for decision-making in relation 
to development policy and trade policy under the Cotonou Agreement; and also Chapter Five at 5.4. in relation to 
the wider CFSP. Indeed, although the minimal roles of the Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the 
ECJ in the CFSP in contrast to the non-CFSP external action has been discussed in Chapter Five (at 5.4. above), 
this still significantly differs from what obtains in the CSDP except for the post-Lisbon role of the EP in the CFSP 
and CSDP which are exactly same (see Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.4.1., in particular fn 171). Similar to the 
CFSP, post-Lisbon, the EP may ask questions and make recommendations to the Council and to the HR/VP on the 
main aspects of the CSDP pursuant to Article 36 TEU (see further Chapter Five at 5.4.1, in particular fn 171. The 
references to CFSP therein simply need to be changed to reflect the CSDP).  
117See ‘Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management’ Council Doc. 11127/03 
of 3 of July 2003; and also the ‘EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level’, Council 
Doc. 10687/08 of 16 June 2008. This can be divided into three phases: (1) the development of a crisis management 
concept (CMC), (2) the development of strategic options, and (3) the development of concrete operational planning 
(see ‘The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Decision-making, Planning and Organisation of ESDP 
Field Missions, (2007),  Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) Updated interactive guide, available at 
http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/home.html, accessed 12 September 2009; and for further discussion of the procedure 
albeit not divided into phases  see Duke, S, Peculiarities in the Institutionalisation of the CFSP and ESDP, in 
Blockmans, fn 7 above, p 80; and Lindstrom, G, ‘Enter the EU Battle groups’ Chaillot Paper, February 2007, No 
77, p 19-21; also see the CSDP Handbook, fn 6 above, p 59-61 where the same procedure is offered albeit broken 
down into six phases. 
 270 
 
 
added value in enhancing coherence post-Lisbon. In the light of the institutional specificity of 
the CSDP, the highlight on the roles of the HR/VP and the EEAS and their added value to 
coherence is discussed under a distinct sub-heading.118 
 
6.4.1. CSDP crisis management decision-making  
 
As indicated in the previous Chapter on the CFSP, although the European Council is the de jure 
and de facto apex institution in EU policy formulation, it does not play any direct role in terms 
of the adoption of legal instruments.119 It also does not play any direct or formally recognised 
role in crisis management decision-making.120 In contrast, the Council is expressly responsible 
for adopting decisions relating to the Petersberg Tasks, defining their objectives and scope and 
the general conditions for their implementation.121 In so far as these are decisions relating to 
operational action by the Union, they are adopted in accordance with the Council's general 
decision-making power for Joint Actions. It is the latter which embodies the mandate and also 
brings them into legal effect pursuant to Article 28 TEU.122 In this regard, the institutional 
procedure for the CFSP as discussed in Chapter Five would apply to a certain degree. For 
example, the relevant post-Lisbon Council configuration is still the Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC) as chaired by the HR/VP.123 Of course, as discussed in the previous Chapter,124 this does 
                                                 
118See 6.4.2. above. This is separate from the discussion of decision-making and implementing procedures and 
strategically placed between the two for better analytical flow.  
119See Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.4.1. fn 163.  
120This rarely climb the decision-making ladder up to the level of the Heads of State and Government sitting in 
the European Council (Grevi, G, ‘ESDP Institutions’, in Grevi, fn 23 above, p 24). Of course, they are ad hoc. 
Contrastingly, the construction of the CSDP as an integral but distinct part of the CFSP as well as the attendant 
distinct institutional logic is attributed solely to the European Council (see Eeckhout, P, External Relations of the 
European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (OUP, 2004), p 410). 
121Article 43(2) TEU. 
122See 6.3.2. above. 
123Article 16(6) TEU; also see Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.4.1.; and Chapter Two at 2.5.3.2.   
124At 5.4.1.  
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not mean that the HR/VP has any decision-making power,125 beyond her legal power to make 
proposals126 which she shares in the CSDP with Member States.127 Nevertheless, it is arguable 
that such a position of general oversight would enable the HR/VP to play the role of a policy 
shaper and informed coordinator for coherence. In this regard, although the ad hoc nature of 
the CSDP means that policy coherence for development may not reasonably be substantially 
accommodated in the course of the decision-making for CSDP crisis management, the HR/VP 
could still persuade the Council to act based on this argument. In general, there is little or no 
doubt that inaction in this field as may be required for example in the context of EU external 
action in SSA, would amount to disregard for policy coherence for development.128 Of course, 
this is not to deny that the success of her influence will depend on the political will of the 
Member States who through the Council are at the heart of the EU’s general ‘capacity to 
decide’129 on CSDP crisis management. Indeed, at all times, the decision for a CSDP crisis 
management rests completely on EU Member States. This is not solely because the Council 
who is the decision-maker represents the Member States. Even Committees that support the 
                                                 
125See Erkelens, L, and Blockmans, S, ‘Setting up the European External Action Service: An Institutional Act of 
Balance’, CLEER Working Papers 2012/1, p 13 where it is rightly argued that the HR/VP is not a member of the 
Council, and accordingly does not play any part in the Council’s decision-making. 
126Article 42(4) TEU. 
127Article 42(4) TEU indicates that CSDP decisions including those initiating a mission shall be adopted on a 
proposal from the HR/VP or an initiative from a Member State (see for example Duke, S, and Vanhoonacker, S, 
‘Administrative Governance in CFSP’, (2006) EFA Rev. p 163-182 at 166; and Bjorkdahl, A, and Stromvik, M, 
‘The Decision-making process behind launching an ESDP Crisis Management Operation’ DIIS Brief, April 2008, 
p 1). However, in general, crisis identification can arise from thematic or geographic Council Working Groups 
(CWG). For example, in the context of EU external action towards SSA, the Council Working Group for Africa 
(generally known by its french acronym COAFR) propose a CSDP crisis management (see CSDP Handbook, fn 6 
above, p 60). On COAFR, see www.se2009.eu/en/meetings_news/2009/7/8/africa_working_party_coafr.html, 
accessed December 29, 2011). COAFR which is now a part of the EEAS Africa geographical desk is responsible 
for monitoring and analysing developments in SSA with regards to horizontal issues such as conflict prevention, 
conflict management, democracy and human rights under the wider CFSP. This is interlinked with the CSDP as 
crisis management under this framework can actually begin with identification by COAFR. This will not detract 
from the implementing mandate of COAFR under the Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in 
Africa, namely that of political dialogue for peace and security with African organisations and African States (see 
Doc. 10538/4/04, fn 74 above; and Chapter Seven of this thesis). Indeed, it is arguable that the political dialogue 
role of COAFR will assist its early warning role for other means of crisis identification. 
128See 6.5. below; and further, Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
129See Grevi, fn 120 above, p 26. 
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Council's work in this field are 'Brusselised' national institutions130 functioning in a 
'transgovernmental' dynamics.131 The latter which goes beyond the intergovernmental approach 
that revolves around relevant traditional EU institutions is one major illustration of the 
specificity of the CSDP. 
 
In contrast to the non-CSDP CFSP external action where there is controversy regarding the 
highest council preparatory body,132 the most prominent of the Council preparatory bodies for 
CSDP crisis management decisions is certainly the Political and Security Committee (PSC).133 
In contrast to COREPER, the PSC never takes the final decisions in the CSDP, but nevertheless 
plays a central role in the decision-making. Indeed, in practice, it acts beyond the role of a mere 
preparatory body and has been described as the ‘linchpin’ of the CSDP.134 In fact, in practice, it 
is the PSC that deliberates on whether EU action is appropriate following the identification of 
                                                 
130The concept of ‘Brusselisations’ means the locating of the relevant institutions and structure in Brussels far away from the Member State 
capitals (see for example Juncos, A and Reynolds, C, ‘The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow’, [2007] EFA Rev. p 
127-147 at 135: ‘Brusselising […] means that while the relevant competencies do remain ultimately at the disposal of the Member States, the 
formulation and implementation of policy will be increasingly Europeanised and Brusselised by functionaries and services housed permanently 
at Brussels’.  
131In a transgovernmental process, national representatives spend more time with their counterparts from other representations than those of 
their own (see Davis Cross, M, ‘Cooperation by Committee: the EU Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management’ 
ISS Occasional Paper 82, February 2010, p 4; also see Juncos and Reynolds, fn 130 above, p 145 where they suggest that the process of 
‘Brusselisation’ transcends an intergovernmentalist approach. However, also see De Baere, G, Constitutional Principles of EU External 
Relations (OUP, 2008), p 225, where he attributes ‘intensive trans-governmentalism’ to the CFSP in general. 
132See Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.4.1.  
133As will be remembered from the previous Chapter (see 5.4.1. above), this Committee (also known by its French 
acronym, the COPS) is comprised of national senior representatives at ambassadorial level). It was established 
under Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP [2001] OJ L27/1. Indeed, even if the controversy regarding the role of the 
PSC and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) rolls into the CSDP, still it has been suggested 
that the often overloaded agenda of COREPER has meant that the PSC is the de facto highest administrative body 
in the CSDP (see Vanhoonacker, S, et al, ‘Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and 
Defence Policy: the State of the Art’ [2010] 14 EIOP, p 9; and De Baere fn 131 above , p 133). In fact, in one 
pertinent analysis on the institutional dynamics of CSDP crisis management decision-making, COREPER was not 
at all mentioned (see Lindstrom, fn 117 above).  
134Duke, S, ‘The Linchpin COPS: Assessing the Workings and Institutional Relations of the Political and Security 
Committee’, EIPA Working Paper (EIPA 2005), available at 
http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/product/20070815142132_FC0505e.pdf, accessed 06 January 2011. The PSC 
has also been described as the ‘workhorse in ESDP decision-shaping’ Meyer, C, The Quest for a European 
Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 116.  and also across the wider CFSP wherein it is regarded as the backbone of foreign policy 
co-ordination in general (Peers, S, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ [1997] 17 YEL 546, at 551). 
 273 
 
 
a crisis.135 In doing this, the PSC is directly supported by two advisory bodies namely the EU 
Military Committee (EUMC)136 and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM).137 The EUMC is composed of national Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODS) of 
Member States meeting at the level of their military representatives. It gives advice and makes 
recommendations to the PSC on all military matters within the EU with the support of the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS).138 The EUMS is also composed of military experts 
seconded by the Member States.139 In parallel, CIVCOM which is equally composed of national 
officials representing the Member States provides advice and recommendations on the civilian 
aspects of crisis management.140 A civilian Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 
(CMPD)141 supported by a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)142 was created to 
improve civilian-military coordination within the CSDP framework as part of the 
comprehensive approach to crisis management.143 The PSC also relies on this Directorate for 
                                                 
135See fn 127 above. 
136Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP [2001] OJ L27/4. 
137Council Decision 2000/354/CFSP [2000] OJ L127/1. 
138Council Decisions 2001/80/CFSP as amended by 2005/395/CFSP [2005] OJ L132/17. 
139It provides expert military advice to the EUMC and is also responsible for the performance of early warning, 
situation assessment and strategic planning for the Petersberg Tasks. 
140Council Decision 2000/354/CFSP [2000] OJ L127/1.  
141Formerly the Civilian-Military Cell (Civ-Mil Cell) established within the EUMS to facilitate operational and 
strategic planning for joint civil-military dimension of crisis management (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 
European Council, 12-13 December 2003, 5381/04, para 90); it also incorporates the former security and defense 
aspect of the CGS Directorate-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs(DG E) namely the Defense 
Directorate (DG E VIII) and the Directorate for Civilian Crisis-Management (DG E IX) (Simon, fn 103 above, p 
25–26).   
142As discussed below (at 6.4.2.), the CPCC which was established in 2007 is also an implementing organ for 
civilian crisis management within the CGS; nevertheless, it took over the operational planning of the former 
Civilian Crisis Management and Coordination (CCMC) which included a Crisis Response and Co-ordination Team 
– (CRCT) (see ‘The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Decision-making, Planning and Organisation 
of ESDP Field Missions, (2007), Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) updated interactive guide, 
available at http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/home.html, accessed 12 September 2009). 
143Prior to the CPMD, there was only a Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) (see Council of the European Union 
Civil Military Co-ordination, Doc. 14457/03, Brussels, November, 7 2003, para 11); also see CSDP Handbook, fn 
6 above, p 60; and Simon, fn 103 above, p 26 where he explains that: ‘the added value of the CMPD would be the 
increased comprehensiveness of the CMC product; the new directorate will have a military angle, a police angle, 
a rule-of-law angle, a development angle, etc.’ These differ from the concept of Civil Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) which is primarily related to cooperation between the EU and other relevant parties in the field (see Khol, 
R, ‘Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management’ in Nowak, A, (ed.) ‘Civilian Crisis Management: the 
EU Way’, ISS Chaillot Paper No 90, June 2006, p125). Of course, the latter is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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the development of a Crisis Management Concept once it decides that an EU action is 
appropriate. The latter is a planning document and a conceptual framework describing the 
overall approach of the EU to the management of a particular crisis.144 In this regard, it is 
intended to contribute to the coherence of EU action, even though this may be limited to the 
CSDP framework.145 The PSC evaluates all strategic options146 and then forwards its decisions 
on them to the Council. It is at this juncture that the Council formally decides on and adopts the 
Decision (or Joint Action) for CSDP crisis management.147 This Decision is made by 
unanimity,148  a potentially uphill task especially in the specific context of the CSDP due to 
some of the factors discussed above. Illustrative is the Mali case study as discussed below.149 
 
 
                                                 
144European Union Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level’, Council Doc 10687/08, 
Brussels, 16 June 2008, p 10; also see CSDP Handbook, fn 6 above, p 60 where the Crisis Management Concept 
is described as a planning document containing the aims and final objective, together with the major politico-
strategic options for responding to that particular crisis, including the possible exit strategy. 
145See the previous page on the description of the role of the CMPD. Indeed, although the CMPD is 
comprehensive in its approach to the Crisis Management Concept (see fn 144 above), it is not specifically tasked 
with coherence between the CDSP and other fields of EU external action. On the latter, see below. 
146Once the PSC agrees the Crisis Management Concept and the Council approves it, the PSC embarks on the 
development of strategic options at the request of the Council. The PSC does this by tasking the EUMC to prepare 
the Military Strategic Options (MSO) and the CIVCOM to prepare the Civilian Strategic Options (CSO) or Police 
Strategic Options (PSO). For the purposes of mixed-civil-military missions, the PSC also avails itself of the 
advisory services of the CMPD. In principle, the Commission is meant to present its own accompanying measure 
to the PSC at this stage to be taken into account. However, whether this applies in practice is difficult to say 
especially in the post-Lisbon era (the Commission is no longer associated to the CFSP like was the case pre-
Lisbon). 
147It codifies, inter alia, the mandate, its objectives, the scope of the implementing decisions (if any) to be made 
by the PSC, the financing arrangement, the chain of command, and the operational headquarters (OHQ). Having 
said that, it is noteworthy that the CSDP procedure is not always strictly followed (see for example, CSDP 
Handbook, fn 6 above, p 62 for an example of a skipped stage during the plan for Operation ARTEMIS (fn 45 
above); and also Major, C, ‘EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: the Experience of EUFOR DR 
Congo in 2006’ ISS Occasional Paper No. 72, September 2008, p 17; and Fritsch, H, ‘EUFOR DR Congo: A 
Misunderstood Operation?’ CIR, Queens University, Ontario, 2008, p 32, for the stage that was skipped during 
operation EUFOR DR Congo (fn 45). 
148Article 42(4) TEU and 31(4) TEU. However, under the CFSP legal framework in general, there is a provision 
for constructive abstention by which a Member State can abstain from voting and yet not oppose further step 
towards the necessary action by virtue of Article 31(1) TEU. Such Member State shall not be obliged to apply the 
decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union (see Jaeger, T, ‘Enhanced Cooperation in the Treaty 
of Nice and Flexibility in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2002) EFARev 297-316, at 320; and 
Galloway, D, The Treaty of Nice and Beyond (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), p134-6. 
149See 6.5. below. 
 275 
 
 
6.4.2. Of the HR/VP and the EEAS and their added value to coherence as it relates to the 
CSDP  
 
The above analysis, is the decision-making procedure for CSDP crisis management post as pre-
Lisbon. However, the post-Lisbon dimension bears the involvement of the HR/VP and the 
EEAS in varying forms even if only lightly. The focus of this section is to highlight their roles 
and the added value they bring to enhancing the coherence of EU external action. In this regard, 
the above analysis illustrate that both the HR/VP and the EEAS do not have any direct roles in 
the decision-making for CSDP crisis management post-Lisbon. Rather, similar to the Chair role 
of the HR/VP in the Council as discussed above, some relevant Council preparatory 
Committees and working groups are also chaired by representatives of the HR/VP appointed 
from the EEAS. These include the PSC, the CIVCOM, and with specific regards to EU external 
action towards SSA, the Working Group for Africa (CAOFR). Of course, similar to the Chair 
role of the HR/VP in the Council, the potential of the Chairs from the EEAS to contribute to 
the enhancement of coherence would be informal in this regard. In fact, in the light of the ad 
hoc nature of the CSDP crisis management, it can be argued that the reference to coherence in 
this context may be needless. This is because the question of the substantial accommodation of 
policy coherence for development does not arise even as a facon de parler150 with regards to 
the strictly short term ad hoc CSDP measures. Although this does not negate the potential 
implications of a lack of synergy in the sequencing of policy options that are available to resolve 
a crisis on this requirement.151 In this regard, it is noteworthy that although there is a conceptual 
overlap between the scope of the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management under the CSDP, and 
the security aspects of EU development policy, the two are functionally different.152 Ultimately, 
                                                 
150See Chapter Five of this thesis. 
151That is, policy coherence for development. 
152The latter is functionally funding-oriented (see Chapter Three of this thesis). 
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what is important is coherence based on the construction of a united whole vis-a-vis synergy in 
the sequencing of policy options towards the achievement of an end. In this regard, CIVCOM 
is responsible for coherence between crisis management under the CSDP framework and the 
crisis management measures implemented by the Commission under development cooperation 
policy.153 Although its success in this regard in the pre-Lisbon era is doubtable in the light of 
available evidence,154 it can be argued that the post-Lisbon Chair of CIVCOM by a 
representative of the HR/VP155 may help to address the pre-Lisbon linkage shortfall between 
the CSDP and development policy.156 Alternatively, it could nevertheless be argued that the 
civilian aspects of crisis management is being taken over by the EEAS in practice and is now 
mainly conducted under the post-Lisbon comprehensive security-development instrument.157 
Illustrative is the EU Strategy for the Sahel as discussed in the previous Chapter.158 In general, 
the EU Member States appear to be taking back the turf in the field of EU foreign and security 
policy in a strict sense. In any event, as the Mali case study illustrates, it is not actually the turf 
battles that constitute the most visible and dangerous threat to coherence based on the 
construction of a united whole. Rather, it is the lack of synergy in the sequencing of policy 
options that are available for achieving policy ends, say for example, the resolution of conflicts 
or crisis as was recently the case in Mali. The former which revolves around institutional 
interaction could readily be addressed with effective institutional dialogue and coordination in 
the spirit of tous pour un, un pour tous.159 In contrast, the latter which revolves around issues 
                                                 
153Guide De La PESD – RPUE – Représentation Permanente De La France Auprès De l’Union Européenne, p 
24–25. 
154See Development Assistance Committee (DAC), ‘Peer Review: European Community’,  Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 2007, p 66 -71 on the limited coherence between the 
Common Security and Defence (CSDP) and longer term development programming’; and also  CEC, 
‘Development Policy in the Run Up to 2000’, SEC (92) 915 final, Brussels, p 42. 
155See Doc. 11903/11, fn 117 above.  
156See fn 154 above. 
157See for example Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.3.3.  
158Ibid. 
159Hillion, C, 'Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations of the European Union' in 
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of human and material resources as well as the political will of the Member States, is the major 
threat. The is because it could lead to inaction to the detriment of the overall effectiveness of 
EU external action towards a region or country. For example, in the context of EU external 
action where violent conflicts does not only set development backwards in general, but also sets 
back the effects of EU development policy in particular, CSDP inaction is particularly 
detrimental to the latter. Having said that, it is noteworthy that inaction is mainly witnessed in 
the military aspect of the CSDP crisis management which arguably lies at the heart of the 
specificity of CSDP crisis management. In fact, the Chair role of the representatives of the 
HR/VP in some CSDP institutions does not extend to the EUMC which continues to be chaired 
by an elected Chair post as pre-Lisbon.160 In this way, the distinct nature of the military aspects 
of crisis management is maintained. Significantly, there also appears to be a gradual 
militarisation of CSDP crisis management especially with the practice of mixed civilian-
military operations.161 Whether this was originally intended is difficult to say. However, it is 
clear that the CSDP is generally expressly excluded from the areas in which the EEAS and the 
Commission are required to consult each other in the exercise of their respective functions.162 
Rather, the EEAS shall take part in the preparatory work and procedures relating to acts to be 
prepared by the Commission in this area.163 The meaning of this is hard to determine especially 
in the light of the fact that the EEAS is tasked with supporting and cooperating with the 
Commission Services in order to ensure the coherence of EU external action.164 Overall, the 
potentials for the HR/VP and the EEAS to enhance coherence as it relates to the CSDP may be 
quite limited in the light of the specificity of the CSDP. Even within the EEAS, the CSDP 
                                                 
Cremona, M, (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2008). 
160Ibid. 
161See above. 
162EEAS Decision Article 3(2). 
163Ibid.  
164EEAS Decision Article 3(2). 
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support structures do not have a link to the rest of the EEAS even though they are under the 
direct authority and responsibility of the HR/VP.165  
 
6.4.3. Implementation 
 
The implementation of CSDP crisis management decisions at the strategic level following a 
Decision or Joint Action is the responsibility of the PSC under the supervision of the Council 
and the HR/VP.166 The PSC provides the political and strategic guidance for the stages 
preceding the launch of the operation, and for the duration of the operation.167 This applies to 
both the civilian and military aspects of crisis management.  
 
Otherwise, the Member States bear the responsibility for implementing the CSDP crisis 
management and provides the required capabilities for the civilian and military assets pursuant 
to Article 42(1) TEU.168 But for both, there are no agreed fixed resources or structures for crisis 
management. This state of affairs which dates back to the evolution of the military aspects of 
crisis management and the failed ERRF169 continues to be the case even after the subsequent 
Headline Goals 2010 covering both military and civilian aspects of crisis management. The 
                                                 
165See Vanhoonacker, S, et al, ‘Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence 
Policy: the State of the Art’ (2010) 14 EIOP, p 10; and more specifically the EEAS organisational Chart (available 
at http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf, accessed 12 February 2016). 
166Article 38 TEU; also as will be recalled, the Council may, and usually authorises the PSC, by means of the 
Decision (formerly Joint Action) for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, to make 
relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation pursuant to Article 38 
TEU; However, the powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the EU military mission 
always remains vested in the Council. 
167Political and strategic direction usually entails general strategic and political decisions as authorised by the 
Council in the instrument of Decision (formerly Joint Action) or subsequently (See Naert, fn 71 above, p 100). 
The EUSR ensures visibility for Union support to crisis management and conflict prevention (see Article 3(1)(c) 
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2274 of 7 December 2015 appointing the European Union Special Representative 
for the Sahel [2015] OJ L322/44. 
168This is the case in practice even though the Treaties provide that the HR/VP 'may propose the use of both 
national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate' (Article 42(4) TEU). 
169See 6.1. above. 
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result is resort to ad hoc voluntarism based on the voluntary commitments of EU Member States 
in the context of civilian crisis management,170 and varying flexible arrangements for the 
military aspects of crisis management.171 In practice, the former appears more successful than 
the latter. This is understandable in the light of the limiting factors discussed above in relation 
to military-oriented operations such as peacekeeping and the other original Peterserg Tasks. Of 
course, these are different from the subsequently developed military-oriented technical and 
advisory aspects of the CSDP crisis management. These which are arguably closer to the 
civilian crisis management than the core military aspects of crisis management, also appears to 
be less controversial than the latter, and are therefore understandably more successful. 
Illustrative of these is the Mali study. Furthermore, as the Mali case study further illustrates, the 
limiting factors discussed above means that sometimes the question of resort to the flexible 
mechanisms of the core military aspect of CSDP crisis management does not arise as an 
agreement on a decision for a Joint Action cannot be reached. For example, there is the 
mechanism of a Framework Nation by which a Member State would volunteer to have specific 
responsibilities in an EU operation172 especially with regards to the provision of an Operational 
Headquarters (OHQ)173 and perhaps a significant contribution of forces174 and the overall 
                                                 
170See for example European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, 'European security and defence 
policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management', available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090702%20Civilian%20aspects%20of%20crisis%20manage
ment%20-%20version%203_EN.pdf, accessed 12 January 2016. 
171For a list of troop contributions by EU Member States towards EU civilian and military operations see 
Multilateral Peace Missions Overview available at http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_Internet/index.php4, accessed 31 
January 2012. 
172European Union Operations Chains of Command, Information Report, Doc A/2009, available at 
http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2009.php, accessed 20 December 
2011.   
173Ibid, Alternatively, the EU can activate its Operations Centre in the EUMS to plan and conduct an autonomous 
EU operation when no national OHQs have been identified (CSDP Handbook, fn 6 above, p 62); also see for 
example, EU OpCen for the Horn of Africa which was activated in 2012 in the context of the Strategic Framework 
for the Horn of Africa (see Council of the European Union At the 3142nd Council meeting on Foreign Affairs in 
Brussels, Doc 5592/12, 23 January 2012).  
174Ibid. First used for Operation ARTEMIS in SSA, the concept of Framework Nation was adopted in 22 July 
2002 ‘as the conceptual basis for conducting autonomous operations with recourse to a Framework Nation' (Duke, 
fn 18 above, p 404). There are so far five voluntary Framework Nations for EU crisis management, namely 
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financing of the operation.175 A Framework Nation can also double as a Battle Group or avail 
itself of the mechanism of Battle Group and vice versa.176 The mechanism of Battle Group 
entails the formation of ‘battle groups’ within the national armed forces of the Member States 
to be made available to the EU whenever the need arises.177 In any event, these neither allude 
to an independent operation, nor do they pre-empt a decision. In contrast, they follow a decision 
for a CSDP crisis management and must therefore be based on a decision that has been 
unanimously adopted by the Council. The same goes for the post-Lisbon 'group of the willing 
and capable' under which the Council can entrust the implementation of a crisis management 
task to a group of capable and willing Member States.178 Where this is the case, those Member 
States in association with the HR/VP shall agree among themselves on the management of the 
task pursuant to Article 44(2) TEU. Essentially, it may be taken for granted that there are always 
one or more EU Member States that are often ready to volunteer for CSDP crisis management 
revolving around a military operation such as peacekeeping. However, they would still require 
the agreement of other EU Member States demonstrated by a unanimous decision, and this is 
the tough bit which usually forestalls a CSDP crisis management as may be required. Illustrative 
is the Mali case study. 
 
                                                 
Germany, France, Italy, Greece and Britain. The respective headquarters are OHQ - Potsdam, OHQ - Mont-
Valerien (Paris), OHQ - Centocelle (Rome), OHQ - Larissa, OHQ - Northwood (London) (see European Union 
Operations Chains of Command, Information Report, Doc A/2009, available at http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2009.php, accessed 20 December 2011). For example, France 
was the Framework Nation for Operation ARTEMIS and EUFOR Tchad/CAR. 
175Ibid. 
176The two are not mutually exclusive and Battle Groups are not excluded from using the OHQs provided by the 
Framework Nations (see Lindstrom, fn 117 above, p14). A Battle Group can be composed of one or any number 
of EU Member States. Although many Battle Groups have been formed and continue to be formed in an ongoing 
process. Nevertheless, none have so far been used in practice in SSA or elsewhere. 
177GAERC, Brussels, 22 March, 2004, ‘The Battle groups Concepts, UK/France/Germany Food for Thought 
Paper, 10 February, 2004, in ‘EU Security and Defence: Core Documents, Vol V Chaillot paper 2005 No 75.  
178Article 44 TEU. These and the other mechanisms are different from the ‘permanent structured co-operation’ 
provided for in Article 42(6) TEU at Lisbon (also see Article 46 TEU; and Protocol (No.10) annexed to the 
Treaties).  
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6.5. Mali case study 
 
In line with the previous Chapters on other fields of EU external action, this section discusses 
Mali as a case study for the conduct of CSDP crisis management in SSA on the back of the 
framework of CSDP crisis management discussed above. This is with a view to determining the 
overall coherence of EU policies towards SSA in general, and perhaps policy coherence for 
development in the same context.179  
 
It is noteworthy that this case study is unavoidably even a shorter case study in comparison with 
the short CFSP case study discussed in the previous Chapter.180 This is because some of the 
aspects of Mali crisis, its evolutionary background and the EU's role therein has been set out in 
that Chapter181 and does not need to be repeated here in its entirety.  
 
6.5.1. CSDP crisis management in Mali: a pertinent background  
 
Without needing to repeat the contextual background of the Mali crisis here, the analysis would 
inevitably start with the immediate pertinent background to the requirement of the CSDP crisis 
management in Mali. In this regard, it will be recalled that following the intensification of 
conflict on the back of the foiled military coup in Mali in March 2012, the interim government 
of Mali on 1st September 2012 requested the assistance of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in combating the insurgents and also terrorism. This was followed 
by successive requests by both the interim Government of Mali and ECOWAS for the support 
                                                 
179However, see the discussion at 6.3. above on the view that the question of policy coherence for development 
in the context of the CSDP is entirely a different matter from what it is in the context of the CFSP in the light of 
the ad hoc nature of CSDP crisis management.  
180See Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.5.  
181Ibid. 
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of the international community which eventually got the attention of the UN. The requests were 
for an UNSC resolution authorising an international military stabilisation force to assist the 
armed forces of Mali acting under Chapter VII as provided by the UN Charter.182 As will be 
recalled from above,183 the primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace lies with 
the UN and the UNSC. In response to the joint call by the interim Government of Mali and 
ECOWAS, the UNSC on October 12 2012, unanimously adopted at the first instance the UNSC 
Resolution 2071. This was an authorisation for ECOWAS and the Africa Union (AU) as the key 
regional and African continental security mechanisms respectively, to develop a plan for 
military intervention in Mali. They were to report back to the UNSC on this within 45 days.184 
This Resolution also included a call for the international community including international 
organisations such as the EU185 to become involved in the bid to resolve conflict.186  
On October 15 2012, the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) concluded, inter alia, that the EU 
was convinced of the need for a rapid response to the security challenges and terrorist threat in 
Mali within a framework to be defined by the United Nations Security Council [UNSC].187 This 
was the background to the EU's response, even if limited, to the Mali crisis under the CSDP 
framework as will now be discussed. 
 
6.5.2. The EU's response to the Mali crisis: between the advisory and technical aspects of 
crisis management tasks and CSDP military operation  
 
Almost immediately following the call on the international community by the UN, the EU 
                                                 
182See Security Council, Resolution S/RES/2071 (2012), adopted by the Security Council at its 6846th meeting, 
on 12 October 2012. 
183At 6.3.2. 
184Ibid, para 7. 
185As indicated above in Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.3.1.), the question of whether the EU is an international 
organisation is controversial. It is also outside the scope of this thesis.  
186Ibid, para 9. 
187See Council of the European union, Council Conclusions on the situation in Mali 3191st Foreign Affairs 
Council, Meeting, Luxembourg, 15 October 2012, para 5, 6th indent [author’s emphasis]. 
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embarked on the plan for a EU Training Mission (EUTM)188 to provide training and advice to 
the Malian armed forces. The EU expressly reckoned that the developments might have a spill-
over effect on neighbouring countries and compromise lasting peace and development 
throughout the Sahel. Furthermore, the EU also recognised that the situation increased the threat 
to the safety of the EU’s citizens in the Sahel as well as in Europe. Moreover, the situation 
equally posed a direct threat to the EU’s strategic interests including the security of energy 
supply and the fight against human and drugs trafficking.189These were clearly contrary to the 
development and security objectives expressed in the relevant instruments of the EU’s external 
relations and objectives discussed in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis.190 The EU clearly 
demonstrated its commitment by embarking on the plan to deploy a EUTM.191 However, while 
this plan was still in the works, there was further escalation of violence as the combat units from 
the insurgents which previously operated in the North192 moved down South with threats of 
further spread. Against this background, the UN adopted Resolution 2085 (on 20 December 
2012) authorising the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission to Mali 
(AFISMA).193 This Resolution also issued a similar call to the one in Resolution 2071 cited 
above. As terror continued to be unleashed aggressively and progressively in the face of all 
authorised plans, repelling the insurgents became a matter of emergency. Consequently, on 10 
January 2013, the UNSC issued a Press Statement calling for a rapid deployment of AFISMA 
                                                 
188European Union External Action, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EU Training Mission in Mali 
(EUTM Mali), EUTM, Mali/1, January 13; Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission 
to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) [2013] OJ L14/19, p 1. 
189Ibid. 
190See respectively Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.4.; and Chapter Three at 3.2.  
191Previously, it had also deployed EUCAP Sahel Niger, a civilian mission launched in the summer of 2012 in 
order to improve the capacities of Nigerian Security Forces to fight terrorism and organised crime (Council 
Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) [2012] OJ 
L187/48). 
192See Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.5.1. 
193Okemuo, fn 37 above. 
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and equally reiterating its call to Member States to assist the settlement of the Mali crisis. 194 
However, while the EU was quick to respond with a decision to send a EUTM to Mali during 
the less aggressive stage of the conflict, it did not maintain this response reflex at this latter and 
more aggressive stage of the conflict. In particular, it is arguable that the EU’s response-reflex 
to the call for a military bridging operation prior to the arrival of AFISMA was inert. This is not 
to say that the EU did not make any positive move following the intensification of the conflict 
and the adoption of Resolution 2085. Indeed, the EU promised to accelerate preparations for 
the deployment of the EUTM. Nevertheless, the EUTM is not the same as a military bridging 
operation which was required for peacekeeping prior to the arrival of AFISMA. For example, 
the EUTM is a military advice and assistance task which is deployed for training purposes. 
While this would be necessary at early stage of a conflict or as post-conflict project, it cannot 
substitute for a task of combat forces in crisis management. The latter is required for 
peacekeeping as was required pending the arrival of AFISMA. There was a clear request for 
assistance from the Union’s African partners as represented by Mali’s President, supported by 
ECOWAS and the AU.  
 
In the face of the EU’s inertia, France responded to the call and on 11 January 2013 deployed a 
combined land and air forces (Operation Serval) to Mali as a bridging operation pending the 
deployment of AFISMA. The Permanent Representative of France informed the UNSC that 
France had answered to the request for military assistance issued by the Malian authorities by 
providing, within the bounds of international law, the support of its armed forces to the Malian 
units engaged in the fight against terrorist groups.195 He rightly pointed out that the evolution 
                                                 
194Security Council Press Statement on Mali, SC/10878 AFR/2502. 
195Okemuo, fn 37 above. 
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of the situation justified the acceleration of the implementation of Resolution 2085 which 
includes the deployment of AFISMA.196 France did not give any explanation for why it was 
going it cavalier seul rather than within the EU framework. In the same vein, the EU did not 
give any indication as to why it would not act in this instance despite its commitments to African 
crisis management.197 It is noteworthy that some EU Member States (including Belgium, 
Denmark and the UK) provided military logistic support to France.198 This may raise the 
question whether these Member States would not have contributed to an EU military operation 
in Mali. However, even if this were answered in the affirmative, it does not presuppose that a 
unanimous decision for a CSDP military operation would have been achieved. As indicated 
above,199 while unanimity is difficult to achieve, it is more so in the specific context of the 
CSDP due to some of the factors discussed above.  
 
In general, as discussed in the previous Chapter, it may be that EU Member States were not 
keen on the Mali crisis primarily due to resource limitations or due to this and indifference (or 
even deference to Member State(s) that are more affected by the crisis). The latter may also 
stem from the original sensitivities towards this field of policy. In fact Davies explains that Mali 
which was a former French colony has long been a priority for French, and to a lesser extent 
Spanish foreign policy, and that both countries tried to push for more EU engagement for some 
time without much success. It was reportedly not until the deaths of European hostages 
prompted more interest from other states, notably the UK that even the initial decision to act 
under the EU framework was made. Suffice it to state that while the EU Member States at the 
                                                 
196Ibid. 
197See 6.2.2. above. 
198Biscop, S, et al 'Mali: another European intervention without the EU', Security Policy Brief, No. 42, January 
2012, p 1. 
199At 6.4.1.  
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heart of the historical relations between Europe and SSA are arguably keen to Europeanise their 
foreign policy, their 'European reflex'200 for SSA is not always matched by the 'European reflex' 
of other Member States who traditionally had no Africa policy. Of course, the former have more 
interests in SSA. In this regard, although it subsequently gained the support of some other EU 
Member States, it was France which arguably have more vested interest in Mali than any other 
EU Member State that eventually took the initiative to answer the call for military intervention 
in Mali after it failed to convince other EU Member States on the need to respond to that call.201 
Of course, the long presence of France in Mali may justify the fear of intervention without an 
end, but Operation Serval was objectively adjudged effective in Mali. Although it was not a 
magic bullet, and may not have fixed any of the underlying problems that caused the crisis in 
the first place, it certainly did halt Mali’s collapse. 
 
From a legal perspective, France did not flout the rules as it clearly consulted the other EU 
Member States before undertaking the action in Mali, as required by the Treaties.202 In the same 
vein, the Member States are also not required to adopt a Joint Action. How safe then for the EU 
that even in its commitment to peace and security in Africa, it did not assume ultimate authority 
but placed this squarely where it belongs namely, on the UN and the UNSC. However, this does 
not detract from the requirement of coherence by way of the construction of a united vis-a-vis 
synergy in the sequencing of policy options available to resolve a crisis. Significantly, this 
requirement was not met by the Union's failure to deploy the military peacekeeping force as 
                                                 
200See Nuttall, S, European Political Cooperation (OUP, 1992), p 312. 
201See the previous page. This was therefore not a question of subsidiarity (Missiroli, A, 'The European Union: 
Just a Regional Peacekeeper?' (2003) 8 EFA Rev. 4, p 501). And, whether this was the same reason why France 
and Britain respectively went cavalier seul in Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone during the crisis in these two 
countries of SSA is difficult to say.  
202Article 32 TEU (ex Article 16 TEU as amended) [emphasis mine]. 
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required pending the arrival of AFISMA in Mali. And this in turn impacts on policy coherence 
for development. As mentioned earlier, the HR/VP and the EEAS have little or no influence in 
this regard.  
 
6.6. Conclusions 
 
The Chapter discussed the CSDP crisis management in SSA using Mali as a case study. It 
submits that although the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP and is embedded in the latter's 
framework as codified at Lisbon, the specificity of the former is illustrated not only by its 
distinct scope of objectives which was widened at Lisbon but also by its distinct institutional 
procedure. Against this background, it argues that while there is an overlap between the scope 
of the CSDP and development policy, the question of policy coherence for development even 
as a facon de parler may not arise with regards to the strictly short term ad hoc CSDP measures 
as with trade and CFSP instruments which are long term measures. Nevertheless, using Mali as 
a case study, it concedes that this does not mean that the question of policy coherence for 
development is irrelevant in the context of the CSDP as it relates to the determination of 
coherence based on a constructive whole vis-a-vis synergy in the sequencing of policy options 
available to resolve a crisis or conflict. Furthermore, it submits that in any event the potentials 
for the HR/VP and the EEAS to enhance coherence as it relates to the CSDP may be quite 
limited if not non-existent in the light of the specific objectives and institutional procedure of 
the CSDP. 
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Chapter Seven 
7.0. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)1: what coherence?  
7.1. Introduction 
 
The distinct EU policies that best provide a strategic background for the analysis of policy 
coherence, including policy coherence for development in EU external relations law and 
policies with special reference to SSA have been discussed in the last four Chapters of this 
thesis. While there is evidence of the Union's commitment to these different dimensions of the 
principle of coherence in the relevant instruments of the different policies, the Union did not 
stop at these. Rather and true to its commitment to the pursuit of coherence, the Union 
eventually set out to develop an overarching framework expressly geared towards achieving, 
inter alia, coherence in EU external action towards Africa including policy coherence for 
development especially in the context of EU external action towards SSA.2 The culminating 
instrument from many years of progressive effort in this regard namely the JAES was adopted 
in 2007 at about the same time as the Lisbon Treaty. However, the former became functional 
before the Lisbon Treaty came into force two years after the latter's adoption. In general, it is 
arguable that the Lisbon emphasis on coherence for effectiveness, amongst others,3 were 
equally at the core of the JAES. Indeed, the JAES only came into force before the Lisbon Treaty 
because the latter required full ratification by all EU Member States. In contrast to the Lisbon 
Treaty, the JAES is more or less a soft law instrument of a political partnership between the 
continents of Europe and Africa as respectively represented by the EU and its Member States 
                                                 
1See The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: a Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan, EU-Africa Summit, 
Lisbon, 8-9, December 2007; and also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council - From Cairo to Lisbon – The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership {SEC(2007) 855} {SEC(2007) 856} /* 
COM/2007/0357 final */ 
2See Chapter Two of this thesis (especially at 2.5.1. and 2.5.2.).  
3See Chapter One of this thesis at 1.1. 
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on the one hand, and the African Union (AU) and its Member States on the other hand. The 
JAES did not require ratification but the political agreement of the leaders on both sides. As 
discussed below, this political dimension of the JAES does not necessarily mean that the JAES 
is completely devoid of all legal relevance.4  
 
Similar to EU external action towards SSA in general, the JAES has been subjected to analysis 
from many different perspectives.5 However, these have mainly centred on the assessment of 
the extent that the different policy objectives have been achieved.6 While these are legitimate 
aims, for the purposes of this thesis, the JAES is examined with the aim of determining its 
significance for the coherence of EU external action towards SSA, including policy coherence 
for development. As discussed below, this was one of its original aims.7  
 
Although the JAES is a strategy not a policy, its analysis in this Chapter is structured in a similar 
way to the Chapters on the distinct EU policies analysed in this thesis.8 In this regard, the 
analysis of the JAES in the present Chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
provides the contextual background to the JAES. Although it is clear that the JAES evolved on 
the heels of the legal instrument that primarily regulates EU external action towards SSA 
                                                 
4On soft law, see for example, Hillgenberg, H, ‘A fresh look at soft law’(1999) EJIL 3, p 499-515; and Van Vooren, 
B, 'A case study of 'soft law' in EU external relations: the European Neighbourhood Policy' (2009) ELRev., p 698). 
5See for example, Mangala, J, 'Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Historical Background, Institutional Architecture, 
and Theoretical Frameworks' in Mangala, J, (ed.), Europe and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
6Ibid. 
7See the following analysis. Although the JAES also addresses coherence between the three different instruments 
for EU relations with different parts of Africa namely the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA ) with South 
Africa, this dimension of coherence is outside the limited scope of this thesis. Indeed, the JAES is too extensive 
to make a complete mapping of all its aspects or dimensions. Because of this, only certain aspects are selected for 
a more careful analysis. Of course, the chief criteria for selection is relevance to answering the research question. 
Other delimitations regarding the analysis of the JAES are highlighted in the course of the analysis.   
8See Chapters Three to Six of this thesis. 
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namely the Cotonou Agreement,9 it is not necessarily the case that the contextual background 
to the Cotonou Agreement provides a complete replacement for the distinct and specific 
evolutional background to the JAES. The latter is therefore an important aspect of this analysis. 
The second section analyses the legal basis of this soft law instrument of political partnership, 
its scope of objectives, and the sub instruments employed for the purposes of achieving the 
latter with special reference to SSA. The third section pertinently discusses the institutional 
dimensions of the JAES including in relation to decision making and implementation. In line 
with the relevant previous Chapters of this thesis on distinct EU policies, this section 
imperatively analyses the dimensions brought by the HR/VP and the EEAS at her service 
especially with regards to coherence. The fourth and final section focuses on Mali as a case 
study for assessing the practical import of the JAES on the question of coherence in EU external 
action towards SSA.  
 
The Chapter submits that the JAES is by all intents and purposes an instrument for coherence 
in EU external action towards Africa in general, and policy coherence for development 
especially in the context of EU external action towards SSA.10 However, it argues that in its 
practice, which mainly revolves around financial and technical support and political dialogue, 
the JAES follows the functional and institutional distinction between the distinct EU policies 
as discussed in the previous Chapters of this thesis. Conversely, the Chapter suggests that this 
is not surprising in so far as the JAES framework is not a separate policy but a framework built 
on, and intended to deepen the original frameworks of EU external action towards the African 
continent through further financial and technical support and also strengthened dialogue as the 
Mali case study illustrates. Against this background, it argues that it would nevertheless not be 
                                                 
9See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.  
10Where the later mainly applies. 
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correct to conclude that the JAES does not have any prospects of  contributing to the coherence 
of EU external policies towards SSA, including policy coherence for development, especially 
as it is flexible in following the traditional functional and institutional distinction between the 
relevant distinct EU policies. This, the Chapter conclusively asserts, remains the case even 
though the potentials of the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service to enhance coherence in this 
context also follow their general potential to enhance the coherence of EU external policies 
towards SSA, including policy coherence for development as discussed in the context of the 
interaction between the distinct EU policies towards the region examined in this thesis.11 
Overall, the Chapter reconfirms the conclusion made in the relevant previous Chapters of this 
thesis, that coherence of EU external action towards SSA in general, and policy coherence 
thereto, is a matter mainly dependent on the political will of the Member States, and sometimes, 
the relevant traditional EU institutions. This is the case post as pre-Lisbon and despite the 
coordinating role of the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service. 
 
7.2. The legal basis, scope and instruments of the JAES  
 
As discussed in the previous Chapters in relation to other EU policies, the legal basis, scope 
and instruments of EU policies are relevant to the coherence discourse. This is because these 
legal aspects hold implications for the procedural and institutional aspects of EU external 
policies including as they relate to coherence. As discussed below,12 although the JAES is an 
instrument jointly agreed by the EU and its African partners, it is first and foremost an EU 
instrument. This means that it cannot possibly evolve outside the general principles of EU law 
including the law of EU external relations, in the light of the principle of conferral and the 
                                                 
11See Chapters Three to Six of this thesis; and also Chapter Eight which offers the overall conclusion to the thesis.  
12See below. 
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Staatenverbund status of the Union.13 Of course, this last sentence does not detract from the 
flexibility and pragmatism that marks the practice of EU external relations law and policies. As 
discussed earlier in this thesis, such flexibility and pragmatism are embraced in a bid to 
negotiate the complexity that naturally arises from the inevitable interaction between law and 
politics in what is foreign policy in all but name.14 Prior to a discussion of its legal dimension, 
the next section provides a pertinent contextual background to the JAES. 
 
7.2.1. The JAES: a contextual background  
 
As mentioned earlier,15 the JAES has a long history dating back to the established traditional 
frameworks of EU external relations with SSA. These previous developments are chronicled in 
the relevant previous Chapters of this thesis.16 However, for the purposes of this Chapter, the 
distinct contextual background to the JAES especially as it relates to the coherence discourse 
can simply be traced back to a specific development namely the EU-Africa Summit in Cairo in 
2000 and the resultant Cairo Plan of Action17 (hereinafter Cairo Action Plan).  
 
The EU-Africa Summit in Cairo was inspired by a recognition of the need for a more specific 
relationship with Africa. Prima facie, this has no connection to coherence. Nevertheless, it can 
be argued that it relates to coherence even if not explicitly stated. As discussed in Chapter Two 
of this thesis, the Union's external action towards SSA originally began with trade and 
development but eventually expanded to a security and political dimension. Part of the reason 
for this was the prevalence of conflict and political instability in SSA, and the recognition of 
                                                 
13See Chapter Two of this thesis. 
14Ibid.  
15At 7.1.  
16See Chapters Two, Three and Five of this thesis. 
17Cairo Plan of Action: Africa-Europe Summit under the ÆGIS of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000. 
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the relationship between security and development. In this regard, it will be recalled that the 
EU foreign and security policy under the CFSP were divorced functionally and institutionally 
from the economic and development policies under the non-CSFP competence of the EU. 
Ndukanbagezi18 posits that the countries of SSA were not satisfied with the arrangement where 
political matters were not discussed in the same forum as the economic and development 
policies under the Cotonou Partnership arrangement.19  As a result of their dissatisfaction with 
the contrasting arrangement in relation to political matters, the countries of SSA pressed for a 
forum for political relations with the EU. Significantly, this development also coincided with 
the clamour of African countries for the EU’s recognition of, and interlocution with, the 
Organisation for African Unity (OAU) – the predecessor of the AU. Similar to the AU, the OAU 
was evolving as the central coordinating point of the continental political agenda of Africa.20 
 
On the EU side, it could not have been hard to negotiate a mutual inter-continental compromise. 
Europe appreciates and has never been shy to stress its special relationship with Africa. 
Arguably, this is not only because of the historical relationship discussed earlier in this thesis,21 
but also because SSA is the largest, potentially richest and geographically closest region to the 
EU in comparison with their counterparts in the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) group of 
states22 as organised for development cooperation.23 In any event, an agreement was reached 
between the EU leaders and their African counterparts to launch a comprehensive framework 
                                                 
18See Nkundabagenzi, F, ‘L’Union Europeenne et la Prevention Des Conflits Africain’, RAPPORT DU GRIP, 
2000/3.  
19The forum was the ACP-EU Council of Ministers which is one of the institutions of the successive association 
agreements between EU and SSA (Ibid., p 16).  
20It had also adopted the Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts in 1993.OAU 
Declaration on a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, The Heads of State and 
Government of the Organization of African Unity, Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session, Cairo, Egypt, 28-30 June 1993. 
21See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.2.4.2.  
22ECDPM ‘Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership Strategy’, Issue paper I, ‘The EU-Africa partnership in 
historical perspective’ (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2006), p 2. 
23See Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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for political dialogue between Europe and Africa under the aegis of the EU and the AU 
respectively. This culminated in the EU-Africa Summit in 2000 and the resultant Cairo Action 
Plan. Adopted in the same year as the Cotonou Agreement, the Cairo Action Plan was a 
comprehensive and institutionalised framework for political dialogue between Europe and 
Africa with a plan of action in priority areas. This was not expressed as an instrument for 
coherence. However, it was arguably relevant to coherence. Indeed, its priority areas for the 
political dialogue traversed all the aspects of the Cotonou Agreement namely regional 
integration in Africa; integration of Africa into the world economy (including inter alia, trade 
and investment)24; human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and 
the rule of law25; peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution26; 
development issues including sustainable development challenges and poverty eradication 
amongst others.27 As explained earlier, the Summit which gave birth to the Cairo Action Plan 
is a meeting of the Heads of State and Government of EU Member States on the one hand, and 
the Heads of State and Government of Africa countries on the other hand. It follows that these 
different strands of policy were discussed at the level of the EU’s apex institution namely the 
European Council prior to joint discussion with their African counter parts. In this regard, it is 
arguable that bringing all these different policy areas together for discussion within the EU’s 
apex institution28 prior to joint discussion with the Union’s African partners could contribute to 
coherence. However, it must not be lost on one that what normally obtains at this level of 
decision-making would mainly be guidelines and not necessarily operational decisions. As 
                                                 
24Other aspects of this are private sector development, development resources, industrial infrastructure, research 
& technology, debt, cooperation in international fora. 
25Including the role of civil society, migration, refugees etc.  
26Including Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, terrorism, small arms and 
light weapons, anti-personal mines, non-proliferation and post-conflict reconstruction. 
27Such as health, environment, food security, drug consumption and trafficking, culture (including the export or 
removal of African cultural goods). 
28See Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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discussed in Chapter Five, the European Council decision-making is limited to guidelines 
pursuant to Article of the Treaties, but it is the operational decisions adopted by the Council 
that are of more relevance to coherence in practice, and hence of more relevance to the 
coherence discourse. Having said that, it is noteworthy that apart from its institutional aspect, 
the Cairo Action Plan substantially embraced the development-security interface even though 
security and development were accentuated differently by the EU side and the African side 
respectively.29 
 
In any event, the Cairo Plan of Action did not produce very successful outcomes.30 While there 
may have been other reasons for this,31 it is arguable that internal issues of coherence within 
the EU were also contributory factors. Indeed, six years after the Cairo Plan of Action, the EU 
recognised the persisting need for coherence and accordingly developed the EU Strategy for 
Africa.32  
 
In contrast to the Cairo Action Plan, the EU Strategy for Africa expressly evolved as an 
instrument for coherence. The Commission Communication33 which proposed it says that 
much,34 and reveals that the concentration on coherence was inspired by the need for 
                                                 
29As discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis, the latter is a persistent aspect of EU’s relations with SSA in that the 
EU generally accentuates security as the precondition to development while SSA accentuates development as the 
precondition for security. This is of course not to say that the development-security interface is the only policy 
interaction with implications for coherence in EU external action towards SSA. The analysis of the EU trade policy 
illustrates this much (see Chapter Four of this thesis). 
30See ECDPM fn 22 above, p 2. 
31Perhaps including the fact that both parties (the EU and its African partners) were jointly responsible for its 
implementation.  
32See Council of the European Union, The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 19 
December 2005 15961/05. 
33EU strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development. Communication from 
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee. 
COM (2005) 489 final, 12 October 2005. [EU Commission - COM Document]. This was produced at the request 
of the European Council (see Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16-17 June 2005, Council of the European Union 
10255/1/05, para 75).  
34The EU Strategy for Africa was adopted by the Council following this Communication produced by the 
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effectiveness and the need to accelerate Africa’s development needs and progress towards 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).35 While this was arguably about policy 
coherence for development, the dimension of coherence that was engaged in the first instance 
was vertical coherence which revolves around the coordination of EU development policy with 
the development policies of the Member States. Indeed, the European Council request to the 
Commission which prompted the latter's proposal was geared towards policy coherence for 
development vis-a-vis a global European approach towards Africa as a whole36 (also known as 
bi-continental approach37). In this regard, the Commission considered three approaches to 
achieving this through the EU Strategy for Africa: 
 
Retention of approach where each Member State and the EU autonomously developed and 
implemented their own policies and strategies towards all African sectors, countries and 
organisations.  
 
A centralised policy which would require common guidelines for all EU Member States 
and the EU in all areas 
 
A balanced approach between a complete merging of aid policies and the absence of 
strategic co-ordination, based on the experience gained and lessons learnt from the EU’s 
long-standing relationship with Africa.38 
Out of these three options which are geared towards achieving vertical coherence, the third 
approach was chosen by the EU on the conviction that it would give the best possible outcome 
in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence.39 This was the approach taken earlier in the 
                                                 
Commission  
35Ibid., para 75; for more on the MDGs as an integral part of EU development policy towards SSA, and its 
expiration (and replacement by the Sustainable Development Goals), see Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.2.1., 
especially fn 59 therein. 
36Council of the European Union 10255/1/05, fn 33 above, para 75.  
37This has been described as a bi-continental approach in Vasconcelos, A, ‘Security for Africans’ (2007) 5 ESDP 
p 10. 
38The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, House of Lords European Union Committee, 34th Report 
of Session 2005-06, Volume 1, July 2006, p 30. 
39Ibid. The first approach was dropped as it would mean that EU Africa policy would remain fragmented or create 
duplications. The second approach was equally dropped because of the potential difficulty of reaching unanimous 
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European Consensus on Development.40 By and large, the issue is primarily about vertical 
coherence in the context of development aid policy.  
 
However, it is noteworthy that the Commission's Communication did not stop at vertical 
coherence and the bi-continental41 approach42 in its proposal for the EU Strategy. Rather, the 
Commission also included its own take which bordered on the horizontal coherence of EU 
policies towards the region so that the final EU Strategy for Africa embraced a comprehensive 
approach, including with a stretch towards the security-development nexus.43 Of course, this 
was not devoid of a display of the characteristic division between the CFSP and the non-CFSP 
development policy. Indeed, a CFSP paper was separately produced on the security aspects of 
the EU Strategy for Africa covering the contribution that the CFSP and the CSDP could make.44 
This CFSP paper emphasised, inter alia, the importance of peace and security as a complement 
to the original paper presented by the EU Commission. In general, the CFSP aspect of the bi-
continental approach eventually stood distinct within the JAES which the EU Strategy for 
Africa morphed into, leading (or adding) to compartmentalisation that has to come to mark the 
former in practice. This affirms the functional and institutional distinction along policy lines as 
discussed in the relevant Chapters of this thesis.45 As discussed below, the implication of this 
for the assessment of coherence in the context of this thesis is that the JAES  ultimately yields 
no significant separate result from the overall conclusion on coherence that could be made from 
                                                 
agreement in such detail for all sectors concerned. Furthermore, there was also the potential to lose specific added 
value by certain actors in specific sectors or regions.  
40See Chapter Five of this thesis. 
41Vasconcelos, fn 37 above, p 10. 
42Both of which are outside the scope of this thesis (see the scope of this thesis as defined at 1.2. above). 
43As indicated in Chapter five of this thesis (see Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.4., especially at fn 166), the 
Commission is in fact known for its influence in shaping EU-Africa policies (Sicurelli, D, ‘Framing security and 
development in the EU Pillar structure: How the views of the European Commission affect EU Africa policy’ 
(2008) 30 European Integration 2, p 217-234). 
44See House of Lords European Union Committee, fn 38 above, para, 84.  
45See Chapters Three to Six of this thesis. 
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observing the extent of compliance with policy coherence for development, and the extent of 
synergy in the interaction between the instruments, institutions and functional dimensions of 
the distinct policies of EU external action towards SSA as offered in Chapter Eight of this 
thesis.46 Nevertheless, as the Mali case study illustrates,47 while the JAES is not a distinct policy 
but an overall umbrella framework covering the distinct EU external policies towards Africa, 
its indirect approach could specifically fall short of coherence with direct or operational EU 
support where there is a need for synergistic sequencing of available policy options in resolving 
a crisis.  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the EU Strategy for Africa was an autonomous EU 
instrument. Indeed, from all indications, there was no reference to a Joint Strategy at the 
beginning. This is not surprising in so far as the relevant policies are first and foremost EU 
policies, and their coherence is generally dependent on the Union. However, in a development 
that is not uncharacteristic of the contemporary dynamics of Africa-Europe relations, African 
leaders expressed concern that the EU had not consulted them on the EU Strategy for Africa. 
They also demanded that any strategy should be jointly developed and owned by both 
continents. Their concern was that the EU Strategy for Africa had a European bias which was 
not conducive to creating African ownership.48 Eventually an agreement was reached that the 
African side should present a matrix towards the development of an action plan for the EU 
Strategy. Subsequently, a joint implementation matrix of commitments was developed and 
presented to the AU-EU expert’s meeting in Addis Ababa in February 2006. This was endorsed 
                                                 
46See the next Chapter which is the conclusion Chapter of this thesis. 
47See 7.5. below. 
48Tywuschik, V, and Sherriff, A, ‘Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy’, (2009), ECDPM Discussion Paper 87, p 2. 
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at the EU-African Troika meeting in May 2006,49 and was the direct background to the JAES 
adopted in 2007 to enhance ‘the coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies 
and instruments’.50 Although it is a joint strategy and also committed to ‘a Euro-African 
consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives’,51 the JAES is not 
necessarily under the equal control of the EU and its African partners. Rather, similar to other 
EU instruments and policies including the EU Strategy for Africa which it evolved from, the 
JAES is first and foremost an EU policy,52 primarily implemented by the EU and its Member 
States.  
 
In the same vein, although the JAES can be described as an overarching political framework 
for Africa-EU relations,53 this is mainly with regards to its coverage of the African continent as 
a whole in contrast to the Cotonou Agreement which covers only SSA in the continent. In this 
regard, it has been suggested that the JAES co-exists rather uneasily with the Cotonou 
Agreement.54 However, in practice the strategic priorities of the JAES partnership55 arguably 
illustrate a reinforcement of the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. This forges a better view 
of the JAES as an instrument for coherence. Nevertheless, it does not equally provide a final 
indicator as to the legal and institutional implications of the JAES for coherence in the context 
of EU external action towards SSA. This can only be addressed by an analysis of the legal and 
                                                 
49Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting, May, 2006, Vienna, Council of the European Union 
9333/06. 
50JAES, fn 1 above, para 6. 
51See the JAES, fn 1 above. 
52This view, which may appear trite, is also expressed by the House of Lords EU Committee (fn17 above, at para 
435); also see Cremona, M, ‘The European Neighborhood Policy: more than a partnership?’ in Cremona, M, (ed.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2008), p 277) where she expresses the same view with regards 
to the ENP which also had ‘joint ownership’ at its core; and Van Vooren, B, ‘A case-study of ‘soft law’ in EU 
external relations: the European Neighborhood Policy’ (2009) ELRev, p 698. In contrast to the JAES, The ENP has 
been accorded a Treaty status under Article 8 TEU. 
53Bossuyt, J, and Sherriff, A, ‘What next for the Joint-Africa-EU Strategy’, ECDPM 2010, p 7. 
54Ibid. 
55See 7.2.3. below. 
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institutional dimensions of the JAES. In this regard, the following sub-sections will discuss the 
legal basis and scope of the JAES prior to the discussion of the sub-instruments of the JAES 
and the institutional dimension of the JAES with special reference to SSA.  
 
7.2.2. The legal basis for a 'politico-legal' JAES 
 
There is no express indication of the legal basis which the pre-JAES EU Strategy for Africa 
was created under. The same goes for the JAES. Its legal basis is not expressly indicated. This 
is prima facie contrary to the core principles of EU external relations law as discussed in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. However, as will equally be recalled from that Chapter, flexibility 
is also a characteristic of EU external relations law, allowing for some exigencies to be met in 
the practice of EU external relations. In this regard, Hillion56 notes that the increasing use of 
instruments that are not explicitly envisaged by the Treaties is one of the recent trends in the 
practice of EU external relations.57 In general, that the flexible instruments are not envisaged 
in the Treaties means that they are not specific to any legal basis. However, this is not to say 
that the lack of a specific legal basis for a flexible instrument translates to a lack of any basis 
in the EU legal order for their existence. The JAES is illustrative in this regard.  
 
The lack of an explicit legal basis for the JAES makes it difficult to locate its exact place in EU 
external relations law. However, an understanding of its place in this field of EU law is an 
integral part of this study. This is not solely due to the Staatenverbund status of the EU and the 
attendant principle of conferral, but also because this study is primarily a legal analysis albeit 
placed in its historical and political contexts. In this regard, this section discusses the JAES as 
                                                 
56See Hillion, C, ‘The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy towards Eastern Europe’ in Dashwood, A, and Maresceau, M, 
Law and Practice of EU External Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
57 Ibid., p 309.   
 301 
 
 
a hybrid CFSP instrument with a cross-pillar effect in the context of EU external action towards 
SSA.  
 
From a legal perspective, the JAES could prima `facie be construed as an instrument outside 
the Treaty framework similar to the pre-Lisbon ENP. However, the JAES could also be 
contrasted from the pre-Lisbon ENP to the extent that the former is arguably implementing an 
existing instrument namely the Cotonou Agreement.58 In any event, the JAES cannot be 
categorised as an instrument of the Union's non-CFSP competence under the ex-Community 
Pillar. This leaves it with being either a CFSP instrument or an instrument of what has been 
described as the EU’s hidden Fourth pillar.59 From all indications, the JAES could rightly be 
construed as a CFSP instrument or at least a CFSP aspect of a flexible Fourth Pillar if this exists. 
In this regard, it matters little that the JAES may be reaffirming or even be 'substantiating' the 
Cotonou Agreement. Indeed, as will be recalled from Chapter Five of this thesis, the Common 
Position on Africa60 illustrates that the EU can pursue any of its external policy objectives 
towards Africa through any of its external policies. This is a position that has since been 
reaffirmed in the ECOWAS case61 and most recently has also been entrenched in the Treaties.62 
The legal basis for CFSP instruments have been discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
Substantially, the analysis was limited to the two core CFSP instruments namely ‘decisions 
defining actions to be taken by the Union’ (formerly known as Joint Action) and ‘decisions 
defining positions to be taken by the Union’ (formerly known as Common Position).63 
                                                 
58 Mangala, fn 5 above, p 10.   
59See Torrent, R, ‘The ‘Fourth Pillar’ of the European Union After the Amsterdam Treaty’ in Dashwood, A, and 
Hillion, C, (ed.) The General Law of EC External Relations (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000), p 221-235. 
60Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa [2005] O J L97/57. 
61Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (ECOWAS/SALW) [2005] OJ C115/10. 
62By virtue of Article 21(2) TEU. 
63See Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.3. where the sui generis comprehensive EU Strategy for the Sahel was also 
discussed due to its primarily functional and institutional leaning towards security as an aspect of foreign and 
security policy (see Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.3.3.). 
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Essentially, although the CFSP instrument of systematic cooperation64 was identified in that 
Chapter, it was excluded from that analysis. However, its exclusion from that Chapter was not 
a case of an undue decision to merely overlook or ignore it as is generally attributed to analysts 
of EU foreign policy.65 Rather, the analysis in that Chapter was limited to the two core CFSP 
instruments with clear and direct legal, institutional and practical implications for coherence 
between the CFSP and the non-CFSP EU external action. 66 
 
In the context of this Chapter, the analysis of the place of the JAES within EU external relations 
law brings to fore the relevance of the CFSP instrument of ‘systematic cooperation between 
Member States in the conduct of policy’.67 Significantly, this instrument has never been 
expressly analysed in relation to EU external action towards SSA in general or the JAES in 
particular. In general, the discussion of the JAES as an instrument of systematic cooperation 
under EU external relations law draws mainly from Wessel’s analysis.68 In this regard, Wessel 
opines that the outcome of the systematic cooperation between the Member States may include 
agreements on concerted and convergent actions that are not laid down in one of the formal 
CFSP instruments.69 These agreements results in declarations such as ‘Presidential 
Declarations’, ‘Declarations’, ‘Conclusions’, ‘Decisions’ or ‘Action Plans’ of the Council that 
are not based on specific legal bases.70 Other aspects include, ‘Road Maps’,71 oral agreements 
between Member States or statements made by the Presidency and tacitly accepted by the 
                                                 
64Article 25(c)TEU (ex Article 12 TEU). 
65Keukeleire, S, and MacNaughtan, J, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Macmillan, 2008), p 159. 
66However, see fn 63 above. 
67Article 25(c)TEU (ex Article 12 TEU). 
68Wessel, A, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective (The Hague: 
Kluwer, 1999), p 108-115. 
69Ibid, p 109. 
70Ibid. 
71Hillion, fn 56 above, p 309. 
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Member States, as well as political dialogues.72 These are the forms of instrument adopted in 
the context of the JAES starting from the Cairo Declaration and Action Plan in 2000 up to the 
Lisbon Declaration on the JAES in 2007.73 In fact, ‘joint strategy’ has been listed as a CFSP 
instrument elsewhere74 and there is no reason to regard this as an error. In any event, it is 
noteworthy that these are not by definition less influential than those CFSP legal instruments 
analysed elsewhere in this thesis.75 In fact, as discussed elsewhere in this thesis,76 from a legal 
perspective, these instruments could be categorised as soft law instruments. A lack of express 
indication of a legal base in an instrument does not nullify the latter or render it illegal. 
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that these instruments are not expressly classified as CFSP 
instruments. Furthermore, they are essentially flexible as mentioned earlier. However, this is 
not difficult to understand going by the benefits of flexible atypical devices of EU external 
relations law as explained by Hillion.77 One of these benefits is the ability of the flexible 
mechanisms to offer a relative immunity to the usual institutional competence-squabbles that 
characterise the EU system of external relations.78 Another benefit offered for the resort to the 
flexible mechanisms is their ability to stimulate change in the existing relationship between the 
EU and its partners.79 For example, Hillion further posits that although such non-specific 
instruments can be problematic in terms of legal certainty, transparency and accountability, they 
allow the EU to carve out more coherence and effective foreign policies.80 Indeed, the JAES is 
                                                 
72Wessel, fn 68 above, p 109. 
73For all the instruments of the political partnership in chronological order see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy/third-countries-and-regions/eu-africa-relations?lang=en 
74See Ferreira, P, et al, ‘The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Opportunities for a more Effective EU 
Response to Crisis-Affected Countries in Africa’ (2001) ECDPM Discussion Paper 22. 
75Wessel, fn 68 above, p 115. 
76See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.2. including in particular fn 254 therein. 
77See Hillion, fn 56 above, p 309. 
78Ibid.; also see for example the ECOWAS/SALW case (fn 61 above). 
79Ibid. 
80Ibid. 
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an illustration of the flexibility that comes with an atypical EU instrument, and the attendant 
opportunity to stimulate change and coherence in an existing relationship. However, although 
the JAES may have provided a relative immunity to the usual competence squabble and enabled 
the EU to stimulate change in its existing relations with SSA, the question of whether it has 
allowed the EU to carve out a more coherent and effective foreign policy towards SSA is one 
that does not have an easy answer. Ultimately, the answer may well depend on the dimension 
of coherence in question.81 With specific regards to policy coherence for development including 
coherence based on the construction of a united whole vis-a-vis synergy in the sequencing of 
available policy options, it could be argued that the answer to whether the JAES has enhanced 
these in EU external relations towards SSA will not be different from the general conclusion 
regarding same in the light of the post-Lisbon legal and institutional changes.82 Illustrative is 
the Mali case study.83 This is because, as the Mali case study also illustrates, the JAES which 
is not a separate policy but a new bi-continental framework follows the functional and 
institutional distinction between the distinct EU policies as discussed in the relevant previous 
Chapters of this thesis. Of course, this is not to say that the JAES does not have any prospects 
of contributing to the coherence of EU external policies towards SSA, including policy 
coherence for development. Arguably, these prospects are reflected in the scope of objectives 
of the JAES, its sub-instruments84 and institutional dimension as will now be discussed in turn 
in that order.   
 
                                                 
81As indicated above (at 7.2.1. above), the JAES is geared towards enhancing ‘the coherence [and effectiveness] 
of existing agreements, policies and instruments’ (JAES, para 6). There is also the vertical dimension to these 
which, similar to the coherence of existing instruments, is outside the scope of this thesis (see fn 42 above). 
82See Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
83See 7.5. below. 
84Or implementing instruments. 
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7.2.3. The scope of objectives of the JAES and coherence with special reference to SSA 
 
The scope of the JAES as it relates to coherence can be gleaned from the fact that it is geared 
towards enhancing ‘the coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies and 
instruments’, and also provides 'a political vision and roadmap for the future cooperation 
between Europe and Africa in existing and new areas and arenas'.85 This means that its scope 
of coverage would traverse the scope of existing agreements, policies and instruments of EU 
external relations with SSA, and could also evolve to cover new areas as may be deemed fit in 
the future. Significantly, the scope of issues to which the systematic cooperation applies is not 
subject to any limitation in time and space.86 Indeed, as the following analysis illustrates, the 
JAES has evolved. 
 
From origin, the JAES sets out four main objectives of the partnership in a comprehensive 
framework within which specific strategies will have to be put in place. The four main 
objectives are ‘(a) peace and security, (b) governance and human rights, (c) trade and regional 
integration and (d) key development issues.’87 These objectives are pursued through eight 
strategic partnerships. The partnerships illustrate an embrace of the existing wide areas of 
coverage in EU external action towards SSA. Substantially, these include (1) peace and security, 
(2) democratic governance and human rights, (3) trade, regional integration and infrastructure, 
(4) MDGs, (5) energy, (6) climate change and environment, (7) Migration, Mobility and 
Employment, and (8) Science, Information Society and Space. Arguably, these areas of strategic 
partnership are more or less essential for the achievement of sustainable development and 
ultimately the eradication of poverty.88 However, for the purposes of this analysis which borders 
                                                 
85On the former see fn 81 above; and on the latter see JAES, fn 1 above, para 3, [author's emphasis]. 
86Wessel, fn 68 above, p 101. 
87JAES, fn 1 above, para 10. 
88See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.2.3. on the scope of development policy. 
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on the examination of the JAES as an overarching instrument of coherence in the context of EU 
external action towards SSA, the discussion of the strategic partnerships of the JAES here are 
limited to the more pertinent strategic partnerships. These are the peace and security 
partnership, the trade partnership, and the partnership for the MDGs which is about 
development policy. The pertinence of these strategic partnerships stems from their more direct 
policy proximity to the core EU policies selected as case studies in the context of this thesis 
namely development policy, trade policy and foreign and security policy under the CFSP and 
CSDP.89 Even then, the delimitation sounded above90 applies to the discussion of these strategic 
partnerships. This is not only because the intricate details of these partnerships are irrelevant to 
answering the research questions, they also cannot be easily boiled down and strictly defined.91 
Suffice it to state that the scope of the JAES is as vast as the EU and the Member States will 
agree. In this regard, the pertinent partnerships are discussed under the instruments as follows.92 
 
7.3. The politico-legal instruments of the political partnership with special reference to 
SSA: the JAES and the pertinent sub-instruments  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the JAES is the core instrument of this political partnership 
between the continents of Europe and Africa with the EU and the AU as their respective 
interlocutors. However, it also gives an indication of the instruments of its implementation. 
These are ‘successive short-term Action Plans and enhanced political dialogue at all levels, 
                                                 
89See Chapter Three to Six of this thesis; and for more on the JAES partnerships, see in general, Mangala, fn 5 
above.  
90See fn 7 above. 
91See for example Elowson, C, ‘The Joint Africa EU Strategy – a study of the peace and security partnership’, 
FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2009, p 13, where she makes this point with specific regards to the peace 
and security partnership; also see Olayode, K, 'The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement and the MDGs' in 
Eze, O, and Sesay, A, (ed.) Africa and Europe In the 21st Century (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 
2010), p 152-176, at p 168 and also p172, where he makes similar point with specific regards to the MDG 
partnership. 
92See in particular 7.3.2. below.  
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resulting in concrete and measurable outcomes in all areas of the partnership’.93 This section 
will discuss these cursorily with special reference to their added value to the coherence 
discourse. However, their discussion will be preceded by a cursory analysis of the JAES itself 
with special reference to coherence, especially the coherence of EU external action towards 
SSA. 
 
7.3.1. The JAES: the key instrument and coherence   
 
As indicated above,94 the JAES is an instrument of coherence adopted at about the same time 
as the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, it can be argued that the JAES was adopted in the same spirit as 
the Lisbon Treaty which has at its core the coherence of EU external action. In fact, Görtz and 
Sherriff explains that the JAES was originally billed as the panacea for policy incoherence.95 
This could be traced back to the EU Strategy which the JAES evolved from. However, as the 
House of Lords EU Committee reported on the former prior to the JAES: 
 
‘The EU Strategy appears on paper to be a shining example of an attempt by the EU to 
co-ordinate its various policies in development, security and economic growth to 
achieve the MDGs. However, it does not state how this level of coherence will actually 
be brought about [...]’96 
 
As already indicated above, the EU Strategy for Africa gave way for the JAES which arguably 
transcended the original primary focus on vertical coherence to set the course firmly on 
                                                 
93JAES, fn 1 above, para 5. 
94At 7.1. 
95See in general Görtz, S, and Sherriff, A, 'Is the Joint Africa-EU Strategy still the future?', Nordic Africa Institute 
(NAI) Forum, 2 March 2011, available at http://ecdpm.org/publications/jaes-joint-africa-eu-strategy-still-the-
future/, accessed 22 March 2016. 
96At p 33, para 103. Although the paragraph also touches on the fact that the Strategy does not address issues such 
as agricultural policy which have a significant impact on African economies, the Union's Common Agricultural 
Policy and its impact on coherence is outside the scope of this thesis (see Chapter Four of this thesis). 
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horizontal coherence including as it relates to policy coherence for development. In fact, the 
EU ad hoc Working Party for the negotiation of the JAES was tasked with, inter alia, ensuring 
‘overall policy coherence, drawing on Member States' and the Commission's expertise.’97 
Within the JAES itself, the requirement of coherence is captured as follows:  
‘In the implementation of this new partnership, the principle of policy coherence for 
development will be applied by both African and EU partners by identifying and 
promoting interactions and positive complementarities between sectoral policies and 
strategies, while ensuring that measures taken in one policy area do not undermine 
results in other areas.’98 
 
The above paragraph does not just make reference to horizontal policy coherence across EU 
sectoral policies and strategies in general, but also refers specifically to policy coherence for 
development. Hence, it reaffirms the supremacy of the requirement of policy coherence for 
development in the light of the place of development policy in the unexpressed hierarchy of EU 
external policies towards SSA as discussed earlier in this thesis.99 Of course whether the JAES 
has proved a panacea for incoherence in practice is another matter. In any event, the paragraph 
also brings to mind the question of EU-Africa joint responsibility for coherence which was 
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, albeit with specific regards to the Cotonou 
Agreement.100 In this regard, although both sides commit themselves to enhancing coherence 
under the JAES, such affirmation is not necessarily an indication of a shared responsibility for 
the requirement of coherence in this context.101 Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Union’s 
partners will ensure coherence beyond demanding (during negotiations or political dialogues) 
that the EU ensure same. This does not detract from the fact that even though the duty is on the 
                                                 
97See Council of the European Union, Establishment of an ad hoc working party on the Joint EU-Africa Strategy, 
9246/1/07 REV 1, Brussels, 22 May 2007, para 4, 2nd indent. 
98JAES, para 11. 
99See Chapters Two and Three of this thesis. 
100See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.1.2.  
101Ibid. 
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Union to ensure the coherence of its external policies towards SSA, the complexity of a joint-
responsibility for implementation could have a watering down effect on coherence in practice. 
Illustrative is the Mali case study.102 
 
7.3.2. Action Plans 
 
While the JAES defines the key objectives of the political partnership, the priority actions for 
the different partnerships are spelt out in the successive Action Plans which follows the schedule 
of the triennial EU-Africa Summits.103 Of course, the latter does not neutralise the origin of the 
policy aspects of the partnerships. As discussed earlier, the joint agreement or joint 
implementation of the JAES does not strip it of its origin as an EU policy. The same goes for 
the Action Plans. In practice, the original eight partnerships have been maintained104 with only 
their priority actions expanding where deemed necessary in the successive Action Plans.105 
Illustrative of the latter is the analysis of the following four pertinent partnerships. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
102See 7.5. below. 
103See for example fns 1 and 17 above. 
104However see the Declaration emanating from the Fourth EU-Africa Summit, 2-3 April 2014, Brussels, where 
the reaffirmation of commitment to the original objectives of the JAES (para 2), was followed with five new 
priorities for 2014-2017 namely: Peace and Security; Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights, Human 
Development; Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and Continental Integration; Global and 
emerging issues (para 60). Since much has not been heard about this, it may be that the needed working 
mechanisms and structures required to implement the agreed actions and reach the expected results are yet to be 
identified or still being pursued (para 61). The next EU-Africa Summit will take place in 2017 as agreed by both 
sides (para 63).  
105Ibid. 
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7.3.2.1. Partnership on the MDGs106 
 
Although the MDGs were arguably about development policy in all its ramifications, the MDG 
partnership focuses on a limited number of areas where the partners consider that the 
partnership can really add value and make a difference. In this regard, the overarching themes 
of Financing and Policy base for the MDGs, Education, Health and Food Security were pursued 
in the First Action Plan (2008-2010).107 And these expanded to include Health, Education, 
Gender, Water and Sanitation, Agriculture, and Disability in the Second Action Plan (2011-
2013).108 Indeed, the first partnership expressly stated that new areas could be selected on a 
rolling basis and that those areas not included were mainly those areas in which intense work 
was already going on in other fora. In the context of EU relations with SSA, the MDGs were 
also implemented as an integral part of EU development cooperation with SSA under the 
Cotonou Agreement as discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis.109 In practice, the difference 
between the two dimensions is insignificant. Indeed, it can be argued that there is not a lot going 
for this aspect of the partnership outside the support to the MDGs under development policy in 
the context of the Cotonou Agreement.110 For example, both the 12 Point Action Plan in support 
of the MDGs,111 and the earlier MDG Contracts112 were launched by the Commission under 
                                                 
106The analysis starts with this partnership only because development is expressly at the heart of EU external 
relations with SSA as discussed in Chapters two and Three of this thesis (of course this does not negate the security-
development interface as also discussed in these Chapters and also Chapter Five of this thesis).  
107As Priority Actions One to Four. 
108As Priority Actions One to Six. 
109See Chapter Five of this thesis at 3.2.1.  
110As indicated above, the JAES does not offer any new policy that is different from the original policies such as 
those discussed in the relevant previous Chapters of this thesis. It only brings an indirect approach to the issues. 
In this regard, it does not have any specific dedicated funding mechanisms, all activities have to be financed under 
existing arrangements (see Chapter Four above; also see the joint report by BOND and ECDPM, 'The EU and 
Africa: the Policy Context for Development', November, 2010, p 19, available at 
https://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/EU_and_Africa_broch_v13.pdf, accessed 02 May, 2016 (hereinafter BOND 
and ECDPM) 
111See European Commission, 'A Twelve-Point EU Action Plan in Support of the Millennium Development 
Goals', Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2010) 159 FINAL, Brussels.  
112See European Commission,  'Technical Discussion Paper on a “MDG Contract” --- A Proposal for Longer Term 
and More Predictable General Budget Support', 2009, available at 
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development policy in the context of the Cotonou Agreement. Pertinently, Mali – the country 
of case study in this thesis – was one of the countries the Union signed the MDG Contract 
with.113 It is not clear how the expiration of the MDGs affects this partnership.114 In any event, 
it has been suggested that this JAES partnership lost relevance mostly because it was deemed 
that the national level was more appropriate.115  
 
7.3.2.2. The partnership trade, regional integration and infrastructure 
 
The JAES partnership on trade, regional integration and infrastructure seeks, inter alia, to 
contribute to ‘enhance the African integration agendas, both at the regional and Pan-African 
levels’ and to foster coherence among current initiatives in the area of trade and regional 
integration. Its priorities as listed in the First Action Plan (2008-2010) included: (a) supporting 
the African integration agenda; (b) strengthening African capacities in the area of rules, 
standards and quality control; and (c) implementing the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership. 
This indirect approach to EU trade policy towards the countries of Africa was expanded in the 
Second Action Plan (2011-2013) to 16 short-term priority plans including one on integration, 
six on trade and nine on infrastructure. As mentioned above, the indirect approach under the 
JAES is facilitated through financial and technical support and political dialogue. Effectively, 
the operationalisation of the trade partnership under the JAES has no significant bearing on the 
                                                 
http://doku.cac.at/eudiscussionpaper070619.pdf, accessed 12 April 2016. The direct link to the Contracts provided 
on the Commission's Website leads to an error message (the link is available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/eu-millennium-development-goals_en, 
accessed 02 May, 2016). 
113See Babarinde, O, and Wright, S, 'Africa-EU Partnership on the Millennium Development Goals' in Mangala, 
fn 5 above, p 123 – 147 at p 143. 
114See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.2.1. above, at fn 59. 
115Directorate-General for  External Policies of the Union (Directorate B) Policy Department Study, 'The 
Implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy: Rebuilding Confidence and Commitments' , March 2014, 
EXPO/B/AFET/2013/42 (hereinafter Directorate B Study), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deve/dv/jaes_study_/jaes_study_en.pdf, 
accessed 02 May 2016. 
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key trade aspect of EU relations with SSA namely the negotiation of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs).116 In fact, where the EPAs were engaged, the modest goal was to ensure 
that they support Africa's efforts on regional integration and to enhance the AU's role in 
monitoring the EPAs.117 As will be recalled from Chapter Four of this thesis, the EU negotiates 
the EPAs at the level of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and not at the continental 
level of the AU. In this regard, it will not be wrong to conclude that the trade partnership under 
the JAES is of little or no significant effect to the requirement of policy coherence in general, 
and policy coherence for development in particular with special reference to SSA. Alternatively, 
it could be argued that the value added by this partnership to the quest for the enhancement of 
these dimensions of coherence is not clear.   
 
7.3.2.3. The peace and security partnership 
 
The peace and security partnership has a wide scope. It addresses all aspects of the conflict 
cycle including prevention, peace-keeping, post-conflict relief, rehabilitation and development, 
with a special emphasis on addressing the root causes of conflict and instability.118 In the First 
Action Plan, these were pursued through three priority actions namely (1) political dialogue to 
address crisis and challenges to peace, security and stability, (2) operationalisation of the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to address peace and security challenges in 
Africa, and (3) predictable funding (and technical support) for Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
undertaken by the AU or under its authority.119 The Second Action Plan (2011-2013) mainly 
expanded the confines of dialogue from conflict and crisis contexts as they arise, to peace and 
                                                 
116See Chapter Four of this thesis; also see BOND and ECDPM, fn 110 above, p 20. 
117See for example, First Action Plan, Priority Action 1 - Support the African Integration Agenda. 
118Elowson, fn 91 above, p 23. 
119See Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2010-2013. 
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security thematically, and to other broader issues like terrorism, in a long term perspective.120 
Invariably, the indirect approach of the peace and security partnership is funded through the 
African Peace Facility (APF) derived from the European Development Fund (EDF).121 
However, the partnership is distinctly conducted under the framework of the CFSP and CSDP122 
hence maintaining the traditional distinction between the CFSP and the non-CFSP dimension 
of security policy under development policy and in the context of the Cotonou Agreement. 
Significantly, the institutional dimension of the JAES follows this even if it does so in a flexible 
manner. Having said that, it is noteworthy that while balancing the provision of direct, 
operational support with support for building African capacity presents a challenge for the 
EU,123 it is difficult to distinguish between the indirect EU support for building African capacity 
under the CSDP on the one hand, and under the JAES framework on the other hand. In any 
event, the peace and security partnership is the most successful of the JAES partnerships,124 and 
is actually the partnership that is substantially examinable for the purposes of assessing the 
relevant dimensions of coherence using Mali as a case study.  
 
7.3.3. Political dialogue 
 
A second core instrument of the JAES is political dialogue. Although the JAES is not 
categorised as either CFSP or non-CFSP, it follows from the above analysis of the nature of the 
JAES under the law of EU external relations that the political dialogue under the JAES could 
be classified as a CFSP political dialogue. Wessel and Monar describe the conditions under 
                                                 
120Haastrup, T, 'Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security' in Eze and Sesay, fn 90 above, p 47 – 64, at p 58.  
121Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 617/2007 of 14 May 20073 on the implementation of the 10th 
European Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement provides the legal basis for the African 
Peace Facility (APF) under the 10th EDF for the period 2011-2013. 
122See Elowson, fn 91 above. 
123See House of Lords, fn 38 above, para 365; and also Chapter Six of this thesis at 6.5.  
124See for example, Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 14. 
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which the CFSP dialogue takes place.125  
 
Firstly, there has to be a formal decision by the Political and Security Committee (PSC)126 
and/or relevant ministers to engage in a ‘dialogue’. Secondly, there has to be a formal agreement 
with the third states concerned. This can take any of the following forms; informal agreement 
between the Presidency and the third states, common understanding, formal treaty obligation, 
or the form of a joint declaration. Lastly, the agreement must provide for regular political 
contacts at one of several levels, in addition to normal diplomatic relations.127 In fact, the JAES 
itself could be classified as a CFSP political dialogue.128 However, while the JAES provides for 
regular political contacts at several levels, in addition to normal diplomatic relations, there has 
been a suggestion that political dialogue was generally not improved or expanded under its 
framework due to a general dilution of its political substance and the absence of political 
leadership on both sides.129 Therefore, the effect of political dialogue under the JAES on the 
quest for coherence cannot easily be determined, even with a case study. Indeed, a political 
dialogue may take place without any publicly available recorded evidence.  
 
Overall, it has been suggested that the JAES implementation 'has tended to focus on technical 
issues in the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs)130 that are susceptible to functional ‘quick wins’ albeit 
low ambition ones (such as events, meetings and workshops)'.131 Conclusively, it may safely be 
                                                 
125Wessel, fn 68 above, p 114-115; also Monar, J, ‘Political Dialogue with Third countries and regional Political 
Groupings: The Fifteen as an Attractive Interlocutor’ in Regelsberger, E, et al (ed.) Foreign policy of the European 
Union: from EPC to CFSP and Beyond (London Lynne Rienner, 1997), p 263-264. 
126See Chapter Five of this thesis at 5.4.1. and Chapter Six at 6.4.1.  
127Ibid. 
128See 7.2.2. above. This does not detract from the view that the JAES may actually be 'substantiating' the Cotonou 
Agreement as discussed in that section; also see Van Vooren (fn 4 above) who theorised this in relation to the ENP 
Plan of Actions. 
129See the BOND and ECDPM report at fn above 110 above, p 19. 
130See 7.4.2. below. 
131See the BOND and ECDPM report at fn above 110 above, p 19. 
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argued that while the JAES has successfully mobilised thematic partnerships through a common 
framework, this does not automatically amount to synergies between these thematic 
partnerships. The latter at all times depends on the political will of the Member States, and 
sometimes relevant EU institutions as discussed in the relevant previous Chapters of this 
thesis.132 
 
7.4. EU Institutions and the JAES 
 
As discussed above, although the JAES is cast as a partnership, it is arguably first and foremost 
an EU policy. In this regard, although the institutional challenges relating to its implementation 
may be found both on the European side and the African side, the analysis in this Chapter is 
limited to the scope of this thesis. Essentially, the emphasis in this analysis is on the institutional 
dimensions of the JAES as they relate to coherence mainly on the EU side.  
 
Although the evolution of the JAES has been traced back to the Cairo Action Plan, it is not 
necessary to discuss the institutional dimension of the latter in a bid to answer the research 
question this thesis set out to answer. In contrast, the focus of the analysis is on the post-Lisbon 
institutional dimension of the JAES.133 Of course, this is not to say that all references to the 
relevant supporting institutions which were there before the post-Lisbon EEAS are eschewed 
from the analysis. Having said that, it is noteworthy that the EU Strategy for Africa which 
morphed into the JAES did not directly address the institutional mechanisms which remained 
in their existing form.134 In contrast, its final institutional dimension was left dependent on 
                                                 
132See Chapters Three to Six of this thesis. 
133Indeed although the JAES came into effect before the Lisbon Treaty, it is arguable that it had not significantly 
been operationalised before the latter came into force.  
134House of Lord, fn 38 above, para 137. 
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circumstances and flexibility.135 Significantly, this could equally be said of the JAES especially 
in the light of its atypical nature under EU external relations law and policies as discussed 
above. Against this background, the following analysis draws from the provisions of the 
Treaties and other secondary materials that deals with the institutional dimension of the 
JAES.136 In doing this, the analysis does not delve into the complex web of all the diverse 
institutions of the JAES which are rather difficult to entangle, even as they are marked by 
scarcity of studies.137 
 
7.4.1. Institutions and JAES Decision-making  
 
Due to the politico-historical evolutionary background of the JAES in the EU-Africa Summits 
which is a meeting of the Heads of State and Government of both sides, it is not hard to 
recognise the role of the European Council in decision-making in this context.138 While it does 
not exercise legislative function,139 the European Council has the responsibility for identifying 
the Union's strategic interests, determining the objectives of and defining general guidelines 
for the CFSP.140 Arguably, this would guide the Council's decisions as much in the context of 
the JAES as in other areas of EU external relations.141 The General Secretariat of the Council 
and (post-Lisbon) the EEAS are supporting institutions in this regard, as is the Council Working 
                                                 
135Ibid., paras 83 and 86.   
136With regards to the latter, the most recent secondary material which this study draws from is Directorate B 
Policy Study, fn 115 above; other earlier reports include Mangala, J, 'Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Historical 
Background, Institutional Architecture, and Theoretical Frameworks' in Mangala, fn 5 above; Tywuschik and 
Sherriff, fn 48 above; Elowson, fn 91 above; and also Pirozzi, N, 'EU Support to African security architecture: 
funding and training components', EUISS Occassional Paper 76, February 2009.   
137See Mangala, fn 136 above, p 28; for a helpful visualisation of the institutional architecture of the JAES, see 
Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 77 (the same visualisation is replicated in annex IV attached to this thesis).  
138As will be recalled from Chapter Two of this thesis (at 2.5.3.1 above), the European Council consists of the 
Heads of State and Government of EU Member States albeit together with  its President and the President of the 
Commission (Article 15(2) TEU).  
139Article 15(1) TEU.  
140Article 26 TEU (ex-Article 13 TEU) [author's emphasis]. 
141As will be recalled from 7.4. above, the institutional architecture for the JAES was not determined but left 
dependent on circumstances and flexibility. 
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Group for Africa (COAFR).142 In any event, the EU Strategy for Africa illustrates that the 
European Council and the Council could avail themselves of the support of the Commission in 
this regard.143 With specific reference to the coherence of EU external action towards SSA, this 
decision-making framework would provide a good opportunity for enhancement of policy 
coherence in general, and policy coherence for development in particular, in the long term. 
However, as in every case, the recognition of the need to heed to the requirement of the relevant 
dimensions of coherence on paper, does not always translate to practical manifestation in the 
implementation. Indeed, as indicated above with specific regards to the JAES, the mobilisation 
of thematic partnerships through a common framework, does not automatically amount to 
synergies between these thematic partnerships. Illustrative is the JAES implementation which 
institutionally follows the traditional institutional distinctions in the field of EU external 
relations law and policies even if it follows that latter flexibly. 
 
7.4.2. Institutions and JAES implementation 
 
 In general, it is noteworthy that flexibility in dialogue and cooperation formats give more room 
for manoeuvre in JAES implementation.144 This obviously renders its institutional dimension 
specifically cumbersome and difficult to navigate.145 It follows that the delimitation sounded 
                                                 
142See Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 77; also see Mangala, fn 136 above, p 29 for a visualisation of the 
pre-Lisbon institutional architecture. However, it is noteworthy that this has not always been the case. For example, 
the draft Council Conclusions on the EU Strategy for Africa – the direct precursor to the JAES - all originated 
from the ACP Working Group (see for example Draft Council Conclusions on the EU-Africa Strategy, 14417/05, 
14/11/2005; Draft Council Conclusions on the EU-Africa Strategy, 14417/1/05, 15/11/2005; and Draft Council 
Conclusions on the EU-Africa Strategy, 14450/05, 16/11/2005, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/servlet/driver?page=Result&ssf=DATE_DOCUMENT+DESC&srm=25&md
=400&typ=Simple&cmsid=638&ff_SOUS_COTE_MATIERE=&lang=EN&fc=REGAISEN&ff_COTE_DOCU
MENT=&ff_TITRE=EU-Africa 
Strategy&ff_FT_TEXT=&dd_DATE_REUNION=&single_comparator=&single_date=&from_date=&to_date=, 
accessed 14 May 2013  
143See fn 35 above. 
144See Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 24. 
145Mangala, fn 136 above, p 42. 
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above146 unavoidable applies to this aspect of the analysis. 
 
In this regard, the main EU actors engaged (or that may be engaged) in the implementation of 
the JAES are the Commission, the Council, and the EU Delegation to the AU, the EEAS and 
the Member States.147  
 
The Commission is tasked with facilitating the JAES, even though its implementation on the 
EU side remains a joint responsibility it shares with the Member States.148 The Commission's 
involvement here does not detract from the arguably CFSP orientation of the JAES. Indeed, as 
indicated above,149 the EU can pursue any of its external policy objectives towards Africa 
through any of its external policies. Internally, the various Commission Directorates-General 
(DGs) have a shared responsibility, involving not just DG DEVCO but also other DGs 
concerned with the different partnerships of the JAES.150 In doing this, the Commission also 
established an Africa Intra-Service Task Force whose overall goal is to enhance coherence and 
seek greater synergies in the implementation of the JAES and its Action Plans.151 Mangala 
explains that this is different from the pre-JAES frameworks of EU external action towards SSA 
where DG DEVCO and DG Trade held sway, dealing with the other DGs in a vertical manner.152 
However, a contrasting view indicates that DG DEVCO is mainly involved in the 
implementation of the JAES to the extent that it is this DG, rather than DG Trade, which co-
                                                 
146At fn 7. 
147Mangala, fn 136 above, p 31. 
148Ibid. 
149At 7.2.2. 
150Ibid; also see Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 23.  
151Mangala, fn 136 above, p 32. 
152Ibid., p 32. Of course, this is relative, as DG DEVCO is relatively subertine to DG Trade in most aspects of 
EU external action towards SSA. Illustrative is the analysis in Chapters Three and Four on development policy 
and trade policy respectively.  
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chaired the Trade partnership and coordinated with other EU institutions and Member States.153 
This latter view is more plausible in the light of the light touch approach to trade in the relevant 
JAES partnership as discussed above.154 Of course this, and the attendant criticism of the lack 
of political dialogue in the JAES for addressing challenges interconnected with EPAs155 
illustrate the specificity of EU trade policy as argued elsewhere in this thesis.156 Furthermore, 
it renders the Commission's effort at enhancing coherence otiose. More pertinently, it is also a 
further illustration of the point made above that the institutional dimension of the JAES follows 
the traditional institutional distinction between the distinct EU policies even if it does this 
flexibly. Indeed, the peace and security partnership of the JAES framework is specifically 
conducted under the CSDP to the extent that its distinct institutional dimension has been given 
to separate special analysis in some studies.157 Suffice it to state that the key distinguishing 
institution in this regard are the PSC and the EU Military Committee (EUMC)158 which conduct 
the CSDP as discussed in the previous Chapter.159  
 
Without needing to go into the roles of the Council in the different partnerships, it is enough to 
say that its involvement in the implementation of the JAES is mainly through the Ministerial 
Troika of the JAES. On the EU side, this usually involve the foreign ministries from the country 
holding the EU presidency and the country that will hold the next presidency plus the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission.160 Going by the institutional distinction between the JAES 
                                                 
153See Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 23. 
154See 7.3.2.2. above. 
155See Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 23. 
156See Chapter Four of this thesis. 
157See for example Tywuschik and Sherriff, fn 48 above; Elowson, fn 91 above; and also Pirozzi, fn 136 above.  
158See Pirozzi, fn 136 above, p 22. 
159See Chapter Six of this thesis at 6.4. And for a detailed analysis of the institutional dimension of the peace and 
security partnership, see for example Tywuschik and Sherriff, fn 48 above; Elowson, fn 91 above; and also Pirozzi, 
fn 136 above. 
160Pirozzi, fn 136 above, p 19, fn 33 inclusive. 
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partnerships, it could be presumed that the assignment of members of the Council in this context 
would follow the existing policy-oriented EU Council configurations.161 
  
The third institutional aspect of the JAES on the EU side is the EU Member States. However, 
in this case even though they agreed to the JAES, the Member States are given the option to 
join which of the eight partnerships they are interested in.162 Effectively, the EU Member States 
are not fully tied to any of the partnerships and can withdraw from one to join another. Under, 
this circumstances, there is no assurance of commitment despite the agreement to a binding 
partnership, and it has been reported that only a few Member States are seriously committed to 
the JAES.163 In general, the free hand which the Member States have within the context of the 
JAES leads to a situation where the Member States that are involved in the different partnerships 
appear to be doing their own things.164 While this implicates vertical coherence, this dimension 
of coherence is outside the scope of this thesis.165  
 
In the case of the European Parliament, its role in the context of the JAES is mainly advisory,166 
as it is in most other EU external policies discussed in this thesis.  
 
The study has not unearthed any involvement by the HR/VP in the JAES. However, it could be 
argued that she is indirectly involved in so far as the EEAS in her service is involved. For 
example, the 2011-2013 Action Plan recognised and expressed the need to establish systematic 
                                                 
161See Chapter Two of this thesis at 2.5.3.2. above. 
162For this view and for the dispersal of the Member States membership in the different partnerships see, 
Tywuschik, and Sherriff, fn 48 above, p 16. 
163Ibid, p 18. 
164See 7.5 below. 
165See 7.2.1. above, especially fn 42. 
166See in general, Directorate B Study, fn 115 above. 
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and structural linkages between the EEAS structures and the implementing institutions of 
political dialogue under the peace and security partnership.167 Furthermore, the EEAS is 
represented, as is the Commission,168 on the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) of the APF 
which funds the peace and security partnership. This is not surprising as both are responsible 
for the programming of the EDF which the APF is drawn from. Apart from this, the HR/VP and 
the EEAS are also indirectly involved in the JAES implementation through the unexpressed 
role of EU Delegations to the AU169 in the flexible institutional framework of the JAES. In line 
with the constitution of the EEAS as discussed in Chapter Two, EU Delegation to the AU 
comprises a Commission component on the one hand, and a Council component on the other 
hand. The latter includes the EU Special Representative (EUSR) which also double-hats as the 
Head of EU Delegation to the AU.  
Otherwise, as explained above,170 the JAES implementation has tended to focus on technical 
issues such as events, meetings and workshops. And these are carried out within the JEGs which 
are not EU institutions.   
 
7.4.3. Institutions and enforcement of the JAES  
 
From the foregoing, the politico-legal character of the JAES is undeniably clear. Even when it 
is seen only through a soft law lens, this would not lead to any conclusion of possibility of legal 
enforcement. Hence, the enforcement role of the Commission and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union is not engaged here. Moreover, there are clearly no fixed institutional 
                                                 
167Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013, p 17.  
168The 7th meeting of the African Peace Facility (APF) Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) took place in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia on 18 October 2011, was co-chaired by a representative of the Commission and the EEAS with a 
representative of the African Union. 
169Mangala, fn 136 above, p 33. As discussed above, the JAES is implemented on a continent to continent basis 
as represented in this context by the EU and the AU. 
170At 7.3.3. 
 322 
 
 
responsibilities in the context of the flexible framework of the atypical JAES.  Of course, this 
is not a huge loss, considering the near impossibility of enforcing the requirement of coherence 
legally in a politically charged EU foreign policy.  
 
7.4.4. Of the HR/VP and the EEAS in the context of the JAES: what added value? 
 
The foregoing study underscores the point that the functional distinction between EU external 
policies is here for the long haul,171 and significantly attendant to this are the institutional 
distinctions which could only potentially be bridged by the HR/VP and the EEAS at her service. 
The JAES does not change this. As explained in Chapter Two of this thesis, the HR/VP and the 
EEAS have not replaced the original institutions of EU external action. Rather, they are framed 
as institutional bridges to enhance, if not ensure coherence in EU external action. However, 
how they will do this in the light of the ambiguous policy and institutional constellation of the 
JAES is not clear. Overall, it remains to be seen whether the effective implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the attendant institutional changes will facilitate greater coherence of EU 
policies towards SSA including within the context of the JAES. Invariably, it is worth reiterating 
that the the potential of the HR/VP and the EEAS to effectively act as a bridge across the 
relevant distinct policies is at all times dependent on political will, sometimes of the traditional 
EU institutions, and at other times of the Member States. As discussed in Chapter Six of this 
thesis, the latter would mainly be the case with regards to the construction of a united whole 
vis-a-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options especially as it relates to peace 
and security. Illustrative is the Mali case study.172   
                                                 
171See in general, Craig, P, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (OUP, 2010), p 422-436. Indeed, 
as discussed in Chapters Two and Five of this thesis, this has always been and is still the will of the Member States. 
172See 7.5. below. 
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7.5. The JAES and SSA: Mali case study 
 
As indicated above, even though the JAES is not a policy but an overall framework traversing 
the different fields of EU external policy towards Africa, this Chapter follows the structure of 
the relevant previous Chapters of this thesis on the distinct EU policies. This is mainly for ease 
of reference. Therefore, on the back of the framework of the JAES discussed above, this section 
discusses Mali as a case study for the conduct of the JAES as an instrument of coherence in EU 
external action towards Africa with a special reference to SSA. This is with a view to 
determining its overall contribution to the enhancement of coherence in EU external action 
towards SSA in general, and also policy coherence for development in the same context. 
In general, it is noteworthy that this case study is unavoidably the shortest case study in 
comparison with the other Mali case studies provided in the relevant previous Chapters of this 
thesis.173 This is because of that simple reason that the JAES is not a distinct policy but a 
framework that encompasses the distinct EU external policies towards Africa including those 
that were discussed in the previous Chapters of this thesis.174 The pertinent background for the 
case studies as they relate to these policies have already been set out in the relevant Chapters,175 
and therefore does not need to be repeated here. In contrast, a summary contextual background 
will be provided as is necessary to aid an easy flow to the subsequent discussion of the impact 
of the JAES on the quest to enhance policy coherence for development and coherence based on 
the construction of a united whole vis-a-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy 
options with a specific focus on the Mali crisis.  
 
                                                 
173See Chapters Three to Six of this thesis. 
174Ibid. 
175See Chapter Three of this thesis at 3.5.1.; Chapter Four at 4.5.1.; Chapter Five at 5.5.1.; and Chapter Six at 
6.5.1.  
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7.5.1. JAES and Mali: a pertinent background  
 
 As explained in Chapter One of this thesis, Mali is one of the countries of SSA associated to 
the ex-Community under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. The focus of the association in terms 
of EU external policy were development and trade where were interwoven in the framework of 
the successive association agreements between the EU and its Member States on the one hand 
and the associated countries of SSA including Mali.  
 
In terms of development, Mali has since 1971 always ranked as one the world’s least developed 
countries, and with time become so aid-dependent that it also become a donor’s darling and a 
“testing ground” for new aid modalities.176 The EU therefore has a long history of development 
policy in Mali as discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. Although the EU also has a long 
history of Trade policy towards Mali as an integral part of its development policy towards the 
country, EU trade policy towards SSA including Mali is gradually evolving as a separate 
framework due to the evolving Economic Partnership Agreements. This is in contrast to the 
traditional practice of entwining trade and development policy towards the region in the 
successive association agreements including the contemporary Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
which primarily regulates EU relations with SSA. As discussed above, apart from the 
autonomous EU external action towards SSA under the CFSP and CSDP frameworks of EU 
external action, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement was the only framework for EU external 
relations with SSA prior to the JAES. It was therefore the fulcrum of EU development policy 
towards SSA including as it evolved to accommodate the MDGs. The above study reveals that 
the MDG partnership under the JAES framework was redundant so that the MDGS were solely 
                                                 
176Loquai, C, 'Supporting domestic accountability in developing countries: Taking stock of the approaches and 
experiences of German development cooperation in Mali' (ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 115, July 2011), p 1.  
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pursued through the Cotonou Agreement framework. In the same vein, the Trade partnership is 
less about trade as an integral part of development policy under the same framework. In general, 
the analysis of the JAES framework illustrates that has tended to focus on technical issues such 
as events, meetings and workshops. It follows that the JAES framework does not offer the 
parameters for assessment of policy coherence for development or coherence based on the 
construction of a united whole vis-a-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options 
beyond what obtains from the assessment of these dimensions of coherence in the interaction 
between the relevant distinct policies discussed in the relevant previous Chapters of this 
thesis.177 
 
Having said that, it has to be admitted that the same dismissal to the other partnerships would 
not apply to the peace and security partnership which is deemed the most successful in the JAES 
framework. In this regard, this partnership offers the only flicker of light of opportunity to 
meaningfully discuss the JAES in the light of the dimensions of the requirement of coherence 
discussed in this thesis. 
 
7.5.2. The JAES peace and security partnership and the Mali crisis 
 
The background to the Mali crisis have been extensively provided in the last two Chapters of 
this thesis. It is therefore difficulty to say anything new about that in a bid to discuss the role of 
the JAES peace and security partnership in the crisis especially as it relates to coherence. AS 
discussed above, the JAES is not a specific policy, and accordingly it does not have any specific 
dedicated funding mechanisms, and all its activities have to be financed under existing 
                                                 
177Also see Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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arrangements.178 This means that the funding for the peace and security partnership also derives 
from the European Development Fund even though the former is rebranded the APF. In practice, 
the peace and security partnership is also conducted under the CSDP. Hence apart from the 
direct operational aspect of the CSDP which cannot be looked at outside the CSDP framework, 
there is no clear difference between the indirect support for building African capacity in the 
context of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)179 under the CSDP framework on 
the one hand, and under the peace and security partnership of the JAES framework on the other 
hand. In this regard, while the indirect support for building African capacity was discussed with 
special reference to SSA using Mali as a case study in the previous Chapter of this thesis under 
the CSDP framework, Biondo discusses this in her assessment of the peace and security 
partnership under the JAES framework.180  
 
In general, the analysis of EU external action towards SSA under the CSDP framework using 
Mali as a case study in the previous Chapter illustrates that balancing the provision of direct, 
operational support with support for building African capacity presents a challenge for the 
EU.181 Or better still, it illustrates that the EU prefers the indirect support for reasons that cuts 
across internal and external factors. For example, as will be recalled from the previous Chapter, 
following the call for the international community including international organisations to 
become involved in the bid to resolve the budding conflict in Mali,182 the EU embarked on the 
plan for EU Training Mission (EUTM).183 This was an indirect approach which entailed 
                                                 
178Ibid. 
179Which is an AU instrument.  
180See Biondo, K, 'Moving beyond a Donor-Recipient Relationship? Assessing Partnership in the Joint Africa-
EU Strategy', KFG Working Paper No. 63, February 2015, p 14. 
181This is a reconfirmation of the same report regarding Darfur (see House of Lords, para 365).  
182Vis-a-vis the UNSC Resolution 2071 of October 12, 2012 (authorising ECOWAS and the AU as the key 
regional and African continental security mechanisms respectively, to develop a plan for military intervention in 
Mali. 
183European Union External Action, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EU Training Mission in Mali 
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capacity building by way of providing training and advice to the Malian armed forces. The 
factors that came to bear on the Unions' decisions have been discussed in the previous Chapters 
of this thesis and does not need to be repeated here. What matters for the purposes of this 
analysis is that while the Union was quick to respond with a decision to send a EUTM to Mali 
during the less aggressive stage of the conflict, it did not maintain this response reflex at this 
latter and more aggressive stage of the conflict when a peace keeping force was required. As 
the ECDPM stresses, for the EU, it should not be a question of choosing between operational 
support or capacity-building, but rather simultaneously balancing the two.184 In any event, it is 
most pertinent to note that there was no express reference to the framework of external action 
which the EU deployed the EUTM under.  
By and large, it can be argued that the JAES is not in fact different in any way from the other 
distinct policies of EU external action which it acts as new political framework for. Indeed, it 
may safely be argued that while the JAES has successfully mobilised thematic partnerships 
through a common framework, this does not automatically amount to synergies between these 
thematic partnerships, or the distinct EU external policies covered by the partnerships. Even   
though it was adopted at the same time as the Lisbon Treaty which focuses heavily on 
coherence, the JAES framework does not have any expressed clear cut roles for the HR/VP and 
the EEAS. Of course, this is not surprising in the light of the haphazard way that the partnerships 
are organised. It follows that neither the requirement of policy coherence for development, nor 
coherence based on the construction of a united whole vis-a-vis institutional and functional 
synergy in the sequencing of available option is effectively enhanced by the JAES framework. 
Overall, the JAES has not ameliorated the pending general conclusion that the reform of 
                                                 
(EUTM Mali), EUTM, Mali/1, January 13; Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission 
to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) [2013] OJ L14/19, p 1. 
184House of Lords, fn 38 above, para 366. 
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external action with the creation of the EEAS has not eliminated old coherence challenges in 
EU policies towards SSA.185 However, this does not mean a complete lack of prospect. Current 
practice is to hold summits approximately every 3 years. With the Cotonou agreement and its 
funding dimension coming to an end in 2020, that year may be relevant to hold a promising 
summit closing a new 7-year cycle of partnership.186  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the JAES is by all intents and purposes an 
instrument for coherence in EU external action towards Africa in general, and policy coherence 
for development especially in the context of EU external action towards SSA.187 However, it 
had been argued that in its practice, which mainly revolves around financial and technical 
support and political dialogue, the JAES follows the functional and institutional distinction 
between the distinct EU policies as discussed in the previous Chapters of this thesis. Conversely, 
the Chapter suggested that this is not surprising in so far as the JAES framework is not a separate 
policy but a framework built on, and intended to deepen the original frameworks of EU external 
action towards the African continent through further financial and technical support and also 
strengthened dialogue as the Mali case study illustrates. Against this background, it was further 
argued that it would nevertheless not be correct to conclude that the JAES does not have any 
prospects of contributing to the coherence of EU external policies towards SSA, including 
policy coherence for development, especially as it is flexible in following the traditional 
functional and institutional distinction between the relevant distinct EU policies. This, the 
Chapter conclusively asserted, remains the case even though the potentials of the HR/VP and 
                                                 
185Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 12. 
186Directorate B Study, fn 115 above, p 28. 
187Where the later mainly applies. 
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the EEAS in her service to enhance coherence in this context also follow their general potential 
to enhance the coherence of EU external policies towards SSA, including policy coherence for 
development as discussed in the context of the interaction between the distinct EU policies 
towards the region examined in this thesis.188 Overall, the Chapter reconfirms the pending 
general conclusion that could be drawn from the overall analysis in this thesis namely that the 
reform of external action with the creation of the EEAS has not eliminated old coherence 
challenges in EU policies towards SSA, and the JAES has not ameliorated this, and that at all 
times, the coherence of EU external action towards SSA in general, and policy coherence 
thereto, is a matter mainly dependent on the political will of the Member States, and sometimes, 
the relevant traditional EU institutions. The latter remains the case post as pre-Lisbon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188See Chapters Three to Six of this thesis; and also Chapter Eight which offers the overall conclusion to the 
thesis.  
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Chapter Eight 
8.0. General Conclusions: what coherence? 
8.1. Introduction 
The principal aim of the Lisbon Treaty with regards to external relations is to address the pre-
Lisbon concerns about the coherence of EU action. Hence, it can be argued that coherence is 
the simple litmus test for EU external action in the post-Lisbon era.  
 
This thesis set out to investigate the coherence of EU external action towards Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) in the post-Lisbon era in light of the requirement of coherence in EU external 
relations law. This included an investigation of the introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS 
with the aim of enhancing coherence in EU external action. The focus was on horizontal 
coherence in the interaction between EU policies towards the region. In doing this, the thesis 
uses the key EU policies towards the region, namely development policy, trade policy, the CFSP 
and the CSDP to investigated (1) the import of the requirement of coherence in EU external 
relations law with special reference to EU external action towards SSA; (2) How these are 
reflected in the relevant instruments of EU external action towards SSA; (3) The (potential) role 
of EU institutions in this regard; (4)  the added value of the HR/VP and the EEAS to realising 
coherence in practice; and (5) the extent to which EU external action towards SSA is coherent 
as a result of these. 
 
The reason for adopting SSA as a regional focus was discussed in Chapter One. From all 
indications, SSA is arguably the best comprehensive regional context or case study for an 
analysis of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law in practice. For example, 
as also discussed in Chapter One, EU external action towards SSA is a classic field of EU 
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external relations and arguably, the Union’s oldest and most comprehensive external relations 
or foreign policy.  Deeply rooted in the history of the European Communities, it evolved from 
a primary focus on development and trade in the pre-90s, to foreign and security policy in the 
early 90s.  
 
With specific regards to the needs underlying the requirement of coherence in EU external 
action, it was submitted in Chapter One that this is arguably of most importance in the context 
of EU external action towards SSA. For example, with regards to the link between coherence 
and effectiveness, there can be little doubt that ineffective EU policies often affect the effects 
of EU development policy towards the region which costs the Union a considerable amount of 
human, material and financial resources. Moreover, the geographical proximity between Europe 
and Africa means that ineffective EU policies hold with it some political and economic 
implications for Europe itself. Perhaps, the most recent example is the migration crisis in the 
Mediterranean, which has inevitably exposed Europe to the effects of extreme poverty or 
violent conflicts in SSA.  
 
Within the limited confines of this thesis, it was impossible to examine all the 49 countries of 
SSA. Consequently, a country case study of Mali was provided. This is mainly for topical 
reasons. Mali is the most recent country of SSA where the need for an all-EU approach 
bordering on the construction of a united whole arose. As also discussed in Chapter One, an all-
EU approach bordering on the construction of a united whole vis-à-vis synergy including 
institutionally and with regards to instruments and the appropriate sequencing of available 
policy options, is the essence of coherence. Overall, Mali inspires a reflection on a 
geographically focused, evidence-based assessment of the coherence of EU external relations 
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law and policies towards SSA. However, the use of this country case study inevitably comes 
with the limitation that it may not be completely representative in so far as there are as much 
differences as similarities in the countries of SSA.  
 
8.2. Findings 
 
While the findings of this study are modest, they may enable a more realistic view of the 
sophistication and complexity of the issues at stake especially in the context of EU external 
action towards SSA. This puts in context any ideas and suggestions for enhancing coherence in 
the same context. 
 
In general, the benchmark for the assessment of coherence in this study is EU development 
policy towards SSA as discussed in Chapter Three using Mali as a case study. This is in line 
with the discussion in Chapter Two that while the EU is committed to the coherence of its 
external action in general, it is particularly committed to policy coherence for development. 
This, renders development policy the benchmark for assessing the coherence of EU external 
action towards SSA. Significantly, the Union's development cooperation objective of poverty 
reduction, and eventual eradication which was only codified in the Treaties at Lisbon, was even 
prior to Lisbon the key objective of EU external action towards SSA. Indeed, this is expressly 
reflected in the contemporary instrument which primarily regulates EU development 
cooperation with SSA namely the Cotonou Agreement. Pertinently, this agreement which 
contains provisions relating to trade and security illustrates not only the wide scope of 
development policy, but also the fact that other EU policies specific EU external policy are 
necessary for the achievement of the objectives of development policy.  Apart from the 
procedure for the contribution of the relevant development in this context namely the European 
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Development Fund, the process of development programming aimed at achieving the objectives 
of development policy was historically the sole responsibility of the Commission. However, 
post-Lisbon, the latter shares this role with the EEAS under the joint supervisory role of the 
HR/VP who is also the Vice President of the Commission.  The arguably expected initial inter-
institutional conflict between the 'new kid on the bloc' and the Commission which has the oldest 
presence in SSA appears to have been resolved with a Working Agreement for development 
programming between the two.   
 
As was argued in this thesis, in this specific context of EU external action towards SSA, all 
dimensions of coherence, including policy coherence in terms of synergy in the sequencing of 
available policy options are implicated in policy coherence for development. However, the 
thesis examined policy coherence for development with reference to the norms and objectives, 
instruments and institutional dimensions of policies on the one hand, and coherence vis-à-vis 
synergy in the sequencing of available policy options, on the other hand. 
 
The main findings relating to these dimensions of the issue of coherence are chapter specific 
and were summarised within the respective empirical chapters namely Chapter Four on Trade 
Policy; Chapter Five on the CFSP; and Chapter Six on the CSDP. This section will synthesise 
the empirical findings to answer the key research question on the coherence of EU external 
action towards SSA building on the answers to the role of instruments and institutions including 
the added value of the HR/VP and the EEAS in enhancing coherence in this regard.  
 
In the first instance, although the EU's commitment to policy coherence for development is well 
represented in the norms and instruments of other EU policies, the substantial essence of the 
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requirement as it relates to the key development objective of poverty reduction and eventual 
eradication arguably differs across the policies. For example, as discussed in Chapter Four, the 
coherence of trade policy with development objectives is invariably a matter of extent. This is 
mainly because of the sophisticated and complex nature of the interaction between trade and 
development in instrument and in practice as the Mali case study illustrates. Indeed, the case 
study affirms the theoretical finding that although trade can contribute to development, EU trade 
policy is distinct from its development policy even though the two are historically entwined in 
the context of EU external action towards SSA. Furthermore, although the analysis of the 
interaction between EU trade policy and development policy could easily be complicated with 
the importation of the Common Agricultural Policy into the equation, the latter is a distinct EU 
policy which is internal albeit not without external effect on EU trade policy. Against this 
background, the thesis argued that even though the distinct legitimate objectives of trade policy 
and development policy may collide, the extent of the trade compromise that the Union is 
required to make in favour of development objectives is indeterminate.  Overall, while the 
pertinent analysis of trade instruments in the Mali case study shows that the EU can always do 
more, the latter may not necessarily equate to a breach of the requirement of policy coherence 
for development. Significantly, although there are opportunities for relevant traditional 
institutions such as the Commission's DG DEV and the development-oriented European 
Parliament to influence trade in favour of development objectives, trade is a specifically  and 
technical policy field wherein even the HR/VP and the EEAS are excluded. Hence, the post-
Lisbon anticipation that the HR/VP and the EEAS will enhance institutional coordination for 
coherence, including policy coherence for development does not veritably extend to trade. 
Invariably, the extent of the trade concession that the EU can make in favour of development 
objectives in its external action towards SSA is ultimately dependent on the political will of the 
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Member States. Ultimately, and most pertinently, whether EU trade policy is at any time 
compliant with policy coherence for development or not is a subjective question impossibly 
seeking an objective answer. 
 
With regards to policy coherence for development as it relates to security policy under the CFSP 
and CSDP frameworks, the situation is different albeit not conceptually less complicated than 
the question of policy coherence for development as it relates to trade. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, the inextricable nexus between security and development wherein 
one is acceptably a precondition for the other arguably renders policy coherence for 
development a façon de parler in relation to the CFSP security measures. Although the countries 
of SSA elevate development as a pre-condition for security, the EU prefers the reverse which is 
not illegal in the light of the irresolution of the hierarchy in the interaction between the two. In 
any event, even without accepting that the security-development nexus renders the requirement 
of policy coherence a façonde parler, it can be argued that this nexus would still imply that the 
work of the HR/VP and the EEAS under the CFSP dimension of EU security policy could 
nevertheless be deemed as automatically coherent with development policy. Consequently, the 
fact that the Commission is not as involved in the CFSP as the HR/VP and the EEAS are in the 
development programming process becomes of little or no significance in terms of the 
assessment of coherence. Moreover, as the Mali case study illustrates, the EU has recently 
embraced the use of comprehensive instruments aimed at bridging the policy gap between 
security and development. In practice, this leads to the cooperation of the EEAS and the 
Commission for the same purpose. Illustrative is the Sahel Strategy which applies to Mali and 
other countries of the Sahel region.  
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Although the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP and is embedded in the latter's framework 
as codified at Lisbon, the former's specificity is illustrated both by its distinct scope of 
objectives and by its distinct institutional procedure. In this regard, it brings a different 
dimension to the question of policy coherence for development. In general, the specificity of 
the CSDP framework as discussed in Chapter Six means that the question of policy coherence 
for development may not arise in relation to the urgent ad hoc CSDP crisis management 
measures. In practice, the urgency required by the latter would not give room for consideration 
of any issues beyond the resolution of the crisis at hand. Illustrative is the Mali case study where 
a coup d'etat quickly spiralled to violent crisis as discussed in Chapter Six. Indeed, although 
the CSDP structures are prima facie a part of the EEAS and are under the HR/VP as represented 
in the EEAS organogramme, by virtue of Article 3(2) of the Council Decision on the creation 
of the EEAS, the CSDP is expressly excluded from the areas in which the EEAS and the 
Commission are required to consult each other in the exercise of their respective functions. This 
is despite the fact there is an overlap between the conceptual scope of the CSDP and 
development policy. 
 
Overall, it could be argued that the question of policy coherence for development in terms of 
policy aims in EU external action towards SSA is mainly relevant in the context of trade policy. 
However, from a legal perspective, even in that case it remains a question of extent, and hence, 
a subjective question impossibly seeking an objective answer.  
 
Having said that, it is noteworthy that the above conclusions do not mean that the question of 
policy coherence for development may otherwise not be impacted specifically by the CFSP and 
the CSDP.  Indeed, as indicated above, this thesis argued that in the specific context of EU 
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external action towards SSA, all dimensions of coherence, including policy coherence in terms 
of synergy in the sequencing of available policy options are implicated in policy coherence for 
development. Suffice it to state that the attendant ineffectiveness of as may result from any type 
of incoherence will impact on development policy and its objectives. For example, , when the 
usefulness of the long term instruments of the CFSP arguably ended with the impending crisis 
occasioned by the coup d'etat in Mali in 2012, the urgent ad hoc CFSP diplomatic instruments 
were not visibly engaged immediately for that stage of conflict. There can be little or no doubt 
that the progression of the crisis endangered wider the wider EU external objectives towards 
SSA, in particular the key objective of development. Without needing to cynically submit that 
the Union's action at this stage would have certainly arrested the further progress of the crisis,  
it could be argued that the latter may well have been a possibility had the Union exhibited a 
coherent external action towards Mali by appropriate synergistic sequencing of the available 
policy options at this stage. Indeed, it could be deduced from the impact of the eventual 
appointment of the EUSR for the Sahel that an earlier appointment in this regard may have been 
helpful even if the extent may not be known. Having said that, it is noteworthy that the 
conclusion relating to the failure of the EU to engage an urgent ad hoc CFSP instrument in Mali 
has to be qualified. The qualification is necessary in so far as diplomatic instruments are not 
always openly deployed and the investigation in this thesis is only based on available 
instruments. In any event, the Union would not be totally absolved from all charges of 
incoherence in its external action towards SSA gauging from the Mali case study. For example, 
there is also the Union's incoherent (in)action under the CSDP framework in Mali. In particular, 
a relevant CSDP peacekeeping operation was not deployed to Mali when required with the 
intensification of violent conflict in October 2012. This constitutes incoherence in the light of 
the effects of violent conflicts on the EU development policy programme and its objectives in 
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Mali. Although no reason was expressed for the inertia in both the wider CFSP and the CSDP 
context, the thesis revealed some of the possible reasons in both cases. Chief of these would be 
the very obvious issue of human, material and financial resource which would apply to both the 
CFSP and the CSDP framework. However, while these which is not different from the old age 
issue of ‘capabilities-expectations gap' can veritably influence the possibility of adopting a 
relevant measure, this could sometimes only be the partial reason. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, the historical background of EU relations with SSA continue to trail the 
relationship between the two. In general, while the EU Member States at the heart of the 
historical relations between Europe and SSA are arguably keen to Europeanise their foreign 
policy, their 'European reflex for SSA' is not always matched by the 'European reflex' of other 
Member States who traditionally had no Africa policy. Of course, the former have more interests 
in SSA than the latter could resource to the argument of resource limitation or fear of 
intervention without an end to avoid a decision for the EU to act. Significantly, the CFSP and 
CSDP arrangements do not force the Member States to adopt a common policy. Furthermore, 
with specific regards to the CSDP, there is also the limitation relating to the operational 
flexibility of CSDP crisis management. With regards to this last factor, there is as yet no 
common standing personnel for CSDP operations and the possibility of an operation completely 
depends on the willingness of EU Member States to contribute the needed personnel. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, Mali was a former French colony and has long been a priority for 
French, and to a lesser extent Spanish foreign policy. Hence, both countries tried to push for 
more EU engagement in the Mali crisis for some time without much success. Indeed, it was not 
until the deaths of European hostages did other Member States, notably the UK, take interest in 
the crisis. Overall, although it was subsequently to gain the support of some other EU Member 
States, after France which arguably have more vested interest in Mali than any other EU 
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Member State failed to convince the latter on the need to respond to the call for military 
intervention in Mali, it eventually took the initiative to answer the call with its Operation Serval. 
 
By and large, the possibility of a CSDP action is outside the powers of the HR/VP and the 
EEAS, and their influence regarding the relevant unfavourable factors may be quite limited, if 
at all possible. This is because they are not involved in CFSP decision-making. Although the 
HR/VP chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, she is not a member of the Council for decision-
making purposes and can only rely on effective persuasion. Suffice it to state that whatever 
influence the HR/VP and the EEAS may wield would ultimately depend on the political will of 
the Council which is the decision-maker.  
 
Of course it could be argued from a legal perspective that the Member States may be acting 
illegally if they renege from their obligations under the adopted legal CFSP decisions. For 
example, while the  provisions of the Treaties that require them to support the Union’s external 
and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and to 
refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its 
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations does not force the Member States to 
adopt CFSP instruments, it is arguable that they are bound to the provisions of any instrument 
that they do adopt. This would mean that the Member States are bound to the provisions of the 
Common Position on Conflict prevention in Africa which requires the coherent use of all the 
instruments available to the EU, including preventive diplomacy for conflict prevention and 
CSDP operations for crisis management. However, as argued in Chapter Two, the law of EU 
external relations is not free from the malaise of the difficulty or near impossibility of bringing 
foreign policy under the grasp law.   
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In general, the framework analysis and the Mali case study together illustrated that while the 
post-Lisbon legal changes and the introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS are positive 
developments with regards to coherence, they have not resolved, and may not completely 
resolve the issues that arise in relation to policy coherence for development on the one hand, 
and the overall coherence of EU external action as it relates to synergy in sequencing of 
available policy options, especially in the context of EU external action towards SSA. 
Significantly, as the analysis of the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) in Chapter Seven 
illustrated, the JAES follows the functional distinction between EU policies. This means that 
the role of the HR/VP and the EEAS in this context does not change from what it is in relation 
to the distinct policies as concluded above.  
 
8.3. Recommendations 
 
The foregoing reflects the complexity of the issues at stake, and indeed calls to mind the Page 
and Mold’s opinion that the coherence rhetoric may outstrip resources, performance and legal 
provisions. Indeed, their call for the requirement of coherence to be toned down resonates 
against the background of the foregoing. This does not mean that there is nothing the Union can 
do to address some of the issues raised. For example, with specific regards to policy coherence 
for development, it may be that the Union need to more clearly express the distinction between 
its trade policy and development policy towards SSA, and in doing so state what it could or 
cannot do with regards to policy coherence for development. While such transparency could 
stoke a debate, it would at least mean that the Union is not setting itself up for failure by its own 
standard. With regards to the overall coherence of EU external action vis-a-vis synergy in the  
sequencing of available policy options, the Union would definitely need to raise and commit 
more resources. In doing this, it could also target the Member States without prior foreign policy 
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experience in SSA, with materials and programs aimed at creating awareness of the (potential) 
impact of the development and security problems in SSA on Europe and EU citizens.   
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Figure 1: The diagram below illustrates the four key policies of EU external action towards Sub-Sahara Africa and their key institutions  
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